Does Philosophy Investigate Language or Reality? Prof. Dr. Dr. Daniel von Wachter http://von-wachter.de Academia Internacional de Filosofia 2 August, 2011 Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 1 / 30
The theme The topic: the philosophy of language is more than just philosophical investigation of language. It is a method of and attitude to philosophy and a metaphysical position. Many philosophers do not like to ask and to try to answer metaphysical questions. Investigation of language is one of the substitute for metaphysics. Others say that it is the method for answering metaphysical questions. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 2 / 30
Plan for this course Understand the linguistic turn. Study and discuss texts by Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, A.J. Ayer, J.L. Austin, Gustav Bergmann. Which methods are used in contemporary metaphysics? What is the right method for answering metaphysical questions? Today: 1. What is metaphysics? 2. David Hume as the forerunner of the linguistic turn. For next week, read: Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 3 / 30
Organisation Send me an email today to daniel@von-wachter.de! Study http://von-wachter.de/lv/2011-2/2011-2-language.htm! Commitment: Each weak 5-20 pages obligatory reading, additionally non-obligatory further reading. Half-term exam. Final essay. Take part actively in the sessions! Object, discuss, ask, defend. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 4 / 30
Metaphysics Sometimes metaphysics just means philosophy, but usually a (big) part of philosophy is meant. For a contemporary categorization see http://philpapers.org/browse/metaphysics. Metaphysica generalis sive ontologia Metaphysica specialis: Theologia rationalis Kosmologia rationalis Psychologia rationalis Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 5 / 30
The questions which belong to metaphysics Problem of universals (Ontology) Categories, substances, kinds Causation Laws of nature What is the ultimate cause? Is there a God? What is God s nature? Possibility and necessity Identity Personal identity Do we have a soul? Do we have free will? Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 6 / 30
Some authors dislike metaphysics Some philosophers dislike trying to find the true answers to the metaphysical questions. The motives are not always clear. Many of these authors have been made famous, although there have always been, and are, many philosophers who do metaphysics. Some say: Metaphysics (as understood traditionally) is impossible. Some say that they do metaphysics but mean by it something very different. Antimetaphysicians substitute metaphysics by the investigation of e.g. language, concepts, history, history of philosophy, sense data, Kantian transcendentals, epistemology Some demand absolute certainty, negate it in metaphysics, and then say that M. is impossible and investigate something else instead e.g. language. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 7 / 30
Some say that we have no access to the objects of traditional metaphysics, therefore we should/can investigate only X (e.g. language) Some claim that we should/can do only historiography of philosophy, not philosophy/metaphysics. (Positivism, Dilthey) Some say that we can/should investigate only the spirit. (Hegel) Some say that we can/should investigate only the genesis of ideas. (Hermeneutics, Gadamer) Logical positivism (1920 1940): Only the natural sciences can investigate the world. Philosophy can and should only investigate language. Bergmann: Philosophize through language. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 8 / 30
Preliminaries: word, meaning, concept, object, idea Words have meanings. What are they? Concepts. Things fall under concepts. (Some postulate additionally mind-independent ideas.) A word (or we by a word) can refer to a thing, its object. The definition of a word specifies the concept which is its meaning. We also say that the concept is defined. A sentence has as its meaning a belief/proposition/statement, which is true or false. Its mind-independent object can be called state of affairs, fact (though some mean by this a true proposition), or truthmaker. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 9 / 30
16 August, 2011 Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 10 / 30
David Hume, 1711 1776 David Hume was born in 1711 to a moderately wealthy family from Berwickshire Scotland, near Edinburgh. His background was politically Whiggish and religiously Calvinistic. As a child he faithfully attended the local Church of Scotland pastored by his uncle. Hume was educated by his widowed mother until he left for the University of Edinburgh at the age of eleven. He died in 1776. A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 11 / 30
Hume s positions Main figure of Scottish enlightenment Atheism Mechanicism, determinism No objective values and duties No actions motivated by convictions No free will Scepticism Empiricism: all knowledge comes through the senses (Memorize!). Empiricists and atheists love him: The most important philosopher ever to write in English (SEP) Anti-metaphysical Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 12 / 30
Hume was against traditional metaphysics We must cultivate true metaphysics (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) But he means by metaphysics something else than usual! Abandon the a priori investigation of the ultimate nature of reality. He calls metaphysical claims hypotheses which can never be made intelligible. Instead of answering metaphysical questions with a priori methods, he puts mental geography or anatomy of the mind. Examine his method. Read: Enquiry, 2 and 7, also 4 and 5. Further: Entries on Hume in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 13 / 30
Hume on ideas and impressions An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 2: Of the Origin of Ideas There are two kinds of perceptions : impressions (sensations, passions, emotions) and ideas The only difference the livelyhood. Ideas are but faint images of impressions. Background: Debate about what can be known without experience. Descartes: Some of our ideas are innate. John Locke: All ideas come from experience. Tabula rasa. An idea is Whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. Hume denies the spiritual nature of ideas. All the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment. Hume denies intellectual ( a priori ) knowledge. All the creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. (E 2.5) Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 14 / 30
Hume s copy principle Important claim: All our simple ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones. (ICI) Complex ideas are composed of simple ones. The chief obstacle to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. (EHU, 61) Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 15 / 30
Hume s method When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality. Final step: Define all terms referring only to ideas that are copies of impressions. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 16 / 30
Hume s method applied to causation In order to determine whether term X has a meaning, search for the impression of which it is a copy. If there is no such impression, then the word is meaningless. There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy or necessary connexion. Does cause have a meaning? Do we have impressions of any bringing about, force, push, necessary connexion? No. Thus the word has no meaning. But then Hume takes another route! (Section 7:) The idea of causal connexion arises through getting used to regular successions. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 17 / 30
To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived. (read 50) the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life. This follows from the copy principle and the claim that we have no impressions of causal connections. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 18 / 30
But Hume turns away from this conclusion and claims that we have the concept of causal connection through customary transition (60). But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion, and one source which we have not yet examined. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 19 / 30
Hume s definition of a cause Hume s definition: Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause, and call it, an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 20 / 30
Resolving the contradiction in Hume s view On the one hand Hume says that cause is meaningless. On the other hand Hume claims that the idea of a cause arises through getting used to regular succession. In order to make this coherent, we have to modify Hume s view. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 21 / 30
Hume s theory modified Only ideas which are copies of sense impressions (or which are composed of such ideas) are reliable/ have cognitive content/ carries information about the world/ transport information about the world. So there are good ideas and bad ideas. In order to examine whether a word has a meaning which carries information about the world, one has to check whether its meaning is an idea which is a copy of a sense impression. If the idea is not the copy of a sense impression, then we should redefine the term in terms of ideas which are. This redefined term then will refer to what is there and what is justified. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 22 / 30
Hume s use of definitions Usually definitions define in terms of other terms. Hume wants something different. To find out when the term is applied justifiedly? To make progress, we need to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy (EHU 80) This account of definition is a device for precisely determining the cognitive content of words and ideas. (See SEP Hume) Begin with a term. Ask what idea is annexed to it. If there is no such idea, then the term has no cognitive content, however prominently it figures in philosophy or theology. If there is an idea annexed to the term, and it is complex, break it up into the simple ideas that compose it. Then trace the simple ideas back to their original impressions: These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity (EHU, 62). Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 23 / 30
Objections Are the terms which Hume calls meaningless really meaningless? Should not Hume call them unjustified or bad instead of meaningless? Is it true that the application of a term is unjustified, or false, if its meaning is not a copy of an impression? Is looking for sense impressions the only method for investigating something? How do we know that at the center of our galaxy is a black hole? How do we know that somebody is angry? Consider evidence and explanation. Is looking for a definition of X a method for finding out whether there are Xs? Hume confuses defining and investigating. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 24 / 30
More Objections to Hume What is an idea? Hume s claim: All ideas are copies of sense impressions. [He does not say sense in section 2, but he is assuming this.] What is an idea? We call it concept. Houses fall under the concept of a house. The meaning of the word house is the concept of a house. A concept (resp. word) has a content and objects. The content is that in virtue of which the objects fall under it; a description of the object. There are simple and complex concepts. Red is a simple concept. Bachelor is a typical complex concept. (With many others it is not easy to say.) Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 25 / 30
Complex concepts have a definition. Example: By a bachelor I mean a man who is unmarried. Difficult cases: Is man a complex concept? Does it have such a nominal definition? [As opposed to a real definition.] Is guilt a complex concept? It is a matter of definition that a bachelor is unmarried. Is it a matter of definition that guilt can only be acquired through a free action? Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 26 / 30
Is any idea a copy of a sense impression? Hume s simplest case: x is red. There are red-impressions. The rose is red says that it looks in a certain way. This certain way is causing impressions of a certain kind. But the concept x is red is not just a recalling or imagining of red-impressions. The predication is not just a recalling. An animal may have memories of impressions without having concepts. Having the concept entails an act of subsuming, distinguishing properties, predication. The concept somehow refers to red-impressions, but is more than this. Copy usually implies similarity. Where is the similarity between the red-concept and a red-impression? Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 27 / 30
An alternative to Hume We know some things through perception and some through evidence (inference to the best explanation IBE). A perceptual experience is a conscious experience of someone where something seems to him to be present. It induces and justifies a certain belief. (No infallibility) This are the impressions Hume should be looking for. There is sense perception and a priori perception (Max Scheler; against empiricism). Through the latter we know moral and modal truths. This distinction may not be exhaustive. Just say that apriori perception is one kind of perception. If you do not want to speak of a priori perception, say that this is a third source of knowledge. Each belief has a certain degree of strength (or it attributes a certain probability to something). That strength can be justified or not. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 28 / 30
The Vienna Circle Titel Revolutionary spirit. Convinced to have ended metaphysics for ever. Isolated in most of German speaking philosophy. Moritz Schlick was murdered in 1936 by a student of his. Verein Ernst Mach founded in 1928 by Österreichischer Freidenkerbund. Manifesto The Scientific World Conception: The Vienna Circle Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 29 / 30
The Vienna Circle Titel Journal Annalen der Philosophie taken over and restarted under the name Erkenntnis, edited by Carnap and Reichenbach. Book series Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, edited by Schlick and Frank. Series Einheitswissenschaft edited by Neurath. Daniel von Wachter (IAP) Introduction 2 August, 2011 30 / 30