Chapters 21, 22: The Language of QL ("Quantifier Logic")

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Chapters 21, 22: The Language of QL ("Quantifier Logic") Motivation: (1) Fido is a cat. (2) All cats are scary. Valid argument! (3) Fido is scary. In PL: Let P = Fido is a cat. Q = All cats are scary. R = Fido is scary. P, Q R Not tautologically valid! Infmal Introduction to Alphabet & Grammar of QL 1. Names and Predicates (a) Use lower-case letters m, n, o,..., to represent the names of individuals. Call these letters "individual constants". ex. "m" = "Socrates" "n" = "Plato" "o" = "Aristotle"

(b) Use capital letters to represent properties attributed to individuals. Call them "predicate letters". Convention: F, G, H,... one-place predicates L, M,... two-place predicates R, S... three-place predicates ex. "F" means " is wise" "L" means " loves " "R" means " prefers to " First Grammatical rule f QL An n-place predicate combines with n names to fm an atomic wff. ex. "Fn" means "Plato is wise." "Fo" means "Aristotle is wise." "Romo" means "Aritstole prefers Socrates to himself." "Lmm" means "Socrates loves himself."

2. Connectives Use PLC connectives,,,, to fm wffs from atomic wffs. ex: (Fm Fn) means "Either Socrates Plato is wise." and not F(m n) (Lnm Lmn) (Rnmo (Lnm Lno)) (Fn Lnn) "It's not the case that Plato loves Socrates and Socrates loves Plato." "If Plato prefers Socrates to Aristotle, then he loves Socrates and doesn't love Aristotle." "Plato is wise and loves himself."

3. Quantifiers (a) Use lower-case letters..., x, y, z to represent pronouns. Call these letters "individual variables". (b) Use the symbols, to represent universal and existential quantifiers. ex. " x" means "F all x" "Everyone" "Everything" " x" means "There exists an x" "Someone" "Something" Grammatical rule f wffs involving quantifiers If C(...c...c...) is a QL wff containing at least one occurrence of the individual constant c, then the expression obtained by replacing all occurrences of c with some individual variable v, new to C, and prefixing the result with v v, is a wff. So if C(...c...c...) is a QL wff containing at least one occurrence of the individual constant c, then vc(...v...v...) and vc(...v...v...) are both QL wffs.

Rmno is a QL wff "Socrates prefers Plato to Aristotle." Thus so are: xrxno "F all x, x prefers Plato to Aristotle." "Everyone prefers Plato to Aristotle." zrzno "There exists a z such that z prefers Plato to Aristotle." "Someone prefers Plato to Aristotle." x zrznx "F all x, there exists a z such that z prefers Plato to x." "Everyone is such that someone prefers Plato to them." y x zrzyx "Anyone is preferred to everyone by someone."

And so are: xrxno x xrxnx x x xrxxx As well as: Fn Rmno (Fn Rmno) x(fn Rmnx) y x(fn Rynx) (Fn y x(fn Rynx)) z(fz y x(fz Ryzx))

The domain of discourse of a quantifier expression is the collection of individuals that expression quantifies over. vc(...v...v...) means "Everything in the domain of discourse has the property that C(...c...c...) attributes to the individual named by c". vc(...v...v...) means "At least one thing in the domain of discourse has the property that C(...c...c...) attributes to the individual named by c". So again: Let the domain of discourse be people. xfx xfx x Fx x(fx Lmx) "Someone is wise." "No one is wise." "Someone isn't wise." "F all people, if they are wise, then Socrates loves them." "All wise people are loved by Socrates." "Socrates loves anyone wise."

Named versus Nameless Individuals Suppose: The following QL wff is true: Fn Then: Is the following QL wff true as well? xfx xfx says "Something in the domain of discourse is an F". This will be true if the thing named by n is in fact in the domain of discourse. So: Given that everything named by some individual constant is in the domain, then any wff of the fm C(...c...c...) entails a wff of the fm vc(...v...v...). But: vc(...v...v...) does not necessarily imply C(...c...c...). There can be domains with nameless individuals in which (a) No named individual has the property C. (b) At least one nameless individual has the property C. In such a domain, vc(...v...v...) is true, but C(...c...c...) is false, f any named individual c.

Similarly: Given that everything named by some individual constant is in the domain, then any wff of the fm C(...c...c...) entails a wff of the fm vc(...v...v...). But: vc(...v...v...) does not necessarily imply C(...c...c...). There can be a domain in which all named things have the property C, but some nameless things don't. So: It's not the case that (a) An existential quantifier wff is true if and only if one of its instances is true. (b) A universal quantifier wff is true if and only if all of its instances are true.