United Nations Security Council

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United Nations Security Council The UN Charter established six main organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened. According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes: to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obligated to implement under the Charter.

AGENDA- SITUATION IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON BOKO HARAM Introduction The Islamist Insurgency in Nigeria began in 1999 with the implementation of Sharia Law in various states of Nigeria, primarily located in the North-East. The Christian minority would not accept Sharia Law. This resulted in several riots across the region. Boko Haram is the main organisation behind the insurgency was formed in 2002 under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf. Its aim is to prevent the spread of Western Education and beliefs and establish Sharia Law in Nigeria. It has begun an armed insurgency against the Secular Government of Nigeria, killing about 2000-4000 people since 2009. It has been deemed a terrorist organisation by the United States of America (USA). One of the main reasons why it began the insurgency is because it wishes to create an Islamic State in Nigeria. Until 2009, Boko Haram carried out its operations in a peaceful manner. It garnered lots of support in areas of high unemployment, under development and poverty. Speaking up against the government s inefficiencies and corruption in the region had caused many to support the organization. After 2009, the government launched an investigation into the organization and its activities on claims that Boko Haram was

arming itself militarily. The impact of the insurgency is seen in the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, Benin and Niger (as shown in the map) too, thus posing a threat to civilians in these countries too. Issues of corruption, poverty, religious restrictions, abuse of power and gross human rights violations are important issues to be looked at while trying to solve this issue. Moreover with increasing hostilities on both sides and more violent campaigns being conducted against the local people in the affected region and International Organisations (including the United Nations itself) the insurgency must stop to prevent more lives being lost and allow Western Africa to proper. Keeping this in mind, that the insurgency falls well within the mandate of the UNSC to protect and maintain international peace and identifying and solving problems that can affect world peace, immediate action by the UNSC must be taken to end this 5 year old conflict. Kidnapping of the Nigerian schoolgirls The abducted schoolgirls are high school seniors, mostly ages 16 to 18, who had assembled to take their final exams at Chibok Government Girls Secondary School. The government had closed all public secondary schools in the northeastern state of Borno in March in response to the threat of attacks by Boko Haram. While most of the girls regularly attended the public boarding school in Chibok, students from other schools

that remained closed had also gathered for the exams, which complicated initial efforts to determine how many girls had been taken by the gunmen. The attack occurred overnight between April 14 and 15. Boko Haram fighters, reportedly numbering more than 200, overpowered security forces based in the town (local police and 17 soldiers). According to Amnesty International, the main headquarters of the army division tasked with countering Boko Haram, located 80 miles away in the state capital Maiduguri, received warning of the pending attack hours before it happened, but did not deploy forces to prevent it. According to press reports, just over 50 of the girls were able to escape during or shortly after the incident. The whereabouts of those still being held captive are unclear, although the Nigerian military announced on May 26 that they had identified the location of at least some of the girls. Some observers speculate that they may have been taken to the Sambisa forest (a reserve used as a refuge by the group) or to a remote mountainous area on the Cameroon border Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria From 2010 till the present there have been many attacks conducted by the Boko Haram in Nigeria. In September 2010, Boko Haram militants attacked the Bauchi prison where Boko Haram members were awaiting

trial for crimes committed in the July 2009 riots and freed more than 700 prisoners. The emir of Bauchi, Muhammadu Rilwanu Suleyman Adamu, went into hiding as soon as this mass breakout occurred. A total of six people were killed. Another significant incident was the United Nations Headquarters Bombing in August 2011. A car broke through security barriers near the UN Headquarters in Abuja and a bomb was detonated in the reception area. About 21 people were killed in the attack. This shows that Boko Haram shifted its targets from local police units to international organisations too. A Boko Haram spokesperson after stating that the organisation was responsible for the attack said, "The government must release all our members detained in various prisons across the country unconditionally before we accept dialogue with the government. The identity of the Abuja U.N. building bomber will be revealed to the public soon." On Christmas Day in 2011, bombings across four cities (Jos, Madalla, Gadaka and Damaturu) occurred. Madalla is a suburb of Nigeria s capital, Abuja. This shows that Boko Haram does have the resources to attack important

government strongholds in Nigeria without much of a problem. Approximately 40-50 people were killed. Christians demanded that President Goodluck Jonathan come visit the bodies. Many believe that the attacks were to provoke the Christians in Nigeria to attack Muslims in the country to further divide it on basis of religion. The attacks were condemned by countries across the world,including all the Permanent 5 (P5) members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the European Union (EU), the African Union and many other organizations In January 2012, Boko Haram carried out two significant attacks in Nigeria, one on Christian businesses and churches while the other was on government buildings and police stations. On the 5th of January, three members of Boko Haram, on January 5, attacked a church in Gombe State, killing six people. On January 6, Boko Haram shot 12 members of the Igbo ethnic group, from southeastern Nigeria, during a community meeting in Mubi, Adamawa State. They also attacked a church in Yola, the state capital, killing 12 Christian worshipers. A total of 40 people were killed. These attacks were in response to an ultimatum delivered by Boko Haram on the 2nd of

January, which gave Christians in the Northern regions of Nigeria three days to leave. The 20th January 2012 attacks were attacks conducted by Boko Haram in Kano, the largest city in Northern Nigeria at the police barracks, offices of the State Security Service (SSS) and police stations. The insurgents attacked people by suicide car bombings and shooting civilians and police. It is estimated that 200 people were killed. Many foreign nationals were also killed in this attack-one Indian, two Nepalese nationals, a journalist working for Channels TV (an independent Nigerian television station), 29 police officers, three customs and immigration officers, and three SSS agents. Through 2012, there were many more attacks and kidnappings that occurred resulting in about 200-300 deaths that year. Two foreigners were also killed during a failed British hostage rescue attempt to free Italian engineer Franco Lamolinara and Briton Christopher McManus who were abducted in 2011, both were killed.

In July 2013, a shooting occurred at a school in Yobe State. Forty two people were killed, majority being students. This was in response to the army beating up students in an Islamic school. Yobe s proximity to Cameroon s border caused 20,000 Nigerians to flee the country after this attack. A similar attack happened at the Gujba College resulting in the deaths of 49 students and teachers. A Boko Haram spokesperson said that such attacks on educational institutes will continue until the government stops interfering with Islamic Education in the country. This caused another 30,000 people to flee to Chad and Cameroon. In early 2014 there had been a wave of attacks carried out by Boko Haram resulting in the deaths of 200-400 people. The Chibok Kidnapping is one crime carried out by Boko Haram that has gathered international attention. It kidnapped 276 girls and stated that the girls would be sold as war booty. The girls are being sold as slaves across the borders in Chad and Cameroon and forced to convert to Islam. Abubakar Shekau, the group leader said, Slavery is allowed in my religion, and I shall capture people and make them slaves. He also stated that the girls should not have been in school but should have been married.

On the 21st of July 2014, Damboa, a bustling market city in Northeast Nigeria fell to the Boko Haram with little resistance from the army. This is a significant victory for the insurgents and shows how effective the Nigerian Army has been in countering the extremists. The Nigerian government faced lots of criticism for this but instead of taking action in the Northeast, it clamped down on dissenting newspapers and critics instead Displacement Crisis In addition to the rising death toll and security challenges that terrorist activities currently cause in Nigeria, a progressively worrisome crisis over increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has recently developed throughout the country. In northern Nigeria, Boko Haram violence has directly caused the internal displacement of over 290,000 Nigerians and the forced migration of 61,000 refugees to the nearby countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These numbers represent just one facet of the displacement crisis in Nigeria. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that more than half of the 12 million civilians living in Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa are directly impacted by the violence in northern states through health risks, significant

child orphanage, and lack of access to basic necessities such as food and clean water. Additionally, militant attacks along the shores of Lake Chad, a critical source of agricultural infrastructure in northeast Nigeria, forced 19,000 farmers to flee the area and resulted in over 5,000 hectares (12,400 acres) of lost wheat and rice production. Mass displacements of Nigerian citizens throughout the country and West African region have taken an unprecedented toll on the current human rights situation Connections to Other Terrorist Organizations and Militant Groups As the principal and most prominent terrorist organization in the country, Boko Haram holds important weight in any conversation on terrorism in Nigeria. However, it is critical to look beyond Boko Haram and delve into the other organizations that share important connections to the current status of terrorism in Nigeria. Al-Qaeda Dating back to the inception of Boko Haram in 2002, the group s ties with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an offshoot of Al-Qaeda active in northwest Africa, demonstrate a perilous history of shared expertise and cooperation. The first signs of Boko Haram s affiliation with AlQaeda occurred in early 2002, when terrorist leader Osama bin Laden distributed three

million USD to Salafi groups in Nigeria, many of whom joined forces to form Boko Haram. More recently, cooperation between the two groups extended through 2013 when reports of Boko Haram combatants attending AQIM training centers in Timbuktu, Mali emerged. The group s connections to Al-Qaeda extended far beyond involvement with AQIM in Africa. Between January 2012 and February 2013, many group members trained with subgroups of Al-Qaeda such as the AlQaeda headquarters in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, al- Shabab in Somalia, and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. Boko Haram s connections to Al-Qaeda and similar organizations in Saudi Arabia run so deeply that many consider the group to maintain a diplomatic presence in the country. Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia provided refuge for former Boko Haram leader Muhammad Yusuf in 2004 and has provided extensive funding for terrorist organizations in Nigeria since Boko Haram s establishment in 2002. Clearly, the links that Boko Haram shares with Al-Qaeda run very deeply through the history of the group and its current terrorist activities in Nigeria. An important consequence of this affiliation has been the formation of connections between Islamic militancy in Nigeria and groups that comprise Al-Qaeda s broader terrorist network.

Ansar al-dine and Movement for Unity and Jihad in in West Africa (MUJAO) Boko Haram s associations with AQIM in Mali greatly facilitated significant cooperation with two other prominent Islamic terrorist groups in northwest Africa, Ansar al-dine and MUJAO. Similar to Islamic militants in Nigeria, Ansar-al Dine professes an underlying motive of proliferating Sharia law throughout Sub-Saharan Africa through local terrorist activities in various Malian cities. Although the group established as an offshoot of various independent tribes and ethnic groups in Mali, Ansaral Dine serves as a coordinator of AQIM, and more recently Boko Haram, operations in northwest Africa. In parallel, MUJAO maintains strong religious and ideological ties to AQIM and Boko Haram as an important ally in Mali who also strives to implement Sharia law throughout society. MUJAO s unique set of contacts throughout the Middle East and North Africa enable the group to recruit both locals and foreigners as ground combatants and terrorist leaders. These two groups connections to Islamic militants in Nigeria represent an essential source of funding, personnel, and expertise for many Nigerian terrorist organizations. Recent activity in Cameroon and Niger conducted by various offshoots of Boko Haram suggests a regional component to the group s fervently religious, ideologically motivated agenda.

Ansaru As the most prominent and notorious offshoot of Boko Haram, Ansaru represents another key group upon which counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria must focus. The group formed in January 2012 under the full name Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa as a faction of Boko Haram. The group s message suggests an extremist view on Islamic authority and selfdefense as revealed by a statement made in early 2012: We will have a dispassionate look into everything to discourage evil and try to eliminate it. Actions over the past year such as the abduction of French national Francis Colump in December 2012 and the killing of seven foreign nationals in Lebanon in February 2013 instigated Ansaru s label as a terrorist organization and suspicions of close affiliation with AQIM by the British government. Interestingly, the group declares a strong distaste for the recent decisions and actions undertaken by Boko Haram as counterproductive to the mission of Islamic militants in Nigeria. Rather, Ansaru proclaims a strong affinity for the highly radicalized and isolationist ideologies that led to the uprising of Usman dan Fodio and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in the early nineteenth century. Although recent actions suggest a more domestically focused, politically motived movement within Ansaru, reports of significant ties to

Al-Qaeda and jihadist groups in West Africa demonstrate that the group maintains ambitions beyond Nigeria s borders. While specific counter-terrorism legislation has typically focused on Boko Haram in the past, Ansaru s tremendously violent and separatist message requires careful consideration in all future actions executed at the international level. UN Response Given the important role that financial support plays in providing weapons and supplies for terrorist organizations, the UN Security Council has undergone significant efforts to impose sanctions on terrorist groups, especially those associated with Al-Qaeda. As of 22 May 2014, the Security Council officially added Boko Haram to the list of entities and individuals linked to Al-Qaeda that are targeted by substantial sanctions and an arms embargo. The report from the Security Council implicates Boko Haram in receiving knowledge from AQIM in constructive explosive devices and fighting alongside groups linked to Al- Qaeda in Mali in 2012 and 2013. Although a very strong sign of international leadership and pragmatic action on a global level, the effectiveness of the sanctions remains very unclear. As political analysts explain, the majority of Boko Haram s financial support comes in sporadic spurts of cash flow from bank robberies, extortion, and ransom payments, rather than a large, traceable bank account that can be accessed through

intelligence operations. Additionally, the travel ban imposed as part of the Security Council sanctions make little appreciable difference as insurgent migration represents a local and state level problem in the Niger Delta region. Although the Security Council cites Boko Haram affiliations with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Iraq, North Africa, Somalia, and Yemen as underlying justification for imposing the sanctions, UN action unique to the situation in Nigeria must be executed to thwart Islamic militants from attaining financial support and expertise from larger terrorist organizations. Boko Haram and other terrorist groups unique financial standing and means for acquiring mission-dependent assets necessitate distinct counter-terrorism policy that explores the best options for cutting off economic support to each group. In July 2014, the UN once again set forth to eliminate the threat of terrorism in Nigeria, yet with a much more comprehensive focus to counterterrorist actions. According to the office of the Secretary- General and UN Office for West Africa, the new UN strategy will comprise an integrated support package that works in conjunction with already existent counter-terrorism efforts in Nigeria to combat terrorism on an economic, humanitarian, and political level. The recent statements also indicate a strong willingness to enter close cooperation with organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, and follow the lead of countries such as

Cameroon and Chad to establish a multilateral approach to current efforts in Nigeria. Evidently, counter-terrorism, when executed on an international level, requires the involvement and expertise of all relevant national and intergovernmental groups to achieve success. Although powerful, executive committees such as the CTED may appear to be selfsustaining, autonomous bodies, international cooperation can only be achieved when the full knowledge, capacity, and authority of all relevant entities are utilized. The Nigerian Government Since Boko Haram s resurgence in 2010, the Nigerian government has struggled to respond to the growing threat posed by the group, and its expanding impact on the civilian population in the northeast. Nigerian security forces have been deployed in counterterrorism operations in the most affected states since 2011 their offensives against the group had some notable successes in 2012 and early 2013, temporarily reducing attacks, but the past year has been the deadliest for civilians in the group s history. Some local communities formed informant networks and vigilante groups in 2013 to protect themselves, in part due to reportedly ineffective responses by security forces. In Borno, these groups have reportedly worked with the state government and security forces to rout Boko Haram cells. Press reports suggest that the groups, who collectively call

themselves the Civilian Joint Task Force or Civilian-JTF, have had some positive impact on security in the Borno state capital of Maiduguri in the past year, but Boko Haram attacks in rural areas, which are sometimes claimed as retaliation against locals for their cooperation with security forces, have been increasingly lethal. By many accounts, these civilian groups have sought to work with the Nigerian military to reduce the possibility of indiscriminate abuses against innocent civilians in the context of counterterrorism operations The Nigerian parliament passed anti-terrorism legislation, originally introduced in 2011, in 2013. The law was designed, in part, to facilitate greater counterterrorism coordination, but interagency cooperation and information sharing remains limited. According to the State Department, the Nigerian government has made little progress in addressing broader grievances among northern populations that may fuel Boko Haram support state government efforts to increase education and employment opportunities have had almost no support from the federal government. Questions to Consider 1. What immediate measures should the UN take to curb Boko Haram s activities?

2. Should negotiations with Boko Haram proceed, with the goal of providing them certain concessions as means to end the violence? Regards Amlan Panda (PRESIDENT) Akshit Seth (VICE PRESIDENT)