REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT IN THE ANALECTS

bs_bs_banner REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT IN THE ANALECTS Abstract In this article, I shall try to argue that some existing interpretations of the Analects cannot provide a satisfactory understanding of the concept of ren, on the one hand, and the relation between ren and li, on the other. Ren is not a thin concept such as right and wrong, good and bad, because it is not a non-substantive concept whose descriptive content has to be identified by a specific criterion which is not included in the concept itself. It is also not or not merely a thick concept such as courage, cruelty, truthfulness, and kindliness. In comparison with a thick concept, ren like courage, but unlike right, has substantive content. Nevertheless, unlike courage and other thick concepts, ren is not only about the ideal quality of a virtuous agent and the moral property of the agent s actions; it is also about the internal capacity of the agent and the principle believed by the agent for making moral actions. Since the meaning of the term is not only related to the external behavior but also related to the internal mind and the relevant principle, here, I call ren a heavy concept. It is heavy in the sense that it is not a concept of observable or substantive entity, but a theoretical construct which is used to explain the complicated relational property of morality, that is emerged from the internal realm and exhibited in the external realm of an agent. I. Question: What Is Ren? In the Analects (Lunyu 論語 ), Confucius does not give us a clear definition of ren 仁 though he often uses the term to describe the ideal quality of a virtuous person, the moral property of a virtuous person s actions, or, as the ultimate goal of moral development, the comprehensive virtue which includes almost all concrete virtues realized in actions. Sometimes he seems to use the term to express a virtuous, Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, Soochow Univeristy, Taipei. Specialties: Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, Chinese philosophy of logic. E-mail: hmymfung@ust.hk Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41:1-2 (March June 2015) 91 113 VC 2015 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

92 person s capacity of making a kind of action which can be identified as having some specific or concrete moral quality. 1 Other times he seems to use the term to refer to a grounding principle of morality. 2 But, if we do not grasp the different uses of the concept in a coherent way, we cannot know exactly what the meaning of ren is. Besides, we also cannot know exactly what the relation between the concept of ren and the concept of li 禮 (institution of rites/sociopolitical norms), another important concept in the Analects, is. The most popular translation of ren is benevolence or humanity. But neither can put the different uses of the concept in a coherent picture. In this article, I shall try to argue that some major interpretations do not provide a satisfactory understanding of the concept of ren, on the one hand, and the relation between ren and li, on the other. I think ren is not a thin concept such as right and wrong, good and bad, because it is not a non-substantive concept whose descriptive content has to be identified by a specific criterion which is not included in the concept itself. It is also not or not merely a thick concept such as courage, cruelty, truthfulness and kindliness. 3 In comparison with a thick concept, ren like courage, but unlike right, has substantive content. Nevertheless, unlike courage and other thick concepts, ren is not only about the ideal quality of a virtuous agent and the moral property of the agent s actions; it is also about the internal capacity of the agent and the principle believed by the agent for making moral actions. Since the meaning of the term is not only related to the external behavior but also related to the internal mind and the relevant principle, here, I call ren a heavy concept. 4 It is heavy in the sense that it is not a concept of observable or substantive entity, but a theoretical construct which is used to explain the complicate relational property of morality, that emerges from the internal realm and exhibits in the external realm of an agent. II. Ren as a Transcendental Entity In the literature, there are two popular interpretations of the idea of ren: one is well received in the Chinese academia and the other is of great influence on Chinese study in the Western world. The former is related to the names of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, etc. while the latter is proposed by Herbert Fingarette. I shall discuss the former first and leave the latter in next section. I think the view of Mou can be recognized as one from a transcendental perspective in terms of moral metaphysics. He thinks that: Confucius emphasis on the discussion of ren is to aim at developing subjectivity. It is because one who wants to strengthen her/his moral

REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT 93 consciousness needs to emphasize the subjectivity. But, from where does Confucius demonstrate ren? Mou s answer is: That is from the place of your mind s comfort or not to demonstrate ren. When Zai Yu 宰予 says that he feels comfortable in giving up the three-year mourning, Confucius judges him as not ren. In this regard, Mou s explanation is: 5 If your saying that it is comfortable means without ren, then, if you feel uncomfortable, doesn t it mean that ren is exposed? This is selfconsciousness. To use today s language, this is moral self-consciousness. Of course, the mind of moral self-consciousness is the subjectivity. If you talk about moral consciousness, how can you not to talk about subjectivity as well? It is because moral consciousness is strengthened, the subjectivity would exhibit itself. As we know, Mou s idea of subjectivity is borrowed from German idealism, which is an idea of transcendental meaning. By means of criticizing Zhu Xi s 朱熹 view, Mou expresses his transcendental interpretation of ren more clearly as follows: 6 Among the scholars of li 理學家, Zhuzi 朱子 is one who treats ren as mere li 理 (principle/reason/ordering) or dao 道. He does not like to use xin 心 (mind) to talk about ren. But Confucius explicitly speaks of ren from xin. It is impossible to talk about ren without relating to xin. Ren is li or dao, itisalsoxin. Demonstrating ren from xin s comfort or not comfort, Confucius is from this place of xin to evoke people s consciousness/intuition. Comfort or not comport is xin s consciousness/intuition. Therefore, ren is not merely identical with li or dao, ren is also identical with xin. In addition to reifying ren as an internal and absolute subjectivity, Mou also follows the mentalist approach of most Song-Ming Confucians, on the one hand, and the transcendental perspective of the German idealism, on the other, to give ren a metaphysical interpretation. He thinks that ren is not only an internal subjectivity or immanent substance, but also a transcendental entity or metaphysical reality. He recognizes that there is no explicit expression of this view in the Analects. However, he thinks that Confucius had implicitly expressed a point of this view which was later developed by Song-Ming Confucians in a clear and explicit way. Although Mou also recognizes that we cannot identify the relation of this so-called true message of Confucius and the developed doctrine of the later Confucians as implication, he is confident that there is some kind of mutual echo between their wisdom of life. In terms of objective fact, he concludes, there is nothing added to Confucius idea by the later Confucians. 7 Here I don t think it is necessary and even possible to treat ren as an entity of both transcendent and immanent import. If li or dao is transcendent of humans and other objects of the world and the mind or

94 moral subjectivity is immanent in the humans, then to treat the former as identical with the latter is similar to the view of mysticism. To demonstrate or point to ren by the feeling of comfort or not comfort can be understood as Confucius emphasis on moral reflection; it does not imply or presuppose that the transcendent dao or li is identical with the immanent mind. After deliberation or reflection on what we have done, especially those actions related to personal responsibility, we often have reactive or responsive feeling or emotion in regard to the consequence of action. The feeling or emotion may be related to moral consideration or not. But it is too far to push to the point that the emergence of the feeling presupposes a metaphysical ground on a non-empirical subjectivity, on the one hand, and a transcendent dao, on the other. I don t think Confucius concept of ren has a transcendental reference. It is not only because there is no textual evidence from the Analects to support this view, but also because it is incoherent to make such a point which is similar to mysticism. To interpret Confucius idea of ren as a concept of transcendental reference is far away from his humanistic stand. As I understand, Confucius is not a metaphysician, but a commonsense philosopher with deep thinking. 8 III. Ren as a Feature of Behavior Fingarette provides a non-psychological interpretation for the concept of ren and other related seemingly mental concepts in the Analects. He rejects to treat ren as a mental concept which is based on the innerouter or internal-external distinction. He thinks that: 9 Jen [ren] is the personal perspective on the public act. When we look at the act as a performance, we see the jen aspect, the distinctively personal characteristics of the performance (we see this by observing the performance, not by looking inside the performer). However, when we look at the act as an instance of a prescribed kind of action that is, as a specific rite, or a particular dramatic or musical work we see the li aspect of it. He does not agree with some commentators who identify him as a logical behaviorist though it is obvious that he sometimes uses a kind of dispositional terms to analyze some of Confucius words which are usually considered by us as having categorical mental import. What is the relation between ren and li? Fingarette gives his answer in the following quotation: 10 The power [of ren] must emanate from the actor, but our image must not direct our attention to the interior of the man but to the act of the man. Yet the image must not identify the jen power with the act

REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT 95 as overt; instead, the directional, aim character of the jen power must be stressed as distinct from the ultimate and actual course of the act. This is to be a matter of emphasis by language and imagery, not separation [my italic] of two distinct events for the aim cannot be determined except as a feature of the behavior [my italic] in the context, and the behavior cannot be understood except as interpreted in terms of some aim. I think Fingarette s claim can be summarized in a sentence, that is, the power emanating from the actor in terms of the act of the man rather than the interior of the man is distinct from the actual course of the act or the act as overt and that this distinction is a matter by language and imagery. In other words, Fingarette s distinction between ren or aim and li or behavior is nothing but a linguistic or conceptual dichotomy. So, at the ontological level, he stresses that their relation is not separation. To use music as an example, Fingarette thinks that, even if the pattern of his [i.e., a music performer s] behavior is unavoidably disrupted, we can see the direction it had, the aim, the concern in it, just as we can see the chord the pianist aimed to play but in the upshot failed to play. We see all this by observing the act in its observable context [my italic], not by looking into the person s head or some purely inward psychic realm. 11 This clearly shows that there is no ontological role of ren or aim playing in the realm of the mental or inside the body. In addition to this ontological thesis which seems to commit logical behaviorism, Fingarette also uses the concept of realization to explicate the relation between ren and li. He says, Te [de 德 virtue][including ren] isrealized [my italic] in concrete acts of human intercourse, the acts being of a pattern [i.e., li]. 12 Nevertheless, when we use the concept of realization to explicate the relation, we would have to commit an ontological thesis which is quite different from that of two aspects of the same thing. 13 I think the view to regard ren as a kind of magic power realized in li is not consistent with the view of not separation. As we know, what is realized in the action (i.e., realizee) comes from something which is ontologically different from its realizer, either in the sense of realization in functionalism or in action theory and literature. 14 So, it is inconsistent to claim both that ren and li are two aspects of the same thing or event, on the one hand, and that ren is realized in li, on the other, if the (derived) ren realized in the action is coming from the (original) ren located in the mind. My use of the concept of realization is not that in functionalism, i.e., not physical realization or multiple realizations. In the functionalist sense, the mental just like software that can be realized in different physical bodies or objects (hardware). As a functional state the mental or software is constitutive of the realizer, they are distinct but

96 not separate. I call this constitutive realization. This concept of realization can be used to explain the relation between the mind and the body, or the software and the hardware, but cannot be used to explain the relation between the mental and the behavior. So, if Fingarette s concept of realization is functionalistic, it cannot be used to explain human behavior which is emerged with causal power from the mind. My use of the concept is different from this use but similar to that in art and literature. I think it is the same concept as used by Donald Davidson as follows: 15 Beliefs and desires conspire to cause, rationalize, and explain intentional actions. We act intentionally for reasons, and our reasons always include both values and beliefs. We would not act unless there were some value or end we hope to achieve (or some supposed evil we hope to avoid), and we believed our course of action was a way of realizing our aim [my italic]. I call this concept causal realization which presupposes that what is realized is causally derived from something outside the realizer, i.e., something as the realizee which can be but is not necessarily realized in the realizer. Just like the case that the intention-in-action (i.e., what is realized in action) is causally derived from an agent s original intentionality which is outside the physical motion (i.e., behavior or realizer). If Fingarette claims that de or ren is realized in li, on the one hand, and the former and the latter are not separable but only different in descriptions, on the other, his peculiar idea of realization can be understood as something without causal power. Here my main point is that, without causal power from the agent s internal, i.e., without the imposition or attribution of the mental property from the agent, we cannot explain intentional action other than physical movement. Besides, if Fingarette is not a logical behaviorist but only wants to reject Cartesian dualism in his interpretation of Confucius idea, he doesn t need to stress that It [i.e., ren] is all there, public and to reject the possibility that it is in the head. 16 If he merely wants to reject Cartesian dualism, he also does not need to explain away the traditional subjective interpretation of the concept of you 憂 (worry) and other mental concepts by his dispositional analysis. When Confucius says: The man of ren is without worries. 仁者不憂 (Analects 9: 29, 12: 4, and 14: 28) it is obvious that there is a close relationship between ren and you.if you is a concept of mental content or subjective import, it is impossible for ren to be understood as a non-mental concept. In order to maintain his non-psychological interpretation, in this regard, Fingarette has to focus on this issue and must try to explain away any mental implication of ren. So he translates you into trouble instead of worry and thus treats you the opposite of ren as a kind of disposition to behavior.

REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT 97 I think Fingarette s assertion that, we certainly find that in all uses yu [you] implies a troubled condition [my italic], is certainly ungrounded on the text. As we know, in the periods before and after Confucius time, you is usually used to refer to an inner and subjective state which cannot be objectively described and publicly observed and can only be described with some imaginative analogies or metaphors. In the Analects, we can also find textual evidence to support a mental interpretation of the term, especially for the term an 安 (comfort) which is equivalent to bu-you 不憂 (without worries) and cannot be interpreted as a disposition to behavior. 17 If an agent s moral action is intentional, it is unintelligible that the action is without the imposition or attribution of status-function, meaning or intention from the agent s original intentionality. In other words, without original intentionality of an agent, there is no derived intentionality in her/his action; or, without the mental power from the agent s internal realm, there is nothing realized or manifested in the performance of behavior. Fingarette doesn t tell us what the power or spirit realized in the behavior comes from; he only informs us that the relation of the power and the behavior are not separate. IV. Ren as Constitutive of Li Kwong-loi Shun has commented on some existing interpretations of the relation between ren and li. He is not satisfied with the interpretations that he calls instrumentalist and definitionalist. 18 He provides a new interpretation which is named by a commentator as constitution thesis. 19 In some sense, I think, his interpretation is not new but similar to Fingarette s. He uses two examples to explain his view. The first one is about marriage. He says: 20 Imagine a community in which the only way of getting married is for the partners to perform certain motions, such as exchanging rings, on a ceremonious occasion of a certain kind. Now, within this community, two people s performing the appropriate motions on the appropriate occasion is both necessary and sufficient for their getting married. Moreover, performing these motions and getting married are not separate occurrences which happen to be causally related; rather, given the practice of the community, the former just constitutes the latter....[o]ur conception of marriage is the conception of an institution in which partners undertake certain commitments to each other by following some appropriate ceremonial procedure, it being left open that different communities may have different ceremonial procedures for the undertaking of such commitments. This example includes at least three points which can be summarized as follows: (1) Within this community, two people s performing

98 the appropriate motions on the appropriate occasion is both necessary and sufficient for their getting married. (2) The former just constitutes the latter. (3) Our conception of marriage is the conception of an institution in which partners undertake certain commitments to each other by following some appropriate ceremonial procedure, it being left open that different communities may have different ceremonial procedures for the undertaking of such commitments. Here Shun uses the relation between performing the appropriate motions and getting married to explain that between li and ren. Ithink this view clearly rejects there is a causal relation between ren and li and thus is incompatible with the instrumentalist thesis; but it is not at odds with the definitionalist thesis. Why is it compatible with the definitionalist thesis? It is because, if a particular action of li can be understood as both a necessary and a sufficient condition of ren,it is possible to make a formal definition between them. Nevertheless, I think, two people s performing the appropriate motions on the appropriate occasion is not sufficient for their getting married though it may be necessary. If marriage is an institution or institutional fact as explained by Searle, the status function or deontic property of being married should be understood as being imposed or assigned to the ceremonial performance by collective intentionality or collective acceptance through a legal or conventional procedure. Without a single intentionality and collective intentionality, there is no institution of marriage and the ceremonial procedure cannot have any status function or deontic property. What the rights and obligations or values and meanings realized in the performance of particular movements in the ceremony are not rooted in the performance per se, but derived from humans original intentionality. In other words, without mental causation from humans mind, there is no institutional fact of marriage and the ceremonial procedure cannot exhibit any status function or deontic property. Just like the case that, without collective acceptance through a legal procedure, a piece of paper would not be used as a currency for buying an ice cream in a shopping mall. The paper s magic power is assigned or imposed through a kind of intentional action rather than intrinsic of itself. In this sense, we cannot assert that ren in terms of the agent s moral capacity and moral attitude is inseparable from the performance of li. Shun s second example is about linguistic practice. He says: 21 To master a linguistic practice is to have the capacity to use a language correctly in appropriate circumstances and to respond in appropriate ways to its use....let us take a concept of this kind, and suppose that it is given verbal expression by a certain linguistic practice in a certain community. Within this community, mastery of the corresponding linguistic practice is not only necessary, but also sufficient, for the mastery of the concept; a person s ability to use

REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT 99 correctly and respond appropriately to the use of the corresponding language will be sufficient for our attributing to the person the capacity to have thoughts of the relevant kind. Moreover, within this community, a person s mastery of the concept and mastery of the corresponding linguistic practice are not distinct capacities which happen to be causally related; given the linguistic practice of the community, we cannot make sense of a member of the community having one but not the other of the two capacities. Shun is right to say that a person s mastery of the concept and mastery of the corresponding linguistic practice are not distinct capacities which happen to be causally related. But it is not because there is any capacity ontologically embedded in the linguistic practice or any capacity constitutive of the practice in the sense that the capacity is not in the head. If a little boy is successful in his linguistic practice to make grammatical sentences with good sense, we can regard him as having a linguistic capacity or as knowing how to use language with good sense, or we can identify his linguistic practice as exhibiting his linguistic capacity. It is all right in a plain sense. But we cannot assert that his linguistic capacity is not inside his head but inside his performance. Performance or practice in terms of behavior or physical motion per se does not have mental power or deontic power; what it exhibits or realizes is imposed or assigned from single intentionality or collective intentionality. The fact that the deontic power of marriage and the mental power of linguistic capacity can be causally (not constitutively) realized in various brute facts or physical movements explains why different communities can have different procedures for marriage and why different linguistic practices can be identified as grasping the same concept, respectively. In other words, it is because the same concept can be realized in different linguistic practices. But what is realized in the realizer is coming from the mind or head, not from the outer practice. Without a mental causation from the mind, there is no intentional act, either speech or non-speech one, located in our physical movement. It seems that Shun confuses the distinction between ontological priority and epistemological priority. Although there is no epistemic priority between identifying the capacity of mastering a linguistic practice and identifying the capacity of mastering a relevant concept, there is still ontological priority between the capacity (in a derivative sense) recognized as realized in the practice and the capacity (in an original sense) recognized as a mental power in the agent s mind or head. V. How to Be a Ren Person? According to Searle s social ontology, Human institutional facts lock into human rationality. They figure in our reasons for acting. 22 Or,

100 Human institutional reality locks into human rationality. This is what gives it its constitutive power. 23 Without reasons for acting from the mind, how come there is an external action? External actions as institutional facts, such as using money to buy things, lock into what Searle calls the imposition of status function and deontic power with collective intentionality. In other words, without the imposition of status function with collective acceptance, what we call money is nothing but a piece of paper. The capacity of rationality, including that of moral rationality or practical reason, is internal, which can be realized but is not necessarily realized in external behavior. Confucius sometimes mentions that he cannot identify the moral quality of the behaviors done by his students and contemporaries as ren or he is not sure whether the good consequences of their behaviors exhibit ren. I think it is because he does not know their motivational set or mental disposition before making action. It may be that their good performance is caused by their motivational set which is not based on the principle of zhong-shu 忠恕 (faithfulness and reciprocity) but the principle of utilitarianism or a religious reason. I think Confucius concept of ren, in particular, and his concept of de 德 (virtue), in general, can be interpreted as a theoretical construct rather than a concept of substantial entity or intrinsic property of the mind. In other words, ren is not a single character trait. As a theoretical construct, ren is a construction of some basic factors of morality which are related to both the internal and external realms of human life. In other words, the term ren can be used to refer to a mental disposition (not disposition to behavior in Rylean sense) which is formed in terms of the rational belief of universalizability of human roles and the moral desire of truthfulness in making effort for consistency between the internal and the external. This mental disposition can be reinforced by a long-term serious moral practice, self-cultivation or learning from moral models and tradition. Besides, the term can be used to mean an ideal moral quality of the agent who consistently makes moral actions. For Confucius, the term can also be used in a moral judgment to express the normative force of an action whose evaluative effect is entangled with or supervenient on the descriptive content of what the ideal society is supposed to require. What is required is the mutual benefit which is brought about in society by the action. If this kind of action can eventually help in making the society in well order, the ren agent would become a sage. However, whether a ren agent can become a sage or not depends on luck or fate which is beyond his control. So the success of making the society into a situation of you-dao 有道 (having dao)isnotaren agent can fully manage. For Confucius, if one can overcome other desires (that is what Confucius calls ke-ji 克己 [conquer or subdue oneself]), especially the

REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT 101 desire of evils, to desire to be ren or to have an intention in accordance with the principle of ren is sufficient to make herself/himself to have the quality of ren or to become a ren person. This point can be summarized as I wish to be ren, and lo! ren is at hand (VII: 30). But to become a sage one is not only equipped with the quality of ren, but also able to make contribution to the well-being of the society. In this regard, the success of an agent s contribution is partly beyond her/his control. Here moral luck plays a role in the sage s moral enterprise. This is the reason why Confucius says that Even Yao and Shun were still solicitous about this (VI: 30). In contrast, sage is a word of the implication of achievement while ren person is a description of the implication of task only. In other words, if a person who is not fortunate or lucky to be successful to reach the ideal of dao or to make a society into an ideal state, he cannot be identified as a sage, though s/ he can be identified as a ren person. So, according to Confucius view, there is no problem of moral luck for being a ren person though for being a sage there is. It is because to be a ren person is based only on the agent s mental capacity which all people are supposed to have. According to Confucius saying that, Is anyone able for one day to apply his strength to ren? I have not seen the case in which his strength would be insufficient (IV: 6), I think his judgment can be understood as an explanation for the above assertion that, I wish to be ren, and lo! ren is at hand. In the Analects, the terms de in general and ren in particular are used to describe a moral quality of the agent who has some kind of mental disposition to make moral actions. The mental disposition is formed by means of moral cultivation. That is, through moral learning and practice, the agent can learn from the society or tradition some kind of moral belief and can be motivated with some kind of desire to produce an intention (or to form a disposition or ability) grounded on that belief. If an intention is strong enough to make moral behaviors in a consistent way, or the intention is transformed into a decision which is able to overcome other desires, this can be called a mental disposition to make moral actions. So, the virtue as a quality of the mental in terms of a kind of mental disposition, not disposition to behavior in Rylean sense, is a quality of the internal state of an agent, not or not merely a quality of the external state of the agent and her/ his behaviors. However, when a virtuous agent or ren person makes a moral action, her/his action can also be described as virtuous or ren. In this regard, the term virtuous or ren is used in a derivative sense. In its original sense, virtue or ren is a constitutive quality of an agent s mental state, while, in its derivative sense, virtue or ren is the manifested quality of an agent s behavior. 24

102 In addition to his idea of quan 權 (weighing or balancing), Confucius moral principle is a rational one which reflects the minimum requirement of rationality. Confucius uses a material mode of speech in contrast to a formal mode of speech in Carnapean sense to express his principle of universalizability that he calls shu 恕 (reciprocity) or zhong-shu. 25 I think Confucius project can be understood as that, if an action can be judged as in accordance with the principle of universalizability, its moral quality or value is entangled with or supervenient on the mutual benefit of the society or the maximizing interest of people in the society which is the ultimate goal of his moral program. In terms of the relation of entanglement or supervenience, we can also call the principle of zhong-shu in a material mode of speech as what we can contribute to each other. 26 Besides, as a general principle incorporated into an agent s motivational set, zhong-shu may not be helpful in solving the problem of fulfilling multiple duties, especially when there is a case of moral conflict. In this regard, Confucius stresses that the determination of priority in choosing among different actions all of which belong to the agent s duties should be based on the principle of rectification of names (zheng-ming 正名 ). 27 For Confucius, all names of social classification assigned to people are regulated by the institution of li which defines various sociopolitical roles and requires people who play a specific role to fulfill a duty imposed by the institution of li. In addition, the institution of li is a second-level institution which, based on the principle of rectification of names, regulates various first-level institutional facts, such as using an equipment like a crown or wine bowl in a ceremony, in terms of imposition of sociopolitical roles and arranges the priority of their roles duty-fulfillment. For example, only persons of a particular kind of status in the li system can be entitled to use a particular equipment or format in a ceremony. This is the reason why Confucius complains that Ji 季 family is not entitled to use the format of ba-yi 八佾 (eight rows of dancing team) in a formal gathering. In this sense, this principle, in comparison with the general principle of zhong-shu, is a concrete principle. That is a principle regulated by the li system which is established with direct collective recognition or indirect collective recognition (i.e., via authoritative or politico-religious power). 28 With respect to the relation between ren and li, I think it is wrong to regard them as not separable if li is understood as mere rituals or norms which are embedded in social and political rites and ren as moral power or deontic property which can be realized in li. Itis because we cannot explain how ren is realized in li only based on the supposition that they are not separate but distinct linguistically. If li is understood as all morally appropriate actions whose moral appropriateness is based on the mental causation from the ren person s internal

REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT 103 state to the actions, it is trivial to say that the relation of ren and li are inseparable if what is realized in li is regarded as nothing but ren in a derivative sense. Ren is a comprehensive or heavy moral concept while yong 勇 (valor or courage) is a thick moral concept, both of which are different from a thin concept. Thin concepts such as good and right are semiformal evaluative concepts or thin concepts mentioned above (which appear in Sen s J[P]) 29 which, based on some kind of principle or standard, can be materialized by means of a criterion to identify their supervenient content which can be factually described. In contrast, ren and yong are non-formal evaluative concepts (which appear in Sen s J [E]) which, in some sense, are embedded or entangled with both evaluative meaning and descriptive content. 30 If we judge that Peter is kind or Peter is courageous, it is not only to mean that his relevant actions are morally valuable or with prescriptive force, but also to mean that, according to our societal consensus, his actions are of some features which can be described in terms of factual language. Of course, when we make such a judgment, it entails that Peter s relevant actions are also morally right in some context. If what is kind is also right in some sense, there must be some significant relation between the relevant thick concept and a thin concept. In this regard, I think the features of the action of kindliness not only must be consistent with the criterion of the right action in some context, but also must be subsumed under the principle or standard of the right action. As mentioned above, ren as a comprehensive or heavy concept in the Analects is different from a thin concept such as right or wrong, good or bad, on the one hand, and from a thick concept such as braveness or generosity, on the other. A thin concept is basically a relatively abstract or semi-formal concept, in addition to its evaluative force, whose descriptive content is not embedded in the concept itself, but has to be offered by a criterion which in turn is figured out by a principle or standard such as Utilitarian principle. In contrast, a thick concept is rather concrete in the sense that its descriptive content is entangled with its evaluative meaning while the descriptive content of the criterion or standard of a thin concept may be regarded as supervenient on its evaluative meaning. In comparison, a thick concept is usually used to describe the agent or the agent s action; it is seldom used to describe the agent s mental or, even if it is used to describe the agent s mental, it is not the defining characteristic of the concept. On the other hand, a heavy concept is not only used to describe the agent and the agent s action, but also used to describe the agent s mental. To judge an agent as ren, according to Confucius in the Analects, is not only to express that the agent has a quality in terms of some descriptive features of the agent s actions which is either recognized as being

104 attached by a prescriptive flag or entangled with an evaluative function in the judgment. There is more in it, including the agent s internal disposition or ability and the zhong-shu principle embedded in the agent s belief. Based on this additional content of the term used in the moral judgment, I call ren a heavy concept. Besides, ren as a term is not used to rigidly refer to an individual entity which is concrete or abstract, internal or external. So I regard ren as a theoretical construct rather than character trait as claimed by some scholars who are interested in both Chinese philosophy and virtue ethics. Here is the question: In what concrete sense ren can be understood as a heavy concept? Based on the above analysis and explanation, I think the following bi-conditional sentence can be used to express this idea: An agent can be judged as ren if and only if (a) The agent s actions can be described as having some descriptive qualities or features which are received with collective acceptance or recognized by people who observe the system of li (the institution of rites); (b) The agent s actions can be judged as having a normative force or deontic property which is assigned or imposed with single or collective intentionality; (c) The agent s actions must be understood as acting for an internal reason (i.e., the reason incorporated into her/his motivational set; 31 and (d) The agent can be understood as embracing the principle of what we can contribute to each other in her/his motivational set (i.e., zhong-shu) which has a mental power to guide and make actions. [That is, the contribution of maximizing positive values or minimizing negative values.] VI. Ren as a Theoretical Construct: Textual Analysis Each of the four mentioned above is a necessary condition of being ren and the conjunction of them is a sufficient condition of being ren. Without (d), even most of an agent s actions can be described in (a), (b) and (c), the agent cannot be qualified as a ren person though these are made under some other reasons and motivational sets such as those based on religious belief. It may be one of the main reasons why Confucius often expresses that he is not sure whether his students and contemporaries good performance in behavior or well-received consequence of their behavior is ren or whether they are qualified as a ren person. So, only good performance in terms of the agent s action having the characteristics of (a), (b), or (c) is not sufficient to be judged as

REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT 105 ren. 32 Although having good performance in behavior is not sufficient for having ren, the former can be understood as a necessary condition of the latter. So, without good performance or with bad performance in behavior, an agent can be identified as without ren. 33 If having good performance or lacking bad performance in behavior is a necessary condition of being ren, then the latter is a sufficient condition of the former. Besides, the performance of various concrete virtues can be identified as included in the performance of ren. 34 In the passage quoted in footnote 1 (Analects, XVII: 6), it seems that the conjunction of five concrete virtues is equivalent to ren. But what Confucius stresses is that the capacity of practicing the five things is the same capacity of ren; it is not really a judgment of equivalence between the five virtues and ren. In addition, the following passage seems to indicate that ren can be identified only by good performance in behavior: The Master said, The Duke Huan 桓公 assembled all the princes together, and that not with weapons of war and chariots it was all through the influence of Guan Zhong 管仲. It looks like his ren! It looks like his ren! (XIV: 16) Actually, this passage expresses that only observing Guan Zhong s great achievement in maintaining the sociopolitical well-order, Confucius can judge him as if he is a ren person. In other words, he does not really identify Guan Zhong as a ren person; what he asserts is that Guan Zhong s performance gives us an impression that he looks like a ren person. The following passage indicates that some actions with concrete duties or first-order virtues such as valor and without bad consequence must be rooted in a principle of righteousness (yi 義 ) which, as I understand, is in turn based on the principle of ren (i.e., zhong-shu): 35 The superior man holds righteousness to be of highest importance. A man in a superior situation, having valor without righteousness, will be guilty of insubordination; one of the lower people having valor without righteousness, will commit robbery. (XVII: 23) In addition to having good performance in behavior, Confucius also thinks that a ren person should embrace a moral principle in her/his motivational set. We can see this point in the following passage: Zi Gong 子貢 asked, saying, Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one s life? The Master said, Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others. (XV: 24) If the principle of shu (reciprocity) is regarded by Confucius as a rule or principle of practice for all one s life, it must also be regarded

106 by him as a rule or principle for the ren person s practice for all her/his life. In other words, without the principle of reciprocity in one s mind, one cannot practice to be a ren person. The following passage also indicates that the principle of shu plays an essential role for a ren person: Zhong Gong 仲弓 asked about ren. The Master said, It is, when you go abroad, to behave to every one as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice; not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family. (XII: 2) According to Confucius disciple Zeng Shen s 曾參 view, the principle of zhong-shu can be interpreted as the dao of all-pervading unity in Confucius thought. 36 It seems easy to know what is ren or dao, however, according to Confucius own view, the principle of shu is easy to know but difficult to embrace in an agent s motivational set and difficult to put into practice: Zi Gong said, What I do not wish men to do to me, I also wish not to do to men. The Master said, Ci 賜, you have not attained to that. (V: 12) Why Confucius judges that Zi Gong has not attended to the principle of shu? One of the reasons may be that Zi Gong is good in speech rather than in moral practice. 37 To be a reason which can cause actions, ren as a principle should be accorded with or should be incorporated into an agent s motivational set. So Confucius says: Let the will be set on dao. Let the virtues be firmly grasped. Let ren be accorded with. (VII: 6) There were four things from which the Master was entirely free. He had no foregone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism. (IX: 4) Confucius puts emphasis on four things to do, all of which express his rejection of behaviors from the mind of self-centeredness. Without selfcenteredness in mind, one can connect her/his self to others, be considerate of others and try to make contribution to others. So he says: Now the man of ren, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others. To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves this may be called the way of practicing ren. (VI: 30) As a theoretical construct, ren has an aspect of principle which can be followed or violated. So Confucius stresses that ren as the proper

REN 仁 AS A HEAVY CONCEPT 107 way or dao of making actions should always be abided by in any time and any circumstances. Confucius says: Riches and honors are what men desire. If it cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be held. Poverty and meanness are what men dislike. If it cannot be avoided in the proper way, they should not be avoided. If a superior man abandons ren, how can he fulfill the requirements of that name [of superior man]? The superior man does not, even for the space of a single meal, act contrary to ren. In moments of haste, he cleaves to it. In seasons of danger, he cleaves to it. (IV: 5) It is possible that people sometimes make actions which look like adopting ren but actually violate ren. It is the case as mentioned by Confucius that: One adopts ren [principle] in appearance but his actions violate it. (XII: 20) It means that the agent s actions can be pretended to be in accordance with the ren principle or standard but actually they violate. Ren is not only related to the principle of zhong-shu, but also related to the mental capacity or motivational set of an agent. In other words, the ren person does not only recognize or believe the principle, but also desires or wants to abide by the principle when taking action. If the desire is strong enough after a long-term serious learning or cultivation, a motivational set can be formed with robust moral emotion. In this regard, Confucius sometimes makes a contrast between ren and li in terms of the relation between the internal and the external. He says: If a man be without ren, what has he to do with the rites of propriety? If a man be without ren, what has he to do with music? (III: 3) To be a ren person, it is not only to observe the norms of li, but also to conquer or subdue oneself in the mind. To conquer or subdue oneself is not to be constrained by others or external factors, but to practice with autonomy. So, here, it is impossible to interpret Confucius words as about the agent s behavior only; he is talking about the agent s mental. That is, how to have self-control in the mind. 38 Yan Yuan asked about ren. The Master said, To subdue one s self and return to propriety, is ren. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will ascribe ren to him. Is the practice of ren from a man himself, or is it from others? (XII: 1) If an agent s mind rests on the ren principle, her/his mental realm would be different from the person who does not have ren. Confucius thinks that the ren person can check this through the internal examination of her/his mind.

108 The dao of the superior man is threefold, but I am not equal to it. Ren, he is free from anxieties; wise, he is free from perplexities; bold, he is free from fear. (XIV: 28) Si Ma Niu 司馬牛 Basked about the superior man. The Master said, The superior man has neither anxiety nor fear. Being without anxiety or fear! said Niu, does this constitute what we call the superior man? The Master said, When internal examination discovers nothing wrong, what is there to be anxious about, what is there to fear? (XII: 4) The opposite of you 憂 (worry) is an 安 (ease or comfort). An is also a subjective mental state which is related to the mental power of ren. This point can be illustrated in a debate between Confucius and Zai Wo. Confucius asks Zai Wo whether he will feel comfortable if he gives up the three-year mourning and then lives in a situation with fine food and good dress. After Zai Wo gives his positive reply, Confucius expresses his displeasure by saying that, If you feel comfortable, then just do it! After Zai Wo s leaving, he continues to complain: How not ren Yu [i.e., Zai Wo] is!...was Yu not given three years love by his parents? 39 It is clear from this piece of dialogue that what Confucius asks is not a question about an objective fact. In this regard, he does not know what Zai Wo thinks and feels in his mind. So, when Zai Wo gives his positive reply, he is very disappointed with Zai Wo s expression of his own subjective feeling. Since this feeling is contrary to the ren person s moral feeling, he concludes with angry that this feeling suggests a mental state or inner disposition without ren. IfZai Wo has ren, he should not forget that he was given love for [at least] three years by his parents. Here an (or bu-you) as a feeling after moral reflection is intimately related to the human s moral power or capacity, that is ren, an inner moral sense or sensibility of full love. Confucius believes that all people have enough mental power to make moral actions which are in accord with the ren principle. He says: I have not seen a person who loved ren, or one who hated what was not ren. He who loved ren, would esteem nothing above it. He who hated what is not ren would practice ren in such a way that he would not allow anything that is not ren to approach his person. Is anyone able for one day to apply his strength to ren? I have not seen the case in which his strength would be insufficient. Should there possibly be any such case, I have not seen it. (IV: 6) It is only the ren man, who can love, or who can hate, others. (IV: 3) If the will be set on ren, there will be no practice of wickedness. (IV: 4) Ran Qiu 冉求 said, It is not that I do not delight in your doctrines, but my strength is insufficient. The Master said, Those whose strength is insufficient give over in the middle of the way but now you limit yourself. (VI: 12)