Copyright 2008, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland (410) 268-6110 www.usni.org Al Qaeda s Demise Or Evolution? By Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) 18 September 2008 www.usni.org
Al Qaeda adjusts its failed strategies. So far the network has not produced a positive vision for its adherents and neither have we. We have almost passed the seventh anniversary of 9/11, which demarks America s entry into direct conflict with the menace we know as al Qaeda. At a combined cost of some 7,500 American lives and several hundred allied soldiers, and many thousand Iraqi and Afghani civilians, the results are not impressive. Even less satisfying is the expenditure of roughly $1 trillion for the war in Iraq and our global effort against terrorism. Our war against the elusive Osama bin Laden and his affiliates has brought little in terms of conclusive results at least the kind that Americans define as success. It is time to step back and look at al Qaeda and the broader conflict it inspired, and to examine where transnational terrorism and the anti-american jihad is heading. A Bad Investment The American taxpayers who supported the invasions want to see a return on their investment. They want to see bin Laden s head on a pike, or at least know that he will be executed like Saddam Hussein. Instead bin Laden remains at large, presumably sitting in a small compound deep inside Pakistan s under-governed tribal area. He is not sitting too comfortably, since a large American bounty rests over his head as does the constant drone of armed unmanned aerial vehicles that could come calling at any moment. His personal movements are constrained, and so is the freedom of action of al Qaeda. Bin Laden s leadership team, resources, supporting cadre, and training facilities have been distinctly reduced. Many of al Qaeda s most experienced fighters were sacrificed in the opening round of Operation Enduring Freedom, or in the grim war of attrition inside Iraq. What remains is tucked deep inside the mountainous Pashtun tribal area, with limited training and connections to the rest of the world. International efforts to limit the finances and freedom of action of the global jihadists have had marked success throughout Europe, but less in Africa and the Middle East. This has led to a more positive take on America s success in our efforts against terrorism. In an interview with the Washington Post in May 2008, CIA Director Mike Hayden painted an optimistic picture. He assessed that al Qaeda was near strategic defeat in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. He added that the organization had suffered significant setbacks globally, and that a lot of the Islamic world was pushing back at their ideology and narrative. 1 This review supports the inclinations of the Bush administration, but was not well received by the counter-terrorism community. The True Picture The problem was not what Mr. Hayden said, but what he left out. His upbeat assessment didn t contain any discussion about al Qaeda s entrenched position in Pakistan istockphoto ON THE MOVE Surviving al Qaeda leaders and encampments have retreated deep inside the mountainous Pashtun tribal area of Pakistan. www.usni.org PROCEEDINGS 19
DEADLY OPENING ROUNDS Many of al Qaeda s most experienced fighters were killed as Operation Enduring Freedom began. Here, members of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit man their foxholes in southern Afghanistan, December 2001. Associated Press (Dave Martin) or its destabilizing activities inside Afghanistan. The fact that al Qaeda s bloodthirsty tactics in Iraq have proven counterproductive and generated a backlash against the jihadist narrative is not much of a surprise. The senior leadership of al Qaeda and its supporters recognized this and debated it internally. Rather than stay the course, they adapted from the mistakes of 2005 and 2006. Lurid videos of beheadings have been passé for years now, as numerous clerics have formally complained about the many Muslims being killed wantonly by al Qaeda in Iraq. But this may not represent a rejection of bin Laden s ideology or objectives only the means employed. The CIA director s interview was widely noted because it appeared to contradict a National Intelligence Estimate titled The Terrorist Threat to the United States of July 2007, which judged that al Qaeda is and will remain the most serious threat to the Homeland. 2 The estimate noted that the senior leaders of al Qaeda have been protected and regenerated in Pakistan, and that they would intensify efforts to put operatives into the United States. It also concluded that the organization would enhance its ability to attack inside the continental United States by cooperating with regional terrorist groups. Finally, it noted that al Qaeda would continue to explore weapons of mass destruction with the intent of using anything it could deploy. The intelligence community believes it has successfully neutralized almost 75 percent of the operational leadership of al Qaeda, but also that the network retains the ability to reconstitute itself and still aspires to topple Arab governments and counter U.S. interests. The press made much of this apparent contradiction in assessment, without noting the distinction between the CIA director speaking for himself and the formal assessment of the collective intelligence community. News reports also failed to hold Mr. Hayden to account for what constituted a strategic defeat versus an operational setback. Labyrinth of Factors and Complications Mr. Hayden s excessive optimism was obviously influenced by our recent success in Iraq, but he confused operational progress with strategic defeat. The source of even the operational success that we can legitimately claim has been generated by al Qaeda s poor tactics as much as by our own improved doctrine and methods. The latter are indisputably positive factors that have materially improved security conditions inside Iraq. But Iraq is not the central front for al Qaeda any longer, if it ever really was. Nor did Hayden s assessment truly capture the regional dynamics. He overlooked a generation of radicalized Muslims, al Qaeda s new safe haven in Pakistan, and the latent dissatisfaction with America s global war. Hayden s rosy assessment has recently been reinforced by Marc Sageman, a noted author of two books on modern terrorism networks. A former CIA analyst himself with service in Pakistan, Sageman has taught at the University of Pennsylvania and is now serving with the New York Police Department. Dr. Sageman concludes that while al Qaeda s old guard remains dangerous, the original network has been contained and is now a fading force. Instead of focusing on al Qaeda and the proverbial last war, Sageman argues that we need to shift our attention to the danger of a newer breed of jihadists who have developed into even more diffused and decentralized networks than they already were and are spreading globally. Radicalized via the Internet instead of extensive indoctrination in training camps in Afghanistan, the new generation is every bit as dangerous as the old one. Sageman 20 September 2008 www.usni.org
has formalized his thesis in a new book, Leaderless Jihad, which argues that the present threat has evolved from a structured group of AQ [al Qaeda] masterminds, controlling vast resources and issuing commands, to a multitude of informal local groups. 3 Others argue that al Qaeda is a more dangerous enemy today than it has ever been. Bruce Riedel, another retired CIA analyst, wrote the article Al Qaeda Strikes Back in Foreign Affairs. He believes the network has recouped its operational losses in Afghanistan and Iraq and reestablished itself in Pakistan. He does admit that bin Laden has suffered losses, but maintains that the newer al Qaeda and its brand remain atop the world of violent extremism: The challenge of defeating al Qaeda is more complex today than it was in 2001. The organization is more diffuse, and its components operate more independently. Bin Laden continues to influence its direction and provide general guidance, and, on occasion, specific instructions. But overall the movement is more loosely structured, which leaves more room for independent and copycat terrorist operations. 4 Competing Analyses Bruce Hoffman, a professor at Georgetown University, critiques Sageman s thesis, methodology and findings. A widely respected terrorism scholar with extensive consulting experience at the RAND Corporation and overseas, Dr. Hoffman agrees with Riedel and scoffs at the notion that al Qaeda is a spent actor penned into a cage in South Asia with no desire or opportunity to either lash out or direct operations. Hoffman compares the network to a shark which must keep moving forward, no matter how slowly or incrementally, or die. The group s capacity to survive is also a direct reflection of both its resilience and the continued resonance of its ideology. 5 Viewed in the present tense, the weight of the argument leans toward Riedel and Hoffman. It is one thing to be skeptical about a resurgent al Qaeda, but it is hard to miss the organization s evolution since 2005, or its dangerous current posture inside a politically divided and dangerously unstable Pakistan. Even worse is Sageman s overlooking the emergence of al Qaeda in North Africa. Al Qaeda in Algeria The Algerian insurgency of the 1990s, once believed to have been reduced to a nuisance after a long counterinsurgency by the Algerian military, has been revived by its transformation into an al Qaeda franchise. This merger was not the product of religious zeal. It was a pragmatic matter, designed to infuse Algerian insurgents with financial resources, but also to ensure that its best manpower assets did not migrate to Iraq or Afghanistan. The insurgency in Algeria is unknown to most Americans, but it was an especially violent struggle, with both sides willing to work in the dark shadows. More than 100,000 deaths are attributed to this uprising. A splinter group, the Associated Press FLEXIBLE, UBIQUITIOUS NETWORK Islamic revolutionaries fought in Algeria during the 1990s, a brutal conflict that left more than 100,000 dead. They have now become an al Qaeda franchise as a matter of practicality. www.usni.org PROCEEDINGS 21
Salifist Group for Preaching and Combat, emerged in 1998. Its contacts with al Qaeda and support for the Sunni insurgency inside Iraq are well established. The newly minted al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has adopted tactics including remote-controlled bombs and suicide attacks that target first responders and Westerners. It is now taking aim at other international actors, including Chinese and Russian interests. Last December, this group attacked the United Nations offices in Algiers. That attack produced 41 fatalities and injured more than 170 people. Al Qaeda will ultimately be defeated, but not by wishing it away. French and Spanish law enforcement officials have arrested cells with ties to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; each one had financial and technical resources well beyond the older Algerian capacity. What was once deemed a limited internal insurgency has morphed into a larger and more lethal entity with potentially greater reach than in the past. This is only one example from the open literature that suggests that both General Hayden and Dr. Sageman are either wrong or simply a bit premature. Accommodating Contradictory Conclusions This is not an either/or debate. Both sides are wrong, and both are also right. Dr. Hoffman is undoubtedly correct that al Qaeda has reconstituted itself and remains a lethal and centralized entity committed to supporting and directing a globally connected campaign. But the evidence does not support a black-and-white argument. Over the long term, Dr. Sageman s argument for more decentralized and homegrown cells makes sense. It already has an empirical basis today, just less than Leaderless Jihad argues. The dispersion of fighters that have left Iraq, and the emulation of al Qaeda tactics by other groups, abetted by the Internet and other communications technologies, will help the rise and greater operational capacity of autocatalytic cells to conduct catastrophic terrorism. There has been an expansion of new groups that appear to be homegrown, self-organizing and autocatalytic networks. Dr. Sageman s point that the future of terrorism is more fluid, independent, and unpredictable entities is more than plausible, it s likely. 6 While today s homegrown cells lack professional skills, they are harder to detect and often well embedded inside Western states, hidden among the immigrant population. These groups will ultimately seek their fame by escalating their skill and lethality levels and exploiting the critical infrastructure and technology loopholes of the global economy. The diffusion of advanced technologies will only accelerate. Numerous analysts of catastrophic terrorism have warned that the emerging Bio-Tech Age augurs untold horrors from super-empowered individuals. Retired Marine Colonel T. X. Hammes has called this Fifth Generation Warfare. 7 Still, eventually we can be optimistic about al Qaeda s demise despite its persistent evolution. Not because of the relentless pressure of our largely military campaigns, and certainly not because of America s ability to generate or stimulate an effective counter-narrative in the Islamic community. As Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin of National Defense University has argued, most terrorist organizations have trouble regenerating and passing on the baton to a new generation. 8 They simply don t age well. Al Qaeda has provoked the United States into making a number of strategic errors, but at the same time it has inspired few copycats and fewer allies in the jihad. But the network recognizes this and has already adapted and shifted its base of operations and focus. It has vastly improved its propaganda products and outlets. We re still catching up to this new strategy while patting ourselves on the back about al Qaeda strategic defeat. This approach fails to recognize both the organization s capacity to evolve and the appeal of anti-americanism that we ve stimulated in the Muslim world. It is true that al Qaeda s bloodlust has proven counterproductive, and that it has failed to produce a positive vision for its adherents. But the same can be said of us unless you believe that renditions, waterboarding, and the detentions at Guantanamo Bay constitute an appealing counter-narrative. Tactical expediency has trumped longterm thinking far too often, up to this point in America s strategy. So prepare for another bloody decade of al Qaeda and its franchises, and for Sageman s self-generating cells, too. They will coexist and evolve, and so will state-sponsored groups who serve as willing proxies to foment instability. Al Qaeda will ultimately be defeated, but not by wishing it away. Its radical vision must be discredited and our standing refurbished before we and our allies can claim a real strategic victory. 1. Quoted in Toby Warrick, U.S. Cites Big Gains against AL-Qaeda: Group Is Facing Setbacks Globally, CIA Chief Says, Washington Post, 30 May 2008, p. A1. 2. National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate, The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (Washington D.C., Director of National Intelligence, 2007). 3. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. vii. 4. Bruce Riedel, Al Qaeda Strikes Back, Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2007, p. 35. 5. Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, May- June 2008, p. 138. 6. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p. vii. 7. T. X. Hammes, Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges, Military Review, May-June 2007. 8. Audrey Kurth Cronin, How al-qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups, International Security 31, no. 1 (summer 2006): 7-48. Lieutenant Colonel Hoffman is a research fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, Virginia. 22 September 2008 www.usni.org