PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (5AANB012) Tutor: Dr. Matthew Parrott Office: 603 Philosophy Building Email: matthew.parrott@kcl.ac.uk Consultation Hours: Thursday 1:30-2:30 pm & 4-5 pm Lecture Hours: Thursday 3-4 pm, Kings Building -1.14 COURSE DESCRIPTION This course focuses on questions in the philosophy of mind. We will approach this topic by thinking through some problems that arise from reflecting on the metaphysics and epistemology of the mind. What is the mind? How does the mind relate to the brain? What is consciousness? How do we know about our own thoughts, feelings, and desires and how do we know about those of other people? In addressing these questions, we will cover topics central to contemporary philosophical discussions of the mind, including consciousness, intentional content, mental causation, and self-knowledge. OBJECTIVES 1) Understand key issues in the philosophy of mind. 2) Develop the ability to think carefully and critically about philosophical questions. 3) Develop skills in critical reading, writing, analytical thinking and in written and oral communication. READING The readings for the course are separated into the following two categories: : reading that everyone who wants proper coverage of the subject must read. Further Reading: additional readings to help further develop your views on a particular subject. Many of the readings for the course can be found either online or in the following collection of essays: D. Chalmers (ed.): Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Another useful collection is: David Rosenthal (ed.): The Nature of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The following are good introductory texts: T. Crane: The Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1
J. Kim: Philosophy of Mind (3rd edition). Boulder: Westview Press. SCHEDULE Week 1: The Mark of Mentality J. Kim: 'Is there a "Mark of the Mental"?' from Chapter 1 of his Philosophy of Mind pp. 17-27. R. Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Chapter 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press. F. Brentano: 'The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomenon', in Chalmers. Further Reading T. Crane: 'Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental', in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. C. McGinn: The Character of Mind, Chapter 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Week 2: Mind-Brain Identity J.J.C. Smart: 'Sensations and Brain Processes', in Chalmers. S. Kripke: Naming and Necessity, Lecture 3. London: Blackwell. F. Jackson: 'A priori physicalism', in B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. London: Blackwell. P. Churchland: Matter and Consciousness, from Chapter 2, pp. 43-51. Cambridge: MIT Press. J. Kim: Philosophy of Mind, Chapter. 4. D. Stoljar: 'Physicalism', in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/) P. Churchland: 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', in Chalmers. W. V. O. Quine: 'States of Mind', in Rosenthal. D. Papineau: Thinking about Consciousness, Chapter 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Week 3: Functionalism D. Armstrong: 'The Causal Theory of the Mind', in Chalmers. H. Putnam: 'The Nature of Mental States', in Chalmers. D. Lewis: 'Psycho-physical and Theoretical Identifications', in Chalmers. N. Block: 'Troubles with Functionalism', in his Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. London: Methuen. Excerpt reprinted in Chalmers. D. Lewis: 'Reduction of Mind', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. London: Blackwell. 2
R. Van Gulick: 'Functionalism', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. H. Putnam: 'Philosophy and Our Mental Life', in his Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. J. McDowell: 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism', in his Mind, Value and Reality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Week 4: Mental Causation K. Bennett: 'Mental Causation', Philosophy Compass, 2, no. 2 (2007): 316-37. J. Kim: 'The Many Problems of Mental Causation (Excerpt)', in Chalmers. S. Yablo: 'Mental Causation', in Chalmers. T. Crane: 'The Mental Causation Debate', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol., 69 (1995): 211-36. J. Campbell: 'Intelligible Causation', in J. Bridges, et. al., (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press. D. Davidson: 'Mental Events', in Chalmers. J. Kim: 'Mental Causation', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. B Loewer: 'Mental Causation, or Something near Enough', in B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. S. Shoemaker: 'Realization and Mental Causation', in C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Week 5: Consciousness T. Crane: The Elements of Mind, Chapter 3. N. Block: 'On a Confusion about the Concept of Consciousness', in Chalmers. T. Nagel: 'What it is Like to Be a Bat?' in Chalmers. D. Chalmers: 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness', Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no 3 (1995). D. Chalmers: The Conscious Mind, Chapter 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. D. Dennett: 'Quining Qualia', in Chalmers. D. Rosenthal: 'Two Concepts of Consciousness', in Rosenthal. S. Shoemaker: 'Qualia and Consciousness', Mind, 100 (1991): 507-524. Week 6: Consciousness F. Jackson: 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', in Chalmers. D. Lewis: 'What Experience Teaches', in Chalmers. J. Levine: 'Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap', in Chalmers. 3
C. McGinn: 'Can we Solve the Mind-Body Problem?' in Chalmers. B. Loar: 'Phenomenal States', in Chalmers. J. Levine: 'The Explanatory Gap', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. D. Chalmers: The Conscious Mind, Chapter 3. D. Papineau: Thinking about Consciousness, Chapter 2. Week 7: Intentionality T. Crane, The Elements of Mind, Chapter 1 J. Fodor: 'A Theory of Content (I)', in his A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge: MIT Press. K. Sterelny: The Representational Mind, Chapter 6. London: Blackwell. D. Dennett: 'Intentional Systems', Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1971): 87-106. R. Milliken: 'Biosemantics', in Chalmers. F. Dretske: 'A Recipe for Thought', in Chalmers. H. Field: 'Mental Representation', Erkenntnis, 13 (1978): 9-61. J. Fodor: Psychosemantics, Chapter 4. Cambridge: MIT Press. R. Wedgewood: 'The Normativity of the Intentional', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Week 8: Intentionality J. Fodor: Psychosemantics, Chapter 2. T. Burge: 'Individualism and the Mental', Studies in Metaphysics, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4 (1979): 73-121. Excerpt reprinted in Chalmers. H. Putnam: 'The Meaning of Meaning', in his Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Excerpt reprinted in Chalmers. A. Clark and D. Chalmers: 'The Extended Mind' in Chalmers. K. Farkas: 'What Is Externalism?', Philosophical Studies, 112 (2003). J. McDowell and P. Pettit: 'Introduction', in their Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. G. Segal: 'Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions', in B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. London: Blackwell. Week 9: Self-Knowledge D. Finkelstein: Expression and the Inner, Chapter 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 4
R. Moran: Authority and Estrangement, Chapter 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press. J. Heal: 'On First-Person Authority', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (102): 1-21. G. Ryle: The Concept of Mind, Chapter 6. London: Penguin Books. Further Reading S. Shoemaker: Self-Knowledge and 'Inner Sense', in his The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. M. Boyle: 'Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2009). A. Byrne: 'Introspection', Philosophical Topics, 33: 79-103. C. Wright: 'Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy', in C. Wright, et. al., (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford: OUP. Week 10: Knowledge of others' minds F. Dretske: 'Perception and Other Minds', Nous 7(1973): 33-44. A. Avramides: 'Other Minds', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A. Gomes: 'Testimony and Other Minds', forthcoming in Erkenntnis. B. Russell: 'Analogy' in Rosenthal. J. L. Austin: 'Other Minds', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 20: 122-197. R. Pargetter: 'The Scientific Inference to Other Minds', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984). J. Smith: 'The Phenomenology of Face-to-face Mindreading', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2013). J. McDowell: 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge', in Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. QUESTIONS FOR FORMATIVE ESSAYS Essay 1 1) 'Having an experience is surely one good way, and surely the only practical way, of coming to know what that experience is like. Can we say, flatly, that it is the only possible way? Probably not.' (Lewis) Discuss. 2) What reason, if any, is there to think that the term 'mental state' picks out a unified category? 3) If every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, how can a functionalist account for mental causation? 4) 'Even if every behavioral and cognitive function related to consciousness were explained, there would still remain a further mystery.' (Chalmers) Discuss. 5
5) Is the fact that mental states are causally efficacious a good reason to think that they must be identical to physical states? Essay 2 6) If a neuroscientist can stimulate the brain in such a manner as to generate thoughts, can an externalist account of mental content be correct? 7) In what ways is my knowledge of my own mental states fundamentally different from my knowledge of others' mental states? In what ways is it similar? 8) What is the most plausible framework for giving a naturalistic account of intentional content? 9) What does the claim that the mental supervenes on the physical tell us about the nature of the mind? 10) Can we acquire perceptual knowledge of what another person is thinking or feeling? 6