The Elements of a Christian Ethic M.St./M.Phil. seminar Michaelmas Term 2016 Tuesdays 1400-1545 S.W. Lodgings, Christ Church Convenors: Professor Nigel Biggar (NJB) Dr James Orr (JO) Prescribed readings in bold will comprise the focus of seminar discussion. Week 1: 11 October (NJB) God and morality: the Good Start with two classic Christian expositions of the Aristotelian notion that moral life has the basic teleological form of the pursuit of the human good or well-being (eudaimonia): Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, qq.1-5: How biblical is the notion of the Good? Why should we think of moral life in these terms? How is the human good understood? What has God got to do with it? Then read one (post-lutheran?) critique of a teleological understanding of moral life: Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. NB: please use this edition: Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, ed. Mary Gregor, intro. Christine Korsgaard (CUP, 1997): What is Kant s objection? What objections might be raised against Kant s alternative? Then read one post-kantian Lutheran critique: Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London: SPCK, 1953; Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982) pt 1; pt 2, chs 2, 4, 6 What is Nygren s objection? Is agape plausible? Could eros be baptized? Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Part I: The Nature of the Good John E. Hare, God and Morality: A Philosophical History (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), Chapter 3, Immanuel Kant Arthur F. Holmes, Fact, Value, and God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997) Oliver O Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St Augustine (New Haven: Yale, 1980) Gene Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) Keith Ward, The Development of Kant s View of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), Morality, Autonomy, and God (Oxford: OneWorld, 2013) Allen W. Wood, Kant (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), Chapter 7.
2 Week 2: 18 October (NJB) Natural law : concepts and critiques Begin by reading Mahoney s account of the theories of natural law espoused by Augustine and Aquinas; and then read Aquinas own classic account: John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 72-83, 103-15; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, qq. 91, art. 1-5; 94, art. 2-6; IIaIIae, q. 154, art. 11-12: Reflect on the location of Aquinas treatise on natural law in his theological system How is it natural? Is it law? How well does it sit with biblical tradition? For a physicalist interpretation of Thomas, read Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (e.g., in On Moral Medicine, ed. S. Lammers and A. Verhey [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987, 1998]). For a personalist interpretation, read Bernard Haring, Dynamism and Continuity in a Personalistic Approach to Natural Law, in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics (New York: Scribner s, 1968) ed. Gene Outka and Paul Ramsey, pp. 199-218. Then read a post-kantian interpretation: John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pt 1, ch. II; pt 2, chs III-V; pt 3, ch. XIII. How do these physicalist, personalist, and post-kantian interpretations compare? Now read the following Protestant critiques of natural law : Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III, pt 4, pp. 19-23 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1983), ch. 4 How do the orders of creation compare with natural law? Can the concerns of these critiques be met? John Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas s Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [contains a helpful survey of competing views of Aquinas on natural law] Stephen Pope, Reason and Natural Law, in G. Meilaender and W. Werpehowski (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) (ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), esp. Clifford Kossel, Natural Law and Human Law. Jean Porter, Natural Law and Divine Law (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999)., Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005).
3 Week 3: 25 October (NJB) First, take Richard Hays attempt to build a moral theology directly out of the text of the New Testament, and then (in chapter 14) to bring it to bear on the use of violence: Richard B Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament (Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1996), chs 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 What is the logic of Hays construction? How does he relate Scripture to other sources of moral authority? Do you find his approach entirely satisfactory? If not, why not? Second, take Thomas Aquinas account of the relation of divine [revealed] law to natural law, and (in IIaIIae, q. 40) his treatment of the use of violent force: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, q. 91, art. 4, 5; q. 100, art. 1; q.107, art. 1-3; IIaIIae, q. 40, art. 1 Is Thomas account of the relation between Scripture and natural law adequate? Compare his treatment of war with Hays treatment of the use of violence. Do you detect any relative weaknesses or strengths in Thomas approach? Third, read this account of Karl Barth s use of Scripture, noting how Barth approaches the issue through systematic theology: Nigel Biggar, The Hastening that Waits: Karl Barth s Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), ch. 3, Biblical Indications How does this approach compare with Hays? What advantages or disadvantages might it have? Finally, read Barth s treatment of war: Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III, part 4: The Doctrine of Creation: the Command of God the Creator, pp. 450-70 How does this compare to Hays treatment of the use of violent force? Richard Burridge, Imitating Jesus: An Inclusive Approach to New Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007). David Cunningham, Christian Ethics: The End of the Law (London: Routledge, 2008), Part I, Narrating the Christian Life, esp. chs 3-5. Eryl Davies, The Bible in Ethics, in J.W. Rogerson and Judith Lieu (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Biblical Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). William Spohn, Scripture, in Meilaender and Werpehowski, Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics.
4 Week 4: 1 November (NJB) God and morality: Divine Commands First read S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. II, pt 2, pp. 631-708 Why do Kierkegaard and Barth want to think of God s relating to human moral life primarily in terms of issuing commands? What do they seek to fend off and what do they seek to gain? Reflect on the location of Barth s treatises on God s commands in the larger framework of the Church Dogmatics. Then read Janine Marie Idziak, Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1979) (the excerpts from John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Francisco Suarez) Why do these authors prefer to think of God as Commander (cp. as Legislator or the Good)? What problems does this conceptuality raise? Then read Nigel Biggar, The Hastening that Waits: Karl Barth s Ethics, ch. 1 David Clough, Ethics in Crisis: Interpreting Barth s Ethics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 114-17. Does Biggar s considerably modified role for divine commands tame them excessively? Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, Part III, The Good and the Right. C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)., God and Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) M. Jamie Ferreira, Kierkegaard (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). John E. Hare, God s Call: Moral Realism, God s Commands, and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001). John Lippitt, Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook (London: Routledge, 2003). Lois Malcolm, Divine Commands, in Meilaender and Werpehowski, Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics.
5 Week 5: 8 November (JO) Are there moral absolutes? Begin with the debate in Protestant circles over situationism : J. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966); Paul Ramsey, The Case of the Curious Exception, in Outka and Ramsey, Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, pp. 67-135: What should be said in Fletcher s favour? What are Ramsey s main criticisms? Then proceed to the debate in Roman Catholic moral theology between proportionalists and absolutists : R.A. McCormick, Ambiguity in Moral Choice, in R.A. McCormick and Paul Ramsey (eds), Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1979); John Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1991): What is the moral ambiguity, according to McCormick? Does McCormick affirm any moral absolute? How does Finnis deal with McCormick s ambiguity? How plausible are Finnis s absolutes? What role does Finnis allow the estimation of consequences? Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 1, Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), ch. 6, Critique of the Proportionalist Method of Moral Judgment Bernard Hoose, Proportionalism: The American Debate and its European Roots (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1987). Christopher Kaczor, Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2002). Paul Ramsey, VII. The Case of Joseph Fletcher and Joseph Fletcher s Cases, in Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (Lanham, MY: University Press of America, 1967, 1983).
6 Week 6: 15 November (JO) Consequences or intentions: must moral analysis choose? Begin with the debate in moral philosophy about utilitarianism: J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). for and against: what are the main points? Then proceed to this negotiation of the debate about the Principle of Double Effect (PDE): Nigel Biggar, Aiming to Kill: The Ethics of Suicide and Euthanasia (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 2004), ch. 3, The Morality of Acts of Killing : What is it to intend something? Why should the moral quality of an act depend decisively on its intention? Under what conditions does the Principle allow space for deliberation over consequences? Does it make good sense to distinguish morally between an effect intended and one foreseen but not intended? If so, under what conditions? Does the distinction always make good sense? If not, when not? Then read Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977), ca. pp. 86-91; John Harris, The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (London: Routledge, 1985), pp. 43-45: Has Biggar succeeded in refuting their criticisms of the PDE? Next, read Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 2: Living a Christian Life, ch. 8.B,C (pp. 469-87); and (for a clear and succinct account of the Finnis-Grisez doctrine of natural law) Rufus Black, Introduction: The New Natural Law Theory in Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black, The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological, and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 1-25. Do Biggar s criticisms of Grisez s version of the PDE really hold? David O. Brink, 14. Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism, in David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). T.A. Cavanagh, Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). Jonathan Glover (ed.), Utilitarianism and its Critics (New York: MacMillan, 1990). Bonnie Steinbock and Alastair Norcross (eds), Killing and Letting Die (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994). P.A. Woodward (ed.), The Doctrine of Double Effect: Philosophers Debate a Controversial Moral Principle (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2001).
7 Week 7: 22 November (JO) Before analysis: narrative and virtue Begin with S. Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame, IN: Fides, 1974), chs 2, 4;, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1975), pp. 1-10, chs IV, V;, The Peaceable Kingdom, chs 2, 3., Rational Suicide and Reasons for Living, Suffering Presence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), pp. 100-13 Then refer to Paul Nelson, Narrative and Morality: a Theological Enquiry (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987): In affirming narrative and virtue, what is Hauerwas reacting against? What does Hauerwas mean by narrative? How does narrative bear on morality, and on virtue in particular? The read this account of Karl Barth s treatment of virtue : Nigel Biggar, The Hastening that Waits: Karl Barth s Ethics, ch. 4: Why can virtue be problematic for Protestants? How does Barth deal with the problem? Then consider this critical response to the notion of a virtue ethic : Jean Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chs 4, 5: Can there be such a thing as a virtue ethic? Where, in relation to other elements, should virtue be located in a comprehensive ethic? Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics, in Copp, The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds, Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) David Cunningham, Christian Ethics: The End of the Law (London: Routledge, 2008), Part I, Narrating the Christian Life, esp. chs 3-5. Jennifer Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008) [on Protestant suspicion] Jean Porter, Virtue, in Meilaender and Werpehowski, Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics.
8 Week 8: 29 November (NJB) May Christian ethics speak in its own terms in public? First read Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), chs 3-7 How fair are Stout s critiques of Macintyre, Hauerwas and Milbank? What, according to Stout, is Rawls position on theology and public reason? How does Stout purport to improve on Rawls? Then read John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999): How far does Rawls exclude theology from public deliberation? What are public reasons? Finally, read Nigel Biggar, Behaving in Public (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011) What different kinds of theological intervention might be made in public deliberation? Should any of them be more or less permissible than others? If so, why? What is it to make an argument accessible? What moral considerations, according to a Christian ethic, should govern communication? Are these the same within the Church and outside it? Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham, MY: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). Nigel Biggar, Not Translation, but Conversation: Theology in Public Debate about Euthanasia, in Nigel Biggar and Linda Hogan, eds, Religious Voices in Public Places (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 151-93. Nigel Biggar, Conclusion, in Nigel Biggar and Linda Hogan, eds, Religious Voices in Public Places (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 151-93. Christopher Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Michael Perry, Under God? Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Professor Nigel Biggar Christ Church OX1 1DP Email nigel.biggar@chch.ox.ac.uk 1 October 2016