Pain, Suffering, and a Benevolent God Topic: The Problem of Good and Evil 1
The philosophical argument for the Problem of Evil, is an argument attempting to prove that an omnipotent, good, loving God as depicted by Judeo-Christian-Muslim, JCM, values cannot exist. This is one of the strongest arguments against the existence of a JCM God. In this paper, I will argue that you cannot use the existence of suffering, pain, and tragedy in the world to determine God does not exist, because suffering and pain can have greater purposes that are both observable to humans and, if you have reason to believe God exists, greater than humanity is capable of comprehending. The argument for the Problem of Evil contains 3 premises implying its conclusion. Premise one states that God, in the sense that JCM religions view him, is, perfectly omnipotent, and benevolent always (Lecture 6:1-25, 2018). In other words, God has infinite wisdom and foresees all of humanity s choices both good and evil. Since God is perfectly benevolent, he chooses to be loving towards his creation in all his acts and would not cause harm. The next premise professes that historically the world has experienced and continues to experience significant amounts of suffering and pain (Lecture 6:1-25, 2018). For example, on 9/11/2001 suffering and pain was caused to the victims of and victims families by a 19 man terrorist attack, claiming the lives of 2,977 people, injuring even more, and causing a significant economic loss ("September 11th Terror Attacks Fast Facts", 2017). Another example, of loss and pain would be the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina, which was not caused by man, but claimed the lives of over 3,500 people, causing pain for their families, and destroying the homes, businesses, and property of thousands ("Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts", 2017). Our world has significant suffering and pain. 2
The last premise asserts that the history and current existence of suffering and pain in the world is incompatible with the depiction of God pronounced by JCM theists (Lecture 6:1-25, 2018). Hume stated it this way neither man nor any other animal is happy; therefore God does not will their happiness ("Hume Dialogues Part 10"). If God is both perfectly benevolent and omnipotent, then God would have the foresight to prevent both pain and suffering, and his perfect benevolence would cause him to choose to prevent it. Clearly, this contradicts the description of the JCM God. Epicurus s old questions have still not been answered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. üis he both able and willing? then where does evil come from? ("Hume Dialogues Part 10"). By the definition of the JCM God, God is the most powerful so he must be the source of both good and evil. Thus, since evil does exist if God exists, he must be malevolent, impotent, or both malevolent and impotent; he is indifferent and/or unable to prevent both humanity s and natures cruelty that causes pain and suffering in this world. From this contradiction, the argument derives that the compassionate, all-powerful JCM God cannot exist (Lecture 6:1-25, 2018). God cannot exist, because of the evil in this world. As compelling and resonating as this argument is, it is unsurprising that there is an abundance of skeptical objections raised by JCM theists, eager to defend the existence of a single, loving, powerful creator. Among these objections, the first of the two objections, which I consider the best, that I will discuss centers on humanity s free-will to choose between good and 3
evil. This skeptical objection, theodicy, touts that God made us with free will; the choice to choose between causing pain and suffering to both ourselves and others, or performing loving good acts (Lecture 6:1-25, 2018). Defenders who attest this argument claim our free will is the greatest good, and without it humans would not really be people (Lecture 6:1-25, 2018). Clearly, this argument is an attack on premise 3, because if God gives us the freedom to choose to perform evil, then he does not cause it, nor will he prevent it; humanity has the freedom to choose. Thus, under this consideration a benevolent, omnipotent God anticipates the worlds evil choices, but exercises his loving nature by allowing us to make choices independently anyways, despite the resulting destruction and despair. Defenders of the argument have a couple responses to this objection. Traditionally the response to this argument, is to point out that free-will can only account for part of the pain and suffering that exists (Lecture 6:1-25, 2018). Humanity cannot cause disasters such as plagues or Hurricane Katrina, yet they occur and are devastating tragedies. Mackie has a different response to this objection If there is no logical impossibility in a manʹs freely choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion (Mackie). To paraphrase, Mackie questions why if God made us with the ability to choose good, he would give us the ability to choose bad; if he was truly benevolent he would not give us the ability to choose to do evil. God choose not to make a world of only good people. The second skeptical objection I would like to address also challenges the third premise, but with a different consideration. This theodicy alleges that God has a parent-child relationship. Comparable to a parent allowing a child to fail a test, or having a child get an immunization shot 4
God allows pain and suffering to occur (Lecture 7:1-30, 2018). The child will not get sick because the immunization is preventing them from catching an illness and will learn from the consequences of failing the test, but may not understand why the parent forced the immunization or allowed them to fail. Supporters of the parent-child theodicy do not suggest a specific justification for suffering, only that God has a reason which cannot understand, like a child may not understand their parent. As I stated before this theodicy challenges the third premise, by claiming that God exercising his loving nature, and foresight allows the pain and suffering to occur for a purpose which we cannot interpret or comprehend. Supporters of the Problem of Evil have some notable counter-arguments to this reply. This reply assumes that God exists (Lecture 7:1-30, 2018). In other words, if you have a reason to believe God exists then this argument is valid, however without cause for belief this argument is invalid. Thus, this reply holds a strong counter argument against the Problem of Evil, because if you have a reason to believe God exists, this argument can explain the existence of evil. Contrastingly, though if you do not have a reason to believe in God it holds no weight. As Hume stated, it is now theists turn to tug the labouring oar, and to defend your philosophical subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience ("Hume Dialogues Part 10"). The argument for the Problem of Evil does not hold; the skeptic has a considerably stronger argument. The existence of evil, suffering, and pain in the world is not conflicting with the ideology presented by theists supporting a JCM God who is benevolent and omnipotent. Considering the theodicy of the parent-child analogy, an explanation can be given for the existence of God and evil. Thus, if you believe in God you are able to provide reasoning to 5
yourself for the pain and suffering you experience, even if it is only that God has reasons and I cannot foresee or understand them. Due to this thorn in the argument s premises, it can only provide a reasonably strong argument as to why you shouldn t believe in God, but cannot dispel the possibility. It is unable to completely dispel the possibility of an omnipotent, benevolent God, any more than theists can establish the undoubted existence a perfect Creator. Theodicies, such as the argument for free will, provide possible explanations for reasoning for pain that we can observe within our scope of understanding. This explanation weighs heavily on a person s view of free-will though and is limited only to a plausible explanation. Mackie s argument that free will could exist without people choosing and having the opportunity to make evil choices is illogical. Humans would not truly be free to independently make decisions, if we were only limited to good decisions, pleasing a benevolent God. Ultimately, Hume s conclusion is the most reasonable one to make. The Problem of Evil provides a strong and compelling argument for why you shouldn t believe in God, but is unable to prove that one doesn t exist, so the skeptical theists are correct no matter their motivation. Without evidence it is impossible to declare that God s existence, only that the existence of evil is not strong enough evidence to dispel the possibility of the existence of a JCM, benevolent, omnipotent God. 6
Bibliography Kelly, D. (2018, January 25). Lecture 6:1-25. Retrieved February 4, 2018, from web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/introphilspring2018lect6.pdf September 11th Terror Attacks Fast Facts. (2017, August 24). Retrieved February 03, 2018, from https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts. (2017, August 28). Retrieved February 03, 2018, from https://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/index.html Hume, D. (n.d.). Hume Dialogues Part 10. Retrieved February 4, 2018, from http://web.ics.purdue.edu/%7edrkelly/humedialoguespart10.pdf Mackie, J. L. (n.d.). Free Will and the Problem of Evil. Retrieved February 4, 2018, from http://web.ics.purdue.edu/%7edrkelly/mackieproblemofevil.pdf Kelly, D. (2018, January 30). Lecture 7:1-30. Retrieved February 4, 2018, from http://web.ics.purdue.edu/%7edrkelly/introphilspring2018lect7.pdf 7