Building the Panopticon: Ideology, Discourse, and Rhetorical Method in the Presentation of Socialist Construction

Building the Panopticon: Ideology, Discourse, and Rhetorical Method in the Presentation of Socialist Construction We are going full steam ahead along the road of industrialization to socialism, leaving behind our century old Russian backwardness. We are becoming a metallic country, an automotive country, a tractor country. When we have put the USSR in an automobile, and the muzhik on a tractor, then let the esteemed capitalist, preening themselves with their civilization try to overtake us. We will see then which countries can be classified as backward and which as advanced. J.V. Stalin, November 7, 1929 Michael D. Breger, University of Virginia Breger 1

Introduction Advised by Professor Jeffrey Rossman 10 December 2014 The political achievement of Stalin is astounding. Coming from humble origins in Georgia, Stalin rose from obscurity to become the undisputed ruler of the largest country on the earth, and was largely responsible for the transformation of Soviet society on a massive scale. The socialism built by Stalin s five year plans and collectivization represented the climax of the Soviet experiment. This vision of a modernized Soviet future reflected the culmination of the Bolshevik efforts after 1917, and formed the basic institutions of the Soviet Union that would remain in place until its collapse in 1991. If Lenin s war communism constituted a rough rendering of the future order of the Soviet Union, Stalin s socialist construction painted the rest of the picture in with forceful brush strokes, a Soviet constructivist art piece, politicized and impersonal. The process was a bleak and comfortless approach to building a nation. Stalin used the concept of socialism in one country to solidify an ideological framework that would support his attempt at socialist construction by way of the first five year plan and collectivization, which were attempts to rapidly increase the industrial and agricultural capacity of the Soviet Union at any cost. He was largely able to accomplish these policy directives because of their perceived legitimacy within the party and Soviet society. In presenting these conceptual and practical policy objectives, Stalin deftly manipulated Marxist Leninist ideology, and legitimized both his position and that of the party through a unique rhetorical method. This paper will investigate how Stalin justified the policies of socialism in one country, The First Five Year Plan, and collectivization, and will attempt to define and contextualize four Breger 2

broad interpretive strands of Stalin s distinct rhetorical method and discursive style. Stalin worked as a maker of arguments by doing the following: Stalin was committed to the doctrine of Marx and Engels, but often cited a fragmentary strain of the broader theory, called Marxism Leninism, which would become the foundation of the Soviet political and social ideology. Stalin would frame many of his policy undertakings within the context of Marxism Leninism, which was ultimately a deviation from Marx s original theories. In his published works, Stalin makes repeated use of lengthy excerpts from Lenin s political philosophy, both pre and post revolutionary. Seeing as Lenin put forth a significant amount of the political philosophy that Stalin considered to be tailored to best suit his rhetorical needs, it makes sense that Marxism Leninism was understood to be a single coherent philosophy. Lenin s anti democratic sentiments, especially prevalent in his address to the 10 th Party Congress On Party Unity where he announced a ban on factions and On 1 Anarcho Syndicalist Deviation, privileged the public unity of the party. Lenin s insistence on party unity furnished Stalin with tools to craft his ideological justification, especially within the context of an unclear succession struggle following Lenin s death. Any disagreement within the party could be framed as factionalism. Deviation from the party and the cult of Lenin would be deemed treasonous. Another rhetorical method that Stalin relies on are his references to heroic periods of struggle, most notably the Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War. He further developed this 1 Joseph Stalin and H. Bruce Franklin, The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings, 1905-52 (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972) Print. Breger 3

concept by portraying socialism in one country, the first five year plan, and collectivization as the continuation of these memorable episodes. He employed heroic memory to construct an us vs. them mentality, as he presents domestic socialist construction within the context of a greater crisis of capitalist encirclement. Stalin s language of crisis and revolution is especially powerful in arousing the emotion of his populace, especially in the years following the Civil War. Stalin needed a means to present himself as the legitimate heir of the revolution and thereby make his early involvement with the Bolshevik party relevant in the succession struggle following Lenin s death. His assiduous cultivation of Bolshevism s heroic traditions largely allowed him to do so. Operating in a golden age of Bolshevik political debate, Stalin marginalized his opponents by critiquing their arguments and distorting them to serve as a counter point to the Marxist Leninist philosophy espoused by the party. In so doing, Stalin portrayed any contemporary domestic opposition as extremist and insufficiently Leninist. Stalin was able to vilify his opponents by first citing a specific excerpt from their theoretical writings, and then differentiating it from the contemporary party line ideology. Stalin concurrently deified Lenin and controlled his legacy, which awarded him with increased political and social authority. In presenting his opponents as non Marxist, non Bolshevik, or more broadly counter revolutionary, Stalin was able to immediately marginalize them. Stalin often held the ideological middle ground, and played different political actors against each other, often presenting his own views as right or left of whichever party official s platform he was attempting to deprecate. Being ostracized from the party was an especially dangerous state of affairs in Stalin s USSR. Breger 4

Stalin presented his policies as a necessary and obligatory reaction to a national existential threat, always marked by a sense of urgency. He frames directives as reactionary to a current problem or enemy. Instead of focusing on inevitable utopia, Stalin largely deals with immediate crisis and threat as a means of mobilizing population. He introduced grandiose policies as a form of revolutionary growth, which added to the popular sentiment of achieving the impossible, a notion that served as an important motivator in the 1917 revolution and reinforced the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War. This exhortatory rhetorical style is reflective of Stalin s proper political consciousness, using crisis as an opportunity to present his favored policy directives in an optimistic manner. Studying Stalinism presents any historian with a particular set of challenges. Many of the sources are obscure, and their quality and plausibility is often hard to determine. As such, a majority of the sources referenced in this investigation come directly from Stalin s writings and orations. Socialism in One Country Socialism in one country represented in part, a crisis of the succession struggle, and a dialogue taking place within the emerging party state apparatus. It is unclear whether the concept of socialism in one country was a legitimate aim of Stalin s, or a valuable opportunity for the practical politician to distance himself from Trotsky, the Bonaparte of the revolution, who believed that international socialism was ultimately necessary for the Soviet Union to reach the 2 potentiality of its being. Stalin believed that an international socialist effort was likely to embroil the Soviet Union in a series of ruinous foreign entanglements and the establishment of a 2 Chris Ward, Stalin's Russia (London: Arnold, 1999), 26. Breger 5

military dictatorship at home, with Trotsky the former War Commissar at the helm. The eventual defeat of several revolutionary movements in countries like Germany and Hungary ended these fears, but also ended the Bolshevik hopes of world revolution, as Lenin imagined. Lenin s belief that revolution in one country was insufficient stemmed from his reading of Engels, who wrote on the question of socialist construction in a single country. In his 1847 work The Principles of Communism, Engels stated that By creating the world market, big industry has already brought all the peoples of the Earth, and especially the civilized peoples, into such close relation with one another that none is independent of what happens to the others. Further, it has coordinated the social development of the civilized countries to such an extent that, in all of them, bourgeoisie and proletariat have become the decisive classes, and the struggle between them the great struggle of the day. It follows that the communist revolution will not merely be a national 3 phenomenon but must take place simultaneously in all civilized countries. Lenin reasserted this position in his 1915 article On the Slogan for a United States of Europe, where he commented upon the uneven economic and political development inherent in capitalism and stated that the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone. After expropriating the capitalists and organizing their own socialist 4 production, the victorious proletariat of that country will arise against the rest of the world. 3 Friedrich Engels. Principles of Communism. (New York: Monthly Review, 1952) Print. 4 Vladimir Ilʹich Lenin, On the Slogan for a United States of Europe. The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution. (Moscow: Progress, 1966) Print. Breger 6

Clearly, Lenin believed not only that socialism could arise in one country, but also that its spread to the rest of the world was inevitable. Once the prospect of radical socialism emerging in other European countries dwindled, the isolation of the USSR on a capitalist continent became all too recognizable, and by 1924, Stalin and Bukharin began to revise Lenin s central idea. Stalin claimed that his new theory of socialism in one country was a further development of Leninism. In order to present it as such, Stalin modified Lenin s formulation in his December 24 pamphlet The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists by dividing the question into two into the question of a full guarantee against the restoration of the bourgeois order, and the question of the possibility of 5 building a complete socialist society in one country. By dividing the question and modifying Lenin s ideas on permanent revolution, Stalin was able to direct party support in his favor. In the pamphlet he creates a direct correlation between his theory and Lenin s when he states that the victory of socialism in one country, even if that country is less developed in the capitalist sense, while capitalism remains in other countries, even if those countries are more highly developed in the capitalist sense is quite possible and probable... such, briefly, are the foundations of 6 Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution. By avoiding any direct quotation of Lenin s writing on the matter and paraphrasing the Leninist stance as a brief foundation of Lenin s theory, Stalin was able to equate his position to Lenin s, bypassing any possible contradiction that may have arisen. It was this new formulation of the international question that was the basis 5 Joseph Stalin. Problems of Leninism. (New York: International, 1934) Print. 6 Joseph Stalin. The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1950) Print. Breger 7

of the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference, The Tasks of the Comintern, which examined the question of the victory of socialism in one country accompanying the stabilization of capitalism in April 1925. 7 At this point, Stalin had persuaded the congress that the building of socialism by the efforts of the Soviet Union alone was both possible and necessary. Stalin attempts to sideline Trotsky by presenting his views on permanent revolution as a delineation of Lenin s theory. In his pamphlet October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists, Stalin questions Trotsky s theory by first presenting his opponents views, when he asks how do matters stand with Trotsky's "permanent revolution" in the light of Lenin's theory 8 of the victory of the proletarian revolution in one country? Stalin proceeds to focus on Trotsky s later works on the subject, and presents the preface to Trotsky s book The Year 1905, written in 1922, a work taken from a period when the proletarian dictatorship had already been established and when Trotsky had the opportunity to test his theory of permanent revolution in 9 the light of actual events and to correct his errors. By framing the entire debate in terms of Trotsky s errors, Stalin s position is clear from the outset. In the passage that Stalin presents, Trotsky mentions that In order to ensure its victory, the proletarian vanguard would be forced in the very early stages of its rule to make deep inroads not only into feudal property but into bourgeois property as well in this it would come into hostile collision not only with all the 7 Stalin, Problems of Leninism, 174. 8 Joseph Stalin. The October Revolution, 120 9 Ibid 121 Breger 8

bourgeois groupings but also with the broad masses of the peasantry with whose assistance it came into power the contradictions in the position of a workers government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population could be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution. 10 (My italics. J.St.) Here Stalin presents an altered version of Trotsky s text, which he italicized to add dramatic effect. He uses this passage as a reference point, from which he launches into his adroit manufacture of arguments. Stalin deconstructs Trotsky s theory of permanent revolution and compares the quotation with previously mentioned quotations from Lenin s works on the dictatorship of the proletariat that appear elsewhere in the pamphlet, with much dramatic zeal. Stalin writes that Lenin speaks of the alliance between the proletariat and the laboring strata of the peasantry as the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat Trotsky sees a hostile collision between the proletarian vanguard and the broader masses of the peasantry Lenin speaks of the leadership of the toiling and exploited masses by the proletariat. Trotsky sees contradictions in the position of a workers government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population according to Lenin, the revolution draws its strength primarily from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself. According to Trotsky, the necessary strength can be found only in the arena of the 11 world proletarian revolution 10 Ibid 121 11 Ibid 122 Breger 9

Here, Stalin does not directly attack Trotsky s arguments, but instead marshals the arguments of the two thinkers against each other, presenting them in parallel, putting them head to head. Stalin also provides multiple repetitions of Trotsky s erroneous thinking, further solidifying his position. At this time, Stalin ensured that Lenin represented a source of absolute authority because of the Marxist Leninist ideological foundation of the party. Stalin also highlights Trotsky s underestimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement, and ensures that his presentation of Trotsky s argument centers upon its doubt in the peasantry. The question of peasant incorporations adds further to the sense of incongruency between Trotsky and the party, which had begun to embrace the role of the peasantry in the ongoing construction of socialism. Stalin also presents socialism in one country as a reason to further develop socialist construction by way of industry and agriculture. Prior to the implementation of the first five year plan, the Soviet Union experienced threats from both internal and external sources. In 1927, a threat of war with the west emerged when several Western nations, including Britain, severed diplomatic ties with the USSR. This diplomatic isolation caused many Soviet officials to 12 consider the prospect that external forces were preparing an offensive against the Soviet Union. This fear was especially fresh in the minds of the Soviet citizens, considering the foreign presence within the USSR which supported the imperial forces during the Civil War. For Stalin, this fear external assault justified the need for rapid industrialization to increase the military capacity of the fledgling state in order to address such threats if needed. 12 Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free, 1994) Print. Breger 10

First Five Year Plan If socialism in one country represented a reason to further develop socialist construction, then the first five year plan was the palpable policy result. Stalin s push for industrialization was often considered to be a largely political maneuver against the obsolescent right wing of the C.P.S.U., which largely favored further implementation of the N.E.P. Those in charge of rapid industrialization viewed the plans as goals that could and must be achieved, with especially high targets set to overcome objective conditions associated with economic growth of such magnitude. The plan represented a continuation of the mentality that normal laws of economic development did not apply to the USSR. The First Five Year Plan for National Economic Construction envisioned the doubling of Soviet industry s fixed capital stock between 1928 29 13 and 1932 33. This all rested on the basis of electrification of the entire country and economy. The Stalinists set impossibly high targets for industrial output that were more goals to stimulate maximum effort and productivity rather than real developmental guidelines. As outlined in the 14 plan, expected yields included: Industry Initial output (millions of tons) Expected output (millions of tons) Pig Iron 3.3 10 Coal 35.4 75 Iron Ore 5.7 19 13 Ward, Stalin's Russia, 45 14 R.W. Davies, The industrialization of Soviet Russia: The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) Print. Breger 11

Additionally, the plan called for the expansion of light industry by 70%, national income by 103%, Agricultural productivity by 55%, labor productivity 110%, with expected labor costs 15 dropping by 35% and the retail price of industrial goods dropping by 23%. For the planners of socialist construction, the formulation of the five year plan represented a high tide of utopian radicalism. All obstacles were to be overcome, and in his November 1929 article The Year of the Great Breakthrough, Stalin spoke of the human will as the central force for recognizing his economic plan, and as such the party echoed the Marxist notion that the task of philosophers was not to interpret the world but to change it paraphrasing Marx when in stating how our task 16 is not to study the economy but to change it. This foundation in Marx gave an air of legitimacy to the high targets of industrial production. When paired with Stalin s heroic language, slogans, and strategies, the plan was carried out more like an immense military campaign, along fronts, conquering the steppe, vanquishing backwardness, all under the threat 17 of external capitalist sources. This heroic language is clear in his famous proclamation during a 18 speech to industrial managers that there are no fortresses Bolsheviks cannot capture! Stalin s emphasis on heroic progress and achieving the impossible are cornerstones of his rhetorical method, and were largely influential in his presentation of his policy. 15 Ward, Stalin's Russia, 45 16 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (New York: Oxford UP, 1998), 235 17 Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 253 18 1931 Speech to Industrial Managers, Stalin, Joseph. Works, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952) Print. Breger 12

Four additional factors influenced rapid industrialization. The return to pre 1914 levels of manufacturing output signaled that the period of restoration was over, only to be replaced by socialist construction. The defeat of the left during the mid 1920 s meant that Stalin and his associates could now implement the super industrialist policies of party economist Yevgeni Preobrazhensky without fear of political reprisals. The external threat from Britain, Poland, and Japan, who had cut off diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union as well as the impending threat of Chinese invasion supported the move towards increased industrial output. Also, the apparently successful management of agriculture convinced people that an accelerated industrialization policy was feasible and desirable, especially with the new decoration of hero of labor, which was awarded to those workers who displayed noteworthy conviction to the efforts of socialist construction. 19 The spike in labor productivity reflects Stalin s efforts to fulfill the ideological charge put forth by Lenin. In a Pravda article published on November 7 th 20 1929 entitled A Year of Great Change: On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution Stalin quotes Lenin who considered that Productivity of labour is the most important, the principal thing for the victory of a new social system. Capitalism created a productivity of labour unknown under serfdom. 19 Ward, Stalin's Russia, 45-46. 20 A Year of Great Change: On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution - Joseph Stalin, Works. Vol. 12. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1953) Print. p. 124-141 Breger 13

Capitalism can be utterly vanquished, and will be utterly vanquished, by the fact that 21 socialism creates a new and much higher productivity of labour. For Stalin, Lenin s word was law, and the increase of labor enthusiasm represented a task to be completed. Lenin posited that the labor enthusiasm and zeal of the masses would guarantee a progressive increase of labor productivity necessary for the final victory of socialism over capitalism in the USSR and as such, Stalin was able to use this prediction to justify his rapid attempt at industrialization. Although a partial retreat from the hasty pace of industrialization would follow, basic Soviet institutions were marked with the indelible impact of the early efforts to industrialize at breakneck speed. Stalin remarked upon the great change accompanying socialist construction, citing it as a 22 determined offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements in town and country. In Stalin s view, the party s retreat from the NEP was a continuation of Lenin s grand project. In the A Year of Great Change article, Stalin reaffirmed the decisive split from the NEP by quoting Lenin, stating that when the NEP was introduced, Lenin said: We are now retreating, going back as it were; but we are doing this in order, by retreating first, afterwards to take a run and make a more powerful leap forward. It was on this condition alone that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy... in order to start a most persistent advance after our 23 retreat. In quoting Lenin, Stalin portrayed the results of the inaugural year of his 21 Stalin, A Year of Great Change, p. 124 22 Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 236 23 Stalin, A Year of Great Change, p. 124 Breger 14

industrialization effort as successfully carrying out Lenin s original directive. Elsewhere in the article, Stalin references Lenin, stating that The salvation of Russia, says Lenin, lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods that, too, is not enough; we also need heavy industry.... Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without it we shall be doomed altogether as an independent country.... Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we do not provide 24 them, then we are doomed as a civilized state let alone as a socialist state Here Stalin resurrects the mantle of Marxism Leninism when citing the increase in productivity of labor as a suitable metric for measuring the development of industry, fashioning the five year plan as the fulfillment of an ideological goal that Lenin laid out for the party. The implementation of the plan in 1928 29 sealed the break with the New Economic Policy, which worked well as an economic recovery measure following the devastation of the Civil War, but was not suited, in Stalin s view, to build up industry and agriculture to the levels he envisioned. Despite the plan s industrial might, the agricultural output of the Soviet Union faltered, ushering in a period of chronic food shortages. Stalin outlines this agricultural crisis in his Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U., a speech delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in November of 1928, where he states that the rate of development of our agriculture lags extremely behind the rate of development of our industry, and that because of this the most burning question is that of agriculture, and 24 Ibid 124-241 Breger 15

especially the grain problem, the question how to improve, to reconstruct agriculture on a new 25 technical basis. By highlighting the primacy and priority of industrial expansion within a public sector framework as well as the mass mobilization of workers for productive tasks, Stalin presented the plan as a grandiose vision, as opposed to a realistic economic forecast. He concurrently presented shortages and imbalances as a new identifiable threat to the mobilization of the proletariat and the growth of socialist construction. In reaction to such a threat, Stalin began to formulate his collectivization policy, to be realized in the years that followed. During the implementation of the First Five Year Plan, Stalin is engaged with an important ongoing dialogue with the right deviation with regard to industrial policy. Stalin s treatment of the right deviation largely portrays it as pandering to capitalist tendencies and lacking faith in the vision for Socialist Construction. By separating himself from right deviation and presenting his individual views as congruent with the Lenin s, Stalin legitimizes his actions. The identification of individual (individuals like Trotsky or Rykov) and broadly defined (the right deviation) strands of opposition as hostile and traitorous provided the basis for the eventual purging of the political apparatus, centralization of political modes, and the preeminence of Stalin's personal authority. Stalin s rhetoric of mobilization and offensive socialism is especially present during the implementation of the first Five Year Plan. In his Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. given on June 27, 1930, Stalin delivered an ideologically charged speech in which he stated how 25 Joseph Stalin, Works. Vol. 11. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952) pg. 265 Breger 16

[the USSR] need[s] the kind of industrialization that will ensure the growing preponderance the socialist forms of industry over the capitalist forms of industry. The characteristic feature of our industrialization is that it is socialist industrialization, an industrialization which guarantees the victory of the socialized sector of industry, over 26 the private sector, over the small commodity and capitalist sector. Here Stalin presents the question of industrialization, not only as a necessary step in the development and electrification of the USSR, but as a necessary step in the ultimate victory of socialism. For Stalin, the project of industrialization is not just one of increasing returns on industrial investment, but also one of winning the ideological battle against the incipient capitalist threat facing the Soviet Union. The project of socialist construction here is just that, broad based industrialization paired with the preponderance of socialist forms of industry over capitalism. Stalin was responsible for the creation of an increased sense of threat within and outside the USSR. Stalin s creation of perceived internal threat is largely rooted in his philosophical background of Marxism Leninism, and is especially apparent when he famously states that 27 The closer we get to communism, the more intense the class struggle becomes. By identifying counter revolutionary elements within Soviet society, Stalin was able to control the perception of threat within the country, a useful tool that solidified his political authority. Stalin also relies upon the identification of external enemies as justification for implementation of the first five year plan. Stalin found a useful motivational force in comparing the Soviet Union to the 26 Stalin, Works, Vol. 11 27 Anthony D'Agostino, The Russian Revolution, 1917-1945. (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011) pg 97. Breger 17

other developed European nations. Stalin plays up this international comparison, and is clear in his intention to dredge up the defeats of the past in the Slavic collective memory when he stated in a 1931 speech to industrial managers that Some people complained that the Soviet Union was being industrialized too fast No comrades... the pace must not be slackened! On the contrary, we must quicken it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. To slacken the pace would mean to lag behind; and those who lag behind are beaten... The history of old Russia... was that she was ceaselessly beaten for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans, she was beaten by Turkish Beys, she was beaten by Swedish feudal lords, she was beaten by Polish Lithuanian Pans, she was beaten by Anglo French capitalists, she was beaten by Japanese barons, and she was beaten by all for her backwardness... We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this lag in years. 28 Either we do it or they crush us." Here, Stalin explicitly links the need to industrialize rapidly with the dangers that the USSR faced form the external capitalist and imperialist powers. He shrewdly references the humiliating defeats of Russia s past and touches a patriotic nerve. In doing so, he fortified Soviet nationalist sentiment, and vilified all external nations who stood counter to the Soviet experiment. Rapid economic development was therefore linked to national security, and any slackening of pace could easily be construed as traitorous. In presenting industrialization, Stalin also referred to a precedent in the minds of many of his listeners. He argued that when Peter the Great, having to deal with the more advanced 28 Stalin, Speech to Industrial Managers Breger 18

countries of the west, began feverishly to build factories and workshops, in order to supply his armies none of the old classes could successfully solve the problem of overcoming the backwardness of the country. 29 Stalin draws directly upon the Russian national sentiment and heroic memory. In linking the current endeavor of industrialization to historical precedent, Stalin frames the project as a continuation of historical heroic industrial growth If introducing the five year plan was a challenging undertaking, meeting its unrealistic needs was an entirely different challenge. Factories and other centers of industrial output had to be constructed to quickly facilitate material production. During this period, massive industrial centers emerged in previously isolated areas, including cities like Magnitogorsk, a city essentially built from the ground up for the purposes of industrialization. The actual implementation and outcomes of the plan were diametrically opposed to Stalin s presentation of the vision, which relied upon his rhetorical method to gain credibility. New industrial cities and projects were often hastily built, with rudimentary facilities for workers, hardly the utopia that many Soviet citizens expected. The projects, which often relied upon forced labor, represented a calculated and mechanistic approach to refashioning the societal landscape, and had drastic consequences. In order to achieve such enormous economic growth, administrators had to reroute vital resources and manpower in order to meet the needs of bourgeoning heavy industry. This redistribution of essential resources resulted in an unbalanced distribution of food, which 29 "Speech delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) on November 19, 1928." Joseph Stalin, Works. Vol. 11. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952) Breger 19

30 became scarce. The USSR would need to fundamentally shift its food policy, and in so doing developed the policy of collectivization, an industrial approach to collective agriculture. Collectivization The first five year plan ushered in a new period of rapid agricultural collectivization in the USSR. Although collectivization was largely a reaction to rampant food shortages that plagued the USSR in the late 1920 s and early 1930 s, there were other factors behind the decision to collectivize. Soviet officials believed that in collectivizing agriculture, crop yields would increase rapidly, and all surplus crop could be sold to help fund other programs in 31 industrialization. Additionally, the creation of a new industrial working class that accompanied the first five year plan meant an increased demand for food in major industrial centers. Stalin called for the massive collectivization of agriculture as a reaction against small scale peasant farming, which was fraught with capitalist tendencies. He states that The specific feature of agriculture in our country is that small peasant farming still predominates in it, that small farming is unable to master the new technology and that, in view of this, the reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture is impossible without simultaneously re constructing the old social economic order, without uniting the small individual farms into large, collective farms, without tearing out the roots of capitalism in 32 agriculture. 30 Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 239 31 Ibid, 240 32 Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) June 27, 1930 Joseph Stalin, Works. Vol. 11. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952) Breger 20

Here, Stalin posits that reconstructing agriculture on a large scale technical basis will not only greatly increase the crop output, but also simultaneously root out capitalism among small scale peasant farms. Stalin identifies internal threat from embedded capitalist agents in the context of agriculture. In doing this, he is able to present collectivization as an obligatory reaction to such a threat. Stalin s desire to reconstruct agriculture on a technical basis is also marked by a sense of necessity, considering the endeavor to be impossible without his specific plan for collectivization. This politicization of necessary agricultural reform represents a dangerous aspect of the collectivization policy that would eventually lead to its ruin. Despite the optimistic predictions associated with collectivization, the project was a failure. The agricultural situation became increasingly political, and largely centered around the liquidation of the kulaks as a class. Anybody who resisted the fixed agricultural prices or 33 inconsistent requisitioning of food from the countryside would be labeled a traitor. In his speech at a plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. in April of 1929, Stalin addressed his concerns with dwindling amounts of procured grain, attributing the loss to the internal threat of the kulaks. Stalin argued that The chief feature of our current grain procurement difficulties [Is] the resistance of the kulak elements in the countryside to the grain procurement policy of the Soviet government. Rykov ignored this circumstance In order to provide bread for the towns and industrial centers, for the Red Army and the regions growing industrial crops, we require about 500,000,000 poods of grain annually. We are able to procure 300 350 million poods coming in automatically the remaining 150 million have to be secured 33 Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 242 Breger 21

through organized pressure on the kulaks and the well to do strata of the rural 34 population. By attributing the grain shortage to the well to do kulaks, Stalin creates a recognizable internal threat that is rooted in the contention between classes. In scapegoating the kulaks as a class, Stalin is able to draw upon the ever present Marxist Leninist foundation of the class struggle and in so doing, is able to prevent any indication that the Soviet government might be responsible for the grain crisis. Stalin goes on to define the course of action to be taken in order to obtain the grain surpluses. He argues that the poor and middle peasant masses must be mobilized against the kulaks when he states that Good results are obtained in two directions: firstly, we extract the grain surpluses from the well to do strata of the rural population and thereby help to supply the country; secondly, we mobilize on this basis the poor and middle peasant masses against the kulaks, educate them politically and organize them into a vast, powerful, political army supporting us in the countryside it is true that this method is sometimes coupled with the employment of emergency measures against the kulaks, which evokes comical howls from Bukharin and Rykov [the kulaks] are speculating the grain and trying to seize the Soviet government by the throat and to enslave the poor peasants evidently, Rykov and Bukharin are opposed in principle to any employment of emergency measures against 35 the kulaks that is bourgeois liberal policy, nor Marxist policy. 34 The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U. Joseph Stalin, Selected Works (Davis, CA: Cardinal, 1971) 286-287. 35 Ibid 287-288 Breger 22

In creating a plan to extract grain from the kulaks, Stalin references the specter of the kulaks as a class, which represents an immediate threat not only to the Soviet government, but also to the poor peasants, who are the potential victims of kulak enslavement. This attempt to rouse the poor and middle peasant strata against the kulaks and compel them to deliver the grain surpluses to the Soviet government bodies increased peasant solidarity against outside threats, destroying the notion of the alliance between worker and peasant which Lenin believed essential 36 for maintaining Soviet power in city and countryside. It also served as an opportunity for Stalin to employ his tried and true rhetorical maneuver, marginalizing both Bukharin and Rykov, who he argues embrace a bourgeois liberal stance by opposing the violent suppression of the kulaks. To be accused of being a bourgeois operator at this time was akin to receiving a political death sentence. This method of collectivization had drastic implications for Soviet food supply, and as a result the USSR was faced with widespread famine that would eventually claim the lives of millions. Stalin s Marxist Leninist foundations in presenting collectivization in such a forceful manner seem tenuous. Stalin s methods of dealing with the peasants were contrary both to the Marxist tradition, as Engels expressed that Our task in relation to the small peasants will consist first and foremost in converting their private production and private ownership into collective production and ownership not, however, by forcible means, but by example and by offering 37 social aid for this purpose and to Lenin s philosophy on the matter, which argued that the 36 Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 240 37 Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels; Selected Works in One Volume (New York: International, 1968) Print. Breger 23

transition to collective cultivation must be carried out by the proletarian state power with the utmost caution and gradualness, by force of example, without the slightest constraint on the 38 middle peasantry. Stalin attempted to compensate for this deviation from Marxist Leninist orthodoxy at a speech delivered at a conference of Marxist students of agrarian questions, where he described the collective farm as a form of socialist economy. In presenting collectivization Stalin referenced Lenin as a source of ideological legitimacy when he linked the concepts of state ownership and socialist enterprises. Stalin referenced Lenin s pamphlet On Co operation where he states how Lenin had in mind all forms of co operation, both its lower forms (supply and marketing co operatives) and its higher forms (collective farms) and presents a quotation from Lenin s pamphlet On Co operation regarding co operative enterprises. Lenin stated how Under our present system, co operative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but they do not differ from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working 39 class In declaring that co operative, collectivized agriculture does not differ from socialist enterprises, Stalin draws a loose connection between the collectivization endeavor, and Marxist Leninist political philosophy, further legitimizing the policy. Conclusion 38 Vladimir Ilʹich Lenin, Collected Works. Vol. 31. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1960) 152 64 39 Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R.Speech Delivered at a Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions: December 27, 1929 Joseph Stalin and H. Bruce Franklin. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings, 1905-52. (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972)Print. Breger 24

For Stalin and his associates, socialism meant industrialization and collectivization carried out and managed by the Communist Party. Stalin was able to consolidate power and legitimize socialist construction through his operations within the party through his unique rhetorical method, which relied on an adherence to the mantle of Marxism Leninism, references to heroic periods of struggle, marginalization of his opponents, and the presentation of his policies as a necessary and obligatory reaction to the ever present threat of capitalist subversion. Stalin embarked upon, in an unpremeditated pragmatic manner, a second revolution that would have been considered implausible a decade prior. No group, Bolshevik or otherwise had considered a plan of industrialization so intensive and rapid or a collectivization policy as rigorous and panoptic as those which Stalin implemented in 1928 onwards. Most Bolsheviks anticipated that collectivization would be a gradual reform and that industrialization would occur at a much slower rate than Stalin intended. Then again, Stalin operated in uncharted waters, as it had never been clear how Lenin intended his dictatorship of the proletariat to extend. Both Lenin and Stalin saw the ends of 40 revolution and radical policies as justifying their means, including the use of terror. It is questionable if Lenin would have favored concentrating maximum authority in the hands of one individual, Stalin, who retained it by imprisoning, exiling, and executing all those who questioned, or were suspected of questioning his approach. Whatever Lenin would have done is what Stalin did. He positioned himself as the most loyal follower of Lenin s philosophy even though his views sometimes deviated from Marxist Leninist orthodoxy, especially on the 40 Department of State Bulletin 66, June 26 1972, p. 898-899 Breger 25

41 nationality question, at the end of his mentor s life. Stalin s adherence to Lenin allowed for him to target all other strands of opposition within the party that he viewed as insufficiently Leninist. His ruthlessness and political shrewdness are evident in his rhetorical method, and are reflected in his rise to power. While many regard Stalin as a supreme Machiavellian who premeditated his every move, carefully planning his path to absolute power, it seems more likely that his victory was only in part due to power hunger, that it was also the result of a pragmatic reaction to political opportunities that arose. It is unlikely that Stalin directed his policies solely on the basis of establishing future political advantages and personal security, but rather because they would, in his view, lead to the establishment of the socialist society that he envisioned. It is undeniable that personal and political goals are complexly intertwined in Stalin s case, as he recognized the cutthroat nature of Soviet politics, but he did what was necessary to thrive in a harsh political landscape. Regardless of his intentions, the results were ruinous. Socialist construction had massive consequences. Collectivization, which was intended to supplement industrialization by producing marketable surpluses of grain instead saw the creation of a permanently depressed agricultural sector and instigated hostile and resentful sentiments 42 among the peasantry. At the close of 1930, Stalin s agents had either arrested or killed 63,000 opponents of collectivization. By 1932, 1.2 million kulaks would be deported to remote 43 regions within the USSR. The breakneck industrialization and collectivization and Stalin s 41 Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 186 42 Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 235 43 Ibid 186 Breger 26

interventionist policy resulted in a famine that killed millions. His rhetorical critiques of party officials developed into a purge, producing the imprisonment of at least 3.6 million and the execution in 1937 38 alone of almost 700,000, including Lenin s surviving associates, most prominent among them Trotsky and Bukharin. By 1940, Stalin s dictatorial implementation of socialist construction had either ended or wrecked the lives of between 10 11 million Soviet 44 citizens, all in order to maintain his power. The Soviet government expanded enormously, and the political apparatus penetrated the economy, culture, and society, and eliminated any movement that ran counter to the party. The party was subverted by the dictator who monopolized power. If the revolution that had begun two decades prior had represented liberation of the Russian people, it had now petrified into a leviathan state led by Stalin, who was possessed by the notion that he could transform the whole of Russia with a miraculous tour de force. Forceful indeed, Stalin s revolution represented a high tide of authoritarianism that left an indelible impact on the Soviet Union for generations to come. 44 Leonid Brezhnev, On Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation, 1973, Pg 230-231 Breger 27

Works Cited Brezhnev, Leonid Ilʹich. On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973. Print. D'Agostino, Anthony. The Russian Revolution, 1917 1945. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011. Print. Davies, R. W. The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929 1930. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. Print. Engels, Friedrich. Principles of Communism. New York: Monthly Review, 1952. Print. Lenin, Vladimir Ilʹich, On the Slogan for a United States of Europe. The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution. Moscow: Progress, 1966. Print. Breger 28

Lenin, Vladimir Ilʹich. Collected Works. Vol. 31. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1960. Print. Malia, Martin E. The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917 1991. New York: Free, 1994. Print. Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels; Selected Works in One Volume. New York: International, 1968. Print. Stalin, Joseph, and H. Bruce Franklin. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings, 1905 52. Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972. Print. Stalin, Joseph. The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1950. Print. Stalin, Joseph. Problems of Leninism. New York: International, 1934. Print. Stalin, Joseph. Selected Works. Davis, CA: Cardinal, 1971. Print. Stalin, Joseph. Selected Works. Honolulu, HI: U of the Pacific, 2002. Print. Stalin, Joseph. Works. Vol. 11. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952. Print. Stalin, Joseph. Works. Vol. 12. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1953. Print. Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. New York: Oxford UP, 1998. Print. Ward, Chris. Stalin's Russia. London: Arnold, 1999. Print. Breger 29