1 Jonathan Grossman Queen s University Ivan Rand and UNSCOP: Another Solomonic Judgment In 1945, the Ford Motor Company in Windsor, Ontario was on strike due to the refusal of management to recognize a union. Mr. Justice Ivan Rand of the Supreme Court of Canada developed a solution to the strike which became known as the Rand Formula. The Rand Formula required the payment of union dues by all workers, regardless of a worker s membership in the union. Rand achieved praise from the legal community for this decision. The British High Commissioner in Ottawa stated that the Rand Formula was a Solomon judgment which gave some satisfaction to both parties. 1 On September 3, 1947, Rand issued another Solomonic judgment. This time, the judgment was manifested in Rand s integral role in creating the United Nation Special Committee on Palestine s (UNSCOP) final report that advocated the partition of Palestine. This second judgment had many profound effects and eventually led to the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, the official beginning of the Arab-Israeli war, and the statelessness of the Palestinian Arabs. Firstly, the following will provide a description of the historical context of events surrounding UNSCOP. A review of the scholarly literature elaborating on different interpretations of the subject will follow. This paper will then argue its main thesis that Rand did not have any personal interest or ulterior motive in mind when he advocated partition. Rather, Rand s decision to support partition arose from a sense of justice justice being defined by the characteristics of objectivity and pragmatism. However, 1 David J Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1985) 76.
2 federal judges cannot be completely objective and it will therefore be explained how Rand s decision was also affected by his previous experiences and values. Finally, this paper will tentatively examine the public reaction, and specifically the Jewish community s reaction, to UNSCOP s report. Such an assessment may help shed light on why Canada s and Rand s role in the establishment of a Jewish State is, to this day, largely unknown. The context surrounding UNSCOP s foundation is important in order to understand why UNSCOP was at all necessary. Zionism and the Land of Israel have always been an integral part of Judaism. Modern Zionism however, did not officially begin until an Austrian journalist, Theodor Herzl, observed the Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s and 1900s. 2 Herzl, commonly known as the father of modern Zionism, witnessed state-sponsored anti-semitism in France towards Dreyfus. Ironically, France was the first European state to officially emancipate the Jews. Witnessing the trial changed Herzl s opinion from that of an integrationist to a believer in the right of Jewish selfdetermination. That is, Herzl thought Jews could not be free of anti-semitic attacks unless they were in a state controlled by and for Jews. Herzl s Jewish nationalist ideas were expressed in The Jewish State in 1896. 3 From 1882 to 1903 the first aliyah, or wave of immigration, started from Jewish communities in Europe to Palestine. 4 These first immigrants gave practical and tangible meaning to Herzl s ideas. 2 Martin Gilbert, Exile and Return (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978) 47. The Dreyfus Affair was a political scandal in the late 19 th and early 20 th century in which Captain Alfred Dreyfus was wrongfully convicted of treason mostly due to the dual loyalty accusations levied by anti-semites against Jews. 3 Gilbert 49. 4 Gilbert 52.
3 World War I saw the allied powers fighting the Ottomans in the Middle East. The British were able to defeat the Ottoman Empire in 1917. At the same time, as Britain fought for its survival on the battlefields of Europe, it had already incompatibly made agreements to divide the land in three different ways: the Sykes Picot agreement stated that the Middle East would be divided between the French and the British, the MacMahon-Hussein correspondence promised the Middle East to the Arabs, and the Balfour Declaration called for the establishment in Palestine for a national home for the Jewish people. 5 In 1920, the League of Nations gave a mandate to the British to administrate Palestine. 6 This move was initially seen as a positive step for the Zionist cause, given Britain s assurances in Balfour. This optimism was exemplified when Jews entered the British Mandated Palestine in, respectfully, the fourth and fifth aliyahs in 1924-1928 and 1932-1939. In response to the influx of Jews from 1936 until 1939, the Palestinian Arabs revolted. 7 Also in 1936, the Peel Commission was established in order to find a solution to the problems in Palestine. The Peel Commission recommended partition between the Arabs and the Jews, but this proposal was rejected by all sides. 8 In 1939, the White Paper was enacted, abandoning the idea of partition for a bi-national state. The White Paper also curtailed both Jewish immigration (to an absolute maximum of 75,000) and Jewish land purchases. This was frowned upon by the Jews but largely accepted by the Arabs. The White Paper was commonly seen as an attempt to gain favour with the oil-rich Arabs in a lead up to World War II. 5 John Laqueur, A History of Zionism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972) xiv. 6 Gilbert 137. 7 Gilbert 197. 8 Laqueur 514.
4 Meanwhile, the Holocaust began in Europe resulting in the murder of six million Jews. The majority of Holocaust survivors, numbering more than a quarter of a million, mainly wished to immigrate to Palestine as they had seen the consequences of living under the gentiles. Many of the displaced persons (DPs) attempted to enter Palestine secretly. Some succeeded while others were sent back to the DP camps from whence they came. The most famous of these secret migrations was the Exodus in 1947, which will be discussed further on. 9 In the same post-war climate, there were Revisionist Zionist militias, such as the Irgun and Lehi, that were fighting both the British and the Arabs using tactics such as terrorism. This can be illustrated in one of the more notorious bombings, that of the King David Hotel in 1946, which at the time was the British command centre. 10 In addition, there were constant sectarian skirmishes going on between the Jewish and Arab residents of Palestine. The British Mandate in Palestine was therefore on the brink of collapse. The British could not administrate a country in the middle of a civil war. To compound problems, Britain was still bankrupt from WWII and the 100,000 British troops stationed in Palestine could not keep order. Thus in 1947, Britain asked the UN to help solve the Palestine crisis. With this background, the UN decided to send a fact-finding mission into Palestine, known as UNSCOP. On September 3, 1947 UNSCOP s majority decision was in favour of partition, but with an economic union between the Arab and Jewish states. Jerusalem would be established as an international city. The minority decision called for a unitary federated state. The Jewish agency accepted UNSCOP s advocacy of partition, while the Arabs rejected it. The reason the Jews accepted the UNSCOP proposal but rejected Peel s was 9 Gilbert 301. 10 Gilbert 287.
5 due to the amount of land allocated to the Jews. UNSCOP, relative to Peel, greatly improved the amount of land given to the Jews including a huge tract of land in the Negev. UNSCOP was both a major catalyst and the turning point for the establishment of a Jewish state because it was later voted on and accepted at the UN. Israel used the UN resolution as a pretext to declaring independence on May 14, 1948. 11 The declaration of an independent Jewish state in Palestine caused an immediate war with Israel s surrounding neighbours. This war, the War of Independence, was the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict that still continues today. The conclusion of the 1948 war was that the Jews had increased their land size, but the land allotted to the Palestinian Arabs was annexed by Jordan and Egypt. Both of these land-grabs left no room for a Palestinian Arab state and sparked their long modern struggle for statehood. A review of the scholarly literature finds that Rand s role in UNSCOP can be placed into the more general field of Canadian foreign policy towards the Middle East and into the sub-field of Canada s role in the founding of a Jewish State. Due to the contentious nature of the subject, scholarship in this field is often biased and intended to sway an audience s view of Canada s relationship with Israel. David J. Bercuson, in Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy, argues that a great deal of the research done in the field is nonsense and is detached from reality. 12 Some pro-arab authors, such as Tareq Y. Ismael, argue that Canada has wrongfully and continuously sided with Israel, thereby neglecting the Palestinians. Such a stance is an approach suggesting Canada should reverse this policy. 13 Other pro-zionists argue, like 11 Gilbert 301. 12 Bercuson vii. 13 Tareq Y Ismael, Canada and the Middle East (Calgary: Detselig Enterprise, 1994).
6 Ismael, that Canada has been staunchly pro-zionist. However, the pro-zionists accounts lead the reader to believe that this relationship should remain in place. Furthermore, scholars like Bercuson and Zachariah Kay assert that Canada has taken an even-handed approach towards Israel. The titles of Kay s works, The Diplomacy of Prudence and Canada and Palestine: the Politics of Non-Commitment, illustrate Canada s careful and non-partisan approach to Israel. 14 Similarly, Bercuson claims that despite other scholars allegations, Canada is no more pro-israeli than it is pro- Brazilian. 15 The facts speak for themselves on this issue, and while Canada has been historically supportive of Israel, Bercuson is correct in claiming that Canada has not been any more pro-israel than any other state. Moreover, right from the beginning, Canada has been one of the most mentionable donors and supporters of the Palestinian cause. Canada was instrumental in the founding and continual contribution of the United Nation Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). A more specific study of Canada s role in the foundation of the State of Israel is a narrow field in which Rand plays only a fractional part. Lester B. Pearson is viewed by most to be the main figure in the orchestration of Canada s involvement in partition. This more prominent status is a result of Pearson s attraction of the media in New York while creating UNSCOP and ensuring UNSCOP s report was turned into a successful general assembly resolution. There are two major schools of thought on the issue of why Canada was supportive of partition. The first comes from Bercuson, who argues that Canada made its decision to support partition out of a realist conception of national self-interest. That is, Canada was far more concerned about the effect of the Middle East dispute on 1996). 14 Zachariah Kay, The Diplomacy of Prudence (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens UP, 15 Bercuson 240.
7 British-American relations and the newly conceived Cold War than on the actual substantive issue of the fate of Palestine. 16 Britain was anti-partition by this time, due to fighting Jewish terrorists for several years, while the US was supportive of the Jews chiefly because of the large Jewish American population. Britain and America were Canada s greatest allies and Canada needed to keep the Western alliance strong in the face of the new Red Menace. Conversely, the opposing line of thought, as embodied in Eliezer Tauber s book, Personnel Policy Making, asserts that Canada did not help found a Jewish State out of national interest. 17 Instead, Tauber argues that a few liberal-minded diplomats personally decided to support the Zionist cause out of a feeling of moral obligation. 18 Unfortunately, it seems Ivan Rand s individual function and motives get lost in these broader explanations that seek to elucidate Canada s entire position in the foundation of Israel. Despite the importance of UNSCOP s decision and the significant role Rand played, there is little scholarship on his involvement. The only work that has concerned itself solely with Rand was undertaken by a Hamiltonian lawyer, John Ross. Ross wrote several interesting and informative articles based on the UNSCOP papers he found at the University of Western Ontario Law School, of which Rand was at one point the Dean. UNSCOP meetings were held in secret and, hence, before Ross s discovery, little was known about UNSCOP s private committee. Ross argues, contrary to Tauber, that a moral justification for partition took a backseat. Instead, Ross claims, Rand was more swayed towards the solution of partition because of the people he met and the arguments they made in favour of partition and the 16 Bercuson ix. 17 Eliezer Tauber, Personal Policy Making (Westport: Greenwood P, 2002). 18 Tauber x.
8 establishment of a Jewish State. Rand met with figures such as Chaim Weizman, who argued for partition along similar lines to what would become UNSCOP s final report. Furthermore, Rand was equally influenced by people such as Moshe Sherrett, who gave economic arguments on behalf of the State of Israel. 19 The following demonstrates that Rand chose partition neither out of Canadian national or personal self-interest, nor because of altruistic moralism. Rather, Rand advocated partition due to his belief in jurisprudence. Relative to other scholars explanations of Rand s motives, this paper s thesis is removed from Bercuson and Tauber s arguments and aligns itself with the opinion of Ross. This choice is based on the realization that Bercuson s and Tauber s theses have both mistaken morality for justice. Ross argues, as will this paper, that Rand heard all the pertinent information and arguments in the case of Palestine. Just as a judge would do, only after both sides had made their case did he then arbitrate in search of the best possible solution. Throughout this paper thus far, it has been presented as fact that Rand was integral to UNSCOP s conclusion of partition. However, not all scholars agree. Bercuson for instance, challenges Rand s role in the partition scheme. Bercuson argues that Rand originally wanted two separate states bound together so that it would, in essence, be a federalist state rather than consist of two separate entities. 20 Moreover, Bercuson cites the testimony of Ralph Bunche, who was a UN assistant to UNSCOP and later the first African-American to win the Nobel Prize (for his work on the 1949 Arab-Israeli Armistice). Bunche once claimed that Rand was the greatest disappointment to UNSCOP and saw Rand as an elderly, crotchety gentlemen who had apparently never 19 John Ross, The Exodus, 1947, and UNSCOP, The Canadian Jewish News, 9 June 2004: B6. 20 Bercuson 100.
9 been outside of Canada [ ] and who talked incessantly without contributing anything. 21 Conversely, Ross and Tauber view Rand as the key member in the partition camp. Early on in UNSCOP s existence, there was already a clear division between partitionists, non-partitionists and undecided voters. It was Rand s idea to have an overarching economic union between the two states that won over many of the undecided voters to allow partition to have a clear majority. 22 This was the Solomonic part of his judgment because Rand compromised between a fully partitioned state and a unitary one. In addition, it was Rand who drafted what would later become the basis for the UN resolution. 23 Leon Maynard, Rand s fellow Canadian alternate in UNSCOP stated: Justice Rand was by far the main contributor to the partition scheme with economic union. Yoav Gelber, serving under the Jewish agency, claimed as well that in Geneva Mr. Justice Ivan Rand dominated the Inquiry Committee s proceedings it was his resolution for partition which carried the day and brought concrete results. 24 With Bercuson s and Tauber s conflicting accounts of Rand s importance to the conclusion of UNSCOP, how can they be reconciled? By looking at the sourcing, one can see that Tauber s account is more credible as he cites directly from UNSCOP primary sources in order to prove that Rand was the delegate who advocated partition with an economic union. However, Bercuson failed to name the source claiming that Rand essentially wanted a federalist solution. This poor referencing, however, is not an implication that Bercuson performed sloppy work, since a great deal of the important 21 Bercuson 105. 22 Tauber 23. 23 John Ross, Ivan Rand and the UNSCOP Papers, The Canadian Jewish News 18 Apr. 2002: 9. 24 Tauber 69.
10 information was not yet released when he wrote his book. Furthermore, one can interpret Bunche s dislike for Rand as biased, given that Bunche was a staunch anti-partitionist. Therefore, despite Bercuson s earlier claims, there seems to be a consensus after 2002 that Rand was the main figure contributing to UNSCOP s successful and history-altering conclusion. Rand s reason for advocating partition was not due to reasons of morality as Tauber claims, but the consequence of Rand s sense of justice being served. While justice and morality are quite close by definition (morality being the basis for justice), there are some very important and distinct features. Morality, by nature, is very subjective. For instance, both the Jews and the Arabs thought it was completely ethical for each of their groups to claim the whole land of Palestine. To be precise, there is nothing intrinsic in morality that would lead to UNSCOP s recommendation of partition; for instance the minority report of a federated Palestine believed they were on the moral high ground and that partition would be completely unethical. However, justice is innately objective. Justice can claim objectivity, as it is based on a set of predetermined reasoning and laws, as defined by what a reasonable person would do in the same situation. Morality also has a sense of utopianism to it. Many thought it was most moral to establish a bi-national state. Those advocates of a bi-national state claimed it would allow the Semitic brothernations of Jews and Arabs to live together in more reasonable borders. Alternatively, justice is very practical. Rand understood the reality of the Palestine conflict and realized that Jews and Arabs could not live side by side in the same state. Rand was a Supreme Court judge and was accustomed to dealing with matters judicially. UNSCOP was no exception. Significantly, Rand was not the only judge in
11 UNSCOP; many of the delegates who also voted for partition were jurists, including the Chairman of UNSCOP Emil Sandstrom, Chief Justice of Sweden. A strong overtone of justice being executed is therefore evident throughout UNSCOP s findings. This theme of justice continues into undoing the wrongs of the past and helping Jews achieve selfdetermination after thousands of years of statelessness. Finally, justice also has the characteristic of retribution and fairness. If any nation deserved a state after all the persecution that they have been through throughout the ages as a result of lack of selfdetermination, it was the Jews. Rand s function in UNSCOP was judicially impartial, due to his rational methodology of solving the Palestine problem. A possible criticism to the presence of jurisprudence in UNSCOP could argue that there cannot be judicial objectivity since there is no pre-established set of laws in this instance. However, this claim is false as there was a legally binding agreement made between the Zionists and Britain in the form of the Balfour agreement. Rand said an Arab state would be a betrayal of the Jewish people and a violation of international agreements. 25 Rand also employed similar reasoning, which he utilized as a Supreme Court judge. As an illustration of Rand s judicial impartiality, Rand once said that the purpose of UNSCOP was to satisfy, not the Jew nor the Arab, but the enlightened and intelligent conscience of mankind as represented by the United Nations. 26 Keeping in mind these notions of fairness, Rand looked at the Salutary and deleterious effects of the possible solutions to the Palestine problem, and from there decided what would be the best course of action. The solutions to the Palestine question 25 Bercuson 96. 26 Bercuson 82.
12 worth considering included keeping the status quo (the British Mandate), creating either a unitary state (either Jewish or Arab) or a bi-national state, or forcing either a unitary state federation or partition. The status quo as a possibility was rejected immediately; the chief reason behind UNSCOP s foundation in the first place was because the status quo was not working. It was evident to Rand that the British had lost all moral authority and legitimacy to rule. 27 A continued mandate was therefore immediately discounted. A unitary state either ruled by Arabs or Jews was also mostly opposed because it was seen as inevitably unfair to give one group power over the other. In addition, a unitary state would not solve the Palestine question, and could potentially cause more problems leading to civil war. There were thus two reasonable remaining options: a bi-national or federal state (similar ideas of power-sharing) and partition. The idea behind a bi-national state was that the Arabs and the Jews are brother nations, both descending from the prophet Abraham. This common Semitic background was thought to be enough to prevent racial animosity. 28 While, ideally, the reasoning behind this claim could work, the argument is completely devoid of realistic considerations. There was effectively a three-way civil war going on between the Jews, Arabs, and British with constant xenophobia on all sides. As well, there were economic reasons for a bi-national state. A bi-national state would be economically more profitable. Moreover, it was commonly believed that an Arab state alone could not be economically viable. As shown above, Rand s economic union scheme for partition was crucial in winning over the undecided voters. The Jews had a large trade deficit with the Arabs. The Jews would buy agricultural produce, construction materials (as well as employing Arabs 27 Bercuson 86. 28 Tauber 17.
13 in construction), and land from the Arabs but never vice versa. 29 This resulted in the funds only flowing in one direction: from the Jews to the Arabs. UNSCOP believed that without the influx of Jewish capital and produced goods an Arab state alone could not be self-sufficient. Rand agreed with the bi-nationalists in these respects, and it seemed at the time ideal for these brother-nations to live together, at the very least for economic reasons. However, Rand differed with the bi-nationalists due to the reality he witnessed in Palestine and the nationalist sentiment felt by both Arabs and Jews. The nationalism of both peoples was the major source of tension in the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine. Both the Jews and Arabs wanted all of Palestine for themselves because both groups perceived it as their national right. This nationalism made partition the lone possible solution, since it was the only way to give each party their own self-determined, sovereign state. Rand argued that both nations wanted an exclusive area where you can stand upon it, or kneel upon it, or kiss it as you like [ ] a sort of sacred national soil. 30 Here, Rand s profound understanding of all the relevant issues and the intricacies of the problem are evident. From this nationalist standpoint, a bi-national Palestine would not only cause a deadlock, but would deny both people their right to statehood. 31 Therefore, one can see that partition was the only practical solution because both Arab and Jewish nationalism would not allow for anything less than their own respective homelands. Furthermore, one could see the only pragmatic and rational solution to the Palestine question was to divide it into two separate states. Regardless of the utopian vision of a bi-national state, the situation in Palestine was already moving toward this 29 Tauber 16. 30 Tauber 16. 31 Tauber 17.
14 dual-state direction. Under British mandate, the Jews and Arabs were allowed to establish their own sub-governments. The Jews set up the Jewish Agency to govern the Yishuv (settlement), and the Arabs established the Arab High Committee for authority over Arab matters in Palestine. Each separate sub-state or national governing institution founded visible government apparatuses. For instance, the Jewish agency had the His Tadrut as their labour union and non-private business entrepreneur and social service provider, and the Arabs had similar organizations, although less influential on the Arab populace due to tribal and family fractures. Each sub-government even had its own defensive wings; the Jews had the Haganah, for example. 32 Therefore, partition seemed to be the only real option, especially considering that was where governing structures on the ground were already headed. Another reason Rand understood that partition was necessary was so the Jews could control their own immigration and land purchases. A large factor in the Palestine question was the hundreds of thousands of Jewish DPs in Europe. No other country was willing to accept them, and the majority of these refugees explicitly wished to go to Palestine. However, due to the White Paper closing the door to Jewish immigration, and Arab opposition to immigration and land purchases, the only way to solve the refugee problem was the creation of a Jewish state. Rand considered and understood all the pertinent arguments and advocated a plan of action that would best reflect the advantages and disadvantages of the potential solutions. Most important, Rand s decision could still be conducive to reality. Rand chose partition after considering all arguments in addition to its pragmatic implementation. However, Rand acknowledged the economic problems of partition and the sensitivity towards division of Jerusalem. The holy city is why 32 Ross, UNSCOP Papers 9.
15 Rand s idea for partition with an economic union composing of a common customs and monetary policy as well as an international mini-state of Jerusalem was the ultimate solution. This paper has argued thus far that Rand was judicially impartial in UNSCOP. However, even judges are subject to biases due to their previously held ideas and values. Therefore, when UNSCOP was investigating the Palestine question, the individual members brought with them certain values and ideas. For instance, in 1943, Rand served on the council of the Canadian National Railways. This made Rand knowledgeable about the organization of large projects of capital and business. David Horowitz, the Jewish Agency liaison with UNSCOP, had also worked planning the Jewish Agency s railways. Horowitz and Rand quickly bonded as friends and continued their relationship well after their work with UNSCOP was done. This close relationship inevitably affected Rand s decision for partition, as Horowitz was also a proponent of partition. Given Rand s experience working with large capital central programmes, he became impressed with the Jewish Agency s initiatives, such as making the land fertile and prosperous, and the establishment of advanced industry and an economically functional state. For instance, when UNSCOP visited the Negev desert and witnessed the Zionists water reservoir tanks and irrigation fields, Rand held: Here you have a very strong argument on your behalf. 33 UNSCOP later partitioned the Negev to the Jewish area of Palestine and it would become a large part of the Jewish State. Furthermore, because Rand was a member of the legal community, he was acquainted with Zionist legal figures such as Louis Brandeis. Rand wrote a book review of Brandeis s book for 33 Tauber 16.
16 the Canadian Bar Review. 34 Brandeis was the first Jew appointed to the US Supreme Court and an ardent Zionist. Brandeis also helped make Zionism more popular among US Jews by dispelling the dual loyalty myth and arguing that Zionism was complementary to US values. Rand would have been more than familiar with Brandeis s brand of Zionism, hallmarked by economic self-sufficiency and a strong manufacturing sector. When he visited Hebrew University, technologically advanced factories, the Hadassah Hospital, and the laboratory in Rehevol, Rand saw signs of an advanced Western state much like Canada. Rand also witnessed other characteristics of a functioning democratic state within the Jewish Agency: specifically liberalism and social progress. 35 Such characteristics were important prerequisites to a functioning nation-state. In Rand s eyes, this bode well for the cause of a Jewish state, especially when compared to the apparent backward authoritarian regimes of the Arabs. Another instance of Rand s values affecting his decision was when UNSCOP visited an Arab cigarette factory. Upon arrival, UNSCOP discovered that the factory did not permit Jews on the premises so that Horowitz was not allowed into the factory and was forced to wait outside. 36 Having gained entrance to the factory, Rand discovered horrible working conditions, including the exploitation of child labour. 37 Rand was particularly disgusted by the racial and national discrimination that led to Horowitz s exclusion, in addition to the horrific working conditions inside. Rand s opinion was inevitably influenced by these events because he was concerned with labour relations and was an advocate of liberal labour 34 Bercuson 77. 35 Tauber 70. 36 Bercuson 85. 37 Tauber 15.
17 laws as seen in the Rand formula. The Jewish society simply reminded Rand more of a functioning western state, of the kind he was used to. It is also important to counter what can now be seen as other falsely conceived reasons why UNSCOP s final report recommended partition. One of these accusations is the morality argument advanced by Tauber. This morality argument is exemplified by the refugee ship, the Exodus. This argument claims that UNSCOP delegates observing the Exodus enter the Haifa harbour was enough to sway their opinion to choose in favour of partition. 38 Since the White Paper, legal immigration was halted and, therefore, Holocaust survivors wishing to make aliyah had to find other means to enter Palestine. These other means often took the form of clandestine but decrepit ships such as the Exodus. UNSCOP members, including Sandstrom and Valado Simic of Yugoslavia, witnessed the terrible humanitarian conditions of the ship and the desperation of the refugees. Perceiving these terrible events was said to persuade UNSCOP out of a sense of morality and/or pity. Ross, however, dispels this commonly conceived of cause for partition. Ross argues that the Exodus s connection to UNSCOP is not only erroneous, but also contradictory to the actual historical record. For instance, one of the delegates said to be most moved by the Exodus was Simic. However, when it came time to voting, Simic did not even vote for partition as the Exodus argument claims. Rather, Simic voted with the minority for a federated unitary state. 39 Sandstrom was not as appalled by the Exodus as he was of the way the Zionist press played it up in the media. Sandstrom even witnessed acts of kindness from the British on that day, claiming: "one soldier who was carrying a suitcase down the ship's gangway for a crying boy, comforting him with the words, 38 Bercuson 74. 39 Ross, Exodus and 1947 B6.
18 'Cheer up laddie, it won't be long before you're back here.' 40 There was little mention of the Exodus in UNSCOP s final report, leaving it to only a few sentences in the background facts section. It can thus be concluded that UNSCOP paid little attention to the Exodus. It is important for Zionists to dispel the Exodus myth, because it plays into the hands of anti-zionists, who claim that the reason Jews were able to establish a state in Palestine is because the European nations, out of Holocaust pity and guilt, allowed the Jews to do so. Nonetheless, immigration did play a large role in UNSCOP s decision. In order for Jews to control their own immigration, they needed their own state. Another anti-zionist accusation is that UNSCOP unfairly ignored Arab concerns. This is a complete fallacy. The UN offered to hear both the Jewish Agency and the Arab High Commission. However, the Arab High Commission decided to boycott UNSCOP. 41 Many pro-arab authors argue that if the High Commission had not boycotted UNSCOP, its findings may have been different. However, this seems unlikely as UNSCOP, regardless of the boycott, unofficially visited various Arab sites. What UNSCOP delegates saw eventually hurt the Arab position very deeply. The aforementioned visit to the cigarette factory made the Arabs appear socially backward and regressive due to its poor labour conditions and internal racism. UNSCOP visited the Arab League in Lebanon and was not impressed with their unwillingness to compromise on the Palestine issue. The Arab League refused anything but a unitary Arab state and threatened war if this was not achieved. 42 Rand questioned if the Jews would be safe in an Arab state. This was in light of the fact that many of the Arab High Commission members in Palestine, such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (Mohammad 40 Ross, Exodus and 1947 9. 41 Tauber 15. 42 Tauber 148.
19 Amin al-husayni) were sympathetic to the Nazi cause. The Mufti, for instance, fled British Mandate Palestine to Nazi-occupied Europe during World War II because of his allegiance to the axis. 43 One can therefore see that even if there had been no Arab boycott of UNSCOP, this would have been unlikely to change their final conclusion. The Jewish reaction to Rand and UNSCOP was mixed; this was the result of splits within the Zionist camp. There were rightist-revisionist Zionists, the mainstream labour Zionists, as well as the leftist cultural Zionists; all of these opinions could be found expressed in the leading Canadian Jewish publication of the day, The Canadian Jewish Review. On October 3, 1947 an article entitled Says Britain Will Not Permit Even a Token State shows the rightist opinion of UNSCOP. 44 The article illustrates how the rightists rejected UNSCOP s decision for many reasons. Because the revisionists wanted a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan River so as to encompass biblical Israel, they would not approve of an Arab state within Palestine and they demanded part of Jordan. 45 Furthermore, the revisionists did not approve of the idea of an economic union between the two states, calling it a fiction. The Revisionists also demonstrated deep contempt for the British, whom they had been fighting with any and every means possible. Revisionists claimed the British would never allow even a token Jewish state in Palestine. 46 The next article, published on Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year) 5708 (1947), was written by Samuel Bronfman, president of the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), thereby representing both mainstream Zionism as well as the Canadian Jewish 11. 43 Bercuson 90. 44 The Canadian Jewish Review, Says Britain Will Not Permit Even a Token State, 3 Oct. 1947: 45 Canadian Jewish Review, Britain 11. 46 Canadian Jewish Review, Britain 11.
20 community as a whole. 47 In the article, Bronfman lauds UNSCOP s report, believing it to be the first step towards a Jewish State in Palestine. Bronfman also argues, as held in this paper, that UNSCOP was nothing more than an act of justice. 48 It is interesting to point out that Canadian Jews sided with the mainstream Zionists, as Canada was from early on a very pro-zionist community. 49 Finally, the last Zionist perspective being represented is that of the cultural Zionists who supported the solution of bi-nationalism. The binationalist Zionists represented the many Jews that would willingly sacrifice a uniquely Jewish state in order to cooperate with their Arab neighbours. The bi-nationalist stance also correctly identifies one of the consequences of partition, prophesying that it would inevitably lead to violence. 50 These three perspectives show that the Jews were heatedly divided when it came to UNSCOP s report. It is also important to note that the Canadian Jewish Review did not mention Justice Ivan Rand explicitly by name. Nonetheless, the Canadian public opinion was not as divided as the Jewish community was. Canadians were generally in agreement that partition was a bad idea. The Canadian reaction was marked by apathy, scepticism, and outright hostility. 51 There was a dominant pro-british theme throughout the nation s newspapers. Canadians believed that Britain had done its best for Palestine and had been unfairly attacked by the Jews in return for its efforts. 52 The Calgary Herald wrote: If the Jewish terrorists determine to go on killing let them try their conclusions with the Arabs, who are not 47 Samuel Bronfman, UN Palestine Report Confirms Principles of Justice, The Canadian Jewish Review, 15 Dec. 1947: 15. 48 Bronfman 15. 49 For further reading on early Canadian Zionism see: Michael Brown Zionism in the Pre- Statehood Years: The Canadian Response, From Immigration to Integration, eds. Ruth Cline and Frank Dimant (Toronto: Institute for International Affairs, 2001) 121-134. 50 The Canadian Jewish Review, Magnes Again Urges Jewish-Arab Co-operation, Not Partition as Policy Objective, 3 Oct. 1947: 12. 51 Bercuson 107. 52 Bercuson 107.
21 worried about their opinions of other nations. 53 There was additionally a constant comparison between the Palestinian partition and that of the Indian partition of 1947 that ended in civil war. Now that the Ivan Rand story has been told, the question remains: Why is it that Rand and his integral role in UNSCOP and the establishment of a Jewish State is not more commonly known by the general Canadian public and, more important, within the Canadian Jewish community? There are several possible theories that can help explain this. First of all, as shown above, the Canadian Jewish community was and still is divided on the Zionist issue. Furthermore, Rand, the hero of UNSCOP, was not a Jew. This may also play into the lack of knowledge about Rand within the Jewish community. The failure of Jews to recognize a non-jew as one of the key figures in helping to establish a Jewish state can be seen in the Jewish media s failure to explicitly name Rand when talking about UNSCOP. However, there are other possible reasons that have been alluded to throughout this paper. For instance, Rand was overshadowed by Pearson in Canada s overall role to institute partition. Additionally, when most people think of Canada s foreign policy toward the Middle East, they remember Pearson s creation of UNEF (United Nation Emergency Force) and therefore, the invention of peacekeeping, and his subsequent Nobel Prize. This also overshadows Rand s role in UNSCOP. As far as the Canadian public goes, Bercuson claims that there has been a general move in Canadian history away from the history of politics and foreign affairs and toward social histories. 54 This transition may account for some of the paucity of study and general knowledge on the subject. Another theory is that a dearth of scholarship on the 53 Bercuson 107. 54 Bercuson vi.
22 subject leads to a lack of public knowledge. Right from the beginning, the partition plan was generally unpopular in the eyes of the Canadian public, as was demonstrated above. The scarcity of general knowledge about Rand in Canada is demonstrated by the fact that one of the best and most recent books written about Rand was written, not by a Canadian, but authored by Israeli professor, Eliezer Tauber. Nevertheless, possibly the largest contributing factor to Rand s anonymity in Israel s partitioning is the inaccessibility of primary sources on the subject prior to 2002. In conclusion, this paper has shown the historical context surrounding UNSCOP, as well as given a review of scholarly writings on the subject. Rand s motives for partition were decidedly not ones of self-interest, as other scholars have posited. Rand s sense of justice, an acknowledgment of actual intercultural relations in Palestine (the intensity and ramifications of nationalism), and his previously held ideas and values, however, did influence his campaign. This paper also looked at Jewish and Canadian reactions and opinions of the UNSCOP report. Finally, this paper attempted to explain, through various theories, why Rand s and Canada s role in UNSCOP is commonly unknown. Rand did not stop his service to the Jewish people after helping them achieve statehood. In 1950, Rand s decision in the case of Noble and Wolf v. Alley held that selling land to Jews would not decrease the value of the property. Rand said in retort to this argument: "If Albert Einstein and Arthur Rubinstein purchased cottages there, the property values would increase, and the association should be honoured to have them as
23 neighbours." 55 Rand, for his role in UNSCOP and elsewhere, has proven to be a great Canadian and a loyal friend to Jews everywhere. 55 Ross, UNSCOP Papers 9.