Was the Diadochi s Succession over Alexander s Empire Typical of the Ancient World?

Was the Diadochi s Succession over Alexander s Empire Typical of the Ancient World? Succession has always been a very important issue for the ancient world. Leaders from all across the Mediterranean looked for heirs in order to ensure that their family continued to rule and their empire remained intact. In this way children competed amongst one-another to ensure that they would rule next. This competition was not contained to within the family, all too often rulers had to adopt in order to protect their kingdom. Not only this but if a ruler had no clear heirs and died, then it was often left to the surviving generals and politicians to decide the succession. This could lead to divisions of an empire and civil war, as was the case with the succession of the Diadochi. This period was long, complex and bitter. In order to understand whether this was a typical pattern of succession in the ancient world, it is necessary to examine the main events after Alexander s death in 323BC. Then we can understand the themes of succession relating to the Diadochi s ruling over Alexander s empire, in order to compare them to other patterns of succession in the ancient world. Thus we can see whether the Diadochi s succession was atypical or the norm. Alexander had left no clear heir. His only legitimate child (Alexander IV) was not yet born, as Roxanne his wife was still pregnant when he died. This resulted in a lot of confusion as to what was to happen next. There was no one clear person who could take up Alexander s mantle of King of Kings. As a result, Alexander s generals met to discuss what was to happen. The word Diadochi (from the Greek meaning successors ) is the collective term for the generals who fought to dominate the remains of Alexander s empire in the late 4 th Century. The most significant generals were Perdiccas, Antipater, Antigonus, Ptolemy, Cassander, Polyperchon and Lysimachus. The problem was that different people wanted different outcomes; Perdiccas, commander of Alexander s companion cavalry, wanted to wait for Roxanne to give birth and give the throne to the baby, with Perdiccas acting as regent. Ptolemy wanted a council of the generals to be formed in order to rule until the heir was old enough to rule. Alexander s army stationed in Babylon was tired of the indecision and so put forward Alexander s half-brother Arrhidaeus (re-named Philip Fig.1 The lands held by the satraps as a result of the Partition of Babylon. 1

by the army). Although he was mentally rather slow and so unfit to rule, the army had put him forward to rule and, without the army the generals would not have an empire to govern. Therefore, a compromise was struck and the Partition of Babylon was formed. As a result of this agreement Philip III would rule as king of the empire with Perdiccas as regent, until the time when Roxanne had given birth. She gave birth later that year to a boy (Alexander IV) and for a while the three of them ruled together. Michael Scott describes the outcome of the Partition as a system designed to explode as it was a settlement which put a whole set of powerful and ambitious men in equally powerful positions, circling a woman and her unborn child. However, it was not long before the generals who had become satraps (provincial governors) started to question whether Perdiccas truly would give up power when Alexander IV was old enough. This doubt was reinforced when Perdiccas married Alexander the Great s sister, Cleopatra, thereby strengthening his claim to be part of the royal family. Perdiccas was determined to gain power for himself, he even said that Alexander had given him his ring, marking Perdiccas out as Alexander s successor; a claim no one believed at the time. In an effort to consolidate his control he re-organised the satraps, sacking those who were not loyal to him and putting in their place others whose loyalty was more secure. He was ruthless in his rule as regent; he ordered mutinying Greek mercenaries posted in Bactria to be massacred by Peithon, local satrap of Media, as well as ordering one Persian satrap, Ariarathes of Cappadocia, to be punished by other loyal satraps. Ariarathes had refused to accept the terms of the Partition of Babylon that would have stripped him of his governorship. The loyal satraps tortured his family as well. Perdiccas measures made him enemies, most notably Antigonus, satrap of Phrygia, who wanted power for himself. Around 322/321 BC Antigonus appealed to fellow satraps, Antipater of Greece and Craterus of Cilicia, to unite against Perdiccas ruthlessness and megalomania. Ptolemy joined with these rebels soon after, having intercepted Alexander s body as it was being transferred to Macedonia and buried it in Memphis instead. This served to both legitimise Ptolemy s own claim and also to weaken Perdiccas authority. As Ptolemy had already committed this crime against Perdiccas and the two kings (Philip III and Alexander IV) and was married to Antipater s daughter, it made sense for him to join with Anitgonus, Craterus and Antipater and so the rebellion gained another ally. Antipater, Antigonus and Craterus invaded Asia Minor as a pre-emptive strike, rather than waiting for Perdiccas, who had the royal army and other kings to back up his claim, to invade them. In response Perdiccas sent Eumenes to defend Asia Minor. However Eumenes was not Macedonian, indeed he had never even held military command. It was a token response by Perdiccas and suggested that he thought Asia Minor was a lost cause. It was a miscalculation because, as a result, many other satrapies deserted Perdiccas. Perdiccas in 321BC made his move on Ptolemy, hoping to remove him before tackling the other rebels. Unfortunately Perdiccas suffered many setbacks in his campaign. More than 2,000 men drowned trying to cross the Nile to attack Memphis. Perdiccas generals were furious and so killed him that evening in his tent. Ptolemy welcomed the army the next day and two of the generals who had killed Perdiccas, 2

Arrhidaeus and Peithon, were named as regents of Alexander IV and Philip III, as well as generals of the royal army. Eumenes proved his worth in the defence of Asia Minor as he managed to defeat Craterus army as well as killing him in the process. Back in Babylon Philip s wife had been stirring up trouble in the Phalanx (the bulk of Alexander s infantry who fought with long pikes), which had always been a supporter of Philip, to the extent that Arrhidaeus and Peithon stepped down from office as regents, leaving way open for Antipater to seize power. Much like Perdiccas did, Antipater re-organised the satrapies by rewarding loyal generals with positions. Antigonus was sent to deal with Eumenes and married his daughter to Antipater s son. Antipater promoted his son, Cassander, to chilarch (commander) of the Asian army. These policies served to unite the rebels as well as show Antigonus s loyalty to the new regime. The first civil war ended in 321BC with Antipater moving back to Macedon along with Alexander IV and Philip III. Things did not remain quiet for long, as people s ambitions once again rose to the surface. Although Antipater was in power, he was very old and his health began deteriorating around 321BC. His son, Cassander, took over control for the time being but Antigonus began pursuing his own agenda soon after the peace been settled. In the meantime other satraps consolidated their positions, waiting for Antipater to die, which he did, in 319BC. Antipater had named Polyperchon (a commander in Alexander s army and a popular man) as regent before he died in order to secure the succession and try and stop another war breaking out. However careful the choice was, he had overlooked the ambitions of two important people: his son Cassander and Antigonus. Cassander, meanwhile, had been changing garrisons in Greek cities, placing men loyal to him in control and had been drumming up support against Polyperchon. He entered into an alliance with Antigonus and Ptolemy, both of whom were also looking to expand their influence, and rebelled against Polyperchon. This was initially unsuccessful as Polyperchon issued an order declaring freedom to all the Greeks, in an attempt to de-stabilise Cassander s control of the region by turning the people against Cassander s autocratic rule. Both Polyperchon and Cassander moved into Greece to consolidate their position, with Polyperchon at first besieging Cassander in Piraeus. However he was unable to take the port and so, keeping Cassander contained there, moved off to try and damage Cassander s support elsewhere, besieging Megalopolis. This was a disaster for Polyperchon as he failed to take the town, resulting in many neutral cities now siding with Cassander and weakening Polyperchon s grip on Alexander s empire in the West. The disintegration of Alexander s old empire continued as Cassander s allies made moves elsewhere, each in order to secure his own realm of influence. Ptolemy invaded Coele Syria (modern-day Lebanon) and Antigonus moved to secure Asia. However Eumenes was declared General of Asia by Polyperchon and given money to raise an army to defeat Antigonus. He rallied the support of satraps still loyal to the kings but by 316BC was defeated and ended up being killed by his own troops. Antigonus now was ruler of Asia and commanded a large army of around 80,000 men. He began to secure his rule, like every other general before him, by chasing out old satraps and placing new ones in who were loyal to him. 3

Back in Macedonia Polyperchon s authority collapsed. Cassander marched into Macedon and secured support amongst the Macedonian nobles. Philip III s wife convinced him to change the regency from Polyperchon to Cassander. This resulted in Cassander arriving in victory and expelling Polyperchon. However Olympias, Alexander s mother, invaded Macedon in 317BC, killing Philip III and his wife. Now there was only one king, Alexander IV. However, he ruled in name only, as he was still only a child and under the influence of the Diadochi. Real power lay with them. The fragmentation of Alexander s empire as result of the conflict between the Diadochi continued. Cassander, as regent, now controlled Macedonia and Greece (apart from the Peloponnesus, which was under Polyperchon s control), Lysimachus ruled Thrace, Ptolemy ruled Egypt and Antigonus controlled Asia. Concerned by Antigonus power in Asia the other three sent an emissary to him with an ultimatum demanding that he restore the old satraps or face war. Antigonus refused and sent money and men to Polyperchon in order to threaten Cassander s control of Greece as well sending men to push Cassander out of Asia Minor. Cassander attacked south in response, pushing into the Peloponnesus and dealing with the problem of Polyperchon. From 314-311BC each side attacked one another, neither achieving a great deal, though Cassander was pushed out of Asia Minor by Antigonus generals. Both sides were exhausted by continuous war and so a peace was established in 311BC. Shortly afterwards Alexander IV was murdered by Cassander. This was done to secure all the generals kingdoms because, in five years time, when Alexander IV would turn 16, they would all lose their power and Fig. 2 The division of the Empire during the Third Civil War have to submit to him as Alexander s true successor. Alexander IV s death ended any hope of a restoration of Alexander the Great s empire. Alexander IV was the last true blood heir and his murder consolidated the Diadochi s positions; they were generals no more, now they were kings. The Diadochi were now free to pursue ruthlessly their own individual agendas, their original loyalties to both Alexander and his empire now gone. Polyperchon caused rifts amongst the Macedonian nobility by claiming to have another heir of Alexander the Great. Polyperchon abandoned this child, who could have united the empire in the name of Alexander the Great, in favour of securing his own position in Cassander s court. The battle of Ipsus in 301BC confirmed the Diadochi s failure to restore the empire of Alexander the Great. Cassander allied again with Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Seleucus against Antigonus and his son Demetrius. Lysimachus and Seleucus formed a huge army of 64,000 infantry, 10,500 cavalry, 400 elephants and 120 chariots against the 4

forces of Antigonus and Demetrius, which contained 80,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 75 elephants. The battle ended badly for Antigonus and Demetrius, with their infantry collapsing and Antigonus being killed. Demetrius withdrew with the rest of his cavalry to his ships. This battle marked the end of the wars of the Diadochi. As a result of this battle, five completely independent kingdoms were created; each with their own king and so the break with Alexander the Great s vast empire was complete. Demtrius was king of Greece, Cassander of Macedon, Ptolemy of Egypt, Lysimachus of Asia Minor and Thrace and Seleucis ruled the rest of Asia. They each formed their own kingdom and ruled with varying degrees of success. The last Diadochic kingdom to fall was the Ptolemaic Empire, which fell when Cleopatra VII committed suicide at the end of the battle of Actium in 31BC. From 301-31BC Diadochic kingdoms had been engaged in almost continuous civil war. Alexander s lack of an undisputed heir had resulted in almost three centuries of civil war which tore apart his dream of a world united under one man. Having looked in detail at the Diadochi s succession and the subsequent break-up of Alexander s empire, we need to consider how typical this was of the ancient world; in particular whether the lack of an heir inevitably resulted in civil war. Additionally we need to examine whether the generals were the real power behind an empire and the succession of its rulers. Alexander had been a brilliant general and statesman and his empire the largest in the ancient world. This legacy was so great that it was hard for the Diadochi to follow. We need to see whether this pressure applied in any other examples of succession in the ancient world. As a result of looking at these areas, we will be able to understand whether the Diadochi s succession was typical or not. Alexander s own succession to his father Philip II contrasts sharply with that of the Diadochi. Alexander had been groomed for the job of king from an early age. He even ruled for a time when he was 16 while his father was away fighting and actually fought in a battle to quell a rebellion. His is an example of how succession ought to happen; a son is brought up in the royal circle, with an understanding of how to rule and with the support of the ruling families. As a result he is ready to assume power when his father dies. Alexander had proved himself very capable as a ruler and as a general and so looked ready to inherit power when his time came. His right to succession however, was not guaranteed. In 338BC, when his father Philip took Cleopatra Eurydice as a bride, Alexander was forced to flee Macedon towards Illyria. His succession was only saved when Pausanias killed Philip in 336BC and Alexander was proclaimed king. Alexander was not an innocent bystander to his father s murder, in my opinion. He may have order Philip to be murdered, in order to protect his own claim. As Plutarch wrotes in his Life of Alexander most of the blame devolved upon Olympias, on the ground that she had added her exhortations to the young man's anger and incited him to the deed; but a certain amount of accusation attached itself to Alexander also. This shows that even at that time there was some suspicion over who was actually behind the murder. It was not difficult to see why. Eurydice had given birth to a son, Caranus, who was of pure Macedonian stock. By contrast Alexander was only half Macedonian; his mother hailed from Epirus. This meant that, had Caranus been given the time to grow up, he may well have been a 5

more legitimate heir of the Macedonian throne than Alexander, because he was of pure blood. Eliminating rivals was also a feature of the Diadochi s succession. For example Cassander murdered the young Alexander IV in order to protect his own claim to the kingship of Greece as well as strengthen the Diadochi s claims to power. Removing threats to one s power was always important and necessary to secure one s own control. The Diadochi s succession happened as a result of too many potential candidates competing for power. However, in the case of Alexander he was fortunate that the death of his father happened when it did. It meant that he could inherit power without the same problems as were faced in 323BC because he was the sole candidate. Indeed he was even able to quell the rebellions which grew up from his father s untimely death and consolidate his rule at home enough in order to make his expansion into Asia possible. In this way the Diadochi s succession was not typical. Alexander the Great was a clear heir. He had been groomed for the job from a young age and was not just thrust into power. The Diadochi came into power in the vacuum caused by Alexander having no living heir. Although his wife was pregnant there was no assurance that the baby would be male or would even make it to adulthood. However in spite of this difference, there were also similarities in the two successions. Alexander may have eliminated his rivals by assassination, much as the Diadochi did, both with Alexander IV and with the other generals. The general theme of the Diadochi s succession is that of a line of generals trying to seize power after the previous ruler died leaving no one as a definite heir. This is testament to the importance of having and naming an heir in the ancient world; without one you risk the kingdom erupting in civil war and even fracturing completely, as happened with the Diadochic kingdoms. This pattern of Fig. 3 The regions where the four Emperors had their influence. succession was similar to the Year of the Four Emperors, 69AD, in which Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian all ruled as Emperor, Otho ruling for only two months. However, although it was considerably shorter than the Diadochi s succession (nearly three centuries) and did not divide the empire permanently, it arose for similar reasons. The power and influence that generals had in the Ancient times was enormous. In particular the Year of the Four Emperors was largely caused by the Marian reforms of the previous century that had greatly enhanced their power and the importance of the army by making it professional. They were the ones who fed and paid the army and thereby gained their trust. This meant that charismatic individuals were able to wield vast influence and control by using the 6

soldiers under their command for their own gains. W. Lindsay Adams describes the generals of Alexander as a group of talented men with strong ambitions, no less than four of whom would become kings in their own right. That so many ended up holding positions of great responsibility proves the point that generals had the opportunity to become powerful. All of the talented potential successors were the generals of Alexander s empire. The idea of generals seizing power is not uncommon and is perfectly logical. If the ruler dies without an heir, many people may try and claim the right to rule. However it is the generals of the army who hold the trump card: the army. For that all a council may have noble ideas or speak with great rhetoric, they have nothing to back up their rule and enforce their laws. By contrast the generals have an army at their beck and call which can be used to suppress revolt or enforce laws. This is clear in the Partition of Babylon, when Alexander s army threatened to storm the palace, if Philip III was not proclaimed king. Another important example of the power of those controlling the army occurred when, at the height of its power, the Praetorian Guard (positioned just outside Rome) were able to suggest people for the role of the Emperor. The Praetorian Guard, having murdered the previous Emperor, Caligula, in 41BC then imposed their puppet, Claudius, on the senate who were powerless to oppose. Both the Diadochi s succession and the generals in the Year of the Four Emperors highlight the opportunism of the generals. Being a general required adaptability and the ability to take a chance and come up with new ideas for defeating the enemy. Not only this but they had also to earn the loyalty of their soldiers in order to achieve victory and so needed to be charismatic. As a result many generals were well suited to imperial power/kingship. The power vacuum caused by Alexander s sudden death and Nero s exile and suicide left people reeling, unsure what to do and gave the generals the opportunity to seize power. It is not surprising that the generals jumped at the chance to take control in both successions. Overall then the succession of the Diadochi can be seen to be typical by the fact that it involved generals seizing power in the political vacuum caused by the sudden death of a leader. Its closet similarity is with the generals from the Year of the Four Emperors, as both involved several generals trying to seize power and using force against one another in order to secure their role. Both events show the power that a general had in the ancient world and indeed how easy it was for them to seize power. Legitimising one s claim was also an important factor in succession in the ancient world. This is why Ptolemy seized Alexander the Great s body in the Diadochi s succession in order to strengthen his claim. It was important for a ruler to legitimize his rule by proving that he was the favourite of the predecessor or that he was related to some old, successful leader. Augustus claimed to be a descendant of Aeneas, the mythical founder of Rome, in order to prove himself as a capable ruler. Although this was undoubtedly not true it gave him credibility. Constantine claimed to be descended from Claudius II a moderately successful emperor. Claudius II s achievements were embellished by Constantine to strengthen his case. The Diadochi attempted to marry into the royal family to strengthen their claim to rule by citing their descent from Alexander. Another example of a leader changing his name or family tree to make his predecessors and thereby himself seem more 7

important was Augustus. He was born Gaius Octavius and did not change his name until 44BC when he was adopted by Caesar in his will. At this point he became Gaius Julius Caesar, taking on the full name of his adopted father. With his new name came the status of being related to one of the greatest generals Rome had produced. This clearly shows the importance of names and legacy; Roman Emperors often changed their names when they claimed the purple, so as to seem more suitable for the job. They often used the name Caesar, Augustus or Germanicus (for example Tiberius Claudius Nero on ascension changed his name to Tiberius Caesar Augustus) to suggest their royal heritage. Even Hadrian added the name Traianus when he became Emperor to emphasise his similarity to the great Traian. Legacy was very important; both Pompey and Mithridates of Pontus, a Hellenistic kingdom which originally sided with Antigonus, styled themselves on Alexander the Great. They both wore a purple cloak in the style of Alexander, and Pompey even had a head of Alexander made from pearls. This shows how both Diadochic rulers and others throughout the ancient world chose to liken themselves to other greats from history in order to bolster their legitimacy. In this way the succession of the Diadochi can be seen to be typical of the ancient world as the Diadochi wanted to be associated with Alexander and all that he had achieved. They sought to legitimise their rule by claiming a connection with the great leader. This happened many times during the ancient world as rulers, desperate to strengthen their power, looked to other, popular and successful leaders to add weight and kudos to their own rule. The Diadochi s succession can, at the same time, be seen as untypical of ancient times. Naming an heir was important in ensuring a strong succession in the ancient world. It was a highly political affair and, if the chosen person was not popular enough, they ran the risk of being killed or overthrown when they got into power. Making the wrong choice could even have an adverse effect on the life of the current ruler, as was the case with Galba. Otho s men assassinated him because Galba had adopted Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus. Otho felt that he, as one of Galba s primary supporters and a man of political experience, should have been named heir. This shows the problem of naming the wrong heir. The fact that Alexander never named an heir shows how untypical the Diadochi s succession was; people fell out because there was no named heir (except for Perdiccas who claimed that Alexander had given him his ring on his deathbed, but no one really believed that), not that the heir was a bad choice. As Michael Scott writes in From Democrats to Kings, It was a world obsessed with the cult of the individual. And now there was no one obvious individual who could take Alexander s place. He agrees with my view that there was no one who had the charisma or leadership to unite an empire built around one person; there were as many as 57 cities named Alexandria around his empire but there was no new Alexander. It is interesting to consider why Alexander had not named an heir; if he wanted his new huge empire to remain strong he must have realised it would need a strong successor. I feel that this was because Alexander was not expecting to die so young. He died when he was only 32. He had not yet planned his succession and this lack of forward planning created problems for his empire s survival. 8

Even if Alexander had chosen his heir at the last minute it would have been better than not at all. Caesar had been vague in naming his heir; some thought Mark Anthony would inherit his title, but no one could say for sure. Indeed it was not widely known that Octavian had been adopted, and he had not been groomed to succeed him. Octavian was supposed to have been the master of the horse during Caesar s planned campaign against the Dacians, but this was no clear mark of favour: Mark Anthony had been Master of the Horse before, as well as a consul. Octavian was named heir only in Caesar s will, as Seutonius wrote in the Life of Julius Caesar In his last will, however, he named three heirs... Gaius Octavius, to three-fourths of his estate... At the end of the will, too, he adopted Gaius Octavius into his family and gave him his name. Octavian was advised not to accept the inheritance at the request of his mother, yet he did and, despite not being prepared for the job, managed to rule well. This shows that grooming an heir was not vital for a smooth succession, but proves that having and naming an heir, even if at the last minute, was better than doing nothing at all. Adrian Goldsworthy argues in Caesar that it would have been extremely unlikely that, had the dictator died of natural causes, the youth [Octavian] would have been able to inherit anything more than his fortune and property. He suggests that this did not really count as naming an heir and that, had Caesar died normally, Octavian probably would not have ended up becoming Emperor. What allowed Octavian to rule was his own prodigious skill and the exceptional times in which he found himself. However, in my opinion, the adoption of Octavian by Caesar gave Octavian enough credibility to capitalise on the confusion after Julius Caesar s assassination for his own gains. This shows that naming an heir, even if tardy, could still be effective. In contrast to Caesar s last-minute adoption, Augustus attempts to provide for his succession are interesting to consider. He was desperate to name an heir. Augustus wanted a pure Julian heir and he married three times to try and secure a son. However the only child he had was with his second wife, Scribonia, and that was a daughter, Julia. He married his granddaughter to Marcellus, the son of his sister Octavia, but they failed to produce an heir and Marcellus died in 23BC leaving the next candidate, Agrippa, a favourite of Augustus. They managed to produce five children and Augustus adopted the two sons, Gaius and Lucius, marking them out as his heirs, with Agrippa acting as their guardian. However Agrippa died in 12BC leaving the two heirs potentially without a guardian, should Augustus also die. Therefore Augustus forced Tiberius, the son of Augustus third wife, Livia, from a previous marriage to marry Julia and act as guardian to the two boys. Fig.4 A simplified family tree of Augustus showing his heirs underlined in red. 9

Both boys were groomed for public office; Gaius was consul in AD1, showing how Augustus was keen to prepare both of his adopted sons for ruling. These complicated attempts to secure a pure Julian heir were only possible as a result of the length of time for which Augustus ruled. However, even the best-laid plans for succession could go wrong. Both boys died before Augustus; Gaius in AD4 and Lucius in AD2 and so Augustus was back at square one again. This meant that he made his last choice, his stepson Tiberius, heir. It should not be assumed from this that Tiberius was a bad choice, he had proven himself to be an able general, it was more that Augustus had been determined to have a Julian emperor, whereas now that choice would have to be Julio-Claudian. This shows the difficulty with succession; if too much pressure is exerted on a potential heir then this can have negative results as, in ancient times, life was shorter and more brutal than nowadays. This meant that despite all that the ruler could do to plan, it was still down to chance as to whether the heir would survive. Alexander died before his Empire had been completely consolidated and unified, let alone before he had begun to think about heirs. His wife was pregnant with his first legitimate child when he died. When his son, Alexander IV was born it was the generals who named him king and not Alexander. The simple fact that Alexander left no heir is not necessarily atypical of the ancient world because many Roman emperors died heirless. However most of them had only ruled for a short period of time, for example Otho, and so they had not had the time or opportunity to plan. By contrast Alexander had ruled for ten years and had had the benefit of being named legitimate heir before his father was killed. He ought to have planned his succession carefully and named an heir. The main reason that the Diadochi were able to grab the succession was because Alexander had not made it clear, or even decided at all, who would rule after him. This made it difficult for his successor to follow without the conviction and legitimacy of being the chosen man. There were alternative patterns of succession in the ancient world, which might have solved the problems that the Diadochi faced. A triumvirate, where three people agree to share power and rule, each with equal status, was a possibility. In both of the following examples, there were great men and leaders who would have fought amongst each other had they not agreed to co-rule. The First Triumvirate Crassus, Pompey and Caesar) began in 60BC when Caesar, as consul, promised to help Pompey and Crassus if they would grant him a five-year command in Gaul. This shows how the Diadochi could have worked together, rather than against each other, to secure their empire. However the First Triumvirate only lasted as long as it was beneficial to all the members and ended with the death of Crassus in 53BC. The main problem with a Triumvirate is that there are only three people involved; if one dies then the other two become rivals rather than each acting to hold the other two in check. Further, a triumvirate only worked if the members were of equal importance and as long as it was mutually beneficial. Thus, in the case of the Second Triumvirate (Octavian, Mark Anthony and Lepidus) that began in 43BC, Octavian and Mark Anthony were the more dominant partners and so Lepidus, who was largely ignored, was soon removed from his position. Diocletian s Tetrarchy, formed in 293AD, was another attempt at solving the problem of succession. In the previous century the Roman Empire had been plagued by civil 10

war and a quick turnover of Emperors. The Tetrarchy was Diocletian s attempt to stabilize or prevent the break up of the Roman Empire. It involved two Augusti, or senior emperors, and two Caesars, or junior emperors, ruling together. They divided up the empire administratively, but kept it whole in all other respects. The idea was that the Augusti would stand down after a period of time and the Caesars would then become the Augusti. Two new Caesars would be elected and so forth. In theory this would have solved the problem of succession, as there would always be two people ready to assume power, and two remaining in office, thereby avoiding a power vacuum. This would have been ideal for the succession to Alexander s empire as there were plenty of experienced generals ready to take their turn in a tetrarchy. By offering four positions of power at any moment in time a tetrarchy might have satisfied their political ambitions and stopped the in fighting for the one role of regent that was a feature of the Diadochi s succession. The problem with the Tetrarchy was that, after Diocletian and his co-augustus, Maximian, abdicated, the new Caesars he had chosen were not those that most people wanted. Others felt that they should have had the role of Caesar. Moreover the newly promoted Augusti were later reluctant to relinquish their power. This shows the fundamental weakness of a tetrarchy, that it only worked as long as the rulers were prepared to give up power. In the Diadochi s succession, an attempt was made to rule as a three. As a result of the Partition of Babylon, Philip III, Alexander IV and Perdiccas all ruled. However, it was not a true triumvirate because the three members were not of equal status and power, Perdiccas was only a regent whilst the other two were kings. Secondly the three members were not true equals as Philip was mentally unstable, Alexander IV was a baby and so the regency was dominated by Perdiccas strong political ambitions. The later alliances of the generals, such as between Antipater, Antigonus, Craterus and Ptolemy in 322BC can not be described as an attempt to rule as a tetrarchy as they were more marriages of convenience rather than a true desire to share power. Whilst the concept of triumvirates and tetrarchies might have provided an option for the generals in 323BC, later experience showed that they tended not to last long. Diocletian s Tetrarchy only lasted for one generation, and both the Triumvirates no more than nine years, because, despite all the restraints and checks on one-another, political ambitions inevitably led to conflict. This was exactly the problem after Alexander s death, when too many people wanted power for themselves and were not prepared to share it. Therefore a triumvirate or a tetrarchy would not have been the answer to the problem of the Diadochi s succession. It is clear to see that the Diadochi s succession, whilst it contains themes similar to that of other successions at the time, was overall not typical. The lack of an heir, the power of the generals and the drive for legitimacy were common problems facing succession in the ancient world. They had all contributed to the Year of the Four Emperors. All three factors also contributed to the Diadochi s succession. However what made the Diadochi s succession unique was the scale involved. No other battle for succession in the ancient world was as devastating, long lasting nor had such a farreaching effect as that of the Diadochi. Alexander s empire, the largest the world had ever seen, broke up into various warring kingdoms and remained so for almost three centuries. 11

Was the Diadochi s Succession over Alexander s Empire Typical of the Ancient World? Bibliography From Democrats to Kings, Michael Scott, UK, 2009 The Successors of Alexander, W. Lindsay Adams in The Greek World in the Fourth Century, ed Lawrence A. Tritle, USA, 2006 Caesar, Adrian Goldsworthy, UK, 2006 Ancient Rome: the Empire 30BC-AD476, Patricia Southern, UK, 2011 Chronicle of the Roman Emperors, Chris Scarre, UK, 1995 The Roman Triumph, Mary Beard, USA, 1997 The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Rome, Chris Scarre, UK, 1995 The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Greece, Robert Morkot, UK, 1996 Alexander 334-323BC Conquest of the Persian Empire, John Warry, USA 1991 Emperors of Rome. The story of Imperial Rome from Julius Caesar to the Last Emperor, David Potter, UK, 2007 From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323-320 B.C., The Journal of Hellenic Studies, R. M. Errington, 1970 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/diadochi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/battle_of_ipsus http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/pontus http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/philip_iii_of_macedon http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/concepts_diadochi.html http://www.unrv.com/military/praetorian-guard.php http://www.livius.org/di-dn/diadochi/diadochi.htm http://www.livius.org/pen-pg/perdiccas/perdiccas.htm http://www.historyofmacedonia.org/ancientmacedonia/ptolemyi.html http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/people_antigonusi.html 12

http://whatisencyclopedia.com/diadochi/ Images: Fig.1 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/15/diadochi_satraps_babyl on.png/300px-diadochi_satraps_babylon.png Fig. 2 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/15/diadochi.png/350px- Diadochi.png Fig. 3 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7b/roman_empire_69.svg/ 350px-Roman_Empire_69.svg.png Fig.4 http://www.the- romans.co.uk/augustus_genealogy.htm Latin translations: Seutonius Life of Caesar 83.1-2: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/thayer/e/roman/texts/suetonius/12caesars/julius*.ht ml Plutarch s Life of Alexander 10.6: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/thayer/e/roman/texts/plutarch/lives/alexander*/3.ht ml 13