Rousseau and Kant on Man s Choice: Desire or Reason

Rousseau and Kant on Man s Choice: Desire or Reason By Joseph A. Casanova A Senior Essay submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Bachelor of Arts in the Integral Curriculum of Liberal Arts. Michael Mike Riley, Advisor Saint Mary s College of California September 23, 2014 1

Introduction After reading Rousseau s A Discourse on Inequality I was left with a feeling of wanting a method to go about acting in a way that is moral and right. Rousseau there describes how the development of man s faculties made man aware of inequalities between men. These inequalities grew to include unnatural inequalities as well as natural ones that put men always in a restless state and pitted them against each other. He claims the restless state is responsible for all man s virtue but mostly for his vice. He says that the spirit of society together with these inequalities corrupt the original state of man, i.e. his innocence and pity and empathy for other men which are not inequalities but equalities. (Rousseau 136) Rousseau wants man to listen to his natural inclinations apart from reason and what he has learned from society. He thinks that when man listens to his natural inclination to pity, he discovers where goodness and sincere empathetic action begin. This solution still doesn t present a way in which a man already in society can go about acting in a way that is virtuous. While Rousseau s argument is a satisfying one in regard to how inequalities come about, it does not provide an answer to the question of how to guide one s own restless state and desire. How can man intuit what is right and what will guide man towards this end? Isn t this the great question in life? Its answer could show how to become a good man. Kant s Metaphysics of Morals provides a possible answer to the question that Rousseau left with me. The answer for Kant is duty. Kant s idea of duty resonated with me and had a greatness about it because it was rooted in reason. Duty for Kant is doing what is practically necessary which he argues is also the good. Where Rousseau left me with a feeling of where to look for what is good, and a proposal for why men act in a way 2

that fosters vice, Kant presents a method for acting rightly. Kant takes his idea of duty and shows what men need to act in accordance with it. I here set out to examine how Rousseau came to the idea of the restless state of man and then to answer the question of how then to act rightly by Kant s notion of duty. I also want to interconnect Kant s ideas of the unsociable sociability and the development of man s faculties with Rousseau s restless state because that will make clearer how duty will best direct the behavior of man in society and in nature. (Kant 122, Rousseau 133) In this paper I first examine what Rousseau says about savage and civil man; second I explore Kant and his notion of Duty; third I compare the ideas of both Rousseau and Kant regarding the restless state and man s quarrelsomeness; and last I set out to reconcile Rousseau s and Kant s ideas as well as my own concerning them. Rousseau Rousseau came to the idea of restless state of man through the exploration of the development of man s faculties and the inequality which arose from them. Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality explains the savage and the civil man and the progression from the savage to the civil man. In order to do this he first starts with the savage man and describes what it is to be savage and in the state of nature. This state is very important to Rousseau and helps readers understand the reasons behind civil man s actions. Towards the end of the discourse he exclaims, the restless state is responsible for what is best and worst among men. (Rousseau 113) What is this restless state and how is it responsible for man s virtue and vice? To answer this question I explore the nature of the savage man as well as his transformation into civil man. 3

Rousseau starts his discourse off by looking to the savage man and to how he developed and lived in nature. In the beginning man was not very far from the state that the other animals were in. He was by himself in nature and acted as other animals would. Man had his senses and he had the world around him to inform those senses of his surroundings as well as the things that inhabited them. Rousseau points out that while nature alone activates everything in the operations of a beast, man participates in his own actions in his capacity as a free agent. (Rousseau 87) He basically is saying that man and beasts have the same senses that are affected by the same source, nature. Now when a beast receives information from nature, there is only one way for him to act and this Rousseau calls instinct. The savage man is in tune with this instinct but in turn he has the choice to comply with nature or to go against it, to act how he wills. For Rousseau the farther from nature man gets, the harder it is for him listen to what instinct tells him, and reason sometimes will get in the way of the natural instinct of pity. A second difference between men and beasts that he points out is the faculty of self-improvement. (Rousseau 88) Self-improvement is at the crux of the future development of man as well as being the source of changes that came about in his development along the way to the present. The free will fosters the faculty of selfimprovement and the free will is what keeps it in effect. By this I mean that without free will and the ability to act in a way that nature does not dictate, the state of selfimprovement would not exist. Other animals do not have the faculty of self-improvement and for this reason they are still animals at the mercy of nature and the information it imparts to them. They cannot act apart from instinct, they are predictable. 4

Rousseau claims that with the spread of humanity and the differing of climates as well as foliage and surroundings, men became aware of differences between other things. He expressed these differences through descriptive words: large, small, strong, weak, fast, slow. (Rousseau 110) These relationships then gave him the tools to differentiate between things as well as animals and beings. With these relations and his faculty of self-improvement came the necessary situations that would convert him to the civil man. For Rousseau in the state of nature man looks toward himself in all ways. He is in nature and he concerns himself with only the things that survival and life depend on. He looks for food and protects himself while sleeping under trees and moving from place to place. This behavior all comes before the domestic home is introduced and even before language. Man had at his disposal his cunning and guile as well as his free will and faculty of self-improvement. Other philosophers such as Hobbes say that man in nature is prone to violence and fighting. Rousseau has a different attitude and that is that man is most peaceable in nature because of the calm of the passions and the ignorance of vice which prevents them from doing evil. (Rousseau 99) Man s peaceable nature and ignorance of evil seems to bolster the idea that Rousseau presents of pity. He believes that, pity is a natural sentiment which, by moderating in each individual the activity of self-love, contributes to the mutual preservation of the whole species. It is pity that carries us without reflection to the aid of those we see suffering; it is pity which in the state of nature takes the place of laws, morals and virtues, with the added advantage that no one there is tempted to disobey its gentle voice (Rousseau 101) Rousseau here makes an important claim about the savage man which is very curious and of great importance. The pity felt here is one that does not require the 5

capacity for reflection and that is why it is something that is still present in the savage common man. Rousseau states, Mandeville well realized that men, despite all their morality, would never have been any better than monsters if nature had not given them pity to support reason, but he failed to see that all social virtues which he denies in men flow from this quality alone. (Rousseau 100) Here he is claiming that it is through pity that man has all of the virtues of generosity, mercy, and humility. When man feels this sense of pity and acts on it to preserve the life of another, the compassion that he feels not only aims at the other man but in an indirect way it also aims at himself. Savage man looks at a person suffering and in his mind puts himself in the place of the sufferer. He sees that they are the same and not that they are different or unequal like his progeny will soon become. This acknowledgment of sameness that comes about by pity is how man brings about and realizes his self-love. Is pity or better, empathy, an aspect of man that actually serves the purposes of species preservation or is this the beginning of man s fall to vice? The capacity for pity is what moves man to take his leap forward and starts his transformation from savage man to civil man. When savage man gains the ability to relate things, he is able to look around himself and notice the differences between things. At the same time he begins to notice, for the first time, others of his race wandering about the forest. He has no language or contemplative reason but is necessarily happy. It is only when he looks to others of his species and in turn has pity for them that he makes his way toward civil man. His realization of his human counterparts then inclines him to work with others to attain a common goal. In time men learned that if they stick together in loose knit groups, they could prosper. When man started to relate to his brethren, they 6

all needed a method to convey ideas to each other and this is language. Rousseau claims that language is how humans developed their reason because humans can only truly express themselves by words. (Rousseau 95) Language is also directly responsible for man s faculty of self-improvement and helps man help others to self-improve. When man learned how to build huts and was able to defend them, savage or partly savage man started to live with his mate and his children. Living together brought with it the sentiments of conjugal and parental love and with them many other problems. (Rousseau 112) In nature man always looked only to himself, not at anything else. Savage man only recognized things that would keep him alive. When man starts to pity his fellow man and comes together in a small community, things change. Man looks to others now and sees the differences between people for the first time. With this knowledge comes the feeling of preference. Beauty, strength and skill come into the picture and people start to realize that they prefer some traits to others. While natural inequality in itself is harmless, when man wants others to look at him as an individual and concerns himself with others opinions, it becomes dangerous. (Rousseau 114) Rousseau states, From those first preferences arose, on the one side, vanity and scorn, on the other, shame and envy, and the fermentation produced by these new leavens finally produced compounds fatal to happiness and innocence. (Rousseau 114) These new feeling clouded man s judgment and made it so that his inclinations pointed toward things that didn t necessarily matter because they are not essential to the betterment of man. Rousseau says that it is when one man has to help another man that the problems that unnatural inequalities create arise. It is also when one man has enough food for two 7

that the lines of equality break and possessions come into being. Like natural inequalities among men this civil difference of property gave one man power over the other. Men holding power over each other in many ways leads to the problems that men face when one man has an object that another man wants or in some cases needs. Rousseau says that along with the problems that come with the realization of differences, comes the development of reason through language and the creation of society. In instinct alone man had all he needed for living in the state of nature; in cultivated reason he has what is necessary only for living in society. (Rousseau 97) Rousseau states here that man does not need reason to exist in nature and that it is superfluous. This reason together with the integration of language and ideas among people is what ignites its power inside man s being. Man has always had the capacity for reason but has not had the motivation, opportunity, or the tools to use it to its full extent. Rousseau thinks that these ideas and reasoning on them in many ways will bring new and wonderful things. Civil man is aware of the love that can be had with his family as well as with his countrymen so that they can exist peacefully together. Together in an ideal situation the realization of the difference between things is good and is facilitated fully by language. This difference gives man the capacity to differentiate between good and evil deeds and then his free will has a choice. For Rousseau the capacity to differentiate is the greatest difference between civil man and savage man. The savage man is ignorant of vice as well as the other human beings around him. Rousseau states, he felt only his true needs, saw only what he believed it was necessary to see, and his intelligence made no more progress than his vanity. (Rousseau 104) Rousseau shows how the natural man needs only sustenance to 8

survive, so if his stomach is full and he is safe from harm, he is happy. With reason and the faculty of self-improvement humans as civil men are rewarded the power of skill. This skill is something that can raise humanity to new heights, but with something so powerful and with our free will, humanity can create many problems as well as solve them. The restless state among men is caused by their will and determination to use skill to the best of their advantage. Hopefully when a civil man acts, he realizes that he is part of a group of people and should not act harshly toward them. Acting with forethought and civility unfortunately is not the case with all men. The principle of self-improvement that Rousseau highlights in his argument speaks volumes about the nature of man. It is not a coincidence that man s greatest tool is that which puts him into so much pain and anguish. It is the choice that civil man should make to act justly and peacefully toward others in the society which he is a part of that troubles him so greatly. Rousseau thinks that civil man should act in a way that is beneficial to all men and that the choice to act in this way reason fosters. Choice, though, is not always reasonable and in some ways it seems like Rousseau knows that the restless state that man has kept himself in is another cause of all the bad things that are present in this world as well as the few good things. (Rousseau 133) Rousseau presents us with an account of how man might have developed from savage to civil man. His account takes into mind the possibility of man as a savage animal who, through his small amount of reason and inclination to pity his fellow man, would start to see the differences between men. This awareness of difference awakens within men a desire to be talked about and the restless state. (Rousseau 133) Man would 9

never be the same and this power would push man to his greatest heights of brilliance and benevolence as well as his most horrific atrocities. Although Rousseau convinces me how man can let his freewill choose vice and crimes against himself and his fellow man, he never really shows a way to get from the present back to man s natural sense of pity or similarly empathy. Kant has a more rational approach that helps in this inquiry of how to act in a manner that conforms with righteousness and goodness. Kant What is man s compass? What can direct the restless state of man to act in the light of virtue and not the darkness of vice? To Kant reason is our guide to what is moral and right. He says that it is only when man acts according to duty that he can have true moral worth. If Rousseau s restless state of man is guided by reason apart from inclination and desire, then man will act rightly. The natural dialectic clouds man s reason and he has to act with regard to pure reason without this distraction. Man uses the natural dialectic, i.e. a disposition, to argue against these strict laws of duty to follow desires as an excuse to do what he knows is wrong and without merit. (Kant 163) Kant says that to act according to duty and what is practical necessary is what is good. First Kant explores the notion of duty and what it consists of. Then he conceives of a formula by which to help man act in the light of these duties. This formula is that of imperatives, and most importantly the Categorical Imperative, which can direct the reason to all other imperatives of duty. Kant became very important to this inquiry because he gives man a formula and a ruler in which he can measure what is virtuous and just. Kant 10

painstakingly presents his method, but it is very helpful to have a starting place to determine the morally correct. Kant s Duty Kant in his work Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals sets out what right action consists of. To Kant an action derives its moral worth from the action and not the object of the action or the end it is for. Duty simply put is to do what is morally right and good. The most important faculty to Kant is man s reason; man s reason enables him to have a free will. Kant says, Everything in nature works according to law. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e. have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognized as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e. the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent on inclination recognizes as practically necessary, i.e. as good. (Kant 170) The existence of a will good in itself is one of the most important concepts to Kant and it is behind all of his assertions in Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. That man as a rational creature can choose to act against his instincts is what intrinsically gives man a will. It is the fact that he can act with the conception of laws and not just from desire alone. To act from instinct does not require one to use his reason. This is what the other animals do and they do not have a freewill, because a freewill can decide to act apart from instinct. Kant argues that the ability to act in such a way that is objectively necessary shows that a man can act in a way that his nature does not control, 11

and gives him a will that is free. If he just acted from inclination, he would not have a will or be a being that has free will, because nature would determine his actions and not him. He would be reacting to stimuli and not taking said stimuli into his mental faculties, his reason, which makes him able to choose the action. It is the ability to act in the name of good that gives man a free will. Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. (Kant 158, Kant s own italics) Duty as exactly this requires a good will in itself and not just a will that colors itself by inclination. To Kant duty is more and greater than a person s feeling or inclination to do a good work, i.e. to help the sick or the starving because it pleases one to do so. It is not enough to achieve the proposed proper good in the end, because the real moral worth comes from the principle of volition. In order to achieve duty a man must have a good will in itself. Man must also have a freewill to act out of duty at all, in the first place. Kant earlier says, A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay, even of the sum total of all inclinations. (Kant 152) A good will is important because when it comes to doing what is right there cannot be any wiggle room for the wrong thing to happen. Even if one does not complete the action Kant considers the will good still. He thinks that man must do everything in his power in order to achieve what duty requires of him, it must not just be a mere wish. (Kant 152) The action must be driven by respect for the law, duty, and nothing else. Inclination to Kant is always wavering and changing, so man cannot rely upon it in a situation that is 12

dire. To be beneficent when we can is a duty (Kant 156). If a person enjoys the act of giving to the poor and is driven by inclination to help sick and dying children, this to Kant has no necessary moral worth. The man doing these acts is not doing something that is wrong, for he is doing a practically necessary thing, but such action does not mean that he has a will good in itself, because his will can still be working from a selfish view. Kant states, It is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty, and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it. (Kant 155) Kant encounters a problem here he cannot easily solve from just looking at a supposed action. Acting in accordance with duty but not for duty s sake but for the sake of one s own sum total of inclinations, or happiness, has no necessary moral worth. The result of acting in accordance with duty is not what is important. The importance lies within the motivating factor in the volition. Sometimes one can act in accordance with duty, not from respect for the law, but out of a selfish view. Kant calls this selfish view happiness or the sum total of one s inclinations. Acting from inclination is a dangerous thing because a man s inclination can change quickly, even if he maintains it would never happen. Where is the worth when man draws himself to that action by inclination more than by the light of reason? Kant gives the example of the command from scripture to love your enemy as well as your neighbor. For love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty s sake may; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love, and not pathological a love which is seated in the will, and not in the pretensions of sense in principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded. (Kant 158) 13

Here is an example that people are very familiar with but because of that familiarity sometimes take its meaning for granted. To love one s enemies goes beyond every instinct. Man s enemies are his enemies because they took from him something which he desired such as his freedom, family, or land. The negative actions taken against man makes him inclined to hate the enemies. The command to love thy enemy goes beyond all wants. Kant says that God could never command man to love someone in a pathological way, because sense and desire make up pathological love, which Kant would say is beyond man s control. To love practically is what God calls man to do. Kant defines practicality as rightness. For Kant if all people loved each other, then the atrocities that happen in the world would have never come about. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations. (Kant 159) Kant explains here one of the greatest definitions and he emphasizes of duty that it is beyond all inclination. Duty should be so far beyond inclination that the objective goal of the law only affects the will and is related in the mind to duty by pure respect. The will that acts according to duty is beyond want and is affected just by reason in itself. Kant says in the second proposition that, That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire. (Kant 158) 14

Kant believes that the intention of a person is what matters in respect to any given action. For example if there are two people who give to the poor the same amount of money to the same charity, they might look exactly the same to the outside observer. But if one of those people is doing it to get a tax write off and the other does it because of knowing that it is a duty, then Kant regards the former not to have true moral worth; instead he thinks that the latter has it. Basically for Kant it doesn t matter even if the result of the action ever comes to fruition. There just needs to be unquestionable effort and a purpose that reason, and not a desire of the will, drives forward. Man s desire can easily sway, even so much so that he tends to use on himself a dialectic that Kant calls natural. Dialectically he lies to himself and subverts his reason so much so that he is able to thwart his sense of duty and choose to act in a way that is in accordance with his desire and not his reason. (Kant 163) Kant s Imperatives In order for the will to be able to act rightly it must use reason to determine what is practically necessary. There is a certain tool that Kant uses to help instruct the will to what a person must do to keep his actions in accordance with duty. This coincides with the idea of an objective principle and is called an imperative. Kant states, The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an Imperative. (Kant 171) Here Kant is saying that there are objective principles that the will can look to for guidance. He is saying that this objective or goal of the will is mandatory and a 15

command of reason and not just a suggestion. Kant sets out the command of reason; called an Imperative, with specific words that he wants man to follow. There are certain words and phrases that will indicate an imperative. Such as; All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). (Kant 171) An imperative by definition is something that a person ought to do and not something he could maybe do. Kant is reiterating that by showing ought and shall as the key words in the formula of an imperative. In order to be a person that appropriately follows his duties, then he must have a conception of imperatives. But Imperatives do not all necessarily have to be overarching generalities concerning the greater meaning of life and the universe. There are a few different types of imperative that can help in understanding the ones that have to do with man s duty. But first it is important to differentiate between the two different ways an imperative can direct a person to right action. Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e. as objectively necessary. (Kant 172) Kant is presenting a hypothetical imperative as one that depends on an action of another as the empirical evidence, for example, required for the intuition to form then responses appropriate for changing situations. Hypothetical imperatives have a supposed end that can be different in one case or another, they are not fixed. Now a categorical imperative is one that has no conditions upon it, it is unquestionable and undeniable by any facts, 16

situations, or excuses. It is objectivity necessary, not subjectively necessary like hypothetical imperatives., all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a good will in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good as in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms reason, then it is categorical. (Kant 172) Kant gives the difference between the two commands even more definition. Not only does the hypothetical imperative deal with other empirical information and upon the actions of others, it is also for the sake of the end of the action. This means that a hypothetical imperative aims toward the object of the action and not for the action in and of itself. Now a categorical imperative deals with a general law that is good because it is good. It does not need any empirical support or does it rely on something else. It is good in itself. It is helpful to see how man uses hypothetical imperatives in his life concerning the state of society and that of nature. These imperatives attribute themselves to reason and they are good, as in correct, but do not necessarily have duty attached to them. Kant gives two kinds of imperatives that command hypothetically and they are called Technical, those belonging to art also known as rules of skill, and Pragmatic, those concerning welfare or counsels of prudence. The technical imperatives have to do with the practical applications of our physical or mental attributes to the world around us. Kant asserts, All sciences have a practical part, consisting of problems expressing that some end is possible for us, and of the imperatives directing how it may be attained. (Kant 173) Hypothetical imperatives include the skills of a carpenter or of an 17

acrobat. These skills are truths that have an end that is good (as a means to something else), are seated in reason, and have a definite end or goal. Kant gives the example of the directives of a physician to make a patient healthy. He gives equal value in this case for a poisoner s skill to ensure certain death. (Kant 173) These are imperatives because they instruct the person of a profession how to execute his task without failure and to full effect. There is no concept of morality or of goodness in the sense of duty, only in correctness and function. Pragmatic imperatives or counsels of prudence concern themselves with the welfare of the person that is implementing them. They also are hypothetical and are determined with empirical information. The differences between rules of skill and that of counsels of prudence are that the end of imperatives of skill is given, while that of counsels is merely possible. (Kant 176). The reason why counsels are merely possible is that they rely on a feeling that is impossible to nail down and that feeling is that of happiness. Counsels of prudence have to do with the welfare of man and his welfare concerns itself with happiness. To better understand counsels of prudence Kant explains the role that happiness takes in this process and why it makes the end of Pragmatic principles uncertain. Kant calls the condition that is constantly changing happiness, To secure one s own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for discontent with the one s condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined in one total. (Kant 157) 18

The concept of happiness is very important to humans in general, so that to understand the distinction of being happy and doing one s duty is essential. Here Kant is reinforcing the fact that it is man s duty to make sure he is happy, but only so that he can better act in accordance with Duties that have true moral worth. He is not saying that it is man s purpose to be happy. He is actually warning man that his inclination is already so strong to attain happiness, that he should be careful of how he goes about filling this void in himself. This care is important to counsels of prudence, because they relate directly to the sum of ones inclinations (his happiness) and one s welfare. Counsels of prudence are very important and can complicate things a little more than the straightforward rules of skill. Here Kant describes why they are important, Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being may be called prudence, in the narrowest sense. And thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one s own happiness, i.e. the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the action is not commanded absolutely but only as a means to another purpose. (Kant 173) Kant explains what a precept of prudence is and that it is a way in which man can counsel himself on the state of his welfare. Man s well-being is very important and includes, his health, living conditions, and relationships. Kant puts much emphasis on man s reason because in a clear sense he recognizes that man is as much his inclinations. For man to ignore his desires would be to endanger the sanctity of Duty and of keeping in accordance with it. In short he is unable, on any principle, to determine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to do so he would need to be omniscient. We cannot therefore act on any definite principles to secure happiness, but only on empirical councils, ex. gr. of regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve, &c. which experience teaches us do, on the average, most promote well being. (Kant 176) 19

Kant in the above passage calls the precepts of prudence counsels, because they do not have definite goals and because they deal with the elusive idea of happiness. Counsels of prudence guide, they do not give definite specific answers. Kant calls happiness not an ideal of reason, but one of imagination. (Kant 176) Still this seeming trivialization of happiness should not take away from the importance of it, because man s inner being can shape his outer world. What man imagines can strangely enough become a kind of reality for him and make his life either a living hell or a great paradise. This is why Kant states that to secure one s happiness is a duty so that man will not spiral out of control because he is unhappy. Both of the types of imperatives that command hypothetically are indispensable to life and living it in a way that is deserving of praise and respect. Without the rules of skill or counsels of prudence there is not a framework for man to act on duty. Where would man be if not for his skill to keep him safe and sheltered? How could man be productive if he did not take care of himself in relation to himself and others through counsels of prudence such as frugality and courtesy? These are just a few examples of ways these imperatives are important and how they give an understanding of imperatives in general. The opposite case of the hypothetical imperative commands categorically and that means without question or excuse. The other type of imperative, called categorical or moral, has to do with free conduct generally and is more recognizable as law. That is not to say that the Categorical Imperative is a law that is made by man. Laws in accordance with it are laws that base themselves on the conception of what is morally right and have to do with a priori principles and not those based upon the whims of man but upon reason as it transcends 20

man. This imperative is the principle that Kant has been setting the groundwork for: There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law. (Kant 178, Kant s italics) Kant means this very literally. In order for the world to work according to the idea of practical necessity, man must act in a way that will make life for all reasonable beings possible without hindrance. He is asserting that for man to live in a co-ordinated society and not that of nature and inclination, any action he takes must follow a universal law. He means by a universal law, not simply things like gravity or that people need oxygen to breathe, but a sense of duty that is ubiquitous throughout beings with a will that is free. He goes on to say that man can take all imperatives of duty from this one Categorical Imperative. (Kant 179) He maintains that it is the categorical imperative that determines the conception of law and reason, so that it is independent of all else, good in itself and not dependent on anything empirical. The fact that it determines the conception of law and reason is why the Categorical Imperative is the greatest moral imperative. The hypothetical imperatives do not depend on this morality to work, but Kant shows that duty is necessary to direct them. That is to say, the categorical imperative can instruct man to use rules of skill in many ways that are good and just. Kant explains the categorical imperative through the example of a man that is in despair of his own life and can not find the strength to go on living. Before committing the act of suicide he asks himself, according to reason, whether it would be in accordance with duty to take his own life. One of man s duties is to preserve and to hold life sacred. Should he through his sense of self-love and lack of happiness take his own? He realizes 21

that this is his inclination and that to make it a law of nature to destroy life would be contradictory to life itself. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature, (Kant 179) Kant is referencing the feeling of self-love. He says that if someone was sick and wanted to end his suffering, he would be contradicting the whole concept and duty of love. It would be this man s duty to go beyond his inclination and to use reason to choose what is morally right and in most cases practically necessary. What if the man ended his life right before a cure was found or if he was about to make a recovery and he or his doctors didn t realize it? Man should not succumb to his inclination, Kant says, because inclinations base themselves on criteria that change and to trust in them can be disadvantageous. A being that has the power of reason can carry this principle of the categorical imperative to all moral questions of life. It is similar to the proverb, do unto others, as you would have them do to you. This proverb actually is a hypothetical imperative because it is the agent that benefits from his good actions. The categorical imperative should be followed for the sake of itself and not for the sake of anything else. Men of true moral worth follow the Categorical Imperative for respect of the law and for this reason Kant holds them in high esteem. Although Kant says that one does not need to be a scholar or have great knowledge to intuit the duties and moral worth that it takes to be a good man, most people have trouble with conforming to the categorical imperative. 22

Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i.e. a disposition, to argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more according with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt them at their very source, and entirely to destroy their worth a thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately called good. (Kant 163) Kant warns against the nature and the craftiness of the inclinations of man. Here is a case in which man s inclinations subvert the will of man and through this subversion of it, can influence the reason of man. For example when a man knows that it is his duty not unnecessarily to risk his livelihood by gambling because he has a family, but puts his reason aside and makes excuses to himself and gambles anyway. Every time the world outside man tempts his inclination, a natural conflict goes on within him. Kant has created a method for determining what is right and moral here that is very helpful as an argument on the question that I was left with by Rousseau. That question was: how can a human being act in a morally good and just manner? I believe that Kant has something here that is a starting point to understanding the nature of the formula that our minds use in order to commit actions in general. Once people understand in his philosophy how man s inclination works with his reason in order to do the right thing, they see helpful truths as well as a few problems. Kant seems to put little to no trust in man s inclination left to itself. He sees it can pervert man s reason, which directs him to what is right and moral. Kant s method of determining duty is very close to perfection and Rousseau s idea of the restless state of man can help fill out what Kant lacks. Kant interestingly enough wrote the paper Idea for a History with Cosmopolitan Intent on a powerful inclination that man has that relates very closely to Rousseau s restless state of man. In this essay Kant helps readers to understand the motivation 23

further behind man s move from the state of nature to that of society and how the development of his faculties affects his state of being with the world, himself, and his fellow man. Kant s argument in Fundamental Principles for the Metaphysics of Morals is exceeding complicated, though necessary to follow the Idea for a History with Cosmopolitan Intent. It helps get the mind in a framework for clarifying what is just. In the upcoming section the reader can better tell how to use Kant s methods (Imperatives) in everyday life and Kant through his exploration of the quarrelsomeness of man explains why man has difficulties in doing this. Kant and Rousseau: Man s Unsociable Sociability and his Restless State Kant states in his essay, Idea For A History With Cosmopolitan Intent (Kant 117), that man has an unsociable sociability. At a first look this statement sounds contradictory, but when examined more closely, it speaks to the erratic and illogical form that the actions of man take. People have conflict inside themselves and although a man considers himself a single individual, there are capacities and powers that are at odds inside him that Kant and Rousseau have both explored in their writings. This isn t to say people have multiple personalities, but instead that they have capacities inside themselves that are responsible for the decision making process of life. These are man s tools and when he uses them correctly with prudence can take humankind to the height of greatness and goodness or on the shadow side can bring out the worst capabilities of man. These powers are man s reason, free will, desire, and the restless state of man. Rousseau says in 24

his Discourse on Inequality that the restless state of man is the driving force behind man s actions, good or evil. (Rousseau 133) Both Kant and Rousseau seem to be examining the same question and that is: what motivates man to act in the way he does? And for Kant: what is the purpose of all of man s seemingly random choices? Rousseau discusses how man transforms from savage to civil man and what happens to his faculties in the process. He sees man s perception of inequalities as a perversion of man s natural desires. Also, Kant speaks of man s steps from barbarism to culture but in a way that is less judgmental (Kant 123). Kant sees man s bloody history as a necessary evil to make man the best he can be. Both Kant and Rousseau have similar philosophies, so much so that Rousseau s idea of inequality and the restless state elucidates Kant s ideas of unsociable sociability of man and Rousseau s own idea of the awakening of man s desire to be better than his peers. Kant s Fourth Proposition is, The means which nature employs to accomplish the development of all faculties is the antagonism of men in society, since this antagonism becomes, in the end, the cause of a lawful order of his society. (Kant 122) Kant says that although man has a free will, nature holds him by laws just like any other event of nature. (Kant 119) The free will is a complicated issue on its own, but Kant posits that man is able to choose for himself and has a flexible purpose. But with man s freedom in mind, nature has in itself a plan for man and has put in him his greatest gift and his worst curse. Unsociable sociability means that man wants to be by himself but at the same time he seeks to be part of society. Man has a big ego and he wants 25

things to be how he intends them to be and not how others want them. Although man has the faculty of reason, which separates him from the animals, he is still an animal in his own right. Humans need each other to survive, procreate, and as Kant says in his Fourth Proposition, to thrive. Conversely man wants others to listen to his ideas because he believes they are the best. He creates for himself an existence where he expects resistance everywhere, just as he knows of himself that he is inclined to resist others. (Kant 122) This resistance between men is what excites one man s desire to be better than the man next to him and to have more than that man just for the sake of greatness and vainglory. (Kant 122) Rousseau s restless state of man is useful in understanding Kant and elucidating and filling up his idea of the antagonism of man in society. He says, I would show that this burning desire to be talked about, this yearning for distinction which keeps us almost always in a restless state is responsible for what is best and what is worst among men, for our virtues and our vices, for our sciences and our mistakes, for our conquerors and our philosophers that is to say, for a multitude of bad things and very few good things. (Rousseau 133) Rousseau s restless state comes very close to what Kant says in his Fourth Proposition when he claims that the resistance between men awakens all the latent forces in man. (Kant 122) The restless state, as Rousseau puts it, is this latent force. Kant doesn t seem to put a lot of emphasis on this latent force, but it is the driving reason behind what spurs man to develop his reason and his mind. Kant echoes Rousseau when he says man overcomes his laziness and impelled by vainglory, ambition and avarice, he seeks to achieve a standing among his fellows. (Kant 122) What Rousseau calls desire to be 26

talked about and Kant calls desire to be better than one s neighbor is what pushes man to great heights and at the same time is what makes him evil and vicious. Rousseau explains the restless state comes from inequalities that arise from man s transformation from savage man to civil man. Man in the state of nature has only his mate and his offspring for companions. He only concerns himself with his safety and the safety of his family. Natural inequalities are ones that arise from nature and not from man s fancies. They are the difference in height, color, look, and weight. Unnatural inequalities arise when man starts to live in social groups. These inequalities are differences in class, renown, reputation, and preference. Such is, in fact, the true cause of all these differences: the savage lives within himself; social man lives always outside himself; (Rousseau 136) It is when man looks outside himself and starts to look at others and wants others to look at him that problems develop. To repeat, Rousseau says, and this was the first step towards inequality and at the same time towards vice. From those first preferences there arose, on the one side, vanity and scorn, on the other, shame and envy, and the fermentation produced by these new leavens finally produced compounds fatal to happiness and innocence. (Rousseau 114) The restless state compels man to desire notoriety and standing over others because of unnatural inequalities. The tools that man has at his disposal have been inside of him long before he became civil man. It is because of these powers that he sought refuge in society. There is a simpler way to see the restlessness of man besides wanting power and renown. Humans inhabit the realm of being and are for all intents and purposes mortal entities. Men come into this world, grow into adulthood, and then fade from this life into 27

nonbeing or the eternal. This being said, humans are always wanting. They need food for fuel and water for thirst as well as air for breath. Mankind is in a constant state of becoming, never satiated and always needing more. This animalistic form of restlessness is true for all savage animals. It is a tool of survival and one that nature has endowed animals with so that they would never be complacent and would always strive for more. Rousseau s form of restlessness accounts for Kant s latent forces that spur the resistance of man versus man and propels him to greater heights. Man from the very fiber of his physical being desires; this power of restlessness fuels man s decision-making abilities and affects those abilities in monumental ways. The next tool or power that man has is his desire. Rousseau s state of restlessness propels desire and does this easily because when man desires something there is no deliberation. To desire something truly is to want it without conscious thought. Aristotle says that man desires the good. Nature made man to be a reward-based organism. When something feels good it often is good for humans. Food tastes pleasurable so that man desires to eat it. The nutritional value of food should be enough to make him want to eat, but it is easer to make food taste good than to apply to the reason. If savage man relied only on reason to compel him to eat, it would complicate the process. Desire is on the same base level as man s restlessness. It is instinctual but without it all humans would be lost. Divine right or chance has endowed man with the gift of reason, which the Greeks define as logos. Kant says reason is the faculty that builds up the most resistance that man has against his fellow man. Yes, a man might compete physically with other men to assert dominance and gain vainglory over others, but that is in the realm of savage man 28