Human dignity and procreative liberties Cristina Gavrilovici Abstract Dignity is a virtue and the virtues shape the way we live. Integrity, traditions, "what is good" or "what is right" frame the attributes of dignity. However, the way we grant dignity to a certain person or event is more relative, meaning something individualistic. Each individual chooses his own criteria to claim what dignity is. Or, in a broader sociological sense, in which gender, race, and ethnicity have their own implication, "every civilized society has standards and conventions defining indignities, and these differ from place to place and time to time". Talking about procreative liberty is a debate in which individual's rights are put ahead of community's. We do live in a liberal society in which a plurality of values coexists, with no special position. Moreover, the fundamental idea of liberalism is that the individual is the "seat of the moral judgment". I don't see the modern reproductive methods as a threat to human dignity, unless there are used for market interest and governed by financial benefits. Human dignity is not encapsulated in a Petri dish or test tube. It does not freeze or melt under the pressure of human wishes. There are no surrogates of dignity when people want to have children to give meaning to their lives. It is just another way to fight with nature's barriers and leave something worthwhile behind you. Keywords: dignity, procreative liberties, reproduction Dignity is a virtue and the virtues shape the way we live. Integrity, traditions, "what is good" or "what is right" frame the attributes of dignity. I would say that most of the time there is a cluster of features such as: honesty, purity, faith (religiosity), courage, truth, compassion, and justice which may be included in this concept. Leon Kass (1974) describes it as "worthiness, elevation, honor, nobility". Fukuyama (2002) express it in a more abstract way, as "factor X", meaning that essential human quality that remains underneath after striping "all of a person's contingent and accidental characteristics". Others use to define it as lack of scruple, feelings or falseness, corruption. And the list could be endless. Thus, a dignified person is able to value these human qualities and communicate it. Dignity is not a matter of quantity, of degree, it is absolute: one either has it or not. In a Kantian view, it has an absolute value, but with a speciesism character, according to which the dignity of a human being is ground on the rational capacity. The uniquely moral use of this concept is typically reserved for human beings (healthy or sick, competent or in-competent). I strongly agree with the Kantian theme that all human beings are possessed by dignity and having thus a moral worth and moral status (Meyer, 2001). Although I stand for the absolute approach, the way we grant dignity to a certain person or event is more relative, meaning something individualistic. Each individual chooses his own criteria (e.g. from the enumeration presented above) to claim what dignity is. Or, in a broader sociological sense, in which gender, race, and ethnicity have their own implication, "every civilized society has standards and conventions defining indignities, and these differ from place to place and time to time" (Dworkin, 1993, pp 233). Even if we find a perfect explanation (another relativistic thing), for such a concept with a tremendous implication for human's life, I wouldn't consider it relevant enough, at least for an ethical standpoint. Much more important I would say, it is to make the distinction between
having dignity and acting with dignity, to find out the weight people put on this image, how it interferes with daily life, with their behavior and especially with decision making. A rhetoric question then would be "what is more important: to achieve a goal or the way to achieve it"? Furthermore, in this ethical break-down we shouldn't skip another connotation, that I consider the most meaningful for this topic: "right to dignity". This is a fundamental and universal right and as Dworkin (1993) also characterize it is more compelling than the right to beneficence, which basically refers and depends on whatever resources are available. Furthermore, in this nuance, dignity requires the community to secure and defend it. People suffer more from indignity than from other forms of expropriation. This raises enormous responsibility for the society at large. Talking about procreative liberty is a debate in which individual's rights are put ahead those of society or community. We do live in a liberal society in which a plurality of values coexists without a privileged position. Moreover, the fundamental idea of liberalism is that the individual is the "seat of the moral judgement" (May, 2002). By granting "liberty of choice" to procreation, I don't see a threat to human's dignity. On contrary, "enhancing" or "enriching" the ability to reproduce, with the support of new technologies is essential for personal identity, dignity and the meaning of one's life. Here comes the advocation of Aristotelian view (presented in the first part, according to which the ultimate reason justifies the dignity of an action. Still in the arena of philosophy we shouldn't ignore the two opposite rhetoric theories that we might use to frame most of the ethical debates: the natural law theory and the natural rights theory. According to the former, human beings are social and political by nature, attaining their full development only by engaging themselves in social activities and reciprocal relationships in the context of civil society. In contrast, the later theory assumes that the same human beings exists as complete and independent "wholes" inside a society created and shaped by them (Devine, 2000). This theory accepts the freedom of choice for procreation as a pillar for the modern society. When talking about procreative liberty it should be drawn a distinction from the beginning between freedom to avoid reproduction and freedom to reproduce, since people may allocate different moral significance to these two options. I don't see dignity at stake in either situations, but I can admit that others may regard them as threat to human dignity and potentially lowering one?s self esteem. The liberty not to reproduce raises societal concerns (such as society's interest in increasing population) and less ethical issues (among these: the justice in distribution of medical resources, access by minors, pours, etc). While not to repro-duce may fall under the society's criticism, the freedom to procreate is born in the same social and natural barriers (unavailability of willing or suitable partners, impotence or infertility, state barriers to marriage, to sexual intercourse etc) (Robertson, 1994). Beside the religious objections (playing God), social concerns (about parenthood) and potentiality to do physical and psychological harm to siblings, there are two main ethical concerns: whether a distinctively procreative interest is involved (other than classical Christian reasoning for perpetuating the specie) and who holds the procreative rights. To answer and discuss these issues is not the main purpose of this paper, but to relate and interpret it through the lens of human dignity. As mentioned before, I consider that not only non-coital reproduction could be a threat to the parenthood component but it does not break one?s dignity. Furthermore, to deny procreative choice means denying persons respect and dignity. There is one exception in my plea for procreative liberty: when reproductive resources are allowed to be purchased. Although I do agree on the use of incentives (like in organ
donation), marketing sperm or eggs seems undignified not only for both donor and recipient but also for the community. A society that won't value enough a nascent human life and let it be driven by money power will transform the dignity into humility. There won't be any natural law and obviously no natural rights in such a society. Most of the human's life values come at stake when debating on abortion. In a traditional society, less rational thinking implication is accepted. It is maybe one of the few issues in which emotional and philosophical arguments override reasoning. Bonnie Steinbock (1992) uses 2 criteria in order to defend her pro-choice position: the moral status of the fetus and the pregnant women's right to bodily self-de-termination. There are huge debates today in which health care professionals, philosophers and theologians have not reach yet a consensus upon the moral status of an embryo. Without disregarding the status of fetus when we approach a subject that deals with so-called "fetal rights", I dare to consider as irrelevant to the problem of abortion. Everybody would agree on the following statement: no matter what status we grant to a fetus, as a "being" or a "person" or just an "entity", he/she is alive from the moment of conception. Since abortion means a purposefully termination of life before birth, one can regard it as killing no matter what moral, social or political right we may assume a baby might have. As the reader might already figured out I also do not agree with "fetal rights" expression. This is not because embryos would not have rights but these "rights" are immaterial and extraneous at this age. I prefer instead to use and to talk about "fetal life" or "fetal needs". Engelhard (1996) also seems to resonate with "the body property" that Steinbock defend, considering that the sperms, eggs, zygotes and fetuses are, in secular moral terms, "the extension and the fruit of one's own body". The parents have responsibilities but also rights to posses and decide until they become persons. I do stand for a pro-choice attitude. This is not because I put autonomy as a sovereign principle, since I strongly believe that a world only or mostly governed by autonomy disregard society's value and is prone to anarchy. Nor because we live in a liberal society in which priorities are ranked by individuals or by certain values that shape and give meaning to individual's life (May, 2002). In my pro-choice defense I use as an argument exactly the central point of this paper: the concept of dignity (and I am perfectly aware that prolife defenders also invoke the same argument for their advocation). I agree with Dworkin's argument that life has an intrinsic value in any forms it takes (even for a pre-implanted embryo). But this also means that one has to be able to find that value. Although universal, human dignity is not eternal. And those who claims that life deserves to be lived no matter what, probable have never perceived that death and dyeing could be an eternal threat not just an end of life issue. It is undignified to give birth and abandon a baby (for any sorts of personal and social reasons). It is undignified to give birth to a sick baby whose life will bring not more than suffering and pain when known from intrauterine life that she is not going to live. It is undignified to decide to have a baby and to sell her organs after birth, thus using the mother-hood as a way to get rich. Peter Singer goes even far by thinking that sometimes caring means killing (Father Richard John Neuhans, 2002) thus "killing" is not a murder but a defense to dignity. Kant and Aristotele stand for reasons, rationales and end-meanings in shaping dignity. If having an abortion comes after a rational decision, in which fetal life, fetal needs and parental desires are all congruent, if there is no malvolent intent and no expectation that the child would not wish to live under certain circumstances, dignity will never be at stake, and society should agree and support individuals choice.
When we invoke the Procreator as being "out of creation" it usually means that people blame on new reproductive technologies as replacing the nature, and abusing on people. It looks like in the same way in which not everything is justifiable in the name of autonomy, nor all reproductive means have gained moral acceptance in nowadays society. Opponents of this methods have stigmatized the babies resulted through artificial conception as "marketable material", "mere matter", "bits and pieces", (Sutton, 1998) the parents as "masters", "guardians" or "keepers" and the techno-logy itself as "dangerous", "trivial" or "cookbook thing". This whole collection of bitter words obviously come from a reluctant population whose main ethical concern would be "quis custodiet ipsos custodes" (who guards the guardians?) (Pence, 2000) Those who invoke religion above everything consider infertility as a "punishment" and the "tyranny of technologies" as exploiting people. But also church representatives like John Fletcher (quotted by Pence, 2000) who does consider that past religious prohibitions are no useful anymore, by not taking into account the consequences for human beings and "religion is best when is pro-people not when it worship abstract - thou shall not's". We ignore the fact that for some people seeking for an artificial way of reproduction (artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization) is like a soul searching. We are so much afraid of the "slippery slope" concept and what might happen in a futuristic society dominated by high-tech, so we forget to consider our present values and how much weight we assign for the very moment we live in "now". Instead of feeling condemned by a "flawed" body phisiology and coerced or op-pressed by science why people shouldn't feel blessed when God would grant an opportunity for artificial reproduction? To be childless is not just a matter of tremendous personal unhappiness but can also bring social disapproval and the brand of selfish and uncaring (Lauritzen, 1990). This is way feminists regard to these technologies is not about increasing choice, but increasing coercion. As mentioned in relation with pro-creative liberty, I don?t see modern reproductive methods as a threat to human dignity (unless there are used for market interest and governed by financial bene-fits). Human dignity is not encapsulated in a Petri dish or test tube. It does not freeze or melt under the pressure of human wishes. There are no surrogates of dignity when people want to have chil-dren to give meaning to their lives. It is just another way to fight with nature's barriers and leave something worthwhile behind you. References [1] Devine E., Rights, In Natural law ethics, pp 105-113, Greenwood Press, 2000 [2] Dworkin R., Life past reason In Life's dominion: and argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom, A.A. Knopf, New York, 1993 [3] Dworkin R., What is sacred In Life's dominion: and argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom, pp 68-101, A.A. Knopf, New York, 1993 [4] Engelhardt TH, The ending and the beginning of persons: death, abortion and infanticide In The foundation of bioethics, pp 239-287, Oxford University Press, 1996 [5] Kass L., Averting one's eyes or facing the music on dignity and death. In Steinfels P., Veatch RM., Death inside out: the Hastings center report, New York: Harper and Row, pp 101-114, 1974 [6] Laurizen P., What price parenthood, Hastings center report, march/april 1990 [7] May T., The liberal framework, In Bioethics in a liberal society, pp 1-12, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002
[8] Meyer M., The simple dignity of sentient life: speciesism and human dignity, Journal of social philosophy, vol 32, no 2, 115-26, 2001 [9] Neuhaus RN., Indefensible ethics: debating Peter Singer, Dignity, summer, 2002 [10] Pence G., Assisted reproduction: Louise Brown and beyond In Classic cases in medical ethics, pp 171-141, 2000 [11] Robertson JA., The presumptive primacy of procreative liberty, In Children of choice. Freedom and the new reproductive technologies, pp 22-42, Princeton University Press, 1994 [12] Steinbock B., Abortion, In Life before birth: the moral and legal status of embryos and fetuses, pp 43-88, Oxford University Press, 1992 [13] Sutton A., When Procreator is left out if creation, Fall 1998, Dignity Open Directory - Society: Philosophy: Ethics: Applied: Bioethics Affymetrix Resources: Genetics and Society - Affymetrix believes informed public discussion will help ensure that beneficial uses of genetic information are available to society.... offices of the journals BIOETHICS and DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS. Contact details. Bioethics, Inc. - Commercial... dmoz.org/society/philosophy/ethics/applied/bioethics Centre for Professional Ethics - Welcome This page forms part of the Faculty of Health site... it has gained a reputation for excellence in applied philosophy, particularly in bioethics and environmental ethics.... www.uclan.ac.uk/facs/ethics/iab.htm PhRMA Genomics: A Global Resource... HOME - PhRMA - Biodiversity - Bioethics - Bioinformatics - Cloning - Education - Journals - Law - Legislation - Medicine... genomics.phrma.org/bioethics.html