The Sevenfold Reasoning Chandrakirti

The Sevenfold Reasoning Chandrakirti [Text Layout by Jampa Namgyal November 2009]

L1: [Preface] L1: [CONTENTS] L1: [The Place of Meditation on Emptiness in Buddhist Practice] L1: [The Object of Negation: The Conception of a Self] L1: [The Actual Meditation: The Sevenfold Reasoning] L2: [1 The Essential of Ascertaining the Object to be Negated] L2: [2 The Essential of Ascertaining the Pervasion] L2: [3 The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed is not the Same as its Bases of Imputation] L2: [4 The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is not Inherently Different from its Bases of Imputation] L2: [5 The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is not Dependent on its Bases of Imputation] L2: [6 The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is not the Support upon which its Bases of Imputation are Dependent] L2: [7 The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Does not Possess its Bases of Imputation] L2: [8 The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is not the Mere Collection of its Bases of Imputation] L2: [9 The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is not the Shape of its Bases of Imputation] L1: [Another Kind of Self-Inquiry: Chandrakirti s Sevenfold Reasoning on Selflessness, by Greg Goode] L2: [Introduction] L2: [Mistaken Conception] L3: [Note on the Teachings of Emptiness: ] L2: [What the Reasonings Refute Inherent Existence] L2: [What the Reasonings Do Not Refute Conventional Existence] L2: [The Sevenfold Reasoning - Preparation] L3: [The Sevenfold Reasoning on the Selflessness of Persons] L3: [The Sevenfold Reasoning on the Selflessness of Phenomena:] L2: [The Sevenfold Reasoning on the Selflessness of Persons:] L3: [1 The self is not inherently the same as the parts of the body/mind ] L3: [2 The self is not inherently different from the parts of the body/mind ] L3: [3 The self is not inherently dependent upon the parts of the body/mind (an effect of the parts)] L3: [4 The self is not inherently the substratum upon which the parts of the body/mind depend (the cause of the parts)] L3: [5 The self is not inherently the possessor of the parts of the body/mind ] L3: [6 The self is not inherently the mere collection of the parts of the body/mind ] L3: [7 The self is not inherently the shape of the parts of the body/mind ] L2: [Conclusion] 2 / 32

L1: [Preface] One of the principal texts used in the study of Madhyamika philosophy in Tibetan Buddhism is Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara, the Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" Chandrakirti represents the Prasangika-Madhyamika school as opposed to the Svatantrika-Madhyamika school of Bhavaviveka, Santiraksita and so on In the Gelukpa presentation of Sutra and Tantra, Prasangika philosophy is the highest system, ie, the correct system, of explaining the phenomena of the world and the way in which they exist The viewpoint of the Prasangika system is thus the basis for practice in both the Vehicle of the Perfections and the Vehicle of the Secret Mantra, the one following the Buddha's Sutra teachings and the other following his Tantric teachings The main body of the Supplement is divided into ten chapters, each chapter dealing with one of the ten Bodhisattva stages Each of these stages has a particular perfection associated with it Thus, the first chapter deals with the actions and concerns of a Bodhisattva from the time he begins to practice, through his actual entry into the path of the Great Vehicle and up to and including his attainment of the first Bodhisattva ground and the perfection emphasized at that time, giving The sixth chapter describes the perfection of wisdom and is by far the longest in the Supplement, consisting of two hundred and twenty-six verses Forty-seven of those verses (verses 120 through 167) deal directly with the method of meditation which will be described here Because this paper is a somewhat more modest undertaking than that which would be required for a treatment of so large a portion of text, I intend to confine myself mainly to an explanation of Chandrakirti's presentation of the Sevenfold Reasoning found in the Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets, a Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching of Jang-gya (Icang skya hu thog thu ye shes bstan pa'i sgron me, 1717-1786) along with an explanation of the context of the Sevenfold Reasoning in Buddhist philosophy as a whole The Presentation of Tenets is a moderately detailed, systematic exposition of the tenets of the Buddhist and non-buddhist philosophical schools of India as they are preserved in Tibetan religious culture Jang-gya's presentation of the Sevenfold Reasoning is clear and concise, as is the rest of his chapter on the system of the Prasangika-Madhyamika He first outlines the sources of this form of reasoning in Sutra and in Nagarjuna's Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle Way Called "Wisdom" (prajna-nama-mula-madhyamaka-karika) Then he presents the Sevenfold Analysis as it is stated when the analogue of a chariot and its parts is used to exemplify a person and his aggregates Having done that, he states the reasonings as they apply to a person He closes with the explanation of the way in which a person, though completely without inherent existence, is still nominally existent 3 / 32

L1: [The Place of Meditation on Emptiness in Buddhist Practice] It will be of benefit to establish the context within which the Sevenfold Reasoning functions before going on to a description of it This meditation is designed as a means of liberation from cyclic existence and although it can be used as a basis for debate or philosophical dialectic, this is not the way in which it is supposed to function within the framework of Madhyamika It is noteworthy that Jang-gya feels called upon to comment on the proper role of reasoning:2 In particular, these statements of the many forms of reasonings which come to a conclusion about reality were made for the sake of clarifying the path of liberation for the fortunate They were not made for the sake of those who are intent on debate Buddhapalita's [commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way says], ~ "What purpose is there in teaching dependent-arising*? ~ I will explain The Teacher whose nature is composition [ie, Nagarjuna] saw that sentient beings are tormented by various sufferings In order to liberate them from their sufferings he accepted the task of teaching the reality of phenomena just as they are Therefore he began the teaching of dependent-arising" [Chandrakirti's] Supplement says [VI: 118ab],3 ~ "[He] taught investigations in the Treatise [on the Middle Way] not out of attachment of disputation but for liberation; they are teachings of reality" ~ 161 ~ The analyzes in the treatises were not composed out of attachment to debate; ~ Rather thatness is revealed for the sake of liberation ~ If in correctly explaining thatness, the works of others are discredited, ~ There is no fault The Great Being [Tsong Khapa] taught, ~ "Every one of these investigations through reasoning which were set forth in the Treatise on the Middle Way were done so merely so that sentient beings might obtain emancipation" Chandrakirti says in the first verse of the first chapter of his Supplement4 ~ Hearers and middling realizers of suchness are born from the Kings of Subduers [ie, from Buddhas] ~ Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas ~ A compassionate mind, non-dual understanding and the altruistic mind of enlightenment are the causes of Sons of Conquerors [ie, Bodhisattvas] ~ [I1] ~ 1 ~ Hearers and Middling Buddhas [ie Solitary Realizers] are born from the Powerful Able Ones; ~ Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas; ~ And the mind of compassion, the wisdom of non-duality, ~ And Bodhicitta are the [three] causes of Conquerors Sons Buddhas are the causes of Hearers and Solitary Realizers because it is from Buddhas that they acquire the teachings, principally of dependent-arising, which enable them to attain their respective paths Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas because the Bodhisattva path leads to Buddhahood What then are the causes of a Bodhisattva? A compassionate mind is a mind that perceives sentient beings suffering and desires to spare them that suffering This kind of mind can induce an altruistic mind of enlightenment, a mind that not only perceives sentient beings suffering and pities them but promises to bring about the end of that suffering through the attainment of highest enlightenment The altruistic mind of enlightenment is the thought, "May I attain complete perfect Buddhahood so that I will be able to 4 / 32

rescue all sentient beings from the sufferings of cyclic existence" A non-dual understanding is a wisdom consciousness that is free of the two extremes of permanence and annihilation A wisdom consciousness is a discriminative mind; discriminative means that it can apply standards, such as the Sevenfold Reasoning, and select correct perceptions from incorrect perceptions The view of the extreme of permanence is -- 1) the intellectually acquired idea that phenomena exist as they are perceived in normal perception, mat is as concrete entities which are inherently there, and -- 2) the innate conception that phenomena exist in this way Both of these are affirmative reactions to the false appearance itself of phenomena as concrete, inherently existent entities The view of the extreme of nihilism is the idea that phenomena are without a mode of existence that they do possess; in Prasangika, although no phenomenon is inherently existent, all phenomena exist conventionally as nominalities or designations all phenomena are dependent-arisings Chandrakirti makes it clear that "non-dual" here means lacking the two extremes as explained above and does not mean cognizing the absence of the duality which is a difference of entity of subject and object5 Although a non-dual wisdom such as the latter is the goal of meditation, on emptiness in the Cittamatra system of tenets and is a rough form of the wisdom which realizes emptiness in Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika, there is no wisdom consciousness which realizes an emptiness of this kind of non-duality in Prasangika Non-duality in this system either refers to the nonexistence of the extremes of permanence and annihilation or the non-appearance of a cognizing subject and its object during a direct perception of emptiness Such a non-appearance does not entail non-existence It is necessary for a yogi to do some meditation and develop a compassionate mind before he can generate an altruistic mind of enlightenment A mind of enlightenment is the desire to put into practice those things that will bring about the end of suffering for all migrating beings and, subsequent to that desire and its concomitant vow, the actual practice of the meditations and various modes of conduct that will result in the ability to do so Besides being a cause of the altruistic mind of enlightenment, compassion also paves the way for and sustains non-dual wisdom The generation and development of non-dual wisdom is entailed in the practice of the sixth of the six perfections The six perfections are among the practices which a Bodhisattva does in order to attain the ability to free sentient beings from their suffering Thus, compassion provides motivation for the practice of meditations that will bring about the wisdom which cognizes emptiness Furthermore Chandrakirti delineates three forms of compassion in his Supplement (I: 3-4):6 compassion which observes suffering sentient beings alone; compassion which observes phenomena; and compassion which observes the unapprehendable ~ I3 ~ 3 ~ I bow down to that compassion for living beings ~ Who from first conceiving 'I' with respect to the self, ~ Then thinking 'This is mine' and generating attachment for things, ~ Are without self-control like the spinning of a well ~ I4 ~ 4ab ~ Living beings are seen to be transient and empty of inherent existence, ~ Like a moon in rippling water -- The first kind of compassion has as its object all sentient beings Its aspect is the wish to free all sentient beings from suffering Aspect is a very broad term but here means the attitude taken by the mind towards its object or the mode of operation of the mind towards its object Compassion observing sentient beings, in its strongest form, would be based on the understanding of the reasons behind migrators' sufferings and their powerless rebirth over and over again in cyclic existence These reasons will be discussed later Here it is only necessary to note that they involve understanding 5 / 32

the mechanism of the conception of inherent existence but do not require that the yogi have had meditative experience of the emptiness of inherent existence -- The second kind of compassion outlined by Chandrakirti, compassion which observes phenomena, has the same aspect as before but its object is different Tsong Khapa, in his commentary on the Supplement, the Illumination of the Thought (dgongs pa rob gsal) comments:7 ~ The compassion which apprehends phenomena does not apprehend sentient beings alone; it apprehends sentient beings who disintegrate momentarily Therefore, its objects are sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence When [a yogi] has certainty that sentient beings are disintegrating momentarily, he has refuted within his mind that there is a permanent, partless and independent sentient being Due to that he can have certainty that there is no sentient being who is a different entity from [his mental and physical] aggregates ~ At this point he understands that sentient beings are imputed to merely the collection of their aggregates Therefore, since his object comes to be sentient beings who are imputed merely to the phenomena of their aggregates and so forth, "[compassion] apprehending phenomena" is spoken of ~ Impermanent sentient beings are merely an illustration "Observing phenomena" can refer also to the observation of sentient beings who are without existence as self-sufficient or substantial entities Chandrakirti himself went no further than to say "migrators upon whom falls the suffering of impermanence in each and every moment"8 Note, however, that Tsong Khapa merely says that it is from the realization of impermanence of sentient beings that the rest is entailed The first entailment, that there is no permanent, partless and independent sentient being, is not one of the principal realizations in Prasangika-Madhyamika; such a sentient being is a philosophical imposition rather than being a self of which there is an innate conception (These terms will be discussed later) The conception of a self-sufficient or substantially existing person, however, does have an innate form For Prasangikas it is the coarser form of the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence For the Svatantrika-Madhyamikas and all other Buddhist tenet systems the negation of self-sufficient existence alone is enough to insure liberation from cyclic existence; thus, for them the conception of self-sufficient or substantial existence is the subtle form of the obstructions to liberation9 -- The third kind of compassion is that which observes the unapprehendable The unapprehendable, Chandrakirti explains, are emptinesses of inherent existence10 Therefore, the objects of this form of compassion are sentient beings qualified by emptiness or, as Tsong Khapa glosses it, by non-true existence11 (In Buddhist philosophy, 'non-true existence' means not truly existent or empty of true existence; it is not some special kind of existence which is a subsistence of what does not exist) The important point here is that while all three types of compassion have the same aspect, the desire to liberate all sentient beings from the burden of their sufferings, the objects in the cases of the second and third varieties are qualified by modes of existence that require a degree of meditative investigation into reality In order to be able to generate the third form of compassion it is necessary to have some experience with the production of non-dual wisdom It was explained above that for a yogi to generate an altruistic mind of enlightenment and then put into action the practices necessary to attain a position where he would have the ability to aid sentient beings involves the practice of the sixth perfection, that of wisdom Even if the yogi is a practitioner of Tantra, he must generate a mind of enlightenment In his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path Tsong Khapa says:12 ~ The Conqueror [Buddha] spoke of two Great Vehicles (Mahayana), the Great Vehicle of the Perfections and that of the Secret Mantra There is no Great Vehicle apart from those Into whichever one of these two you enter, the only portal is an altruistic mind of enlightenment When you have produced that in your continuum, even were you to produce nothing else, you would still be called a person of the Great Vehicle And when you lack it, no matter what good qualities you have, such as cognition of emptiness for instance, you will fall to the levels of the Hearers and their like Furthermore, without a non-dual wisdom which cognizes emptiness a yogi would be unable to practice correctly the stage of completion of the Highest Yoga class of Tantras and would thus be unable to accomplish the accumulation of 6 / 32

wisdom which when fully developed becomes a Buddha's Truth Body Tsay-chok-ling Ye-shay-gyel-tsen (tshe mchog gling ye shes rgyal mtshan, 1713-1793), the tutor of the eighth Dalai Lama, says:13 ~ It is said that this profound view of the middle way [ie, emptiness] is the life of both the Sutra and Tantra paths; it is also said, particularly with respect to Highest Secret Mantra [ie, the Highest Yoga Tantra] that there is no chance of having an actual path of Mantra without this view Thus both non-dual wisdom and an altruistic mind of enlightenment are necessary even in Tantra There are many other ways of explaining the relationship between meditation on emptiness, meditating compassion and the generation of a mind of enlightenment For instance, Tsong Khapa in his Three Principal Aspects of the Path presents the generation of an altruistic mind of enlightenment and meditation on emptiness as the second and third members of the triad of principal practices Compassion he does not explicitly treat but it may be inferred, as does his commentator Lo-sang bel-den-den-bay-nyi-ma (bio bzang dpal Idan bstan pa'i nyi ma, the fourth Panchen Lama, 1781-1854), that it is a precursor to the attainment of a mind of enlightenment In his commentary the generation of a mind of enlightenment is explained following the sevenfold precepts of cause and effect of the Indian Buddhist philosopher and yogi of the eleventh century CE, Atisa14 In Atisa's system the fifth step in the generation of an altruistic mind of enlightenment is that of great compassion The remaining aspect of the three aspects enumerated by Tsong Khapa is renunciation It is a prelude to both of the other two Tsong Khapa says in his Three Principal Aspects of the Path:15 ~ If you do not have the wisdom ~ Which cognizes the way things are, ~ Even if you have cultivated renunciation ~ And an altruistic mind of enlightenment ~ You-cannot sever the root of cyclic existence ~ Therefore, make effort in the means ~ Of realizing dependent arising Aryadeva says:16 ~ When selflessness is seen in objects, ~ The seeds of cyclic existence are destroyed Thus the yogi must practice meditation which develop his non-dual wisdom If he has generated an altruistic mind of enlightenment but balks at meditating on emptiness, then his dedication of himself to relieve all sentient beings of their sufferings is merely words If he cannot liberate himself from cyclic existence, how can he have the ability to liberate countless numbers of sentient beings? This has been a broad overview of the manner in which meditation on emptiness fits into the philosophy and practices of a Buddhist yogi according to Chandrakirti and other Prasangika-Madhyamika philosophers Let us now narrow our focus and examine the way in which a yogi would begin to meditate on the emptiness of true existence of persons using the Sevenfold Reasoning It will be helpful to discuss first the structural framework which explains the manner in which phenomena and, in particular, persons are conceived to exist inherently 7 / 32

L1: [The Object of Negation: The Conception of a Self] Chandrakirti introduces his presentation of the Sevenfold Reasoning with the following verse [VI: 120]:17 ~ [A yogi] sees in his mind that the afflictions and ~ the faults ~ Arise from the false view of a transitory ~ collection ~ Having understood that the object of this is self, ~ He negates self Tsong Khapa in his commentary on the Supplement, the Illumination of the Thought, comments:18 ~ A yogi, desiring to engage in reality, desiring to remove all the faults which are the afflictions, now analyzes thinking, "What is the root of this wandering in cyclic existence?" When he has analyzed thus he will see in his mind that the afflictions of desire [hatred, confusion and so on] and the faults of birth, aging, sickness and death arise without exception from the false view of a transitory collection The false view of a transitory collection is an afflicted knowledge in the form of the thoughts "I" and "mine", conceiving these two to be inherently existent [The afflictions and the faults] are results of the false view of a transitory collection The thrust of this passage is that the sufferings of cyclic existence and the afflictions through whose activity more suffering is induced are the results of the false view of a transitory collection If this can be destroyed, then the yogi can attain liberation from cyclic existence What then is the false view of a transitory collection and what is wrong with it why does it inevitably lead to suffering and the afflictions? In order to explain this, it is first necessary to explain a little about self Chandrakirti said:19 ~ Having understood that the object of this is self, the yogi negates self 'Self in the first line means the nominally existent person, the so called mere-i This self is a phenomenon that exists conventionally It is the object of observation of the false view of a transitory collection The false view of a transitory collection errs in conceiving this mere-i to be an inherently existent I, or inherently existent person This inherently existent person is the self in the second line of the above quotation It does not exist either ultimately or conventionally and it is the object to be negated when the yogi meditates on an emptiness of a person The emptiness of a person is a person's lack of inherent existence That the self which is the object of observation of the false view of a transitory collection is existent and is not an object to be negated is made clear by Tsong Khapa:20 ~ At that time [a yogi] desiring to destroy all faults should destroy their root, the false view of a transitory collection These will be destroyed, moreover, through understanding the nonexistence of a self, that is [the non-existence of] a natural existence of the self which is the object of that [false view of a transitory collection] Thus, it is important to know that self in Buddhism has two disparate meanings In some instances it means inherent existence, natural existence or self-sufficient existence none of which are existent in any way whatsoever, even conventionally They are completely incorrect Chandrakirti, in his Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of a Bodhisattva", defines the term:21 ~ Here, 'self is an inherence or nature of phenomena, ie, a non-dependence on anything else The non-existence of this [inherence] is selflessness Jang-gya glosses this as meaning that the mode of innate conception of self is that the phenomenon to which a self is falsely attributed is conceived to exist objectively through its own nature without being posited there by the power of thought His definition of this sense of self, therefore, is objective existence, ie, existence in the object through its own nature This kind of conception of existence carries with it the feeling of an independence of the object from the subject, a feeling of an object which is not merely imputed there by thought Examples of such a usage of 'self are the terms 'conception of a self' and 'selflessness' 8 / 32

At other times, 'self can mean the person or I As these terms are technically used in Prasangika philosophy they refer to the conventionally existent person which does have existence as a mere nominally imputed to the collection of the five mental and physical aggregates Such a self cannot be found when searched for with an ultimate analysis and thus has no ultimate existence, as is the case with any phenomenon in the Prasangika system Ultimate analysis is a search to find a phenomenon which really exists in the way in which the world conceives it to exist Therefore, this nominally existent self, although it is existent, is not existent in any way that corresponds to the normal perceptions of the world Examples of such a usage of 'self are 'self which accumulates actions' and 'emptiness of inherent existence of a self' Here is a brief summary of the different meanings of self and related terms ( indicates a reconstruction of the Sanskrit from the Tibetan) The terms within each group in the right-hand column are mutually inclusive of each other For example, person, I and mere-i are equivalents The terms in the left-hand column, on the other hand, are broader than their "synonyms" on the right: every instance of existence as a self-sufficient or substantial entity is an instance of self but every instance of self is not an instance of existence as a self-sufficient or substantial entity The type I self, the mere-i, is the person as it actually is and as it should be apprehended This self is a conventionally existent I which is imputed to the five aggregates which are its particular bases of imputation It is the so-called "base which is empty", the foundation of the negation of inherent existence; inherent existence itself is the object of negation Tsong Khapa explains the position of this self in the context of meditation on emptiness as follows:25 ~ In the beginning the yogi analyzes only the self: "Is this so-called self which is the object of the conception of a self existent by way of its own entity or not?" ~ A yogi, through negating the self which is inherent existence, destroys the false view of a transitory collection This done he has turned away from all faults Self in the term 'conception of a self is an incorrectly imposed mode of existence which does not exist in reality The self which is the observed object of the conception of a self, however, is an existent phenomenon This latter self is technically the basis of analysis in meditation on emptiness The analysis of which it is the basis is an inquiry into whether or not the existent self does or does not exist as an inherently existent phenomenon, that is, as a self of the former type (type II in the table) The type n self, inherent existence, is not the basis of analysis because if it were the Yogi would be analyzing whether inherent existence inherently exists or not The mere-i is an existent phenomenon The selves of types n (inherent existence), in (self-sufficiency), and IV (permanent, partless independence) are not They are classified not as phenomenon but as nonexistent imaginaries 'Mere' in the term 'mere-i' eliminates the false imposition of a type n, m or IV self as the mode of existence of this I The mere-i is an I qualified as being non-inherently existent The type II self, inherent existence, is the referent object of a subtle conception of a self in the Prasangika system A suitable conception of a self is so named because it is a strong, difficult to remove conception It conceives a person, for instance its object of observation to be inherently existent; the inherently existent person is its referent object An object of observation is nominally existent The referent object of a false conception of a self has no existence whatsoever The type III self (self-sufficient or substantial existence) is the referent object of a coarse conception of a self of persons in Prasangika Conceiving a person to be a self-sufficient or substantial entity is conceiving it as having a different character from the aggregates which are its bases of imputation It is seen as in control of and not dependent on the aggregates The example used is that of a head salesman and the other salesmen who are under him Just as the head salesman and his subordinates are all salesmen, so; a self-sufficient or substantially existent self is not innately conceived to be a different entity from its aggregates Such a conception of difference of entity is only intellectually acquired26 A self-sufficient or substantially existent self is a self that is substantially existent, which is to say, selfsufficient; the "or" shows a qualifying opposition The type IV self (permanent, partless and independent) is the referent object of the coarsest conception of a self of persons in the Prasangika system It corresponds to the self as postulated by non-buddhist systems such as Vedanta 9 / 32

The mine, type V in the table, can be divided into two varieties The mine which are of the subject's own continuum are the objects of observation of the false view of a transitory collection which conceives mine The mine of the continuums of persons other than the subject are objects of observation of the conception of a self of phenomena external to the continuum of the subject The latter mine does not have the importance of the former nor is it as central a subject of discussion in the literature of emptiness as is the former For, the false view of a transitory collection is the principal fetter obstructing liberation from cyclic existence The nature of the mine is a subject of much controversy Chandrakirti, in his Clear Words (a commentary on Nagarjuna's Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"), and Tsong Khapa, in his Ocean of Reasoning (a commentary on Nagarjuna's Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom" following Chandrakirti's commentary), define mine as the phenomena of the subject's own five aggregates Chandrakirti says,27 ~ That which pertains to the self is the mine; the term refers to one's own five aggregates ~ The [conventionally existed] self is the object of the conception of an I The mine, the aggregates and so on, are the objects of the conception of mine Due to the pacification, ie, the non-arising or non-observation, of the true existence [of the I and mine] the yogi annihilates the conception of an I and the conception of mine Tsong Khapa says, commenting on the same verse [XVIII: 2cd]:28 ~ [because of] the pacification of the true existence of the self, ie, the person who is the object of the conception of an I, and of the true existence of mine, ie, the aggregates which are the objects of the conception of mine Nga-wang-ben-den (ngag dbang dpal Idan, b1797), in bis Annotations for [Jam-yang-shay-ba's ('jam dbyangs bzhadpa)] "Great Exposition of Tenets", adduces many more examples of this definition of mine from the Clear Words, the Supplement, Chandrakirti's Autocommentary on the Supplement and Tsong Khapa's commentaries on both the Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom" and the Supplement29 Many of these quotations treat mine only tangentially Many, for example, do not have as their main topic the I and mine themselves but rather the destruction of the false view of a transitory collection or the relationship between the cognition of the emptiness of true existence of an I and the cognition of the emptiness of true existence of mine In at least two places, however, Tsong Khapa gives explicit explanations of mine In his Illumination of the Thought he says,30 ~ The object of apprehension of an innate false view of a transitory collection which, conceives mine is just mine: do not hold that one's own eyes and so forth are its ~ The aspect [of the innate false view of a transitory collection] is the observation of that object and the conception that the mine is naturally existent ~ Now [a qualm might arise as follows]: [Chandrakirti, in his] Autocommentary to [the line of the Supplement beginning] "This is mine", [1: 3b],31 says: "This is the apprehension of any phenomenon other than the object of the conception of an I; [this apprehension] thinks "This is mine" Apprehending a base such as an eye, there is the conception, "This is mine" This conception is explained to be the conception of mine How is this so? ~ The meaning of this is that having seen an eye, example, to be mine, there is a conception that this mine is truly existent However, this is not a teaching that [something which is] an example of mine is an object [of the conception of mine] The crucial phrase here is "Having seen an eye, for example, to be mine" Tsong Khapa is saying that an eye, while it is a base which can be characterized as being mine, is not always characterized as being mine This accords with the oral tradition explanation of the false view of a transitory collection which conceives mine This explanation may be paraphrased as follows:32 ~ First [the subject] observes [his own] I and conceives it to be naturally existent Then, observing the eyes, ears and 10 / 32

so forth, he generates the thought "mine" Observing that mine, he conceives it to be naturally existent This is the false view of a transitory collection which, conceives mine ~ However, all instances of the false view of a transitory collection are necessarily instances of the conception of a self of persons This is because the import of the apprehension of mine is apprehension of an I, since the apprehension of mine must be associated with the apprehension of an I Tsong Khapa explains in his Ocean of Reasoning?3 ~ The [conventionally existent] I is the base which generates the thought "I" There is a consciousness observing it which as its aspect conceives [the conventionally existent I] to exist naturally This is both an innate false view of a transitory collection which conceives of an I and a consciousness which is ignorant with respect to a self of persons There is a consciousness observing the [conventionally existent] mine which as its aspect conceives [the conventionally existent mine] to exist naturally This is both an innate consciousness which is a false view of a transitory collection conceiving mine and a consciousness which, is ignorant with respect to the mine of a person The consciousness which observes the bases of mine, the eyes and so forth, and conceives them in this way [ie, as naturally existent] is a conception of a self of phenomena other than persons Therefore, the apprehension of mine is not an apprehension of those [phenomena] Jam-yang-shay-ba uses the first two paragraphs of this passage as support for his assertion of a mine which is a person who makes his mental and physical aggregates into possessions34 The aggregates, exemplified as "the eyes and so forth," are the bases of designation of the mine imputed to them This mine is not a different entity from the person; it is the person considered from a different point of view as the maker into mine or the possessor Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentator, Nga-wang-ben-den, quotes the final paragraph of the passage from Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning in support of his assertion that mine refers to the phenomena of the subject's own continuum, his aggregates, his former and future lives and so on For him, the "consciousness which observes the bases of mine" and is a conception of a self of phenomena other than persons is an apprehender of the eyes and so forth of any continuum Rather than asserting that a mine is necessarily a person as does Jam-yang-shay-ba, he merely restricts the spectrum of suitable objects to those of the subject's own continuum35 These views fall into either the theory that mine are phenomena specified or qualified as the possessions of a person or the theory that mine is the entity which does the specifying Another view is the assertion of Jay-tsun-pa (Rje-btsun-pa), the textbook writer for the Chay (Byes) college of Sera monastery, that mine is a third category apart from both persons and phenomena other than persons36 The two conceptions of a self types VI, VII in the table and the conception of mine (type VIE) are mental consciousnesses which are mistaken about the actual mode of existence of persons and other phenomena They conceive what is not inherently existent to be inherently existent There are, however, conceptions of I and mine which are not misconceptions These are the correct conceptions of I and mine and are sometimes called by the same names as those motivated by ignorance In normal perception these valid cognitions are invariably found mixed with the after-effects of ignorance which cause objects to appear as if inherently existent This is one of the unique features of Tsong Khapa's presentation of Madhyamika; he seeks to preserve the valid cognition of conventional phenomena It should be kept in mind, however, that valid cognition of phenomena in ordinary worldly perception does not produce knowledge about their actual mode of existence Therefore, since our concern here is with the mechanism of the incorrect conception of reality and the means to correct that misconception, when these terms are used here they will refer to these false conceptions The English term 'conception of a self is actually only an approximation of bdag-tu-'dzin-pa (Skt: dtmagrdha) A "conception of a self' is more strictly a conceiver of a self: it is a mental consciousness whose function is to conceive a self 'Conception' in the strict sense of the word is the process in which a phenomenon is conceived Moreover, a conception of inherent existence may be broken into four parts, only one of which is the conceiver The other three parts are the so called objects of the conception: the object of observation, the referent object and the appearing object 11 / 32

It has already been explained that the referent object of a conception of inherent existence is an inherently existent phenomenon and that this referent object does not exist An inherently existent phenomenon seems to exist because an image of it appears to a conceiver of inherent existence Although this appearing object seems to have its locus in the external world, it is an internal generic image It exists itself, but the object to which it refers, an inherently existent phenomenon, has no existence The object of observation is a conventionally existent phenomenon It is not known by a conceiver of inherent existence except in the sense that the referent object corresponds to this phenomenon in so far as it is imagined to be inherently existent The type VI conception of a self the conception of true existence is the conception of either persons or phenomenon other than persons as having a mode of existence that they do not have in reality 'Self here means a self of type n, m or IV This self is the referent object of the type VI conception of a self Its objects of observation are the type I self the mere-i and conventionally existent phenomena The type VII conception of a self, the conception of an I, has two varieties The conception of a self of the person which is of the subject's own continuum is the false view of a transitory collection which conceives of an I The conception of a self of persons who are of continuum other than the subject's continuum is not a part of the false view of a transitory collection The type VII conception of a self is usually called the conception of an I 'Conception of a self almost always refers to that of type VI in the table, the conception of true existence Furthermore, the term 'conception of an I' almost always refers to the conception of an I which is one of the two types of the false view of a transitory collection The conception of mine (type VIII in the table) has two divisions in exactly the same manner as the conception of an I In the same way, the term 'conception of mine' usually refers to the conception of mine which are the subject's own continuum The false view of a transitory collection corresponds to the conceptions of I and mine, with the proviso that these are the subject's own I and mine The "I" in the term 'conception of an I' is the mere-i discussed previously The false view of a transitory collection takes the mere-i of that same person's continuum and conceives it to be a truly existent I Likewise, it takes the phenomena of that same person's continuum, the parts of the body, consciousnesses, mental factors and so on, which have been qualified or specified as mine, and conceives them to be truly existent mine Or, following the other view, it takes the mine which is the possessor of these phenomena and conceives it to be a truly existent mine The mere-i and the mine are the objects of observation of the false view of a transitory collection The truly existent person and the truly existent mine are its referent objects 'False view of a transitory collection' translates the Tibetan term 'jig-tshogs-la-lta-ba which is in turn a translation of the Sanskrit original satkayad sti The Tibetan literally reads "view of what is a collection and is disintegrating" Satkaya comes from the verbal sad which is from the root Qsad, to perish, plus kaya, corpus, collection37 The sat is not from the verbal root Qas (to be) which has sat as its present participle meaning being or existent Contemporary Sanskritists, however, appear to build the word from the sat of Qas3S The "disintegrating collection" is the collection of mental and physical aggregates If the object of observation of the false view of a transitory collection is the mere-i, why is it called a view of the aggregates? Nagarjuna says in his Precious Garland of Advice for the King:39 ~ As long as a conception of the aggregate exists, ~ So long therefore does a conception of I exist ~ Further, when the conception of I exists, ~ There is action; from that further there is birth Again, from that same text,40 ~ Just as without depending on a mirror ~ An image of one's face Is not seen, so also [there is no] ~ I Which does not depend on the aggregates Although the actual object of a false view of a transitory collection is the mere-i, this object will not appear unless the aggregates appear first The mere-i, as mentioned previously, exists as an imputation to the five aggregates If the five 12 / 32

aggregates do not appear, then neither can it Moreover, unless the five aggregates are conceived to exist truly the false view of a transitory collection does not come into being Thus, Tsong Khapa explains that a conception of a self of phenomena other than persons is a cause of the conception of I and Mine41 Since, as was seen above, the false view of a transitory collection is the root of cyclic existence, how is it proper for it to have a cause itself? Would not this cause then be the root of cyclic existence? Tsong Khapa's answer is that although the conception of a self of phenomena other than persons and the false view of a transitory collection have different objects, the way in which they conceive these objects to be truly existent is the same42 It is not the object of observation but rather the conception itself that is the causal factor in bringing about rebirth and suffering The modes of existence of persons and of other phenomena are asserted to be exactly the same A person is any sentient being: the yogi himself, other human beings, animals, bugs and so on Phenomena, as the term is used in the expression 'conception of a self of phenomena,' includes all phenomena which are not persons; plants, rocks, houses, chariots, space, emptinesses and all instances of the five mental and physical aggregates save one (The exception is the person, the mere-i, which is considered to be an aggregate in the division of compositional factors Generally speaking, all impermanent phenomena in the universe are included within the five aggregates) Therefore, in Prasangika, both persons and all other phenomena are empty of inherent existence Persons, however, also lack existence as self-sufficient or substantial entities and as permanent, partless and independent selves Phenomena other than persons are not meditated upon as being empty of these modes of existence for the simple reason that there is no innate conception of either of these two in phenomena other than persons Indeed, in Prasangika, there is no innate conception of persons' existence as permanent, partless and independent The following tables will clarify the relationship between the various modes of the conception of a self (The innate conception of an I, the innate conception of mine and the innate conception of a self of internal phenomena are the principal fetters which bind a sentient being in cyclic existence) These tables follow Jang-gya's system of explaining the different modes of conception of a self There is debate on some aspects of this Jay-tsun-pa, for instance, makes the initial division threefold; in addition to a conception of a self of persons and a conception of a self of phenomena other than persons there is a conception of a self of mine43 Jam-yang-shay-ba (jam dbyangs bzhadpa), the textbook writer for the Go-mang (sgo mang) college of Dre-bung monastery argues that mine is not what is possessed but is the possessor Thus, the object of the conception of mine is a type of person: this type of person is the same entity as the person who is the object of the conception of an I44 Note that on the above charts all the modes of the conception of a self except one have two forms: innate and artificial The explanation of the false view of a transitory collection has been of its innate form The innate conception of a self is a habitual affirmation of the way in which phenomena appear In Prasangika-Madhyamika, phenomena are not just conceived to exist truly, they also appear to do so The obstructions which must be gotten rid of in order to attain Buddhahood are divided into two types, the obstructions of the afflictions, or obstructions to liberation, and the obstructions to omniscience The obstructions to liberation are the conceptions of a self of both persons and phenomena The obstructions to omniscience are mainly the predispositions established by the conception of true existence which cause phenomena to appear from their own side as if they were truly existent In Prasangika the error involved in the conception of a self is not merely a gratuitous error on the part of the perceiving subject, it is a mistake made in response to the way in which the object appears due to the subject's previous conditioning Artificial conceptions of a self are based on intellectually acquired theories about the nature of phenomena The conception of a person as permanent, partless and independent being is an artificial conception that might rise, for example, from the study of Vedanta Artificial conceptions of a self are not limited to philosophers, however They may masquerade as common sense; common sense is usually nothing more than culturally acquired values which only seem to be universal An example of an artificial form of the false view of a transitory collection is the conception of an inherently existent person who has no relationship with his mental and physical aggregates The false view of a transitory collection, whether it be innate or artificial, cannot apprehend its object, the mere-i or the mine, without the prior appearance of the 13 / 32

aggregates The innate form affirms this appearance and conceives of a self or mine which is associated in some way with the aggregates Jang-gya states it succinctly:45 ~ [This is] the way in which an innate conceiver of true existence conceives the person to be naturally existent in the aggregates It does not conceive [the person thus] after having analyzed whether [the person] is the same as or different from [the aggregates] It conceives the person thus] through the power of ordinary habituation without any reason at all The mode of conception which [conceives them to be] one [entity] or different [entities] does not exist in an innate mind It should be noted that in Tsong Khapa's system of explaining the operation of the mind, an innate mind is not necessarily a mind which conceives a self There is an innate mind which is a valid cognizer and is often present in correct perception but is not valid with respect to the mode of existence of phenomena It therefore is not a correct perception which can act as direct aid to liberation from cyclic existence It was explained above that in Prasangika both persons and other phenomena are conceived to exist in the same way by the innate conception of a self It was also explained that despite the fact that the conception of a self of the aggregates must take place prior to the false view of a transitory collection there is only one root of cyclic existence this being so because the mode of conception is the causal factor and not the object observed When it comes to practice however a yogi begins his meditation on emptiness with meditations on the emptiness of a self of persons Tsong Khapa says in the Essence of the Good Explanations:46 ~ The conception of a person the observation of which generates the thought "I" and of the phenomena of his continuum as the two selves are the principal fetters [which bind one to cyclic existence] Therefore these two conceptions are the principal bases which are negated through reasoning This establishes that the chief obstacles to be gotten over are the conception of a self of persons, in particular, the conception of an I and the conception of a self of the internal phenomena those which belong to the subject's own continuum The former is part of the false view of a transitory collection The latter is the inducer of the false view of a transitory collection47 Or interpreted in a different way the latter is the false view of a transitory collection which conceives mine It is impossible to say that the false view of a transitory collection or the even broader conception of a self of persons is the only obstruction to be removed Since the conception of a self of the aggregates is a part of the conception of a self of phenomena, rebirth and suffering cannot be halted without meditation on the emptiness of phenomena also Chandrakirti says in his Commentary to the Supplement48 ~ When worldly conventionalities are analyzed thus [ie, through a Sevenfold Analysis] they do not exist They do however, exist through non-analytical renown Therefore, a yogi, when he analyzes [the chariot and the person] through this series [of reasons] will penetrate the depths of reality very quickly Jang-gya also indicates that the Sevenfold Reasoning is an easy means of realizing emptiness49 14 / 32