Molly Elizabeth Gardner Curriculum Vitae 207-G Caldwell Hall Department of Philosophy Cell: 608.852.6357 University of North Carolina megardne@email.unc.edu Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-3125 www.mollyegardner.wordpress.com Academic Appointment Education Visiting Lecturer, Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Program, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, July 2013 present Ph.D., Philosophy, 2013 M.A., Philosophy, Northern Illinois University 2006 B.A., Music, Grinnell College 2000 Area of Specialization Ethical Theory Areas of Teaching Competence Dissertation Publications Bioethics, Environmental Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Logic, and Philosophy of Mind Our Duties to Future Generations Committee: Robert Streiffer (Chair); Russ Shafer-Landau, Harry Brighouse, Peter Vranas, J. Paul Kelleher How Lives Measure Up (with Justin Weinberg) Acta Analytica (28:1) 2013, pp. 31 48. Retribution, Deterrence, and Organ Donation The American Journal of Bioethics (11:10) 2011, pp. 7 9. Cut the Fat! Defending Trans Fat Bans (with Nathan Nobis) The American Journal of Bioethics (10:3) 2010, pp. 39 40. 1
Works in Progress Presentations Misfortune and Inevitability, Public Affairs Quarterly, revise and resubmit, 34 pp. The Interspecies Killing Problem 28 pp. On the Strength of the Reason Against Harming 16 pp. Causes, Conditions, and the Metaphysics of Harm 14 pp. Beneficence and Procreation Colloquium in the department of philosophy at University of South Carolina, Columbia (invited), scheduled for November 2013 South Carolina Society for Philosophy Conference, February 2012 Russell VII Mini-Conference, Sonoma Valley (an annual conference with approximately nine invited speakers), March 2011 Environmental Degradation and Our Duties to Future Persons Lunch and Learn series, sponsored by the Parr Center for Ethics, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (invited), scheduled for October 2013 Rights, Wrongs, and Killing Nonhuman Animals Philosopher's Corner series, sponsored by the Jackson Family Center for Ethics and Values, Coastal Carolina University (invited), October 2013 On the Strength of the Reason Against Harming Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, August 2013 Value Monism and Incomparability Midsouth Philosophy Conference, February 2013 Joint Meeting of the South Carolina Society for Philosophy and the North Carolina Philosophical Society, February 2012 Inevitability, Misfortune, and Personal Value Iowa Philosophical Society, October 2012 The Comparative Account of Misfortune (poster presentation) Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, August 2012 How to Count Value (with Justin Weinberg) Bled Conference on Ethics, June 2012 The Problem of Too Much Harm (poster presentation) Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, August 2011 2
Time Travelers Who Kill Their Younger Selves: They're Closer Than You Think Central States Philosophical Association, September 2010 Situationism and Autonomy Wisconsin Philosophical Association, April 2010 The M-Set Theory of Causation UW-Madison Graduate Philosophy Conference, Summer 2008 The Myth of War's Necessity Northern Illinois University Graduate Philosophy Conference, January 2005 Commentaries Comments on Duncan Purves, The Non-Identity Problem and the Leveling-Down Objection, Illinois Philosophical Association 2012 Comments on Jason Hanna, Doing, Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past, Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2012 Comments on Christopher E. Franklin, Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument, American Philosophical Association Central Division 2012 Comments on Robert Osborne, Why Death is a Loss, Illinois Philosophical Association 2011 Comments on Hallie Liberto, Moral Perpendiculars, Central States Philosophical Association 2011 Comments on Melinda Roberts, Variabilism and the Asymmetry, Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2011 Comments on Lori Gruen, Ethics of Captivity, Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2010 Comments on Robyn Gaier, Hey, You, What s So Special About the Second Person Perspective? Central States Philosophical Association 2009 Comments on John Brunero, Consistency in Belief and Intention, Central States Philosophical Association 2008 3
Honors & Awards Singer Summer Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Philosophy, UW 2011 A competitive summer dissertation fellowship for UW-Madison graduate students in philosophy. Nominee for Dana-Allen Dissertation Fellowship in the Humanities, UW 2011 A one-semester dissertation fellowship for UW-Madison graduate students in the humanities. Phi Beta Kappa, Grinnell College 2000 Mentored Advanced Project Grant, Grinnell College 1999 United Technologies Corporation Scholarship, Grinnell College 1996 2000 Courses Taught as Primary Instructor Philosophy 165: Bioethics (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) Introductory course on ethical issues in health care, medicine, and science. Issues included abortion, prenatal screening, genetic enhancement, resource allocation, experimentation on humans and animals, informed consent and patient autonomy, euthanasia, and assisted suicide. Philosophy 280: Morality and Law (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) Intermediate-level examination of issues at the intersection of law and philosophy. Topics covered included analytical jurisprudence, normative ethics, economics and the law, theories of punishment, property rights, and privacy and government surveillance. Philosophy 109: Introduction to Philosophy (University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh) Elementary introduction to topics in philosophy including epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Philosophy 341: Contemporary Moral Issues (4X, ) Intermediate-level examination of issues in practical ethics including euthanasia; abortion; capital punishment; animal ethics; morality, economics, and the environment; business ethics; sweatshop labor; and world hunger. Philosophy 211: Elementary Logic () Elementary introduction to invalidity, validity, and natural deduction in sentential and predicate logic. Teaching Assistantships Ethics in Business (, 3X, Lester Hunt) Intermediate-level course on moral issues in business. Covered ethical theory, deception in sales, insider trading, workplace safety, bribery, and corporate responsibility. Introduction to Philosophy (, 3X, Juan Comesaña, Lawrence Shapiro, Martha Gibson) Elementary-level introduction to problems in philosophy. 4
Graderships Introductory Ethics (, Carolina Sartorio) Intermediate-level introduction to ethics. Covered the nature of moral problems and of ethical theory, varieties of moral skepticism, practical ethics, and the evaluation of social institutions. Elementary Logic (, 2X, Peter Vranas, Michael Titelbaum) Intermediate-level examination of the formal characteristics of logical truth and inference. Contemporary Moral Issues (Northern Illinois University, 2X, Matthew Pamental, Lawrence Poncini) Intermediate-level examination of issues in practical ethics including abortion, animal ethics, torture, the death penalty, and euthanasia. Chinese Philosophy (Northern Illinois University, William Tolhurst) Intermediate-level survey of the philosophical tradition of China through the critical study of major Chinese classics in English translation. Introduction to Philosophy (Northern Illinois University, Baron Reed) Elementary-level introduction to problems in philosophy. Covered epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, normative ethics, and practical philosophy. Jurisprudence and Contemporary Issues (, Alan Rubel) Advanced-level legal studies course on analytic and normative jurisprudence. Surveillance, Privacy, and Police Powers (, Alan Rubel) Advanced-level legal studies course covering legal, social, political, and moral issues related to government surveillance and privacy. Fundamentals of Formal Logic (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Stephen Leeds) Advanced-level logic course covering sentence and predicate logic, identity, functions, mathematical induction, soundness, and completeness. Other Lectures Senior Summer School, Madison, Wisconsin Senior Summer School is a private company that offers educational vacations to senior citizens. The Ethics of Immigration (2010) Our Duties to Future Generations (2010) The Ethics of Medical Marijuana (2009) The Ethics of Health Care Reform (2009) The Ethics of Euthanasia (2009) The Ethics of World Hunger and Poverty (2009) The Philosophy of War and Terrorism (2008) The Ethics of Euthanasia (2008) The Ethics of the Death Penalty (2008) The Mind-Body Problem (2008) Minds, Brains, and Computers (2008) The Philosophy of Religion (2008) The Philosophy of Personal Identity (2008) The Philosophy of Time Travel (2008) An Introduction to Logic (2008) The Ethics of Reproductive Cloning (2008) An Overview of Environmental Ethics (2008) 5
Graduate Coursework Ethical Theory Environmental Ethics (Streiffer) Metaethics Survey (Shafer-Landau) Theories of Value (Hudson) Moral Dilemmas* (Vranas) Normativity* (Shafer-Landau) Liberty (Hunt) Intuitionism (Tolhurst) Biomedical Ethics (Sytsma) Rawls* (Card) Justice and Values in Education* (Brighouse) Logic Modal Logic (Vranas) Symbolic Logic (Vranas) Deontic Logic* (Vranas) Imperative Logic (Vranas) Intermediate Logic (Buller) Metaphysics Metaphysics (Kapitan) Metaphysics and Ethics* (Sartorio) Philosophy of Time Travel (Vranas) Epistemology Epistemology (Engel) Bayesian Epistemology* (Titelbaum) Epistemology of Disagreement (Comesaña) Philosophy of Mind/Cognitive Science Philosophy of Mind (Lackey) Mindreading (Margolis) & Cognition (Miyamoto) Development of Concepts (Rogers, Kalish) Philosophy of Mind (Buller) Philosophical Psychology (Bishop) Culture Affect & Evolutionary Aesthetics (Singer) Intro to Parallel Distributed Processing* (Rogers) History of Philosophy Spinoza (Nadler) Nietzsche (Soll) 19 th Century Philosophy* (Gelven) 20 th Century Philosophy* (Buller) Early Modern Philosophy* (Nadler) Other Courses Aesthetics (Tolhurst) American Association of Philosophy Teachers Teaching Seminar (Concepción and Rauhaut) Conditionals* (Mackay) *denotes audited class 6
References Robert Streiffer Associate Professor of Philosophy, Bioethics, Agricultural & Applied Economics, & Veterinary Medical Science Madison, WI 53706 Russ Shafer-Landau Professor of Philosophy Madison, WI 53706 Peter Vranas Professor of Philosophy Madison, WI 5306 Harry Brighouse Professor of Philosophy Madison, WI 53706 Jesse Steinberg (teaching reference) Faculty Associate and Assistant to the Chair Madison, WI 53706 Mylan Engel, Jr. Professor of Philosophy Northern Illinois University Zulauf Hall 915 DeKalb, IL 60115 608.263.9479 rstreiffer@wisc.edu 608.263.3727 shaferlandau@wisc.edu 608.263.3740 vranas@wisc.edu 608.263.8136 mhbrigho@wisc.edu 608.263.5162 jrsteinberg2@wisc.edu 815.753.6405 mylan-engel@niu.edu
OUR DUTIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS In my dissertation, I explicate some of the moral duties that members of present generations have to members of future generations. I defend the view that (DV1) individual moral agents who are now alive have pro tanto duties of nonmaleficence and beneficence to and regarding at least some future humans; (DV2) in the present circumstances, this duty of nonmaleficence grounds reasons for all presently living moral agents to refrain from damaging certain features of the natural environment; and (DV3) in the present circumstances, this duty of beneficence grounds reasons for at least some presently living moral agents to bring future humans into existence. For ease of reference, I refer to the view consisting of (DV1) (DV3) as the Duties to Future Humans View (DV). In Chapter 1, I argue for DV1. My argument appeals to a parity claim: because we owe duties of nonmaleficence and beneficence to at least some presently living humans, and because there are no morally relevant differences between these presently living humans and some future humans, we also owe duties of nonmaleficence and beneficence to at least some future humans. I consider and respond to the objection that the non-existence of future humans constitutes a morally relevant difference between presently living and future humans. In Chapter 2, I argue that increases in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and numerous species extinctions are harms for future humans. Thus, if DV1 is true, then there are nonmaleficence-based reasons for us to refrain from causing carbon dioxide to be released into the atmosphere and for us to refrain from causing large numbers of species extinctions. This conclusion supports DV2. I then consider and respond to the objection that the very actions that damage the environment also improve the living conditions of future humans in a way that negates any potential for harm. In Chapter 3, I explain the non-identity problem, which is the problem of explaining how an individual can be wronged by an action that is a condition of her own worthwhile existence. I show how the problem gives rise to another objection to DV2. I survey some proposed solutions to the non-identity problem and argue that the most promising of these is to reject the counterfactually worse-off condition on harming, which holds that an action harms an individual only if it makes her worse off than she would otherwise have been. In Chapter 4, I defend a substantive account of harming. The account holds that for any individual having moral standing, S, and any state of affairs, A, the following are true: (1) A is a harm for S just in case if it were true that both S existed and A did not obtain, then S would have a higher level of well-being; (2) an action or event harms S just in case it causes a harm for S to obtain; (3) other things being equal, the reason against harming S is stronger, the more similar the world would be if A did not obtain. In Chapter 5, I argue that not only my own account of harming, but other accounts of harming will get the wrong results if they are paired with an account of causation that does not support a metaphysical distinction between causes and mere conditions. I suggest that fortunately, there are plausible accounts of causation that do support such a distinction, and I endorse Alex Broadbent's (2007) account. In Chapter 6, I defend DV3. I argue that, just as some procreative actions can harm those whom the actions bring into existence, so can some procreative actions benefit those whom they bring into existence. Since there is a pro tanto reason to benefit future humans, there is a pro tanto reason for some of us to cause some future humans to exist.