CHAPTER 9 MARCH 1917: LENIN INTERFERES FROM AFAR On March 19 Alexandra Kollontai, a Bolshevik just returned to Russia, arrived at the offices of Pravda bearing two letters that Lenin had written in Switzerland nearly two weeks before. In these Letters From Afar 1 Lenin outlined his diagnosis of the revolutionary situation in Russia and his prescription for action. His formula picked up where he had left off in Two Tactics twelve years earlier updated, of course, to fit the circumstances of 1917 and breathed a revitalized revolutionary spirit that had been largely dormant since the failure of the 1905 Revolution. The years of temporizing were past, and it was Lenin's pressing desire to brush aside the Provisional Government and push on toward socialism. Stalin's reaction to Lenin's call to action can be glimpsed only in fragments, but the available evidence indicates that he agreed from the outset with significant parts of what Lenin said. His judgment remained independent, however, and through March he continued to try to chart the course he felt best for the Party, Lenin's certain opposition on some important issues notwithstanding. In his first letter Lenin asserted that Russia was in transition: the February Revolution was but "the first stage of the first revolution" in Russia, to be followed by another upheaval. The February events had initiated the transformation of the imperialist world war into a Europe-wide civil war between social classes. But to prevent the revolution from growing and to keep their Russian ally in the war, the British and French imperialists had joined, Lenin said, with "the class of capitalist landlords and bourgeoisie which has long been ruling our country economically." Together they had set up the Provisional Government, which Lenin thought had "already begun to strike a bargain with the [ousted] landlord Romanov dynasty." Believing that the provisional regime "is already working to restore the tsarist monarchy" in a disguised form, Lenin proclaimed that anyone "who says that the workers must support the new government in the interest of the
2 struggle against tsarist reaction is a traitor to the workers, a traitor to the cause of the proletariat, to the cause of peace and freedom." If "there is to be a real struggle against the tsarist monarchy, if freedom is to be guaranteed in fact and not merely in words," he stressed, "the workers must not support the new government." Rather, they should look to the "as yet undeveloped and comparatively weak workers' government, which expresses the interests of the proletariat and the entire poor section of the urban and rural population," namely "the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Petrograd, which is seeking connections with the soldiers and peasants." Only by "arming the proletariat and strengthening, extending and developing the role, significance and power of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies" did Lenin think that the revolution could be secured against its enemies. The "people" had to learn "to depend entirely on their own strength, their own organization, their own unity, and their own weapons." Lenin also urged efforts to spread and intensify the revolution in the countryside and especially to establish links with the poorest peasants. With the support of "the broad mass of the semi-proletarians and partly also the peasant small-holder population, which number scores of millions," and also of "the proletariat of all the belligerent countries and of all countries in general" Lenin concluded that the proletariat, utilizing the peculiarities of the present transitional situation, can and will proceed, first, to the achievement of a democratic republic and complete victory of the peasantry over the landlords, and then to socialism, which alone can give the war-weary people peace, bread and freedom. 2 Lenin had suggested years before, rather cautiously in Two Tactics, that a successful revolt against tsarism could lead to a socialist revolution in Russia. Now by describing socialism in Russia as a precondition for ending the current war Lenin was confidently implying that the coming of socialist revolution was close at hand. But to most socialists, even most Bolsheviks, Lenin's expectation seemed to be based on the reckless and unmarxist notion that Russia could skip the capitalist stage of development. In his first letter Lenin rebuked the Petrograd Soviet s leaders for cooperating with the Provisional Government. In his second, these rebukes swelled to a torrent of personal
3 abuse. He was outraged, in particular, by the Soviet's failure to recognize the imperialist and reactionary nature of the new regime and by its support for the government's continuing involvement in the imperialist war. "The proletariat cannot and must not support a war government," insisted Lenin, nor could it conclude even tacit agreements "with liberal society" as he claimed the leaders of the Soviet had done. But, despite the Soviet leaders' many faults, Lenin acknowledged that they had developed one "purely proletarian, truly revolutionary and profoundly correct" idea, "namely, the idea of establishing a 'Supervisory Committee' of proletarian-soldier supervision over the Provisional Government." This was "a step along the right road," Lenin said, "but only the first step." It should lead "immediately and despite all obstacles to the formation of a workers' militia, or workers' home guard, extending to the whole people, to all men and women." This militia would replace the dissolved police force" of the old regime and "make the latter's restoration impossible by any government either in St. Petersburg or anywhere else in Russia." Lenin promised that in his next letter he would explain his thoughts about the militia more fully, showing on the one hand, that the formation of a militia embracing the whole people and led by the workers is the correct slogan of the day, one that corresponds to the tactical tasks of the particular transitional moment through which the Russian (and the world) revolution is passing; and, on the other hand, that to be successful this workers' militia must, first, embrace the entire people ; second, it must proceed to combine not only purely police, but general state functions with military functions and with the control of social production and distribution. 3 Pravda's readers did not have the opportunity to read Lenin's views in full: only an edited version of the first letter was published, in installments on March 21 and 22, while the second letter was suppressed altogether. Eliminated from the first letter were Lenin's personal attacks on Soviet leaders and also on military officials, as well as several illfounded charges of plots and conspiracies, including his accusation that the new regime was seeking to restore the monarchy. 4 But there were more substantive and meaningful revisions. Most notably, his charge of political treason against socialists who lent support to the Provisional Government was cut out. Evidently less confident than Lenin about the
4 accomplishments of the Petrograd Soviet, the editor also deleted statements that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies was already establishing links with other soviets representing soldiers and peasants. In addition, the editor altered Lenin's assertion that Russia's situation was unquestionably radical to make it appear that Lenin was somewhat skeptical about just how "radical" the situation really was. Finally, a change of verb tense placed the transformation of the World War into a class civil war at some point in the future, whereas Lenin had written that it was already underway. These changes point to a more cautious, pragmatic and realistic attitude in the Pravda office than on the part of the distant Lenin, who remained not only poorly informed but unburdened by the responsibility of having to deal with the moderate Soviet leaders in Petrograd and the dominant popular mood which supported them. But the heart of what Lenin had written remained. The fundamental assertion that Russia was in a state of transition to a second stage of the revolution was printed without change. His characterizations of the new regime as a tool of Britain and France and of its war aims as predatory and imperialistic were allowed to stand, as was his emphatic assertion that workers must not support the Provisional Government. Pravda also printed Lenin's urgings that the workers arm themselves as the only way to guarantee revolutionary freedom, though his more extended comments about a workers' militia in the second letter remained unpublished. Essentially intact too was his description of the Petrograd Soviet as the embryo of a workers' government which must expand its role and its power. No changes were made in his instruction to spread the revolution into the countryside. More significant, no censor's knife cut Lenin's concluding and highly radical confidence that the Russian workers, together with their peasant and international proletarian allies, would achieve a democratic republic and the complete dispossession of the landlords, and then move on to socialism. 5 What role did Stalin play in editing Lenin's first Letter From Afar and suppressing the second? Any answer must be based wholly on inference. 6 It is reasonable to assume
5 that the prime responsibility was Kamenev's: the senior editor supported the Provisional Government's military effort to defend Russia and, following Lenin's return, became the most vocal Bolshevik critic of Lenin's aggressive line, especially of his desire to push on to socialism. Stalin's role is far less clear. Quite probably he opposed publication of Lenin's personal attacks on Soviet leaders: having to work with these people daily in the Soviet Executive Committee, he had eschewed such attacks in his own writings. Also, the caution evident in his own articles during the previous week suggests that he would have favored toning down some of Lenin's more rash optimism about the immediate situation. It is unlikely, however, that his opposition extended any further. There is too much similarity between what Stalin had written on central issues in the previous week and the views Lenin expressed in his Letters. Though there were differences between their outlooks in details and in tone, Stalin and Lenin were close on the key questions of the Provisional Government and the war effort, as well as on developing the Soviets, arming the workers, and winning peasant support to defend and expand the revolution, for Stalin to have favored silencing Lenin's substance. Another reason to question Stalin's responsibility for suppressing Lenin's words is suggested by the brief description which accompanied the publication of the first part of the first letter in Pravda. Above Lenin's text ran the caption, "Letters From Afar; 1 st letter." 7 This description demonstrates that someone on the Pravda editorial board intended to publish the second letter (albeit probably in an edited form); otherwise, the information that there was more than one letter would itself have been concealed. Obviously, however, this intention was not fulfilled. Whoever wanted to publish the second letter was overruled. Here is evidence that a serious disagreement existed among the Pravda editors about publishing Lenin's views. The likely person favoring publication is Stalin. The main substance of the second letter clashed with Kamenev's positions but did not conflict with Stalin's. Indeed, even the edited text of Lenin's first letter contained views which could not have sat well with Kamenev. Perhaps, then, the question should not be,
6 "How responsible was Stalin for suppressing Lenin?" but rather, "How responsible was Stalin for getting at least parts of Lenin's Letters into print?" Only the slightest hint of Stalin's reaction to the Letters From Afar surfaced in Pravda. In the fifteen days between the arrival of the letters and Lenin's return to Russia in early April, only three articles by Stalin appeared, compared to the four he had published in the previous seven days. Moreover, two of these three are concerned with the nationalities question, a topic not mentioned in Lenin's letters. 8 The third, however, does touch on an issue raised in Lenin's second letter. This article addressed a statement by Foreign Minister P. N. Miliukov, which, as Stalin put it, indicated that the war was being fought not "in 'defense of the fatherland' but for the seizure of foreign territories in the interests of a handful of imperialists." Noting that "the Russian people are opposed to the seizure of foreign territories," Stalin concluded that "the Russian people must call the Provisional Government to order and compel it to recognize its will!" But who could act for the Russian people? Stalin did not say. But elsewhere in the article he identified "the spokesman of the will of the Russian people" as none other than the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. 9 Thus he was implying that it was the Soviet, as the agent of the Russian people, which should call the government to account. In other words, he was saying that the Soviet should exercise the kind of supervision over the Provisional Government that Lenin had endorsed in his second letter. Stalin had not previously expressed this idea, and his adoption of it in this article indicates his positive reaction albeit on a single point to Lenin's Letters From Afar. 10 That Stalin made his point about Soviet supervision of the government obliquely (instead of stating it directly) suggests an answer to the question why he was so quiet in Pravda on the issues raised in the Letters From Afar. In dividing his argument into two parts which readers had to assemble to grasp its full meaning, Stalin was using an Aesopian technique to convey his meaning in veiled form. His presumable purpose was to smuggle his point into print. This conclusion suggests that Kamenev had not only won
7 the battle over whether to publish Lenin's second letter but now was censoring Stalin's contributions to the paper. If Kamenev indeed was discouraging contributions from Stalin which smacked too much of the influence of Lenin's Letters, the reason for Stalin's relative silence becomes clear. The hypothesis that Stalin responded favorably to some aspects of Lenin's Letters From Afar and consequently came into conflict with Kamenev faces a challenge from Stalin's own later behavior at an All-Russian Conference of Bolsheviks, which met in the capital from March 27 to April 4. 11 There, on March 29, Stalin endorsed a resolution proposed by the Krasnoyarsk Soviet calling for conditional support of the Provisional Government in so far as it advanced the interests of the revolution. Stalin's action would seem to place him squarely at odds with Lenin and behind the Party conservatives on a crucial policy issue. 12 The situation, however, is not so simple: at the same session, Stalin himself proposed a resolution opposing support for the Provisional Government. 13 An explanation of this apparent conflict requires an understanding of the different contexts in which Stalin made his remarks. In the latter case, according to the stenographic record of the Conference, Stalin proposed "taking as a basis [for action] a resolution not supporting the Provisional Government," on the grounds that the regime "plays soldiers off against workers and, relying on the forces of Anglo-French capital, is already organizing counter-revolution." Characterizing the Petrograd Soviet as the dynamic element and the government as reluctantly being forced to follow the Soviet, he said that "It is not logical to talk of supporting the Provisional Government. On the contrary, it is more appropriate to talk of the government not hindering us from implementing our own program." 14 In all this his views were close to Lenin s. In the other instance, which occurred earlier in the day, Stalin was expressing his preference among two competing draft resolutions which the Conference was then considering. One was a proposal by the Central Committee's Russian Bureau calling for immediate actions aimed at an uprising. The other, the motion by the Krasnoyarsk Soviet,
8 labeled the Provisional Government as a tool of the class enemy but nonetheless authorized "support for the Provisional Government in its actions in so far as it takes the path of satisfying the interests of the working class and the revolutionary peasants." 15 Stalin's choice between these two was somewhat equivocal: he said he did "not completely agree" with the Russian Bureau's proposal and would "rather support the resolution of the Krasnoyarsk Soviet." 16 Like many a voter, Stalin evidently had to choose between two imperfect alternatives. Because the resolution that he subsequently proposed indicates unmistakably that he opposed supporting the Provisional Government, it would appear that he favored the Krasnoyarsk draft only because he viewed the militancy of the Russian Bureau's proposal as the greater evil. The Krasnoyarsk proposal, moreover, left the decision as to what constituted the interests of the workers and peasants, and hence whether specific actions of the Provisional Government might warrant support, in the hands of the Party. The record of a subsequent session of the Conference offers further evidence that Stalin opposed supporting the Provisional Government. At the end of debate on the twenty-ninth, a committee had been appointed including Stalin and also Kamenev to prepare a resolution on the question of the Provisional Government. On the thirty-first the committee, having failed to reach agreement, presented two opposing proposals to the Conference. One called for support of the Provisional Government. The other, offered by Kamenev and Stalin, portrayed the Provisional Government as the tool of Anglo-French imperialism and counter-revolution, in contrast to the Soviets, which it characterized as "the only organs of the will of the revolutionary people." Further, the Kamenev-Stalin proposal urged "a vigilant control over the activities of the Provisional Government" throughout the country, "a most energetic struggle for the complete liquidation of the old régime," and the rallying of all revolutionary forces around the Soviets to repel counterrevolution and extend "the conquests of the revolutionary movement." Kamenev, having moved leftward since mid-march, declared that it was the Soviets "that we must
9 strengthen and support and not the Provisional Government." After the majority of the Conference evidently decided to endorse the rival proposal calling for support of the Provisional Government, Stalin offered a motion to delete the language on support. This motion carried, with only four dissenting votes. 17 The question of Stalin's position on the question of support is raised again, however, by the Conference stenographer's maddeningly ambiguous version of two connected statements he made during the initial debate on the twenty-ninth. He is reported as stating that the "question of support" is "empty and unacceptable." He is then reported as saying, "Insofar as the Provisional Government consolidates the advances of the revolution, so far can it be supported; insofar as it is already counter-revolutionary, support for the Provisional Government in unacceptable." 18 Was he expressing qualified support for the Provisional Government, or summing up the proposals under discussion? The evidence of his own proposals indicates that the latter was the case. Stalin's description of the "question of support" as "empty and unacceptable" might have had a different and more significant meaning. Though both his own suggestion for a resolution and his motion to delete pro-support wording were based on not supporting the government, Stalin stopped short of openly declaring non-support. His position suggests that while he regarded supporting the government as wrong, he viewed declaring non-support for it as unwise. This is perhaps what he meant when he said that the very question of support that is, of taking a public position on support was "empty and unacceptable." This reading is consistent with broader statements Stalin made at the Conference about revolutionary strategy in 1917. Constituting the fullest statement of his thinking in March 1917, these statements amplify the patient and gradual tactic evident in his published articles earlier in March, while making it clear how he expected this approach to accomplish far-reaching goals. Stalin told his audience that power in Russia was divided between and contested by the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government. "The initiative in effecting
10 revolutionary transformations," he said, had been taken by the Soviet, which he called "the revolutionary leader of the insurrectionary people" and "an organ of control over the Provisional Government." The "meddling" Provisional Government, backed by Anglo- French imperialism, had assumed "the role of protector of the conquests already achieved by the revolutionary people." This situation was but transient, however. The revolutionary crisis could spread "very quickly," Stalin assured, and out of it "will come the transition to socialism." As the revolution inevitably became more radical, bourgeois elements that presently supported the revolution would be alienated and driven into the camp of the counter-revolution, causing the Provisional Government to "become transformed into an organ for organizing counter-revolution." 19 Stalin was saying that the Provisional Government, already stronger than the revolutionary forces, would become both stronger and more counter-revolutionary as time passed. This was not a cheery prospect for Bolsheviks. What should they do? Of course, Stalin called upon Bolsheviks to support the Soviet's efforts to strengthen itself. But his chief recommendation, echoing Two Tactics, was that "In our view, it's not a good idea to force developments just now" because this would hasten the splitting off of bourgeois groups from the revolution and thereby speed the strengthening of the enemy. "It is necessary for us to gain time," he counseled, "by putting a brake on the splitting off of the bourgeois strata so that we may prepare ourselves for the struggle against the Provisional Government." "It is silly to think," Stalin noted, "that the revolution can be brought to its completion without splitting with the bourgeoisie," but he favored delaying the splitting process so that the revolutionary forces would gain time to strengthen themselves sufficiently to prevail in the end. It seems probable that he saw declaring non-support for the Provisional Government as a step that would needlessly alienate petty bourgeois elements while achieving nothing positive for the revolution.
11 Why not try to seize power straight away? "Many comrades who have just arrived from the provinces," Stalin said, were asking just this. But he branded such talk as "untimely." In addition to pointing out that the Provisional Government was still too strong to be toppled, Stalin voiced what was perhaps the central element in his strategic outlook. "We must bide our time," he said, until the Provisional Government exhausts itself, until the time when in the process of fulfilling the revolutionary program it discredits itself. The only organ capable of taking power is the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on an all-russian scale. We must bide our time until the moment when events will reveal the hollowness of the Provisional Government, and prepare ourselves until events ripen, but for now we must organize the Central Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and strengthen it this is the task of the moment. 20 Here, in a nutshell, was Stalin's way to make the revolution. With the radical forces too weak at the moment to act, Stalin counseled a policy of patience, discipline, and organizational growth while the Provisional Government prepared the way for its own demise. When "events ripen," power then would be transferred to a "Central Soviet," the creation of which must be the immediate goal of Bolsheviks. 21 Stalin's participation in the Conference debates on the question of the Provisional Government shows that Lenin's Letters From Afar had a definite, though definitely limited, impact on his thinking. On March 16, prior to the arrival of the letters, Stalin had maintained that European imperialists would not intervene against Russia's revolution; now he accepted Lenin's argument that Anglo-French imperialism was indeed actively at work inside Russia against the revolution. He also adopted Lenin's idea that the World War would accelerate the pace of the revolutionary crisis. He cited as an example, however, not the growth of a revolutionary mood in Europe but the war's adverse impact on Russia's food supply a choice indicative of his parochial national focus in contrast to Lenin's internationalist orientation. Stalin also echoed Lenin's call for close supervision of the Provisional Government by the Petrograd Soviet. Most important, he adopted Lenin's confidence that the revolution would result in the coming of socialism. Though Lenin had
12 suggested this prospect in Two Tactics, Stalin had not previously expressed agreement with it. In his thinking about how the revolution should advance toward its goal, however, Stalin rejected Lenin's militancy and sense of urgency and held fast to the cautious approach he had outlined earlier in March. The continuity in his thinking is perhaps most evident in his renewed reference to an all-russian "Central Soviet" as the successor to the Provisional Government. More important was his expressed belief that events should be left, in essence, to take their own course. Though this attitude reflected perhaps a greater confidence that the revolution would inexorably go forward than Lenin had, Stalin still offered little in the way of a dynamic of action for the Party to embrace. It should rally the revolutionary forces, it should organize them... and it should wait for the opportune moment. The main development that would move the revolution forward, as Stalin saw it, was the Provisional Government's discrediting of itself. Stalin's own jabs at the Provisional Government in March indicate that he was ready, of course, to help this process along. Considering the strength of the Provisional Government, the backing it enjoyed from the Petrograd Soviet and thus indirectly from the majority of workers, the patriotic appeal of defencism especially among soldiers, the weakness of the Bolsheviks and the strength of conservatism within even Bolshevik ranks, Stalin's position was a realistic one which recognized that premature action would be irresponsible and dangerous. It is easy to criticize Stalin for evidently lacking the sweeping vision of revolutionary purpose and of revolutionary action that marked the best of Lenin's thought and which could inspire his followers. In this regard it is significant that in his articles earlier in March Stalin expressed no clear vision beyond the Soviet eventually replacing the Provisional Government, and that he affirmed socialism as the goal of the revolution only after Lenin had advocated it in his Letters From Afar. Stalin's vision was limited. On the other hand, it seems clear that Lenin's impatience and militancy were unrealistic and would likewise have proved inadequate to the task without the tempering that Stalin and
13 others contributed. In the end, it would be Stalin's patient approach which would prevail and bring success to the Bolsheviks in October. Before the Bolshevik Conference came to an end, Stalin played one more important role in its deliberations, this time on the question of relations with the Mensheviks. Here Stalin showed not only his independence from Lenin but also a measure of defiance. The moderate Menshevik leader of the Petrograd Soviet, I. G. Tsereteli (who had been one of the chief targets of Lenin's Letters) had invited the Bolsheviks to discuss unifying the two wings of Russian Social Democracy. A wide range of Bolsheviks welcomed efforts toward a united front. 22 Stalin had championed efforts to promote Party unity for too long, despite Lenin's opposition, to reject this opportunity. His response to Tsereteli's invitation was simple: "We should go." The only issue for Stalin was to clarify the Bolsheviks' position about the terms on which unification might be achieved, and he expressed his belief that "Unity is possible along the lines of Zimmerwald-Kienthal." In other words, the Bolsheviks could unite with those Mensheviks who subscribed to the resolutions passed by these two international socialist anti-war conferences. Other speakers criticized Stalin's position on the grounds that it was superficial and that Tsereteli's endorsement of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal resolutions was a disingenuous mask for defencism. In reply, Stalin argued that Running ahead and anticipating disagreements is not the way. Without disagreements there is no Party life. Within the Party we will overcome minor disagreements. But there is one question what cannot be united is impossible to unite. With those who agree on Zimmerwald and Kienthal, that is, with those who are against revolutionary defencism, we can have a united Party. This is the demarcation line. To assuage the concerns of his opponents, Stalin assured that We need to inform the Mensheviks that our desire is only a desire, only of the group meeting here, and that it is not binding on all Bolsheviks. We should go to the meeting and not put forward any kind of platform. The limit of our desire is the convocation of a conference on the basis of anti-defencism. Having stipulated these conditions, Stalin prevailed. With but one dissenting vote the Conference endorsed his proposal and appointed him to the committee that was to meet
14 with the Mensheviks. He was also assigned the task of reporting on the results of the meeting. 23 Stalin was well aware that Lenin opposed any kind of "rapprochement with other parties." 24 He also knew that uniting Bolsheviks and Mensheviks behind the Zimmerwald and Kienthal principles would have defined the restored Social Democratic Party in a way unacceptable to Lenin, whose antagonism toward the resolutions adopted by the two conferences was well known. But Lenin's views in these questions apparently mattered naught to Stalin. The Georgian had long sought to increase the unity of the Party and of the revolutionary forces because he believed that disunity engendered weakness and played into the hands of the enemy. But even as he met with the Mensheviks on April 3, an event occurred which spelled the defeat of his hopes: Lenin returned to Petrograd. 1 Lenin wrote five Letters from Afar in all, but only the first two (written between March 7th and 9th) reached Russia ahead of him. 2 LCW, 23:297-308 (emphases in the original). 3 LCW, 23:309-19 (emphases in the original). 4 Similar elements constituted the bulk of the unpublished second letter; had it been published, it would certainly have been very heavily edited. 5 This analysis is derived from a detailed comparison of Lenin's original text of the first letter (LCW, 23:297-308) with the text published in Pravda, March 21-22, 1917. 6 The traditional inference is that Kamenev and Stalin jointly suppressed much of what Lenin wrote (see, for example, Tucker, Stalin, 165; Slusser, 32-33.) 7 Emphasis added; the phrase "1 st letter" is not included in the text as presented in either LCW or PSS. 8 Stalin's March 1917 articles on the nationalities problem will be considered in the next chapter. 9 Article of March 26, SW, 3:22-24 (emphasis in the original). 10 Slusser, 42, argues that Stalin's article was "much more moderate" than a Russian Bureau resolution (printed in the same issue of Pravda) calling for the Petrograd Soviet to keep close watch on the acts of the Provisional Government. When Stalin's Aesopian rhetoric is grasped, this difference disappears.
15 11 The records of the conference may be found at "Protokoly Vserossiiskogo (martovskogo) soveshchaniia partiinykh rabotnikov, 27 marta-2 aprelia 1917 goda" (hereafter cited as PVSPR), Voprosy istorii KPSS, 1962, no. 5: 106-25 and no. 6: 130-152, and Trotsky, Stalin School, 231-301. 12 For example, Tucker, Stalin, 165-66, cites this as evidence of what he calls "the Kamenev-Stalin policy of conditional support for the Provisional Government." 13 Slusser, 43-45, notes the conflict in Stalin's behavior but offers no explanation of it. 14 PVSPR, no. 5: 120, and Trotsky, Stalin School, 255. 15 The resolutions are in PVSPR, no. 5: 113-14, and Trotsky, Stalin School, 240-42. 16 PVSPR, no. 5: 112, and Trotsky, Stalin School, 240. 17 PVSPR, no. 5: 137-38, 141, and Trotsky, Stalin School, 270-73, 300-1. 18 PVSPR, no. 5: 112, and Trotsky, Stalin School, 239 (where Stalin's description of the question as "empty and unacceptable" [pust i nepriemlem] is rendered as "let us even allow that support is not permissible"). 19 Implicitly disagreeing with Lenin, who was expecting efforts to restore tsardom, Stalin stressed that the counter-revolution would "not be a tsarist counter-revolution we face no danger from that side but imperialistic." PVSPR, no. 5: 112, and Trotsky, Stalin School, 239. 20 PVSPR, no. 5: 112, and Trotsky, Stalin School, 239. 21 A brief analysis of Stalin's thinking is provided by Van Ree, "Stalin's Bolshevism," 38-39. Though Van Ree notes significant differences between Stalin and Kamenev, he still refers to "Stalin's and Kamenev's dominance" prior to Lenin's return. 22 On Bolshevik interest in common efforts with Mensheviks in March see N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917. Eyewitness Account, 2 vols. (New York, 1962), 1:224-27 and 239-54. 23 PVSPR, no. 6: 139-40, and Trotsky, Stalin School, 274-76. 24 Lenin, telegram on tactics to Bolsheviks leaving Scandinavia to return to Russia, March 6, 1917, LCW, 23:292 and 407. The telegram was read at a meeting on March 13 of the Russian Bureau that Stalin attended. See Slusser, 47-48.