Nietzsche s Naturalistic Metaethics: In Defense of Privilege

Nietzsche s Naturalistic Metaethics: In Defense of Privilege Timothy McWhirter Presented at the Nietzsche and Naturalism conference Cardiff University, Wales, UK, September 21. I. Introduction. One component of the naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche that has emerged over the past three decades is the view that he rejected metaphysical attempts to see human beings as being separate from nature. 1 Leiter describes Nietzsche accepting the view that man is not of a higher [or] different origin than the rest of nature. 2 Leiter refers to this view as being a fundamental component of Nietzsche s substantive naturalism. 3 Another fundamental component of Nietzsche s naturalism, according to Leiter, is Nietzsche s use of scientific methods. Leiter describes Nietzsche developing theories modeled on the sciences and believing that philosophy must be continuous with the methods of the sciences. 4 Leiter refers to this as Nietzsche s methodological naturalism. 5 As Nietzsche put it, man should stand before man as he now, hardened by the discipline of science, stands before the other forms of nature, (BGE 230). I argue in what follows that Leiter s view of Nietzsche s substantive and methodological naturalism provide an alternative answer to the central question Leiter addresses in his essay Nietzsche s Metaethics : 6 what status metaphysical, epistemological do the values used to undertake [Nietzsche s] revaluation [of value] (the assessing values ) enjoy? 7 Are these values true or better justified? In Leiter s examination of the secondary literature he identifies what he calls the privilege readings. These are interpretations provided by Schacht, Foot, and Wilcox, among others, which hold the perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values is privileged in some way. Leiter critically examines

2 the privilege readings and finds that the arguments for them are insufficient. He concludes that the perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values is not privileged at all. It is neither true nor better justified. It is simply the idiosyncratic perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values. In what follows, I outline and defend a privilege reading of Nietzsche s metaethics. I argue that the privilege given to the perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values follows as an implication of his substantive and methodological naturalism. When we use scientific methods and view social systems like other natural systems we are led to conclude the privilege Nietzsche gives the will to power is empirically justified. After reviewing and critically examining Leiter s argument, I will turn to a discussion of John Richardson s recent work and recent developments in the sciences to provide an empirical foundation for a thermodynamic interpretation of Nietzsche s naturalistic metaethics. II. Leiter on Schacht s Privilege Reading Leiter distinguishes a few varieties of privilege readings but he focuses primarily on the version developed by Schacht, which Leiter describes as a naturalistic realism (N-realism). 8 Leiter sees this view holding that there are normative facts because normative facts are just constituted by certain natural facts. 9 This view is the most popular. It is advocated in some way by Morgan, Kaufmann, Wilcox, Hunt, as well as Schacht. 10 Leiter describes Schacht s version as being representative. 11 According to Leiter s interpretation of Schacht, Nietzsche revaluates values from the perspective of the will to power and this perspective is privileged relative to others. In order to explain Schacht s interpretation, Leiter focuses on two particular passages in Schacht s classic text Nietzsche. [Nietzsche] is proposing to evaluate [moral values] by reference to a standard of valuation independent of them, from a perspective which transcends them. And the sort of value of which he speaks when viewing them from this perspective is one which he considers, in contrast to them, to have a kind of validity which they lack.... For this perspective is a privileged one, which an understanding of the fundamental character of life and the world serves to define and establish. 12

3 Human life, for Nietzsche, is ultimately a part of a kind of vast game... [which] is, so to speak, the only game in town....the nature of the game, he holds, establishes a standard for the evaluation of everything falling within its compass. 13 Leiter is looking for an argument to defend Nietzsche s alleged view that the perspective from which he re-evaluates values is itself privileged and he notes that in the passage above it is not obvious what the argument is supposed to be. 14 In an effort to fully explore the potential of this privilege interpretation of Nietzsche s metaethics, Leiter attempts to construct an argument for Schacht s privilege reading. Leiter uses the form of argument employed by Mill to justify the principal of utility: (P) To show that something is desirable (i.e., valuable), show that it is desired. 15 Leiter notes that the Millian Argument is not valid: showing that something is desired, does not demonstrate that it ought to be desired. But he suggests that this argument does seem to capture what [Schacht] has in mind. 16 Leiter suggests this millian argument, if successful, only demonstrates that the will to power is a non-moral, prudential value; it cannot be used to demonstrate that the will to power is a non-prudential moral value. 17 Leiter believes part of the N-realist position is that the will to power serves as a fundamental, non-prudential moral value. So Leiter considers further modifications to the millian argument. However, all modifications face a fundamental obstacle according Leiter. They depend on the truth of the strong descriptive doctrine of the will to power. This presents two problems in Leiter s view: first, Nietzsche did not accept the doctrine in the strong form needed for the argument, at least in those writings he chose to publish; and second, in its strong form, the doctrine is simply not plausible. In order for any argument for Schacht s naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche s metaethics to be successful, Leiter notes that, power must be the only thing that in fact is or can be desired. 18 When we turn to Nietzsche s published work, we find that he does not always accept this strong doctrine of the will to power. In the AntiChrist he describes people consciously embracing values that lack the will to power (A 6). Leiter finds similar passages in Twilight of the Idols, and Ecce Homo (A 17, TI IX: 38, EH IV: 4).

4 Leiter also points out three additional textual arguments against the strong descriptive doctrine of the will to power, two of which I will have time to address in this presentation. 19 First, if those who advocate a strong doctrine of the will to power are correct, this doctrine must play a fundamental role in Nietzsche s thought. Leiter notes however that this doctrine does not play a fundamental role in Nietzsche s published works and, in particular, the will to power is not discussed during the two reflective periods of his academic career: his last major work Ecce Homo and the series of prefaces he wrote in 1886 for The Birth of Tragedy, Human, All Too Human, Dawn, and The Gay Science. Second, the single most famous passage that asserts a strong doctrine of the will to power (WP 1067) where he writes This world is the will to power and nothing besides! has now been conclusively discredited by the leading scholar of the Nachlass, the late Mazzino Montinari. He argues Nietzsche judged the passage to be unworthy of publication. 20 Leiter concludes his critical analysis of Schacht s N-Realist interpretation outlining a number of hurdles facing Schacht s use of the will to power: (iii) Nietzsche must hold the strong descriptive doctrine of the will to power; (iv) this descriptive doctrine must be a plausible doctrine; and (v) we must have reason for attributing an argument to Nietzsche that he only makes in texts of questionable canonical status. I have suggested that by reasonable interpretive scruples, it seems we ought not to attribute N-Realism to Nietzsche when it presupposes an implausible view (the strong doctrine of the will to power) that he does not seem to hold, and when his argument for it appears only in the Nachlass. 21 A. Critically Examining Leiter s Argument The first aspect of Leiter s argument this investigation will critically examine is his description of N-realism as holding the will to power is a non-prudential moral value. Leiter describes the N-realist position as assessing non-prudential value in terms of the maximization of prudential value. 22 He then

5 proceeds to evaluate arguments for the will to power as a non-prudential moral value. But Leiter provides no textual evidence that Nietzsche viewed the will to power as a non-prudential moral value or that Schacht interpreted him in that way. Nietzsche viewed morals as symptoms and knowledge as a means for either growth or decline (TI Socrates II; WP 676). He believed that life itself could not be justified metaphysically as a nonprudential moral value (B 5). Given the instrumental role Nietzsche described for our knowledge of value, it would be more accurate to describe the will to power as a fundamental prudential value: it is the prudential value that makes all other prudential values possible. To assume that human behavior can be justified by appealing to non-prudential moral values, assumes that human behavior is of a higher or different origin than the rest of nature where behavior is viewed instrumentally in the service of reproductive fitness or power: it contradicts Nietzsche s substantive naturalism. By burdening the N- realist position with this inconsistency, Leiter creates a straw man. The second part of Leiter s argument that is problematic is his assumption that in order for the strong doctrine of the will to power to be true, power must be the only thing that in fact is or can be desired. 23 In Leiter s popular essay on Nietzsche s theory of the will he describes Nietzsche holding there is no free will. 24 Humans are not conscious of the causes of their behavior; their behavior is influenced by unconscious drives. Leiter quotes Nietzsche saying, moralities are merely a sign language of the affects of unconscious drives (BGE 187). 25 As Richardson notes, Nietzsche clearly viewed drives like the will to power as operating on an unconscious level. 26 The evidence Leiter cites demonstrating Nietzsche thought some people do not consciously desire power does not undermine the plausibility of the will to power as an unconscious drive. 27 The third concern raised by Leiter s discussion is the failure to interpret Nietzsche s metaethics within the context of the behavior found in the rest of nature. Nietzsche s substantive naturalism implies that human behavior is not of a higher [or] different origin than the rest of nature. Yet we

6 find no discussion of evolutionary theory or the thermodynamic characteristics of natural systems in Leiter s analysis. The origin and purpose of human behavior is conceived independent from the origin and purpose of the behavior of other natural systems. III. The Darwinian Model If we correct the problems described above, the N-realism position would interpret the will to power: 1) as the fundamental instrumental value; 2) as operating on an unconscious level; and 3) as operating on all natural systems. We see the outlines of this position emerging in the recent work of John Richardson. 28 Richardson believes that Nietzsche uses the end or results of a drive to explain that drive in a manner similar to Darwin. We get an idea of this type of explanation in the etiological or historical approach to functions outlined by Wright and Millikan. 29 They maintain that the function of the heart is to pump blood because in the past it did this well and it enabled the spread of genes that produce similar hearts. The fact that hearts pumped blood well in the past explains why they are here now. This past provides a causal history which explains the existence of the heart in terms of the results it has provided in the past. Richardson writes that, This etiological analysis not only allows results to explain in the manner of ends, it also shows how all organisms can, in a sense, have the same end. For each biological item and its specific function, the latter explains the former in the same general way: that result has enhanced the reproductive fitness of the item. In each case we can distinguish between the general and structural end of survival/reproduction, and the specific result(s) this item has recurrently had, by which it has furthered that highest end. Organisms have many different functions, but all of them are subjoined to the same structural end; by this subjunction, Darwinism justifies attributing to organisms a common end. 30

7 Richardson argues compellingly that Nietzsche and Darwin share the view that drives can be explained in this etiological fashion. Richardson notes how this approach is reflected in Nietzsche s genealogical analysis of morality (GM). 31 Richardson points out that Nietzsche does provide one clear and important criticism of Darwin: Nietzsche believes that life is not guided by a struggle to exist or reproduce; it is guided by a will to power (WP 688 [1888]). 32 Richardson offers a number of ways to interpret the will to power in this context: (a) he offers will to power as a life-will that is, explanatorily, fully basic, as prior in particular to natural selection; or (b) He offers will to power as a product of natural selection, and uses selection to explain (why or how there are) these wills. 33 The option that best captures Nietzsche view, according to Richardson, is (a). But he does not focus on this interpretation because it has small plausibility for most of us. 34 He explains that (a) represents, a thick strand in Nietzsche s view: he often thinks of will to power as a sort of cosmic force, prior to selection-as a positive and creative principle that must already be there, before selection can begin to work negatively upon it. He does most to elaborate this view in his notebooks, but it s strongly present in his published works too. In this power ontology, he denies that selection plays a genuinely constructive role in evolution, after all. 35 So while Richardson thinks the power ontology described by (a) captures more of what Nietzsche has in mind, Richardson thinks the most plausible account of Nietzsche s view would be (b): he offers will to power as a product of natural selection. 36 On this account, Richardson sees two alternatives. The will to power is either: i) a function or goal shared by some or many selected tendencies, or ii) a (higher-level) structural end in selection itself, that somehow squeezes in alongside or under Darwinian survival. 37 I, however, argue that we do not need to resign ourselves to setting aside the interpretive option Richardson believes most accurately characterizes Nietzsche s position (a) the view that he offers will

8 to power as prior to natural selection. 38 The plausibility of this view becomes clear when we view the will to power within the context of the general direction of energy transformations described in the contemporary science of non-equilibrium thermodynamics. This science provides a general theory of natural systems that is consistent with the power ontology Richardson sees Nietzsche describing with the will to power. IV. The Thermodynamic Model The second law of thermodynamics states that a natural process that starts in one equilibrium state and ends in another will go in the direction that causes the entropy of the system plus the environment to increase. 39 This law describes the general direction of energy transformations over time. Nietzsche was familiar with William Thomson's interpretation of the second law (WP 1066). The second law of thermodynamics implies that in order for natural systems to maintain or develop their organization over time, their environment must increase in disorganization or entropy. Natural systems develop their organization in a manner consistent with the second law through a process called dissipation. Dissipative structures maintain their organization over time by expending energy from their environment. This fundamental structure of natural systems was first described by the Belgian chemist Ilya Prigogine. 40 He won a Nobel Prize in 1977 for his work on the concept. Living organisms and inorganic natural systems like stars and galaxies all take in organized forms of energy from their environment and expend them in order to sustain and develop their organization over time. 41 Prigogine s work demonstrates that when we follow the logic implicit in the second law we must conceive of the tendency of natural systems to develop their organization over time in terms of an ability to dissipate or transform energy. The chemist and mathematician Alfred Lotka attempted to codify this tendency of natural systems to selforganize in terms of a tendency to increase power. In 1922 he outlined

9 in two short papers what came to be called the maximum power principle. 42 Lotka first states the maximum power principle in a discussion of organic systems from a thermodynamic perspective: It has been pointed out by Boltzmann that the fundamental object of contention in the lifestruggle, in the evolution of the organic world, is available energy. In accord with this observation is the principle that, in the struggle for existence, the advantage must go to those organisms whose energy-capturing devices are most efficient in directing available energy into channels favorable to the preservation of the species. 43 Lotka goes on to describe the principle of natural selection as a physical principle that operates on the inorganic level in the same manner: to give an advantage to natural systems that maximize their ability to transform energy. 44 Throughout his long and productive career, the ecologist Howard Odum used the maximum power principle successfully to analyze the development of ecological, economic, planetary and astrophysical systems. 45 John Delong recently (2008) reanalyzed the results from three two-species competition experiments and found that the results support the maximum power principle. 46 This principle has become important to contemporary scientists, particularly those involved in modeling ecological systems. 47 Because of the explanatory power of the maximum power principle, Odum has suggested we should consider making it the fourth law of thermodynamics. 48 The theoretical physicist Sean Carroll recently offered an argument for a bold hypothesis: life is Nature s way of opening up a chemical channel to release all of [the] free energy bottled up in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere of the young Earth : life emerged to increase the universe s ability to maximize power. 49 This, I argue, essentially echoes Nietzsche s bold hypothesis: this world is the will to power (WP 1067).

10 Nietzsche describes the will to power in BGE 36 as a pre-form of life. In his notes he suggests that it is in the relation between organic and inorganic processes that the 'fundamental will' of organic processes is revealed (WP 691). Nietzsche describes life in A 6 as an instinct for growth, for survival, for the accumulation of forces, for power. In HH 24 He describes this growth in terms of an increasing ability to manage the earth as a whole [more] economically. In his notes he explains further: The will to power expresses itself in the interpretation ; transformation of energy into life, and life at its highest potency, thus appears as the goal (WP 639). 50 The increase in the size and power of the human race has in fact tracked increases in the ability to transform energy: moving from hunting and gathering to agricultural and then industrial modes of production, we see a continual process of maximizing power. In BGE 242 Nietzsche describes this strengthening of the productive process ( physiological process ) as making possible the freedom that Europeans enjoy in his time. Nietzsche viewed our desire for knowledge, including our desire for knowledge of value, as a means through which the body (WP 676) maximizes power. V. Conclusion Here we can see how Nietzsche replaces Darwin s structural end of reproductive fitness with the maximum power principle. 51 The contributions drives, type-facts, sensibilities and values have made in the past to maximizing power, in his view, explain why they are here now. If we use this thermodynamic interpretation of the will to power and the etiological approach to explanation Richardson describes, we can begin to see the plausibility of the strong doctrine of the will to power and the naturalistic metaethics it implies. From this perspective, we can also see why the contemporary sciences view the concept of dissipative structures and the maximum power principle as being privileged. This interpretation of the will to power provides a fundamental thermodynamic framework for the growth of all forms of power. However, it does not provide a comprehensive explanation for all forms of

11 power: music, for example, is not reducible to thermodynamics. But all music is the product of natural systems that follow thermodynamic laws and this must be taken into account to develop a comprehensive understanding of music and its role in life Richardson also helps us understand why Nietzsche did not feature the concept of the will to power prominently in his published writings. Richardson decided not to focus on Nietzsche s power ontology because he believed it had small plausibility for most of us. 52 He made this determination notwithstanding the fact that there is now empirical evidence that supports the will to power in the contemporary sciences. In Nietzsche s time, there was no such empirical evidence. So, it would certainly be understandable for Nietzsche to decide for similar reasons not to focus his work on the will to power. The Naturalistic realism developed here sees moral values as serving an instrumental role in the process of maximizing power. This vast thermodynamic contest is a fundamental component of the only game in town : it structures the possibilities for everything that exists regardless of what humans happen to think about it. When we take this perspective into account, we stand before man as he now, hardened by the discipline of science, stands before the other forms of nature, (BGE 230). Notes 1 See, e.g., Schacht (1983; 1988), Clark (1990), Leiter (2002), Hussain (2004), Richardson (2004). 2 Leiter 2002: 7. 3 Leiter 2009: 5. 4 Leiter 2009: 2; 2002: 5; 1998: 1. 5 Leiter 2009: 4; 2002: 4 6 Leiter 2000. 7 Id. at 277. 8 Leiter distinguishes three varieties of privilege readings of Nietzsche s metaethics: Intuitionist Realist (I- Realist); Naturalist Realist (N-Realist); and Privilege Non-Realist (P Non-Realist). He sees the proponents of these views holding the following: (i) According to the I-Realist, there are non-natural normative facts, which are sui generis, and which are apprehended by some appropriate act of normative perception. (ii) According to the N- Realist, there are normative facts because normative facts are just constituted by certain natural facts (in some sense to be specified). (iii) According to the P-Non-Realist, there are no normative facts, but some normative judgments

12 still enjoy a privilege by virtue of their interpersonal appeal or acceptance (Leiter 2000: 279). Leiter suggests that no one has advocated the I-Realist position. Foot is the primary advocate for the P-Non-Realist position (See Foot 1973; 1991). 9 Leiter 2000: 279. 10 Leiter directs the reader to Schacht 1983: 348 9, 398 9. For related accounts he cites Moragn 1941: 118 ff.; Kaufmann 1974: 199 200; Wilcox 1974: 194 9; Hunt 1991, Ch. 7. 11 Leiter 2000: 281. 12 Schacht 1983: 348-9. 13 Id. at 398. 14 Leiter 2000: 283. 15 Leiter 2000: 282. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 The third textual argument Leiter offers is one provided by Clark. Leiter describes how Clark has argued that Nietzsche could not have accepted the strong doctrine of the will to power given the putative argument he gives for it (Leiter 2000: 287). Clark notes that the only argument he gives for this doctrine in his published writings is in Section 36 of Beyond Good and Evil. He articulates the argument there in a conditional form: If we believe in the causality of the will, then the strong doctrine of the will to power will follow. Clark has however argued that Nietzsche rejects this principle of the causality of will elsewhere in his work (e.g., GS 127; Clark 1990: 212-218). She concludes that the argument he outlines in Section 36 is not one he actually accepts. I address Clark s argument in endnote 22. 20 Id. at 287. 21 Leiter 2000: 287. 22 Id. at 280. 23 Leiter 2000: 284. 24 Leiter 2007. 25 Leiter 2007: 8. 26 Richardson 2002: 554. A concept of the will to power that operates on an unconscious level also avoids the concerns raised by Clark. This concept is not dependent on the causality of the will in the sense that Nietzsche rejects. He rejects the causality of the will in the sense assumed by the idea of free will: he does not believe people freely and autonomously cause their actions. He believes they are influenced by unconscious drives. This view is consistent with the description of the will to power as an unconscious drive. We can therefore accept the causality of the will to power (BGE 36) while still rejecting the causality of the human will implicit in the concept of free will (TI Four Errors 7). 27 To provide a complete answer to Leiter s criticism here would require an explanation of Nietzsche s value monism. John Richardson recently gave a presentation on this topic: Nietzsche s Value Monism: Saying Yes to Everything, September 13 th, 2009, St. Peter s College. He explained that for Nietzsche good and bad are scalar and comparative rather than bifurcated and inherent. Bad is merely a lesser manifestation of the fundamental value: the will to power. Therefore when Nietzsche complains that the will to power is lacking in the highest values of humanity (A 6) he is pointing out that there are values that would maximize power more. All natural systems represent a manifestation of the will to power to some degree. 28 Richardson 2002; 2004. 29 See Wright (1973) and Millikan (1989). 30 Richardson 2002: 553. 31 Forber critically investigates the limits of Richardson s use of the etiological approach to explanation in a recent essay (Forber 2007: 373-76). 32 Richardson: 2002: 541. 33 Id. at 560-61. 34 Id. at 538. 35 Richardson 2002: 562-63. 36 Id. at 560-61. 37 Id. at 564. 38 Richardson 2002: 561-3.

13 39 Halliday and Resnick 1974: 415. 40 See, e.g., Prigogine 1961. 41 The significance of this dissipative relationship between natural systems and their environment was reduced or ignored in equilibrium thermodynamics. Systems where analyzed in imaginary equilibrium states where there was no interaction between the system and the environment. This simplified calculations. But here we find the problem with equilibrium thermodynamics: systems in nature are continually changing. Their organization increases and decreases, and they interact with their environment. Scientists have consequently begun to see equilibrium thermodynamics as being a little like confining the subject of medicine to the dead (Coveney and Highfield 1991: 156). Nietzsche was concerned about this himself. He wrote, that a state of equilibrium is never reached proves that it is not possible... "Timelessness" to be rejected (WP 1064). He thought this reductive focus led scientist to overlook how natural systems develop their power over time. The scientists who developed the contemporary science of non-equilibrium thermodynamics agreed with Nietzsche. 42 Lotka 1922a; 1922b. 43 Id. at147. 44 Lotka 1922b. 45 Odum 1963; 1994. 46 Delong 2008. 47 See, e.g., Hall 2004, Cai, T., Montague, C., Davis, J. 2006, and Zhang 2007. 48 Odum 1963: 437. Lotka introduced the maximum power principle seven years before Edwin Hubble discovered that the universe was expanding in 1929. Hubble s discovery provides empirical evidence Lotka and Nietzsche did not have. The Big Bang scenario along with its leading rival, chaotic inflationary cosmology, were both developed in an effort to explain the cosmological implications of Hubble s discovery. Both views of cosmology describe the observable universe emerging from a singularity. None of the natural systems we observe now existed at the time of this singularity. In order for these natural systems to develop, they had to use the energy expended in the universe to increase their power. As Lotka notes, the other laws of thermodynamics do not explain how natural systems selforganize; the maximum power principle does. This principle outlines the thermodynamic process by which natural systems developed in accordance with the other thermodynamic laws. We could call this the cosmological argument for the maximum power principle. This argument supports the conclusion Nietzsche considers in his published writings (BGE 36) and outlined in his notes--'this world is the will to power...'(wp 1067). 49 Carroll 2010. 50 Nietzsche goes on in this passage to write that which constitutes growth in life is an ever more thrifty and more far-seeing economy, which achieves more and more with less and less force As an ideal, the principle of the smallest expenditure (WP 637). This makes the value of power relative to efficiency less clear: the later portion of the note appears to emphasize efficiency while the earlier portion focuses on power. Odum includes both power and efficiency in his formulation of the maximum power principle without distinguishing their relative value in the statement of the principle quoted in the text. He outlines this relative value elsewhere and focuses on optimum power (Odum 1955). This focus is more consistent with the rest of Nietzsche s writings where vast sacrifices are justified through their contributions to the development of a form of power. 51 Forber argues in his critical analysis of Richardson s interpretation of Nietzsche, for something to be a structural end of selection all the outcomes (i.e., the traits selected for) must share some structural property (2007:372). As Lotka notes, all natural systems selected for share the property of maximizing power more than their competitors. 52 Richardson 2002: 538. References Cai, T., Montague, C., Davis, J. (2006), The Maximum Power Principle: An Empirical Investigation, Ecological Modeling. 190/3-4:317-335. Carroll, S. (2010), Free Energy and the Meaning of Life, Discover, Cosmic Variance Blog. http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2010/03/10/free-energy-and-the-meaning-oflife/

Clark, M. (1990), Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coveney, P. and Highfield, R. (1991), The Arrow of Time. New York: Fawcett. Crutchfield, J., Farmer, J.D., Packard, N., and Shaw, R. (1986), Chaos, Scientific American, 255 (6): 46-57. Delong, J. (2008), The maximum power principle predicts the outcomes of two-species competition experiments, Oikos, 117: 1329-1336. Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1971), The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.. (1975), Energy and Economic Myths. Southern Economic Journal, 41/3. Godfrey-Smith, P. (1994), A Modern History Theory of Functions, Nous, 28(3):344-362. Foot, P. (1973), Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values, in R. C. Solomon (ed.), Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.. (1991), Nietzsche s Immoralism, New York Review of Books. 38/11: 18 22. Forber, P. (2007), Nietzsche Was No Darwinian, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75, 2: 369-381). Guilleminot, H. (1919), La Matiere et la Vie., Flammarion: Paris. Hall, C. (2004), The Continuing Importance of Maximum Power, Ecological Modeling. 178/1-2: 107-113. Halliday, D. and Resnick, R. (1974), Fundamentals of Physics. New York, Wiley & Sons. Hare, R. (1988), Possible People, Bioethics. 2/1. Harris, M. (1987), Cultural Anthropology. 2nd edition. New York: Harper & Row. Heads, M. (2009), Darwin s changing views on evolution, Journal of Biogeography. 36: 1018 1026. Hunt, L. (1991), Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue. London: Routledge. Hussain, N. (2004), Nietzsche s Positivism, European Journal of Philosophy, 12: 326-368. Janaway, C. (2007), Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche s Genealogy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kauffman, S. (1993), The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution. New York: Oxford University Press. Kaufmann, W. (1974), Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Krohn, Kuppers, and Nowotny, eds. (1990), Selforganization: Portrait of a Scientific Revolution. Boston: Kluwer. Lange, F.A. (1865/1950), The History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Present Importance. Tr. E.C. Thomas; 3rd edition. New York: Humanities Press. Orig. pub. 1865. Leiter, B. (1998), One Health, One Earth, One Sun, Times Literary Supplement. New York: New York Times Ltd..(2000), Nietzsche s Metaethics: Against Privilege Readings, in European Journal of Philosophy 8/3: 277 297.. (2002), Nietzsche on Morality. London: Routledge.. (2007), Nietzsche s Theory of Will, Philosophers Imprint 7/7.. (2009), Nietzsche s Naturalism Reconsidered, to appear in K. Gemes & J. Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Oxford: Oxford University Press..(2010), Nietzsche s Philosophy of Action, to appear in T. O Connor & C. Sandis (eds.), 14

Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Blackwell. Lotka, A. (1922a), 'Contribution to the energetics of evolution'. Proc Natl Acad Sci, 8: pp. 147 51. (1922b), 'Natural selection as a physical principle'. Proc Natl Acad Sci, 8, pp 151 4. Mandelbrot B. (1983), The Fractal Geometry of Nature. Freeman, New York, 1983. Mill, J. S. (1861), Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979. Millikan, R. (1989), In Defense of Proper Functions, Philosophy of Science 56:288-302. McWhirter, T. (1999), Nietzsche's Physics, International Studies in Philosophy, 31/3: 5-17. Moore, G. (2004), Introduction, Nietzsche and Science. Ed. By Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer. Aldershot: Ashgate. Moragn, G. (1941), What Nietzsche Means. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Odum, H. and Pinkerton R. (1955), Time s speed regulator: The optimum efficiency for maximum power output in physical and biological systems. American Scientist 43:331 343. Odum, H. (1963), 'Limits of remote ecosystems containing man', The American Biology Teacher. 25/ 6: 429-443.. (1971), Environment, Power and Society. New York: Wiley.. (1994), Ecological and General Systems: An Introduction to Systems Ecology, Colorado University Press.. (1995), 'Self-Organization and Maximum Empower', in C.A.S.Hall (ed.) Maximum Power: The Ideas and Applications of H.T.Odum, Colorado University Press, Colorado. Read, R. (1985), Evolutionary Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago. Richardson, J (2002), Nietzsche Contra Darwin, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65/3: 3.. (2004), Nietzsche s New Darwinism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schacht, R. (1983), Nietzsche. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.. (1988), Nietzsche s Gay Science, or, How to Naturalize Cheerfully, R.C. Solomon & K.M. Higgins (eds.), Reading Nietzsche. New York: Oxford University Press. Wilcox, J. (1974), Truth and Value in Nietzsche. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Wright, L. (1973), Functions, Philosophical Review, 82: 139-168. Zhang, J (2007), Energy Flows and Maximum Power on an Evolutionary Ecological Network Model, Advances in Artificial Life. Heidelberg: Springer Berlin. Zeleny ed. (1980), Autopoiesis, Dissipative Structures, and Spontaneous Social Orders. AAAS Selected Symposium, Boulder: Westview Press. 15