Forum: Issue: Student Officer: Position: African Union Combatting the rapid advance of al-shabaab in the Horn of Africa and the presence of al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel region Beverly Rose Lobo President Introduction In January 2013 the United States claimed that their counter-terrorism strategy had succeeded in eliminating the al-qaeda s core leadership, however a much more complex problem was on the horizonthe emergence of al-qaeda affiliates in the African continent. Political instability and economic distress have created a worrisome inlet for terrorist organisations in the continent, particularly in the Sahel, West Africa and Horn of Africa. The issue began to escalate in 2006 when the al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) officially announced its affiliation to al-qaeda. The AQIM, declared a terrorist organization by both the United Nations and the African Union, had its roots in the Algerian civil war of the 1990s and aligned with the al- Qaeda in the early 2000s to improve recruiting and to maintain a high profile. Today it has grown into a US designated foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) that operates in the Sahara and Sahel region of North Western Africa with regional ambitions. AQIM's objectives include getting rid of Western influences, overthrowing governments including those of Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia and installing fundamentalist regimes based on sharia law. The al-shabaab, another United Nations and African Union labeled terrorist organization, became affiliated to the al-qaeda in 2012. It currently has an operational reach throughout the Horn of Africa. The al-shabaab or the Youth, also known as Harakat al-shabaab al-mujahideen are fighting primarily to establish an Islamic State in Somalia. The group once controlled Mogadishu and major parts of the Somalian countryside. However efforts by the AMISOM troops have managed to considerably weaken the group and destroy many of their strongholds. In June 2012 the head of the US Africa Command, Gen. Carter Ham, confirmed that Boko Haram, al-shabaab and AQIM were coordinating and synchronising their efforts to overthrow national Research Report Page 1 of 18
governments and to establish in areas under their control oppressive sharia law. 1 This complex and penetrating network of terrorist outfits poses a threat to national governments and the social, economic and political stability of the continent. Apart from the obvious financial and personnel gaps of both African Union and United Nations bodies in the region, sovereignty issues are also becoming an increasing part of the conflict due to an increased consideration of foreign intervention. Although military solutions being pursued by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) troops in the region have managed to push back the terrorist organisations and recapture strongholds, regional stability and a final resolution to the conflict may only be reached by multi-dimensional solutions that tackle deeply rooted social and economic issues and ensure that terrorist organisations do not resurge. Definition of Key Terms Maghreb 2 A region of northwest Africa comprising of the coastlands and the Atlas Mountains of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and sometimes Libya. Sharia Law 3 Islamic laws based on the Quran that govern how a nation-state should be run. Sahel 4 The Sahel region covers parts of (from west to east) Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, northern Burkina Faso, extreme south of Algeria, Niger, extreme north of Nigeria, central Chad, central and southern Sudan, and northern Eritrea. Horn of Africa 5 The area is the easternmost projection of the African continent and refers to the region containing the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. 1 "LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Aqim, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 25 Apr. 2012. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htm> 2 Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com, n.d. Web. 07 July 2015. 3 "Sharia Law." SHARIA LAW. N.p., n.d. Web. 07 July 2015. <http://www.billionbibles.org/sharia/sharialaw.html> 4 "Sahel Region, Africa." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d. Web. 07 July 2015. <http://www.britannica.com/place/sahel> 5 "Horn of Africa Region, Eastern Africa." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d. Web. 07 July 2015. <http://www.britannica.com/place/horn-of-africa> Page 2 of 18 Research Report
Kidnapping for ransom (KFR) 6 A common method used by terrorist organisations wherein foreign aid workers, media persons and tourists are kidnapped and held hostage with the sole aim of receiving a ransom for these hostages which can be used to fund their terrorist activities. In certain cases instead of a monetary ransom a prisoner swap is demanded instead. Background Information Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the Sahel region The al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb became affiliated to the al-qaeda only in 2006 but its origin date way back into the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. The Islamist resistance group was originally part of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) but eventually declared its independence in 1998 out of concerns that GIA s violent methods were hurting the Islamist cause. Once separated from GIA, the group was called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and was popular for its commitment to fighting the Algerian government while simultaneously working to prevent indiscriminate killing of civilians in the process. In 2003 the group pledged support to the al-qaeda and when this was accepted in 2006 the group renamed themselves as the al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM initially pursued a targeted suicide bombing campaign in Algeria, according to the Long War Journal. However, by 2008 these attacks tapered off and were replaced with ambushes against security forces and kidnapping operations the latter of which provides millions of dollars in financing for its operations. In fact it is claimed that the AQIM is the wealthiest al-qaeda affiliate today. However since 2010, the group has failed to conduct the high-casualty attacks in Algeria that it had in previous years. Multinational counterterrorism efforts, including a joint French-Mauritanian raid in July 2010 against an AQIM camp, resulted in the death of AQIM members and a temporary disruption of their operations 7 AQIM reportedly maintains mobile training camps along the Algeria-Mali border and has taken advantage of the porous borders of the Sahel region in order to move people and supplies. There are increasing concerns of weapons smuggling between Libya and the AQIM. Currently, apart from its aims to force sharia law in the Sahel region, it has also declared a terrorist agenda against France and Spain due to their belief that these nations are responsible for the Westernisation of the region. The major threat posed by the AQIM today is the possibility of a spillover into continental Europe and the illicit activities it carries out to finance itself. Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa 6 "Kidnapping for Ransom: Everyman s Organized Crime." The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime. N.p., n.d. Web. 07 July 2015. <http://www.globalinitiative.net/kidnappingdec13/> 7 Research Report Page 3 of 18
A band of Somali extremists, including many current al-shabaab commanders, formed the al Ittihad al Islamiyya (AIAI) that sought to establish an Islamist emirate in Somalia with the help of funding and weapons from al-qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. The militant activities of the AIAI peaked in the Somalian Civil War from 1969-1991. In 2003, a rift developed between AIAI's more moderate old guard, and younger members. The al-shabaab and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) became two factions of the AIAI and wrested control of the capital in June 2006, a victory that stoked fears of spillover jihadist violence in neighboring Ethiopia, a majority Christian nation. Today however the al-shabaab however is not monolithic, with various factions within and its intent shift from expelling AMISOM forces and the existing government from Somalia and pursuing a transnational terrorist agenda. The group threatens various neighbouring African countries and Western interests in Africa. The organisation carried out its first terrorist bombing outside Somalia in June 2010 in the Ugandan capital of Kampala. Ever since it has been conducting terror strikes throughout the horn of Africa. Somalia has not had an effective national government for more than 20 years, during which much of the country has been a war-zone. Al-Shabaab gained support by promising people security. But its credibility was knocked when it rejected Western food aid to combat a 2011 drought and famine. However, al-shabaab continues to stage periodic attacks in both Somalia and neighbouring countries. In areas it controls, al-shabaab enforces its own harsh interpretation of sharia, prohibiting various types of entertainment, such as movies and music, the sale of khat (a narcotic plant often chewed), smoking, the shaving of beards, and many other un-islamic activities. Stonings and amputations have been meted out as punishment on suspected adulterers and thieves. 8 Counterterrorism experts say al-shabaab has benefited from several different sources of income over the years, including revenue from other terrorist groups, state sponsors, the Somali diaspora, charities, piracy, kidnapping, and the extortion of local businesses. The governments of Eritrea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, and Yemen have all been accused as financiers. Currently United States African Command (AFRICOM) and AMISOM efforts are destroying al- Shabaab strongholds in Somalia and the surrounding region. However due to the support of local clans and civilian sympathisers the group remains one of the largest threats to security in the African continent. Major Countries and Organisations Involved Somalia 8 Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, n.d. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650>. Page 4 of 18 Research Report
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), supported and recognized by the USA and the UN, currently faces the biggest threat from Islamist militant group al-shabaab. The government of Somalia first requested international help from Ethiopia in 2006 to remove the ICU and al-shabaab from power in Mogadishu. Today the FGS cooperates widely with AMISOM troops, Ethiopian troops and UNSOM advisers to carry out anti-terrorist operations and to create a more resilient political structure in the nation. Although bombings and attacks by the al-shabaab are still widespread across the country, and even in the capital of Mogadishu, the Somalian National Army along with support from the AMISOM has managed to reclaim much of its territory and has even managed to expel the al-shabaab from several strongholds especially in Mogadishu. However there have been several reports of al-shabaab infiltration in the government and accusations of corruption. Recently the President of Somalia has welcomed defectors of the al-shabaab back into Somalian society. Although the government does have strict policies in determining the willingness of the defectors into Somalian society, they are using these defectors to gather intelligence about the militant group and to carry out a propaganda war against them. Algeria After a violent and costly war of independence from France between 1954-1962, Algeria was embroiled in a power struggle during which several armed insurgent groups came to power. When the AQIM became affiliated with the al-qaeda in 2006, the Algeria began to face regular violence and terrorist activities from the group. Car bombings outside Algerian police stations and other centers of civilian and government importance became a regular occurrence disrupting the peace and security of Algerian. The AQIM s focus on foreign interests and the energy sector was seen in several other attacks and attempted attacks against foreign oil workers and pipelines in late 2006 and early 2007, which caused temporary disruptions in the Algerian energy sector. The group's increased operational tempo and less discriminate target selection came with consequences caused the Algerian government to launch a massive operation against them in mid- 2007. These operations caused large losses in men and material for the AQIM helping the government drive the militant out of main land Algeria into surrounding mountains and into other countries. The operation also created a growing schism between members of the group s leadership. UNSOM The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is a mandate established by the United Nations Security Council, acting on recommendations of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, on 3 rd June 2013 that works with the Federal Government of Somalia to aid their priorities for the 2013-2016 (interim) period. This strategic policy advice includes national reconciliation, consolidating stability in Somalia, and enhancing relations with the international community. Research Report Page 5 of 18
The unanimous decision to adopt the mandate of the UNSOM on May 2, 2013 was intended for an initial period of 12 months following which it would be renewed as appropriate. The mandate would advice the federal government of Somalia on peace building and statebuilding in the areas of: governance, rule of law and security, development of a political process as well as preparations for the 2016 elections and coordination of international donor support. The UNSOM also works towards promoting human rights, preventing sexual and gender-based violence as well as strengthening justice institutions. It also investigates and reports to the UNSC any human rights violations conducted in Somalia or any abuse towards woman and children. AMISOM The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and create necessary conditions for the reconstruction and sustainable development of Somalia. Created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council with the approval of the UN on 19 January 2007, the AMISOM had an initial mandate of 6 months. It is mandated to help implement a national security plan, train Somali forces as well as provide aid to transitional governmental establishments. The maximum allowed strength of the mandate is 22,126 troops. The AMISOM won a decisive victory in cleaning out the al-shabaab from strongholds in Mogadishu and in recent times have forced the al-shabaab members to defect or go into hiding, vastly decreasing the strength of terrorist group. In August 2014, the government of Somalia, and the Somalian National Army with the assistance of AMISOM, launched Operation Indian Ocean to cleanup the remaining al-shabaab-held pockets in the countryside. However the AMISOM suffers from a major lack of personnel with the just around 18000 soldiers currently, a much lower number than their stipulated operational capacity. MINUSMA Established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was created to aid the federal systems in Mali as well as undertake several tasks related to its security. The Mission was asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap. In December 2012, the UN Security Council authorized a military peacekeeping by the MINUSMA for which the regional coalition, Economic Community of West African States, pledged thousands of troops. Although the MINUSMA operations have forced AQIM fighters to retreat from major towns, they still carry out sporadic attack against MINUSMA troops. On 25 June 2014, the Security Council unanimously decided to adopt resolution 2164 that enables the Mission to focus further on duties such as protection, security and stability for citizens, redevelopment of security processes, promoting national political reconciliation, assisting reestablishment of state authority and dialogue and safeguarding human rights in Mali. Page 6 of 18 Research Report
A list of other important Nations: Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Chad Sudan Eritrea Ethiopia United States of America France Spain Timeline of Events Date Events relating to the al-shabaab 1991 AI-Itihaad al-islamiya (AIAI), which the U.S. State Department designated as a terrorist group, strengthens after the fall of Siad Barre's military regime and during the years of lawlessness that ensue 2003 A rift erupts between AIAI's old guard, which is seeking to, establish a new political front and its younger members, who want to impose fundamental Islamic rule. (al- Shabaab means "the youth.") May 7, 2006- October 1, 2006 Working together, the Islamic Courts Union and al-shabaab gain control of most of North and East Mogadishu but fail to topple the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) December 20, 2006 January 30, 2009 The fears that violence will spill over to neighbouring Ethiopia combined with a request from Somalia s transitional government led Ethiopian and AMISOM forces to enter Somalia to remove the ICU from power Research Report Page 7 of 18
July 11, 2010 Al-Shabaab claims responsibility for the July 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, that killed more than 70 people, including a U.S. citizen, who had gathered at different locations to watch the broadcast of the World Cup final soccer match. February 9, 2012 Al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and al-qaeda leader Ayman al-zawahiri release a video announcing the alliance of the two organisations. Date Events relating to the AQIM 1990 A guerrilla, Islamist movement calling itself the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is formed in opposition to Algeria s secular leadership January 1992 The Islamist insurgent factions begin begin violence against the government after the French- backed Algerian military cancels the 2 nd round of parliamentary elections, which the Islamic front claimed they were poised to win. September 11, 2006 A faction of the GIA declares allegiance and affiliation to the al-qaeda and is renamed as the al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) April 11, 2007 The AQIM simultaneously bombs the Regional UN headquarters and the Algerian Constitutional Court, killing 33 people 2003-2011 AQIM members join the ranks of the insurgents in Iraq in the war against the United States of America 2012 AQIM begins to coordinate with other terrorist groups in the region including Nigeria s Boko Haram, Somalia s al-shabad, and Yemen s AQAP with arms and funds flowing across these groups May 2014 The AQIM claims responsibility for the killing of 4 policemen outside the home of Tunisian Internal Minister Relevant UN and AU Treaties and Events Treaties and Events relating to the al-shabaab Piracy in Somalia, Security Council, 12 November 2014 S/RES/2184 Page 8 of 18 Research Report
Extending the Mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia for One Year, Amending Sanctions Regime, Security Council, 24 October 2014 S/RES/2182 9 In 2013 the Security Council decided to establish, in accordance with the recommendation of the Secretary-General S/RES/2102, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to advise the Somalian government on issues ranging from the political process to peace and security. 10 Apart from the Security Council, other UN bodies, including the GA and HRC, have passed resolutions on issues relating to the al-shabaab and their activities. The Secretary General of the United Nations also provides reports to the Security Council primarily regarding human rights violations, piracy and instability in Somalia cause by the al- Shabaab 11 The African Union Mission in Somalia was created by the African Union s Peace and Security Council on 21st February 2007 and its mandate was approved by the UNSC to help in military training, government structuring and providing humanitarian aid to the Somalian government and people. 12 Treaties and Events relating to the AQIM Extending Mandate of Multidimensional Mission in Mali until 30 June 2016, Adding Military Observers to Monitor Ceasefire, 29 June 2015 S/RES/2227 13 The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. The mission aims to support the political process and carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks, with a focus on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return 9 "Security Council, SC, UNSC, Security, Peace, Sanctions, Veto, Resolution, President, United Nations, UN, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution, Prevention." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 05 July 2015. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2014.shtml>. 10 "ABOUT US." United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. N.p., n.d. Web. 05 July 2015. <https://unsom.unmissions.org/#>. 11 "UN Documents for Somalia." UN Documents for Somalia. N.p., n.d. Web. 05 July 2015. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/>. 12 "AMISOM MandateMandat De L'AMISOMWaajibaadka AMISOM - AMISOM." AMISOM. N.p., n.d. Web. 05 July 2015. <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>. 13 "Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2227 (2015), Extends Mandate of Multidimensional Mission in Mali until 30 June 2016, Adding Military Observers to Monitor Ceasefire Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11950.doc.htm>. Research Report Page 9 of 18
of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections. African Union Peace and Security Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, 2 September 2014 14 Previous Attempts to Resolve the Situation AQIM Military Operations Currently Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania cooperate to share information on the issue and effectively combat terrorism in the region with relative success in reducing the number of AQIM members currently active in the region. While Algiers has abjured a direct counterterrorism role for Western powers namely, the United States and France, it has welcomed indirect support. The Algerian government individually has successfully reduced the number of AQIM members from 30,000 to fewer than 1,000 in the present day, a development possible due to the vast amount of resources and personnel that the Algerian government is dedicating to anti-terrorism operations. However a major issue that arises out of the Algerian approach to dealing with the situation is the retreat of the terrorists from the mainland to safe-havens and caves and across the porous international borders into other nations. This spillover of AQIM fighters into neighboring countries led to a rebellion in Mali in early 2012. Although the UNSC sanctioned the creation of MINUSMA to combat the regional threat, the Malian government invited French forces to intervene directly. French forces retook Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, pushing AQIM militants northward into the mountains. While the combined French/Malian force was successful in recapturing the lost territory, violence continues and lasting peace has not been achieved. Therefore although the AQIM is no longer dominant in Mali, continued instability in the country has allowed the group to retrench and expand in some areas. Furthermore, the intervention of French troops in the region has led to a development in the aims of the AQIM that now include a vendetta against France and French nationals which manifests in the form of KFRs and attacks on French troops. Attempts at blocking funding The United Nations has become increasingly concerned with the funding of terrorist organisations, especially those affiliated with the al-qaeda. Apart from closely monitoring borders and transport routes, the UN closely monitors the purchase and transport of sophisticated weapons. Moreover, the United Nations Security Council has established the Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee and has also deployed economic sanctions, such as travel ban, weapons embargo and assets freeze. However, these actions 14 "Peace and Security Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, Kenya African Union." African Union. N.p., n.d. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://au.int/en/content/peace-andsecurity-council-455th-meeting-level-heads-state-and-government-nairobi-kenya>. Page 10 of 18 Research Report
have not seen any significant fruition since the AQIM continue to receive income from illicit drug smuggling, KFRs and the al-qaeda. Al-Shabaab Operation Restore Hope In the optimistic aftermath of the Cold War, the Security Council authorized many more peacekeeping missions including the United States of America led mission in Somalia (UNOSOM). When UNOSOM arrived in Somalia in December 1992, the peacekeeping soldiers were charged with providing humanitarian relief for Somalia s starving population, disarming the fighting sides, and forming a stable central government based on the Western model. The UN s steps met with dogged resistance on the part of traditional powerbrokers and entities with political interests in Somalia, and the UN s humanitarian mission rapidly deteriorated into a violent confrontation with local militias, particularly with the forces of General Aidid, which inflicted heavy casualties on the UN forces. 15 In June 1993, Aidid s forces ambushed and massacred 24 Pakistani peacekeepers. This incident constituted a turning point in UNOSOM s effectiveness and relationship with the Somali people. UNOSOM became closely identified with revenge in the minds of many Somalis, and the perceived anti-aidid bias of UN peacekeepers, including the 20,000+ United States marines and soldiers in Somalia, despoiled the previous goodwill that had existed between Somalis and UNOSOM. In October 1993, United States forces conducted a raid aimed at capturing two of Aidid s most trusted lieutenants but one that ended with them being ambushed by well-armed Somali and Islamic militant fighters. While the United States apprehended the militants, the lasting images of 2 Black Hawk helicopters being shot down and a United States soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu provoked the withdrawal of all US troops from Somalia within months. The UNOSOM mission ended without restoring political stability or ending the widespread violence in Somalia. Following the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia in 1994, the civil war continued and UN efforts to achieve a ceasefire and reconstruct the country s political system were temporarily put on hold. 16 Humanitarian Relief Attempts After the failure and withdrawal of the UNOSOM in the mid-1990s, severe drought and continued conflict have led to the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somali nationals and refugees. The refugee crisis has severaly escalated with 678,000 Somalis under the responsibility of UNHCR and still more displaced and without aid. The United Nations Mission in Somalia has become become the third largest refugee operation, just behind war ravaged Afghanistan and Iraq. However even as the UN and international benefactors and governments respond to the evergrowing crisis to the growing humanitarian crisis in Somalia, efforts continually suffer setbacks sue to 15 5 Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle 2007 p. 71. 16 5 Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle 2007 p. 86. Research Report Page 11 of 18
factional political fighting, attacks against aid workers and attempts by the al-shabaab, in areas controlled by them, to block all Western aid. The effects of this crisis continue to severely complicate political and indigenous matters within Somalia ever since. Key Issues The first and most obvious step towards developing encompassing and lasting solutions is to understand the key problem areas in this situation and consider the challenges that existing attempts at conflict resolution have encountered. Some, but not all of which are: The spreading of the terrorist network and the increase in the militant activities of the AQIM and the al-shabaab to larger regions of continental Africa is putting a strain on regional stability. The proper nature of trans-national borders in the continent make it both convenient and conducive for these organisations to expand their activities. Considering the case of the al-shabaab, it is evident that these terrorist outfits have begun to expand the international aspirations. Apart from their ongoing offensives in Somalia the group has also begun militant activity in Kenya and Ethiopia. Similarly, the AQIM has about one thousand members in Algeria and smaller numbers in the Sahel region, which includes areas in Chad, Mali, and Mauritania. It has now begun to set up cells in Libya, Nigeria, and Tunisia. The merging of both groups with the al-qaeda giving them increased credence among jihadist organisations around the world. This helps both groups not only to receive funding and tactical assistance from other terrorist outfits but also to recruit radicalised youth to their cause. The integration of both groups into African society providing them protection, financing and also an opportunity to radicalise the youth. In many regions of West Africa and in Somalia a clan social structure still persists. In this deeply rooted tradition it is easy for these extremist organisations to assimilate and cement themselves into the social fabric. By earning the loyalty of the clan leaders or through familial connections with the clans, members of these organisations can ensure the loyalty of these clans. This means that it is becoming increasingly hard to identify and remove these extremists from society as well as to stop them from growing in strength and numbers The illicit activities that fund these organisations including smuggling, trafficking of arms and humans, kidnapping for ransom (KFR) and state sponsors. The AQIM and al-shabaab have become increasingly worrisome because of the practice of these groups to take foreign journalists and tourists as hostages. These hostages are used as leverage for ransoms and for prisoner exchanges, thus making even humanitarian aid work in the region difficult. Page 12 of 18 Research Report
Atrocities committed by these groups against civilians. 17 One of the primary reasons for outrage against both the al-shabaab and the AQIM is their brutal treatment of civilian populations. Apart from arbitrary executions and violent public beatings, these organisations also punish civilians whom they accuse as being guilty of espionage and federal government sympathisers. Their interpretation and imposition of sharia law often results in violence against civilians and especially women. The increasing pirate activity in the Horn of Africa due to al-shabaab activities and the radicalisation of poor seamen in Somalia. Possible Solutions As would be obvious to most delegates the primary solution to these organisations and their activities is to a) ensure that they do not expand in number and reach and b) to uproot them from the social fabric. However considering the complexity of their network and operations this is easier said than done. Perhaps the most obvious means to get rid of these organisations is by a direct military confrontation, a measure that is already being taken. AMISOM troops in Somalia composed of AU forces whose role has shifted from peacekeeping to peace enforcing. This measure has managed to push the al-shabaab out of several strongholds, including the capital Mogadishu, and keep them on the run. However current armed opposition against these groups is crippled by lack of funds and personnel. Sustaining such an effort requires a massive amount of capital that current African Union troops currently lack. A possible solution to this barrier that has been considered is foreign intervention. Foreign intervention, coordinated by the international community, would have the benefit of better funding and more personnel from intervening nations. However it is important to remember that these interventions must be mandated legally by the UN and must follow Responsibility to protect guidelines, thus ensuring that they do not breach the sovereignty of free African nations. However it is important to consider whether the African nations where these interventions may take place would be receptive of a move that they may also consider a breach of their sovereignty. Additionally considering the track record of foreign intervention in nations with insurgents and terrorists, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the outcome of such an intervention is questionable. It is important to consider whether foreign military intervention will eradicate the extremists and create stability or just plunge the region into further crisis and insecurity. 17 "Violence against Civilians and Al Shabaab: Tactics of Internal Security and Distabilisation." Acleddata Crisis. N.p., n.d. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/violence-against-civilians-and-alshabaab-tactics-of-internal-security-and-distabilisation/>. Research Report Page 13 of 18
Perhaps, even if the foreign intervention does succeed in destroying and eradicating militants it may not be a constructive solution to de-radicalising society. Apart from pursuing the militants it is important to ensure that these militants do not make Northern Malian caves and the terrain of the Sahel region into safe-havens. Although this may seem like an extremely challenging pursuit, it is essential that these safe-havens be eliminated to ensure that guerrilla attacks on AU and UN troops do not persist and that once pushed out of strongholds the militants do not retreat into these safe-havens to regroup. This could be achieved only with a significantly larger number of troops in the region with the ability to maintain surveillance and counter-terrorism offences in the remote regions of the continent. These troops though will need to be specially trained for combat and operations in such regions to prevent them from being incompetent in these terrorist sanctuaries. Currently border security in Africa is a major concern and it is essential that this be dealt with in order to prevent smuggling of drugs, conflict minerals and weapons which funds the extremist organisations. If border security is tightened al-shabaab and AQIM would not be able to maintain crosscontinental exchanges with each other and the network between terrorist organisations would be broken. Although security personnel in the region have already begun to tighten border security it is important to remember that high-levels of corruption in local administration and the possibility that many of these personnel are in fact working in tandem with these terrorist groups may make this attempt futile. It is important therefore that the UNSOM, AMISOM, MINUSMA and international community in general continue to aid and support these efforts to strengthen border security. It is important also to introduce safeguards that reduce the capture of foreign hostages by the terrorist organisations (KFR). These kidnapped individuals are used as leverage and to extort ransoms from foreign governments. To facilitate this national governments may have to set up security corps to protect aid workers in the region. However with already dwindling personnel in government security ensuring that these foreigners are protected is a major concern. Letting this issue remain however may in the long term mean that humanitarian and food aid are denied to thousands of innocent civilians in the region. Placing and strengthening travel regulations for foreigners to countries affected by these terrorist groups would help ensure that these terrorists are not presented with soft targets easily. This would not only mean that the occurrence of KFR would decrease but also so would terrorist funding by these activities. Furthermore aid workers and humanitarian workers must be provided with security details to ensure that they do not remain soft targets and continue to carry out their relief work in the continent without the fear of being kidnapped. Considering that many measures have already been taken in the continent to combat these terrorist organisations, delegates will have to come up with creative and constructive solutions in order to truly implement measures that will have a lasting, positive impact. Page 14 of 18 Research Report
Bibliography "ABOUT US." United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. N.p., n.d. Web. 05 July 2015. <https://unsom.unmissions.org/#>. "Africa, the New Outpost of Terrorism." - RT Op-Edge. N.p., n.d. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://rt.com/opedge/180996-africa-outpost-islamic-terrorism/>. "Al-Shabaab Terror Attacks Raise Extremist Threat in East Africa, Experts Warn." FOX News. N.p., n.d. Web. <http%3a%2f%2fwww.foxnews.com%2fworld%2f2015%2f04%2f07%2fal-shabaabterror-attacks-raise-extremist-threat-in-east-africa%2f>. "AMISOM MandateMandat De L'AMISOMWaajibaadka AMISOM - AMISOM." AMISOM. N.p., n.d. Web. 05 July 2015. <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>. Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, n.d. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650>. "LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Aqim, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 25 Apr. 2012. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htm>. "Peace and Security Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, Kenya African Union." African Union. N.p., n.d. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://au.int/en/content/peace-and-security-council-455th-meeting-level-heads-state-andgovernment-nairobi-kenya>. "Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2227 (2015), Extends Mandate of Multidimensional Mission in Mali until 30 June 2016, Adding Military Observers to Monitor Ceasefire Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11950.doc.htm>. "Security Council, SC, UNSC, Security, Peace, Sanctions, Veto, Resolution, President, United Nations, UN, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution, Prevention." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 05 July 2015. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2014.shtml>. Research Report Page 15 of 18
"Security Threats in the Sahel and Beyond: AQIM, Boko Haram and Al Shabaa." (n.d.): n. pag. Http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3818.pdf. Web. "UN Documents for Somalia." UN Documents for Somalia. N.p., n.d. Web. 05 July 2015. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/>. "Violence against Civilians and Al Shabaab: Tactics of Internal Security and Distabilisation." Acleddata Crisis. N.p., n.d. Web. 06 July 2015. <http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/violence-againstcivilians-and-al-shabaab-tactics-of-internal-security-and-distabilisation/>. Appendices I. Maps of the Regions under Question Figure 1 Map of the Maghreb Region Page 16 of 18 Research Report
Figure 2 Map of the Sahel Region Figure 3 Map of the Horn of Africa Region Research Report Page 17 of 18
II. Useful Links http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-threat-of-the-unholy-trinity http://rt.com/op-edge/180996-africa-outpost-islamic-terrorism/ http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/02/26/somalias-sullied-security/ For a full list of UN resolutions, reports and other documents on the al-shabaab: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/ A comprehensive guide to jihadist groups across the world: http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups.html As a ready-reckoner on the al-shabaab: http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650 As a ready reckoner on the AQIM: http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaedaislamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717 An interesting read on conflict, peace and security in the Horn of Africa: http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31709/1/monograph178.pdf?1 For an insight into the aims of the AQIM: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqim s-objectives-in-northafrica For a comprehensive overview of the organisational structure of the AQIM: http://www.slideshare.net/criticalthreats/aqim-leaders-and-their-networks Page 18 of 18 Research Report