Cognitive Deductive R

Similar documents
Can machines think? Machines, who think. Are we machines? If so, then machines can think too. We compute since 1651.

On Breaking the Spell of Irrationality (with treatment of Pascal s Wager) Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/27/17 version 2 RPI

Logic and Artificial Intelligence Lecture 26

Rationalism. A. He, like others at the time, was obsessed with questions of truth and doubt

A Model of Decidable Introspective Reasoning with Quantifying-In

On the hard problem of consciousness: Why is physics not enough?

15 Does God have a Nature?

General Introduction

Contra Darwin, Humans are Rational Animals, But Mere Animals are Not; and Darwin is Irrational in Thinking Otherwise

LTJ 27 2 [Start of recorded material] Interviewer: From the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. This is Glenn Fulcher with the very first

Here s a very dumbed down way to understand why Gödel is no threat at all to A.I..

From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction

OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 8

2.1 Review. 2.2 Inference and justifications

Causation and Free Will

Chapter 8 - Sentential Truth Tables and Argument Forms

ON CAUSAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE MODELLING OF BELIEF CHANGE

INF5020 Philosophy of Information: Ontology

ILLOCUTIONARY ORIGINS OF FAMILIAR LOGICAL OPERATORS

Understanding irrational numbers by means of their representation as non-repeating decimals

Introduction: Belief vs Degrees of Belief

Lecture 9. A summary of scientific methods Realism and Anti-realism

Circularity in ethotic structures

Defining Ontological Naturalism

Realism and instrumentalism

PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OVERVIEW LOGICAL CONSTANTS WEEK 5: MODEL-THEORETIC CONSEQUENCE JONNY MCINTOSH

A Scientific Model Explains Spirituality and Nonduality

Masters in Logic and Metaphysics

Negative Introspection Is Mysterious

Logic I or Moving in on the Monkey & Bananas Problem

Contradictory Information Can Be Better than Nothing The Example of the Two Firemen

ASPECTS OF PROOF IN MATHEMATICS RESEARCH

A New Parameter for Maintaining Consistency in an Agent's Knowledge Base Using Truth Maintenance System

1 Logical dynamics, agency, and intelligent interaction

6.080 / Great Ideas in Theoretical Computer Science Spring 2008

Computational Metaphysics

On David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind

1/10. The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism

INTERMEDIATE LOGIC Glossary of key terms

Chapter 1. Introduction. 1.1 Deductive and Plausible Reasoning Strong Syllogism

PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OVERVIEW FREGE JONNY MCINTOSH 1. FREGE'S CONCEPTION OF LOGIC

Reasoning and Decision-Making under Uncertainty

High Power Manifesting by Richard Lee McKim Jr.

Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less than Three Questions

Logic Appendix: More detailed instruction in deductive logic

Review of Philosophical Logic: An Introduction to Advanced Topics *

What is a counterexample?

Formalizing a Deductively Open Belief Space

ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 1.1 What is Logic? Arguments and Propositions

The Theoretical Model of GOD: Proof of the Existence and of the Uniqueness of GOD

The Extended Mind. But, what if the mind is like that? That is, what if the mind extends beyond the brain?

Artificial Intelligence: Valid Arguments and Proof Systems. Prof. Deepak Khemani. Department of Computer Science and Engineering

Study. In Wooldridge, M., and Jennings, N. R., eds., 890 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 71{85. Springer Verlag. appear.

1/12. The A Paralogisms

Intuitive evidence and formal evidence in proof-formation

subject are complex and somewhat conflicting. For details see Wang (1993).

P=NP Proved, Disproved, Varies Based on Problem or issue, and Indeterminate Based on Similarity between Checked and Find

spring 05 topics in philosophy of mind session 7

MISSOURI S FRAMEWORK FOR CURRICULAR DEVELOPMENT IN MATH TOPIC I: PROBLEM SOLVING

Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View

An Alternative View of Schizophrenic Cognition

Richard L. W. Clarke, Notes REASONING

Lecture 4. Before beginning the present lecture, I should give the solution to the homework problem

Pronominal, temporal and descriptive anaphora

REVIEW. Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Nass.: NIT Press, 1988.

Rosen, Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications, 6th edition Extra Examples

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC FOR METAPHYSICIANS

INQUIRY AS INQUIRY: A LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY

Logic and Pragmatics: linear logic for inferential practice

Craig on the Experience of Tense

THE STUDY OF UNKNOWN AND UNKNOWABILITY IN KANT S PHILOSOPHY

DOWNLOAD OR READ : THEO LOGIC VOL 3 THE SPIRIT OF TRUTH PDF EBOOK EPUB MOBI

By submitting this essay, I attest that it is my own work, completed in accordance with University regulations. Minh Alexander Nguyen

A s a contracts professional, from

Positive Philosophy, Freedom and Democracy. Roger Bishop Jones

1/9. The First Analogy

Positive Philosophy, Freedom and Democracy. Roger Bishop Jones

Ethical System Formalization using Non-Monotonic Logics

Final grades will be determined by 6 components: Midterm 20% Final 20% Problem Sets 20% Papers 20% Quizzes 10% Section 10%

Chapter 3: Basic Propositional Logic. Based on Harry Gensler s book For CS2209A/B By Dr. Charles Ling;

The Kripkenstein Paradox and the Private World. In his paper, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages, Kripke expands upon a conclusion

Coordination Problems

Logic for Computer Science - Week 1 Introduction to Informal Logic

Illustrating Deduction. A Didactic Sequence for Secondary School

On A New Cosmological Argument

Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism. BY TED POSTON (Basingstoke,

A Theory of Immediate Collective Liberation

Brief Remarks on Putnam and Realism in Mathematics * Charles Parsons. Hilary Putnam has through much of his philosophical life meditated on

Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? Joseph Barnes

(1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., 'the present King of France'.

First Truths. G. W. Leibniz

The Problem with Complete States: Freedom, Chance and the Luck Argument

A Riddle of Induction

Foundations of Non-Monotonic Reasoning

Department of Philosophy TCD. Great Philosophers. Dennett. Tom Farrell. Department of Surgical Anatomy RCSI Department of Clinical Medicine RCSI

Artificial Intelligence Prof. Deepak Khemani Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Ketland Neil Tennant

Circumscribing Inconsistency

JELIA Justification Logic. Sergei Artemov. The City University of New York

Lonergan on General Transcendent Knowledge. In General Transcendent Knowledge, Chapter 19 of Insight, Lonergan does several things:

Transcription:

Cognitive Deductive Shots @ R Are Humans Rational RPI Selmer Bringsjord 9.18.17

Floridi s Continuum, and Claims ( Consciousness, Agents, and the Knowledge Game Minds & Machines) False Belief Task Wise Man Test (n) Deafening Test Torture Boots Test Ultimate Sifter Cutting-Edge AI Yes Yes No No No Zombies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Human Persons (s-conscious! p-conscious!) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Cracking False-Belief Tasks...

In SL, w/ real-time comm w/ ATP

In SL, w/ real-time comm w/ ATP

SNARK-USER 14 > (in-immature-scenario (prove '(t-retrieve subject teddybear c) :answer '(looks-in c))) (Refutation (Row 1 (or (not (person x)) (not (object y)) (not (container z)) (not (in y z)) (bel-in x y z)) assertion) (Row 2 (or (not (person x)) (not (container y)) (not (object z)) (not (w-retrieve x z)) (not (bel-in x z y)) (t-retrieve x z y)) assertion) (Row 4 (person subject) assertion) (Row 6 (container c2) assertion) (Row 7 (object teddybear) assertion) (Row 8 (in teddybear c2) assertion) (Row 9 (w-retrieve subject teddybear) assertion) (Row 10 (not (t-retrieve subject teddybear x)) negated_conjecture Answer (looks-in x)) (Row 11 (or (not (person x)) (bel-in x teddybear c2)) (rewrite (resolve 1 8) 6 7)) (Row 25 (bel-in subject teddybear c2) (resolve 11 4)) (Row 28 (t-retrieve subject teddybear c2) (rewrite (resolve 2 25) 9 7 6 4)) (Row 30 false (resolve 10 28) Answer (looks-in c2))) :PROOF-FOUND SNARK-USER 15 > (answer t) (LOOKS-IN C2)

SNARK-USER 12 > (in-mature-scenario (prove '(t-retrieve subject teddybear c) :answer '(looks-in c))) (Refutation (Row 1 (or (not (person x)) (not (container y)) (not (object z)) (not (w-retrieve x z)) (not (bel-in x z y)) (t-retrieve x z y)) assertion) (Row 2 (or (not (person x)) (not (object y)) (not (container z)) (not (p-in x y z)) (bel-in x y z)) assertion) (Row 4 (person subject) assertion) (Row 5 (container c1) assertion) (Row 7 (object teddybear) assertion) (Row 8 (p-in subject teddybear c1) assertion) (Row 9 (w-retrieve subject teddybear) assertion) (Row 10 (not (t-retrieve subject teddybear x)) negated_conjecture Answer (looks-in x)) (Row 11 (bel-in subject teddybear c1) (rewrite (resolve 2 8) 5 7 4)) (Row 25 (t-retrieve subject teddybear c1) (rewrite (resolve 1 11) 9 7 5 4)) (Row 26 false (resolve 10 25) Answer (looks-in c1)) ) :PROOF-FOUND SNARK-USER 13 > (answer t) (LOOKS-IN C1)

The present account of the false belief transition is incomplete in important ways. After all, our agent had only to choose the best of two known models. This begs an understanding of the dynamics of rational revision near threshold and when the space of possible models is far larger. Further, a single formal model ought ultimately to be applicable to many false belief tasks, and to reasoning about mental states more generally. Several components seem necessary to extend a particular theory of mind into such a framework theory: a richer representation for the propositional content and attitudes in these tasks, extension of the implicit quantifier over trials to one over situations and people, and a broader view of the probability distributions relating mental state variables. Each of these is an important direction for future research. Intuitive Theories of Mind: A Rational Approach to False Belief Goodman et al.

The present account of the false belief transition is incomplete in important ways. After all, our agent had only to choose the best of two known models. This begs an understanding of the dynamics of rational revision near threshold and when the space of possible models is far larger. Further, a single formal model ought ultimately to be applicable to many false belief tasks, and to reasoning about mental states more generally. Several components seem necessary to extend a particular theory of mind into such a framework theory: a richer representation for the propositional content and attitudes in these tasks, extension of the implicit quantifier over trials to one over situations and people, and a broader view of the probability distributions relating mental state variables. Each of these is an important direction for future research. Intuitive Theories of Mind: A Rational Approach to False Belief Goodman et al.

Done. The present account of the false belief transition is incomplete in important ways. After all, our agent had only to choose the best of two known models. This begs an understanding of the dynamics of rational revision near threshold and when the space of possible models is far larger. Further, a single formal model ought ultimately to be applicable to many false belief tasks, and to reasoning about mental states more generally. Several components seem necessary to extend a particular theory of mind into such a framework theory: a richer representation for the propositional content and attitudes in these tasks, extension of the implicit quantifier over trials to one over situations and people, and a broader view of the probability distributions relating mental state variables. Each of these is an important direction for future research. Intuitive Theories of Mind: A Rational Approach to False Belief Goodman et al. Done.

Cracking Wise Man Tests...

Wise Men Puzzle

Wise Men Puzzle Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Wise Men Puzzle I don t know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Wise Men Puzzle I don t know I don t know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Wise Men Puzzle I don t know I don t know I DO know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Wise Men Puzzle I don t know I don t know I DO know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Wise Men Puzzle I don t know I don t know I DO know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Proof from WM3 Proposition: I have a white fez. Proof: Remember as a first fact that we all know that at least one of us has a white fez. When the first wise man says that he doesn't know, I immediately know that either WM2 has a white fez, or I do, or both of us does. I know this because if neither of us has a whilte fez, WM1 would have said immediately that in light of our first fact, he has a white fez. My next piece of info comes from what WM2 says; he says that he is also ignorant. Now, if he had seen no white fez on my head, he would have immediately said "I have a white fez!" (He would have said this because after WM1 spoke, he carried out the same reasoning I did, and hence ruled out the (WM2-bf & WM3-bf) permutation.) But this isn't what he said. Hence, I do have a white fez on my head. QED

Diagrammatic Version of Reasoning in WMP3 (pov of truly wise man; easy for rational humans)

All our humanauthored proofs machinechecked. Arkoudas-Proved-Sound Algorithm for Generating Proof-Theoretic Solution to WMPn

Life and Death Wise Man Test (3) * Again: Object-level reasoning, reasoning that produces object-level reasoning (e.g., methods), and direct, dirty, purely computational procedures.

Life and Death Wise Man Test (3) * Again: Object-level reasoning, reasoning that produces object-level reasoning (e.g., methods), and direct, dirty, purely computational procedures.

Now harder...

Floridi s Continuum, and Claims False Belief Task Wise Man Test (n) Deafening Test Torture Boots Test Ultimate Sifter Cutting-Edge AI Yes Yes No No No Zombies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Human Persons (s-conscious! p-conscious!) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Floridi s Continuum, and Claims False Belief Task Wise Man Test (n) Deafening Test Torture Boots Test Ultimate Sifter Cutting-Edge AI Yes Yes No No No Zombies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Human Persons (s-conscious! p-conscious!) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Floridi s Ultimate (s- and p- consciousness) Sifter Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

poison innocuous Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C Poison pill strikes the taker dumb.

Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Have you been struck dumb Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Have you been struck dumb Heaven knows! Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Two possibilities: Subsequent silence: failure/death. Or...

NO!! Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

Had I taken the dumbing tablet I would not have been able to report orally my state of ignorance about my dumb/non-dumb state, but I have been, and I know that I have been, as I have heard myself speaking and saw the guard reacting to my speaking, but this (my oral report) is possible only if I did not take the dumbing tablet, so I know I know I am in the non-dumb state, hence I know that... Luciano Floridi

h, i h, argument/proof i h Contrarian view on animal minds in Nat. Geo.: http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2008/03/animal-minds/virginia-morell-text

h, i h, argument/proof i h Contrarian view on animal minds in Nat. Geo.: http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2008/03/animal-minds/virginia-morell-text

http://kryten.mm.rpi.edu/sbringsjord_etal_self-con_robots_kg4_0601151615ny.pdf https://www.youtube.com/watchv=mcejyhvd_xy

Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

So, there s work to be done... but despite the fact we can t build rational persons, we can build AIs that pass any short test. That s why Blade Runner (& Ex Machina) is our future. Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C

So, there s work to be done... but despite the fact we can t build rational persons, we can build AIs that pass any short test. That s why Blade Runner (& Ex Machina) is our future. Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C