D. Justin Coates University of Chicago Email: djcoates@uchicago.edu 403 D Angelo Law Library Homepage: djustincoates.com 1111 E. 60 th Street Office Phone: 773.702.2219 Chicago, Il 60637 Cell Phone: 864.992.9468 Employment Law and Philosophy Fellow, University of Chicago Law School, July 2012-present Education Ph.D. Philosophy,, 2012 Dissertation: Reasons and Resentment (defended June 11, 2012) Committee: John Martin Fischer (chair; ) Gary Watson (University of Southern California) John Perry (Stanford University/) Andrews Reath () Michael Nelson () Book M.A. Philosophy, Georgia State University, 2007 B.A. History and Philosophy, Erskine College, 2005 1. Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds. D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. Publications 7. Blame, (with Neal A. Tognazzini), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, expected 2013. 6. Reasons-Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility, (with Philip Swenson), Philosophical Studies, forthcoming. 5. The Contours of Blame, (with Neal A. Tognazzini), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. eds. D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Review 4. No (New) Troubles with Ockhamism, (with Garrett Pendergraft), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, forthcoming. 3. Ethicists Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences, (with Eric Schwitzgebel, Joshua Rust, Linus Huang, and Alan Moore), Philosophical Psychology, forthcoming. 2. The Nature and Ethics of Blame, (with Neal A. Tognazzini), Philosophy Compass, Vol. 7.3 2012: 197-207. 1. Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions, (with Eddy Nahmias and Trevor Kvaran), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXXI 2007: 214-242. 1. Review of Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility by Tamler Sommers, Journal of Moral Philosophy, expected Nov. 2012. Works in Progress Manipulation, Resentment, and Blame, under review. Manipulation and Independence, under review. In Defense of Love Internalism, in progress. Presentations 6. Manipulation and the Reactive Attitudes, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, CA, March 2013. 5. Responsibility Without (Panicky) Metaphysics, Society for Philosophy of Agency, Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, New Orleans, LA, February 2013. 4. On Blame, Law and Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL, November 2012. 3. Internality and the Weighting of Reasons,, Riverside, CA, December 2011. 2. No (New) Troubles with Ockhamism, (with Garrett Pendergraft), Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, CA, April 2010. 1. Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism, (with Eddy Nahmias and Trevor Kvaran), Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Toronto, June 2007.
Commentaries 3. Comments on Jesse Summers Compulsion as Resistance to Reasoning, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Seattle, WA, April 2012. 2. Comments on Paul Tulipana s Kant s Conception of Autonomy in Two Objections to Metaethical Constitutivism, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Diego, CA, April 2011. 1. Comments on Andrew Eshleman s Praise and the Second-Person Standpoint, UCR Alumni Conference, Riverside, CA, March 2009. Awards and Honors The John Templeton Foundation Free Will and Science Summer Seminar, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, June 2012 (participant). University of California Dissertation Year Fellowship,, Riverside, CA, 2011-2012. Chancellor s University Fellowship,, Riverside, CA, 2007-2008. Outstanding Graduate Student Award, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, 2007. Ralf F. Munster Fellowship, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, 2006. Teaching Experience LAWS 61512: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, (with Brian Leiter), University of Chicago Law School, 2012-2013 Phil 138: Philosophy of Agency, University of California, 2009, 2011 Phil 003: Ethics and the Meaning of Life, University of California, 2010 Phil 116: Business Ethics, University of California, 2011 PHIL 2010: Great Questions in Philosophy, Georgia State University, 2007 PHIL 1010: Critical Thinking, Georgia State University 2006, 2007
Professional Service Referee, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Philosophical Psychology, Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Graduate Student Representative, University of California Riverside, 2009-2011. References John Martin Fischer Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Andrews Reath Professor of Philosophy Maudemarie Clark George Carleton Jr. Professor of Philosophy/ Professor of Philosophy Department(s) of Philosophy Colgate University/ Gary Watson Provost Professor of Philosophy and Law University of Southern California Brian Leiter Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence The Law School University of Chicago John Perry Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor/ Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Department(s) of Philosophy Stanford University/ Michael Nelson Associate Professor of Philosophy
Dissertation Abstract In Reasons and Resentment I develop a theory of practical reasons and extend that theory in particular to moral reasons. According to this theory, which I call Structuralism, the existence and weight of an agent s reason R to a ontologically depends on those motivational states that play some role in structuring the agent s practical identity. After presenting Structuralism, I contend (i) that it is a well-motivated reductive account of reasons and (ii) that it is extensionally adequate. I then turn to moral reasons, which putatively have the properties of categoricity and practical priority. In defense of this conception of moral reasons, I first argue that Structuralism doesn t rule out the possibility that moral reasons instantiate these two properties. Second, following Peter Strawson, I suggest that such properties could be grounded in our inescapable commitment to regard others as participants in certain forms of meaningful interpersonal relationships a commitment that, in virtue of its rational inescapability, is internal to our practical identity as relational agents. I argue that if this is correct, then moral reasons will be categorical and have practical priority. PhD Coursework (bold denotes taken for credit) 2007 Theories of Well-being (Watson) Psychopathy (Watson and Fischer) Self-Knowledge (Jeshion) 2008 Moral Responsibility (Fischer) Blame (Macnamara) Philosophy of Religion I & II (Fischer) Scientific Explanation (Reck) Practical Reasons (Watson) Intention and Action (Nelson) Meta-logic (Reck) Moral Psychology (Schwitzgebel) 2009 Experimental Philosophy (Fischer) Modal Logic (Nelson) What is Analytic Philosophy? (Reck) Nietzsche s Beyond Good and Evil (Clark) Knowledge and Function (Graham) Free Will (Perry) Philosophy of Mind (Hoffman) Action and the Self (Nelson) 2010 Kant s First Critique (Keller) Kant s Groundwork and Second Critique (Reath) Kant s Third Critique (Keller) Husserl s Logical Investigations (Siewert and Wrathall) Smith s Theory of the Moral Sentiments (Hoffman and Reath) Nietzsche s Genealogy of Morality (Clark) Holding Responsible (Macnamara) 2011 Kant s Normative Ethics (Reath) Metaethical Constitutivism (Nelson) Nietzsche s Critique of Culture (Clark)