OLLI Sonoma: ISIS Wahhabism Today Saudi Arabia's New Ambassador To The U.S. Makes His First Pitch Huffington Post March 9, 2016 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/saudi-arabia-ambassador_us_56e04767e4b0860f99d75630 [1] WASHINGTON -- Prince Abdullah bin Faisal bin Turki Al Saud, Saudi Arabia's new ambassador in Washington, used his first message to the American people to rebut criticism of the kingdom, in an op-ed published Wednesday in The Huffington Post. Abdullah, signaling that the Saudis are aware of their longtime American partners' growing impatience, denied that the kingdom has contributed to violent intolerance in the Muslim world. But experts said his article is unlikely to have much impact on frustrations with Saudi Arabia among American policymakers and the public. [2] "Saudi Arabia has been falsely accused by some commentators of promoting extremism," wrote Abdullah, who was appointed ambassador in October. "Don t they realize that extremists are as much or more of a threat to Saudi Arabia than to any other part of the world? If critics took the time to look at the facts, they would see that Saudi Arabia has and will continue to lead all nations in combating the mindset that foments violent extremism." Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) this year accused Saudi Arabia of contributing to religious intolerance in the region. That charge was the focus of a speech questioning the U.S.-Saudi alliance, making waves within the Beltway and showing that criticism of the kingdom is no longer taboo for top American players. [3] Abdullah noted Saudi involvement in the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, emphasizing its role in trying to stem the flow of terror financing. The kingdom has been willing to send ground troops into Syria if the U.S. gives it the green light, he added. This fight against radicalization has become a focus of Saudi government policy, Abdullah wrote. Hundreds of Saudis have joined ISIS, al Qaeda and other terror organizations over the years. "Saudis are working together to modernize our society and create a better life for our children. Extremism has no place within that vision. Rather than point fingers, we hope the world will work with us to help achieve these goals," Abdullah wrote. [4] Critics of Saudi Arabia note that 15 of the 19 Sept. 11 attackers were Saudis and say that the strand of Islam the kingdom promotes has enabled violence against the West. Some believe, based on testimony from the so-called 20th hijacker, that the Saudi government helped the 9/11 plotters -- a charge that's been promoted recently by Donald Trump to appeal to Americans unhappy with U.S. partners in the Middle East. The Saudis emphasize that their accuser, Zacarias Moussaoui, was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia by a psychologist. But some, including two former senators, say Moussaoui's allegation may be worthy of further scrutiny. [5] "It is illogical for the Kingdom to promote the very mindset that has threatened Saudi Arabia with deadly attacks against our homes and mosques," Abdullah wrote. ISIS has repeatedly called for and executed large terror plots against Saudi Arabia. Unlike al Qaeda, the group has focused primarily on the "near enemy" -- governments in the Muslim world that it sees as corrupted by their ties to the West. "Saudi Arabia will win this battle against extremism no matter how long it may take," Abdullah concluded. [6] Abdullah's PR battle could take just as long. Many Americans see Saudi Arabia as both an exporter of extremism and the home of a nasty form of it, given its curbs on women's rights, frequent beheadings, suppression of political dissent and close alliances with controversial clerics. David Weinberg, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, told The Huffington Post he has testified to Congress repeatedly that the kingdom protects preachers who spread extremist ideology. He cited a March 1 ISIS-linked attack on a pro-government Saudi preacher in the Philippines. Though the U.S. does not classify Saudi Arabia as a state sponsor of terror, unlike Saudi rival Iran, "the Saudi state is still engaged in propagating its brand of Islam," Weinberg said. "I think the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have overlapping interests [in combating terror]... but that still doesn't excuse Saudi Arabia's embrace of extremist Sunni actors that for example are designated by U.S. or U.N. terror financing laws," Weinberg said. "That doesn't mean state preachers are promoters of tolerance." [7] The scene outside a mosque in Saudi Arabia after the Islamic State organization staged a suicide bombing there in 2015. Absent from Abdullah's message was mention of the Saudis' unpopular and bloody Obama-backed campaign to restore the
government in Yemen, which has claimed thousands of civilian lives and distracted U.S.-provided Saudi resources from the ISIS fight. Analysts tracking the Riyadh-Washington relationship told The Huffington Post the new ambassador's effort won't succeed if he continues to avoid uncomfortable conversations. 2 [8] "Polling shows that Saudi Arabia is much more unpopular among Americans today than at any time in recent history, so I think the kingdom is wise to try and engage in countering its image problems," said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst and White House adviser who is now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. "I think the biggest weakness [the ambassador is] going to have is explaining the war in Yemen and why the richest Arab country is bombing the poorest Arab country. That s increasingly prompting concern on Capitol Hill. I think he s going to have a tough fight up there." [9] The Saudis could take steps that would endear themselves to Americans, Riedel noted, but he said those moves would be too difficult to maneuver in the short term, given the conservative bent of the powerful state-backed clerical establishment there. "I've said this to the Saudis many times: You really want to improve your image? There's one simple thing to do: Let women drive cars. I understand that's easier said than done." Many U.S. difficulties with Saudi Arabia stem from the government's cooperation with orthodox clerics. Still, the Saudi state continues to signal that it's unwilling to challenge even question its version of Islam. The ambassador's op-ed said non-saudis misunderstood the kingdom's prevalent theology, called Wahhabism abroad because of its ideological father, Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-wahhab. Abdullah said blaming Wahhab for the spread of extremism is simplistic and wrong. [10] "'Wahhabism' is an invented term that has become a slur against the Saudi people," the ambassador wrote. That argument does carry weight, given other factors contributing to radicalization, particularly in countries that have almost no Wahhabi influence, like ISIS recruitment hub Tunisia. And Saudis themselves do not speak of being Wahhabi, according to Riedel and Weinberg. "If you are actually a believer in the kind of Islam that most Saudis believe in they don t think of it as Wahhabi, it's not about revering [Wahhab as] an individual," Riedel said. [11] The austere Saudi version of Islam is mostly concerned with ideological purity rejecting versions of Islam that incorporate folk traditions or accord respect to human religious leaders, and instead celebrating only God, the Quran and saying of the Prophet. That's led to controversial policies, like government efforts to destroy early Islamic historical sites, which are seen as blasphemous by many Saudis, and punishing criminals according to early Islamic practice -- in ways that end up being reminding the rest of the world of ISIS. [12] Saudi Arabia is home to Makkah, the holiest site in Islam. Many non-saudi Muslims believe that the Kingdom has not done enough to protect early Islamic heritage sites because its version of Islam sees them as blasphemous, and they are unhappy with the growth of more modern buildings like the Clock Tower landmark. Policy experts said Saudi Arabia is an essential U.S. partner in the fight against militant Islamists in Syria and elsewhere, even with religious and other constraints. But, they added, the kingdom must put a stop to policies that are harmful to U.S. interests and global stability. "They continue to see security in the Middle East as zero-sum," said former State Department official Reza Marashi, now research director at the National Iranian American Council and a frequent commentator on Saudi-Iran issues. He said that belief led the Saudis to over-extend themselves rather than dealing with "real, legitimate security concerns" out of a misplaced fear that any gains by Iran mean a weakening of Saudi Arabia and its alliance with the U.S. [13] While there are grumblings within the Obama administration about Saudi Arabia, relations are cooler than they were under President George W. Bush, the two countries share a structural alliance. That means the U.S. has little interest in talking about Saudi rights abuses, even if they threaten the government's long-term stability. The Saudi voice remains loud on Capitol Hill, courtesy of well-connected lobbyists, a congressional aide told The Huffington Post. The aide said recent congressional actions indicate displeasure with the kingdom a weapons transfer hold related to the Yemen campaign and Murphy's speech pale in comparison to sympathy for the Saudi position. Murphy's office said he wouldn't comment until he had read Abdullah's op-ed. [14] Israel's role is a powerful factor, because it shares an interest with Saudi Arabia in keeping U.S. lawmakers and Americans wary of Iran, the aide noted. Were anti-saudi or pro-iran arguments to become too common, the aide would expect to see "the Israelis stepping in to save the Saudis." Israel's main Palestinian worry, Hamas, has been close in recent years to Iran and to
political Islamists, so the group has lost some appeal to Saudi Arabia. So too has the Lebanese organization Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy that was once celebrated by Muslims in spheres of Saudi and Iranian influence for standing up to Israel. Their government is worried about losing U.S. support and its diminished influence because of the fall in oil prices. That reality means that nudging the Saudis carefully is the best bet for the Obama administration, the experts said. "It's got to be backroom diplomacy, not megaphone diplomacy. because it's at a time of skittishness for Saudi Arabia where publicly criticizing them isn't going to help," Marashi of the National Iranian American Council said. 3 [15] Saudi worries about the U.S. are growing as the country's leaders fret about how the falling price of oil will affect their economy and regional reach. Marashi said the White House could do a better job, noting that it has supported the Saudis' Yemen action without offering guidance that may have prevented the campaign from becoming as controversial as it has. Ilan Goldenberg of the Center for a New American Security, who last month hosted the first public Saudi effort to win Washington support for the Yemen war, said Obama's personal style didn't seem to have meshed with the Saudis. Goldenberg added that some supporters of the president's policies, particularly the Iran deal, have developed a tendency of blaming the Saudis for Middle East chaos while neglecting Iran's role. [16] "I'm actually for finding ways to reassure the Saudis partially, by gently punching the Iranians in the nose a couple of times, even while we continue to implement the deal and search for other potential areas of cooperation," Goldenberg told The Huffington Post, adding that he was a strong proponent of the deal. The question for the Saudis particularly the new ambassador then becomes whether the next U.S. administration will develop a way to do that, helping the American alliance with the kingdom become less challenging for both sides to maintain. "A lot of these are issues of Saudi policy, not of Saudi message," Weinberg of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies said. "So it's hard to change the way the message is being received if there's only so much you can work with." Our Radical Islamic BFF, Saudi Arabia Thomas Friedman New York Times September 2, 2015 [1] The Washington Post ran a story last week about some 200 retired generals and admirals who sent a letter to Congress urging lawmakers to reject the Iran nuclear agreement, which they say threatens national security. There are legitimate arguments for and against this deal, but there was one argument in this story that was so dangerously wrongheaded about the real threats to America from the Middle East, it needs to be called out. That argument was from Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, the retired former vice commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, who said of the nuclear accord: What I don t like about this is, the number one leading radical Islamic group in the world is the Iranians. They are purveyors of radical Islam throughout the region and throughout the world. And we are going to enable them to get nuclear weapons. [2] Sorry, General, but the title greatest purveyors of radical Islam does not belong to the Iranians. Not even close. That belongs to our putative ally Saudi Arabia. When it comes to Iran s involvement in terrorism, I have no illusions: I covered firsthand the 1983 suicide bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, both believed to be the handiwork of Iran s cat s paw, Hezbollah. Iran s terrorism, though vis-à-vis the U.S. has always been of the geopolitical variety: war by other means to push the U.S. out of the region so Iran can dominate it, not us. [3] I support the Iran nuclear deal because it reduces the chances of Iran building a bomb for 15 years and creates the possibility that Iran s radical religious regime can be moderated through more integration with the world. But if you think Iran is the only source of trouble in the Middle East, you must have slept through 9/11, when 15 of the 19 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia. Nothing has been more corrosive to the stability and modernization of the Arab world, and the Muslim world at large, than the billions and billions of dollars the Saudis have invested since the 1970s into wiping out the pluralism of Islam the Sufi, moderate Sunni and Shiite versions and imposing in its place the puritanical, anti-modern, anti-women, anti-western, anti-pluralistic Wahhabi Salafist brand of Islam promoted by the Saudi religious establishment. [4] It is not an accident that several thousand Saudis have joined the Islamic State or that Arab Gulf charities have sent ISIS donations. It is because all these Sunni jihadist groups ISIS, Al Qaeda, the Nusra Front are the ideological offspring of the
Wahhabism injected by Saudi Arabia into mosques and madrasas from Morocco to Pakistan to Indonesia. And we, America, have never called them on that because we re addicted to their oil and addicts never tell the truth to their pushers. Let s avoid hyperbole when describing one enemy or potential enemy as the greatest source of instability, said Husain Haqqani, the former Pakistani ambassador to Washington, who is an expert on Islam at the Hudson Institute. 4 [5] It is an oversimplification, he said. While Iran has been a source of terrorism in supporting groups like Hezbollah, many American allies have been a source of terrorism by supporting Wahhabi ideology, which basically destroyed the pluralism that emerged in Islam since the 14th century, ranging from Bektashi Islam in Albania, which believes in living with other religions, to Sufi and Shiite Islam. The last few decades have seen this attempt to homogenize Islam, claiming there is only one legitimate path to God, Haqqani said. And when there is only one legitimate path, all others are open to being killed. That has been the single most dangerous idea that has emerged in the Muslim world, and it came out of Saudi Arabia and has been embraced by others, including the government in Pakistan. [6] Consider this July 16, 2014, story in The Times from Beirut: For decades, Saudi Arabia has poured billions of its oil dollars into sympathetic Islamic organizations around the world, quietly practicing checkbook diplomacy to advance its agenda. But a trove of thousands of Saudi documents recently released by WikiLeaks reveals in surprising detail how the government s goal in recent years was not just to spread its strict version of Sunni Islam though that was a priority but also to undermine its primary adversary: Shiite Iran. Or consider this Dec 5, 2010, report on BBC.com: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned last year in a leaked classified memo that donors in Saudi Arabia were the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide. She said it was an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat such activity as a strategic priority. The groups funded include al-qaeda, the Taliban and Lashkare-Taiba, she added. [7] Saudi Arabia has been an American ally on many issues and there are moderates there who detest its religious authorities. But the fact remains that Saudi Arabia s export of Wahhabi puritanical Islam has been one of the worst things to happen to Muslim and Arab pluralism pluralism of religious thought, gender and education in the last century. Iran s nuclear ambition is a real threat; it needs to be corralled. But don t buy into the nonsense that it s the only source of instability in this region. The King and ISIS Daniel Benjamin Foreign Policy September 10, 2015 [1] When Saudi Arabia s King Salman made his first visit to Washington since ascending the throne in January, his goals were simple. The 79-year-old ruler wanted to paper over the disputes that have eroded the U.S.-Saudi relationship for years and extract from President Barack Obama s administration a payoff for Riyadh s tepid support of the nuclear deal with Iran. With the White House eager to maintain momentum on the nuclear agreement after securing the Senate votes to block the Republican rejection of the deal, King Salman s timing was excellent all but erasing memories of his no-show at a Camp David conference of Gulf leaders in May. [2] Papering over differences is one of diplomacy s finer and more useful arts. With the Saudis anxious about a possible warming in the U.S. relationship with Iran and sharp disagreements regarding Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and the broader sectarian blood bath in the Middle East, the visit was a solid piece of work in the service of Washington s ever more schizophrenic partnership with Riyadh perhaps the most convoluted bilateral relationship the United States has had with any country. The atmospherics around the visit were sufficiently positive that few mentioned the contradictions that seem to be fraying ties between the United States and its longtime friend in the Gulf. [3] One commentator who did dwell on the deep dissonance in the relationship was Thomas Friedman, in a New York Times column published just before King Salman s arrival. Teeing off on some benighted retired Air Force general who opposed the nuclear deal on the grounds that Iran was the leading sponsor of Islamic radicalism in the world, Friedman exclaimed: Nothing has been more corrosive to the stability and modernization of the Arab world, and the Muslim world at large, than the billions and billions of dollars the Saudis have invested since the 1970s into wiping out the pluralism of Islam and imposing in its place the puritanical, anti-modern, anti-women, anti-western, anti-pluralistic Wahhabi Salafist brand of Islam.
[4] Democracy is the best foundation for global peace, stable and secure societies, and open markets; supporting democracy is both in their interest. Friedman is on target in arguing that Saudi Arabia s contribution to Islamist extremism has far outstripped Iran s. Indeed, Tehran s effort to transcend sect and become the leader of the Muslim world s radical rejectionist stream has been in tatters since the Arab Spring and the heightening of sectarian tensions because of the Syrian civil war. Although systemic misgovernance is the Arab world s deadliest disease, Saudi Arabia s energetic propagation of Wahhabism which began as a response to Iran s Islamic Revolution in 1979 has been central to the rise of violent extremism, from Indonesia to Mali. 5 [5] Wahhabism has been a devastating invasive species in Islam s enormous ecosystem it s the zebra mussel, the Asian Tiger mosquito, and the emerald ash borer wrapped into one. The consequences have been fateful: A solid line of causation from the slaughter in Islamic State-controlled Iraq and the tragedy of 9/11 traces back directly to Saudi evangelization and the many radical mosques and extremist NGOs it spawned. [6] Friedman s explanation for why the United States has never challenged Riyadh is crude in both senses of the word. We re addicted to their oil and addicts never tell the truth to their pushers, he wrote. This is too easy; if oil were the only vital U.S. interest binding it to the kingdom, dealing with the export of extremism would be vastly easier. What Friedman and almost everyone else misses is the increasingly pivotal importance of counterterrorism cooperation in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. That may set heads spinning, but when it comes to tactical counterterrorism uncovering conspiracies and disrupting them Saudi Arabia has become an invaluable partner, one of the very best Washington has. [7] Following Saudi Arabia s apparent epiphany after the May 2003 bombings in Riyadh, which killed 39 people, ties between U.S. counterterrorism authorities and their Saudi counterparts have grown close, collegial, and effective. There is a reason why Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef, now second in line to the throne and the architect of Saudi counterterrorism strategy, is far and away Washington s favorite leader in Riyadh. The golden age of this cooperation began in 2009, when the terrorist threat was developing most dangerously in the kingdom s backyard: Yemen. Saudi counterterrorism cooperation at the time prevented hundreds of American deaths, possibly more. Some of the cases are well-known, like the plot to hide bombs in printer cartridges aboard U.S.-bound planes. Without these tips, one or more aircraft would have gone down. Other operations have helped the United States defend against a new class of undetectable bombs that might also be used against aviation. Wherever else one might find fault with them, the Saudis did superb work in these cases. The cooperation extends beyond the cloak and dagger stuff. Since 2003, the Saudi government s work on counterterrorism finance has improved considerably, and its efforts in the area of rehabilitating extremists have been recognized internationally. [8] Still, there is an extraordinary paradox here. Because of the large sums that flow from the country s religious establishment and huge NGOs to institutions that promote Wahhabi-style Islam with its malignant views of Shiites, Jews, Christians, and the West Saudi Arabia remains the fountainhead for Islamist extremism. These funds, together with curricular materials, preachers, television broadcasters, religious literature, and the like stoke radicalism in scores of countries, even if they are typically not directly implicated in violent acts. At the same time, Saudi intelligence services are active around the world trying to prevent the terrorism that grows from this activity. [9] Crazy? Absolutely, but it is an insanity borne of the kingdom s original political compact between Muhammad ibn Saud, progenitor of the House of Saud, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab, the original Wahhabi, a charismatic preacher who joined forces to wrest control of the Arabian Peninsula in the mid-18th century. The royal family could rule Arabia so long as it promoted Wahhabism, and the monarchy has relied on Wahhabi clerics to validate its legitimacy as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques ever since. Whenever the monarchy has faced challenges to its rule, it has pumped even more money to the clerical establishment, some of which went abroad. Not surprisingly, the prospect of a democratic wave sweeping the region during the Arab Spring led to billions being disbursed. [10] So why hasn t the United States pressed Riyadh more effectively to dial back the support for extremism that so clearly affects our security and global interests? There are several reasons. To begin with, counterterrorism cooperation of the kind that Riyadh has supplied is hard to argue with. No president wants to risk alienating a government that is helping safeguard American lives. While some officials have pushed for engaging the Saudis on the export of extremism, many others are averse to starting a tough discussion that could go nowhere. The Saudis, after all, are unlikely to reconceive their polity on our account.
[11] Further complicating matters has been what might be called the Politburo syndrome. As with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the small handful of Saudi gerontocrats who are authorized to do anything either the king or a few of the senior-most princes are either dying or too intellectually ossified to persuade anyone to adopt a radically different approach. So for all the advances after 9/11 and the kiss-and-make-up atmosphere of the moment, the prognosis for the U.S.-Saudi relationship is not encouraging. The two countries priorities are simply too far apart. For the United States, the imperatives are to implement the nuclear deal with Iran and halt the rise of Islamist extremism above all, contain and diminish the Islamic State without dispatching American combat troops to the region. For the Saudis, the paramount goal is to roll back Iranian advances, especially in Yemen and Syria. 6 [12] In Yemen, the Saudi campaign against the Houthi insurgents has become the signature initiative for Riyadh s new and emboldened foreign policy. The United States has voiced hedged support for the Saudi effort primarily an effort at alliance maintenance, which was a necessity against the backdrop of the nuclear negotiations. But behind the scenes, Washington has gnawing concerns about the Saudi war effort. The bombing runs are killing civilians in appalling numbers, and a country that hovers on desperation has been plunged into a humanitarian disaster. The United States is trying to refine Saudi targeting, but the carnage remains ghastly, and the Saudi claim that the Houthis are nothing more than an Iranian proxy has also worn thin. [13] This isn t just bad for the Yemenis. It s also bad for the United States because terrorist groups thrive in conflict zones and Yemen s jihadis especially al Qaeda are gaining territory and influence, since they face no pressure except from the occasional U.S. drone shot. Meanwhile in Syria, the Saudis are not supporting the Islamic State, but they would be quite happy to see other Islamists topple Bashar al-assad and make Damascus again a Sunni capital. Plenty of money is now flowing from the Persian Gulf to al-nusra Front, the al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Again, extremists are benefiting from the chaos. [14] As for the U.S.-led coalition fighting against the Islamic State, the Saudi contribution has been minimal. It hasn t flown a mission in Iraq yet, according to the accounting on the Pentagon s website. Exactly why is not clear: Perhaps the Saudis can t ask for permission from the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government because they don t have an embassy in Baghdad, or perhaps they just can t bring themselves to support the Baghdad government. In Syria, it has flown a scant few of the 119 airstrikes not carried out by the United States. In short, Riyadh believes that the extremist problem can be cleaned up later after it wins the wars in Yemen and Syria and puts Iran back in its place. [15] Can any of this be fixed? Will our partners of seven decades, as U.S. officials like to refer to the Saudis, join in the fight against extremism and not just its terrorist end-product? Don t count on it: Saudi Arabia has avoided taking such steps for decades, and there is no reason to think the kingdom can t stay on its current course for decades more. As for the United States, it will remain saddled with tactical imperatives that prevent it from addressing the bigger mess. And so Washington will muddle forward against the jihadi threat.