STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism The University of Chicago Department of Political Science 5828 S. University Avenue Pick Hall Suite 418 Chicago, IL 60637 cpost@uchicago.edu http:// STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM April 6, 2015 Dr. Robert A. Pape, Professor and Director of University of Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Suicide Terrorism An instrument of coercive punishment Attempts to inflict pain and the threat of future pain. Goal: to induce government to concede to demands, prompt population to pressure government to capitulate. Democracies often viewed as more susceptible to coercive punishment. Defined as attack in which the perpetrator kills himself/herself No attempted attacks are included. Issue of revealed preference. Weapon of the Weak Force Multiplier Often used when there is little prospect of achieving military goals. Historical cases predating the advent of plastic explosives: Jewish Zealots, Ismali Assassins, Japanese Kamikazes 1

Suicide Attack Database Searchable database on all suicide attacks from 1982 to July 2014 English using native language sources (e.g., Arabic, Hebrew, Russian, Tamil) Emphasis on collecting claims from original sources The current CPOST-SAD release contains the universe of suicide attacks from 1982 to 2014, a total of 3,976 attacks in over 40 countries Data coded for attack target and attacker variables Target type: Security, Political, Civilian Attackers: nationality, biographic data on over 900 attackers Geolocation 2 Source Verification 2

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Ordinary versus Suicide Terrorism Ordinary terrorism in decline 1987 = 666 2001 = 348 Suicide terrorism rising sharply: 3 per year in 1980s 10 per year in 1990s 25+ per year in 2000-2001 50 per year in 2002-2003 8

Suicide Terrorist Attacks Worldwide, 1982-2003 343 suicide terrorist attacks For 298, we know the ideological affiliation (88%) World Leader: Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka 78 attacks Secular group drawn from Hindu families more than Hamas (61) or Islamic Jihad (27) 30% of Muslim attacks by secular groups PKK in Turkey (14) Al Aqsa (25), PFLP (6) on West Bank SSNP (8), CP/Baa th Party (8) in Lebanon ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IS NOT PRIMARY DRIVER OF WORLD SUICIDE TERRORISM 9

Tamil Suicide Terrorist Attack 10

Causal Logic of Suicide Terrorism Strategic Level Coercive Power Social Level Mass Support Suicide Terrorism Individual Level Personal Motive 11

Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism Purpose: Coerce democracies to withdraw military forces from territory terrorists prize Key Patterns: Timing = campaigns Goals = national self-determination Targets = democratic states 12

Motivation and Targets of Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1982-2003 Region/Dispute Homeland Status Terrorist Goal Target a Democracy Lebanon, 1982-1986 US/F/IDF military presence US/F/IDF withdrawal Yes West Bank/Gaza 1994- IDF military presence IDF withdrawal Yes Tamils in Sri Lanka 1990- SL military presence SL withdrawal Yes (after 1950) Punjab, 1995 Indian control Punjab autonomy Yes Kurds in Turkey 1990s Turkey military presence Turkey withdrawal Yes (after 1983)* Chechnya, 2000- Russia military presence Russian withdrawal Yes (after 1993) Kashmir, 2000- Indian military presence Indian withdrawal Yes Arabian Peninsula, 1995- US military presence US withdrawal Yes Iraq, 2003- US military presence US withdrawal Yes 13

Hezbollah (1985): Great and necessary objectives were to put an end to foreign occupation and to adopt a regime freely wanted by the people of Lebanon to expel the Americans, the French and their allies putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land. LTTE (1987): Our martyrs are extraordinary human beings Let us continue to struggle to expel the enemy forces who have occupied our sacred land. Chechen rebels (2003): As you have seen and noticed, most of the suicide attacks were carried out by women particularly the wives of the mujahedin who were martyred, are being threatened in their homes They do not accept being humiliated and living under occupation. AQ fatwa: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies is an individual duty of every Muslim who can do it in order to liberate the Al-Aqsa mosque and the holy mosque[mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. 14

Nationality of AQC Suicide Attackers 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database Rev 4/2014. Data current through 12/31/2013. 15

Main Conditions of Suicide Terrorism 1. Military Occupation either by foreign government (Israel vs Palestinians) or national government (Sri Lanka vs Tamils) where occupation means the occupied group believes it cannot change the political (and other) institutions governing them. 2. Religious Difference between the occupier and occupied communities (Jewish occupiers vs Islamic occupied, Buddhist vs Hindu, Shi'a vs Sunni). 3. The occupier is often a Democracy that holds meaningful elections. 16

Suicide Attacks by Campaign, 2004-2014 2004 2010 2014 Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 17

Logic of Suicide Terrorism Post 2003 New Campaigns occurring in response to new occupation Afghanistan Iraq Nigeria Somalia Old Campaigns ending as occupation declines Lebanon West Bank/Gaza Beginning to See Suicide Campaigns against Non-Democracies still small % China Syria Iran Predominately Muslim because US occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, the two biggest cases 18

Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, by Year 160 140 140 120 126 100 80 105 99 110 111 92 88 116 60 40 20 0 1 2 3 20 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 19

Distribution of suicide attacks by target types Afghanistan, 2003-2014 By Year Total, 2002-2014 140 120 15% 6% 100 80 79% 60 40 20 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Security Political Civilian Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 20

Nationality of Suicide Attackers in Afghanistan (N=200) 200 95% 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 Region, 2% Other, 4% 20 0 Afghanistan Pakistan Tajikistan Tunesia Jordan Palestine Russia UAE Yemen Germany Source: Lexis/FBIS/Video/Claims 21

Thousands US and NATO forces in Afghanistan 2001-2014 160 140 NATO US 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source: Brookings Afghanistan Index 22

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Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Pakistan, 2003-2014 2003-2011 2012-2013 2014 336 Attacks 84 Attacks 33 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% 19% 19% Security 15% 18% 63% 18% 63% Civilian Political 21% 64% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 24

Troops (Thousands) Afghan and Foreign Forces in Afghanistan 2002-2014 200 US 150 NATO ANA ANP 100 50 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source: Brookings Afghanistan Index 25

Confirmed suicide attacks against security targets in Afghanistan, 2002-2014 80 80 70 60 NATO ANA ANP ALP 70 60 Foreign Afghan 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 26

Suicide Attacks in Iraq From AQI to the Islamic State, 2003-2014 AQI MSC ISI ISIS IS 120 100 80 60 Led by Jordanian Al- Zarqawi extreme violence undermines appeal Unclaimed Claimed Umbrella organization, led by Egyptian al-masri Zarqawi killed The Surge New objective to establish Islamic state, led by Iraqi Abu Omar al-baghdadi until death, Abu Bakr al-baghadi replaces in 2010 al-masri and al-baghdadi killed Group expands to Syria and proclaims Caliphate Coalition airstrikes begin 40 20 US Withdrawal 0 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 27

What Changed in Anbar, 2006-2008? US/Coalition (Iraq) US/Coalition (Anbar) COIN 1:50 (Anbar) Sons of Iraq (Anbar) Sept 2006 157,000 34,000 100,000 5,000 Sept 2008 154,000 38,000 100,000 100,000 28

What Happened to Sunni Insurgents? Est Total Insurgents Total Killed In Prison Sons of Iraq (Anbar) Jan 2004 3,000-5,000 Aug 2004 20,000 Sept 2006 20,000 15,000 28,000 5,000 Mar 2007 30,000 (& Militias) 70,000 Supporters 1,000-2,000 AQ 18,000 37,000 Sept 2008 1,000-2,000+ AQ 19,000+ 51,000 100,000 29

Sunni Awakening Decline 120K 100K 80K 60K 40K 20K 0K 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 30

Who is ISIS? Evolved from AQI, current leader is Abu Bakr al-baghdadi, took power after US killed previous leaders, radicalized following US operation against Fallujah in 2004. Leadership = 25 commanders, 1/3 former Saddam military officers Has relationships with Iraqi Sunni tribal militias, but murky and fluid Recent CIA estimate 20-31K in both Syria and Iraq, possibly 15K foreign fighters, 2K Western (mostly in Syria) but figures highly uncertain De facto control over Sunni majority areas 31

ISIS s Stated Territorial Ambitions ISIS divides Iraq and Syria into 16 Wilayats or Regional Commands? 32

Nationalities of Confirmed ISIS Suicide Bombers, 2012-2014 By Nationality By Region 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Saudi Arabian Iraqi Tunisian Syrian Moroccan North African Libyan Egyptian Lebanese Turkish German Palestinian Algerian Australian Chechen British Dutch High likelihood that largest proportion of unknown are Syrian and Iraqi 70% 8% 10% 9% Iraq/Syria Region North Africa 2% 1% Europe Oceania Origin Unknown Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 33

Nationalities of identified suicide bombers linked to confirmed suicide attacks, by campaign % local bombers % of bomber nationalities known 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Afghan Taliban AQC AQIM Chechens Hezbollah AQI/ISIS LTTE Pakistani Militants Palestinian Groups PKK/Dev Sol Syrian Rebels AQAP Shabaab Afghans Saudis, Egyptians & Yemenis Moroccans, Tunisians & Algerians N. Caucasians Lebanese Iraqis Sri Lankans Pakistanis Palestinians Turks Syrians Yemenis Somalis Afghan Taliban AQC AQIM Chechens Hezbollah AQI/ISIS LTTE Pakistani Militants Palestinian Groups PKK/Dev Sol Syrian Rebels AQAP Shabaab % Home % Foreign % Known % Unknown 34

The ISIS Threat & Policy Implications Current Situation: ISIS threat today is mainly regional: Instability in the Persian Gulf Threat to Western countries exists, but is low lone wolf or small groups, not 9/11 Key Goal in Fight Against ISIS: Contain regional instability and keep threat to West low Best Strategy: Off-Shore Balancing: Over the horizon air, naval power and special forces, plus economic empowerment of local groups Key to success: Creating New Sunni Awakening, driving wedge between core ISIS and nationalist/tribal Sunnis Sunnis should lead the fight against ISIS Should we expect attacks on US and Western homelands? *If US/Western Militaries takes lead in crushing ISIS* 35

Air power halts ISIL expansion Kobani Mosul Dam Aleppo Raqqah Mosul Erbil Deir ez Zour Kirkuk Amerli Haditha Hit Ramadi Baghdad 36

but not consolidation Raqqah Mosul Erbil Deir ez Zour Kirkuk Bayji Haditha Hit Ramadi Baghdad 37

Air strikes and ISIS territorial control 38

Back Up Slides 39

Airstrikes Total, by Country, Aug. 8-Dec. 1, 2014 400 350 300 250 200 150 Iraq Syria Total 100 50 0 Aug Sep Oct Nov 40

Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Iraq, 2003-2014 2003-2011 2012-2013 2014 1359 Attacks 237 Attacks 195 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% 23% 13% 64% 28% 10% 62% Security Civilian Political 22% 10% 68% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 41

ISIS Command and Control Command is dispersed Organization only sets policy Leaders are mobile and not centralized The military council is made up of Ba athist military council Have military expertise and want to regain power Almost all were imprisoned Identities are known for many top commanders Sources: al-akhbar, Financial Times, the New York Times. Deputies for Iraq and Syria (2 people) Caliph Al-Baghdadi Shura Council (8 to 13 people) Military Council (3 people) Position Name Nationality Caliph Ibrahim al-samarrai Iraqi War Minister Neaman al Zaidi Iraqi Interior Minister Hazem Abdul Razzaq al-zawi Iraqi Security Chief Abu Safwan Rifai Spokesman Taha Subhi Falaha Syrian Military Commander Tarkhan Batirashvili Chechen Anbar Commander Shaker Wahib al-fahdawi Iraqi 42

Alternative: Off-Shore Balancing Rely on air, naval, and rapidly deployable ground forces vs Al Qaeda camps Transition over 2-3 years Train/equip local groups for self-protection Empower Pashtuns who reject Al Qaeda 43

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Mali: 2011 to 2013 Distribution of Suicide Attacks A L G E R I A 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Suicide Attacks 2011 2012 2013 Target Types 94% Civilian Political Security Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database Rev 4/2014 45

Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Afghanistan, 2003-2014 2003-2011 2012-2013 2014 716 Attacks 180 Attacks 116 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% 5% 14% 81% 18% 9% 73% 15% Security 9% Civilian Political 76% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 46

Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Pakistan, 2003-2014 2003-2011 2012-2013 2014 35 Attacks 30 Attacks 17 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% Security 29% 43% 6% 51% 53% 47% Civilian Political 12% 59% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 47

Suicide Attacks by Campaign, 1982-2003 1982 1990 2001 2003 Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 48

Suicide Attacks by Campaign, 2004-2014 2004 2010 2014 Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 49

Confirmed Suicide Attacks Syria and Lebanon, 2011-2014 60 50 40 47 51 30 31 20 10 0 3 2011 2012 2013 2014 50

Confirmed Suicide Attacks Iraq, 2003-2014 350 300 250 304 291 200 199 188 188 195 150 100 50 0 122 81 79 62 49 35 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 51

Confirmed Suicide Attacks Pakistan, 2003-2014 100 90 80 90 70 60 50 58 62 59 40 30 40 43 41 33 20 10 0 11 2 7 3 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 52

Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, 2011-2013 Over space by Group Total Attacks, by Group 103 242 30 5 ISIS JN Other Unclaimed Target Types, by Country Iraq 62% 28% ISIS Jabhat al-nusra Free Syrian Army Kurds Azzam Brigades Unclaimed Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 150km Syria /Leb 64% 25% 0% 50% 100% Security Civilian Political 18% 73%9% 53

Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, 2014 Over Space by Group Total Attacks, by Group 77 157 8 ISIS JN Other Unclaimed Target Types by Country 4 Iraq 69% 22% Syria ISIS /Leb 73% 22% Jabhat al-nusra Free Syrian Army Kurds 0% 50% 100% Azzam Brigades Security Unclaimed 150km 18% 73%9% Civilian Political Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 54

Campaign Share of All Suicide Attacks 1981-2013 1600 1400 19% 1200 81% 1000 800 600 Occupied Not Occupied 400 200 0 Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 55

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Pakistan: 2003 to 2010 100 80 60 40 20 Suicide Attacks 0 Target Types 18% 63% 19% Civilian Political Security Distribution of Suicide Attacks Source: US National Park Service, Copyright: 2014 Esri, HERE, DeLorme 56

Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Syrian and Lebanon, 2011-2014 2011 2012-2013 2014 5 Attacks 78 Attacks 51 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% 6% 100% 25% 23% 52% Security Civilian Political 22% 72% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 57

Military Occupation Key: National/Communal identity = Self-Determination Palestinian nationalism in Israel Pashtun nationalism in the tribal areas of Northwest Pakistan Foreign Occupation creates environment conducive to suicide terrorism Government seen as illegitimate, apostate Potential for atrocities which can prompt revenge motives (Abu Ghraib) Can trigger social logic as potential attackers perceive a threat to their community, ethnicity, religion, and way of life Religious difference can be a particularly salient cleavage Threatens local community s way of life 58