ANTI-HALAL AND ANTI-ANIMAL SLAUGHTERING SENTIMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT IN POST-WAR SRI LANKA. Mohammad Agus Yusoff 1 & Athambawa Sarjoon 2

ANTI-HALAL AND ANTI-ANIMAL SLAUGHTERING SENTIMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT IN POST-WAR SRI LANKA Mohammad Agus Yusoff 1 & Athambawa Sarjoon 2 School of History, Politics and Strategic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia ABSTRACT This paper aims to examine the overall impact of anti-halal and anti-slaughtering sentiments in the context of post-war Sri Lanka. The practice of religious norms and duties by ethno-religious minorities in Sri Lanka has been severely challenged due to the reemergence of majoritarian ethno-religious anti-minority nationalist forces and their intensified anti-minority hatred and violence. The Muslim community is highly targeted by the above sentiments. A number of Islamic fundamentals practiced by the Muslim community have become highly criticized, opposed, and sometimes accompanied by violence and threats. These campaigns and violent oppositions imposed by the Buddhistnationalist forces have resulted in serious concern for the Muslim community in preforming their obligatory religious duties and norms. In Sri Lanka, the Muslim community has been allowed to produce halal food and slaughter animals for human consumption and religious rituals for a long period without any disturbance. Unfortunately, the opposition and hatred in the post-civil war era in the country are threatening these rights. Thus, it has become imperative to investigate the motivating factors of the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments and violence, as well as their related impact, which is lacking in the existing literature on ethno-religious politics in the context of Sri Lanka. To this extent, this study has found that the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments and oppositions that have been intensified by the Buddhist nationalist forces were part of the anti-muslim sentiment that was intended to sabotage the economic pride and undermine the religious renaissance among Muslims. These sentiments have also been highly facilitated by the state apparatus. Also, findings of the study revealed that continuous facilitation of the anti-muslim sentiments, including the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughter campaigns, would challenge the economic prosperity and the rebuilding of ethnoreligious harmony in the country. Key Words: Anti-halal sentiments, animal slaughtering, Muslims, Buddhist-nationalism, post-war Sri Lanka. INTRODUCTION As a minority group in Sri Lanka s ethno-religious societal set-up, Muslims have a colorful history of co-existence with other ethnic groups. Among the Muslims, Moors form the majority (about 95 percent) together with a small portion of Indian Muslims and Malays. 1 Mohamed Agus Yusoff is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of History, Politics and Strategic Studies, University Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia). He has extensively published in federalism, electoral politics, public administration and Muslim minority politics with the particular focus on Malaysia, South-East Asia and Sri Lanka. 2 Athambawa Sarjoon is a PhD candidate at the School of History, Politics and Strategic Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia). His area of research interest is Muslim minority issues in administration in Sri Lanka. He has extensively published in ethnic and minority politics, and administrative issues in Sri Lanka. Athambawa Sarjoon also teaches Political Science at the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. 81

Being one of the ethnic groupings in the country, the Muslims have been living for centuries as a privileged community provided with high level of rights and freedom including that of practicing their religion Islam and its fundamentals. Other than the incident of 1915 anti- Muslim riots, there were no such anti-religious hatred and violence opposing the Muslims and their Islamic practice in Sri Lanka. But, in the post-30 year long civil war which ended in 2009, Muslim community who are scattered in the island country became another other and have come to face number of issues and challenges in terms of fostering their ethnoreligious identity and performing norms and duties relating to their religion. Most of the issues and challenges were induced and imposed by few Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces that proclaim to protect, promote and preserve the Sinhalese race and Buddhism and their dignity in the country. Their sentiments are based on the belief that Sri Lanka is the only country blessed by the Great Buddha for prosperity of Buddhism, and is facing challenges from the raising of Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism. Questing the ethnic origin and the history of the Muslims, opposition to build worship and religious teaching places such as mosques, and madrasas, and attacking over them, opposition to the practice of Islamic law (Sharia) and financial systems, opposition and criticizing Islamic clothing such as abaya, niqab and hijab, opposition to halal food and halal food processing and labelling, opposition to animal slaughtering for human consumption and religious rituals have become the major manifestations of anti-muslim sentiments of these nationalist forces ( Frase 2013; Getberiya 2013; Jeyatilleke 2013; Hussain 20144; Stewart 2014; Imtiyaz and Saleem 2015; Gravers 2015; Jones 2015). These sentiments became highly intensified among the majority ethno-religious group in the country the Sinhalese-Buddhist through campaigns, agitations, demonstration, and violence, using both printing and electronic media. Among these tactics, the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments were influential and their impact and implications were also severe in terms of religious practice and economic wellbeing among Muslims. The major objective of this paper is to analyze the motivations and the impact, particularly from the economic perspective, of the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments intensified by the Buddhist nationalist forces, as part of the anti-muslim sentiments and opposition, in the post-civil war era in Sri Lanka. Although there are studies in the ethnic, religious and cultural perspectives of the anti-muslim sentiments and violence in post-war Sri Lanka, the studies on economic motives or perspectives of the anti-muslim sentiments particularly of anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments are highly lacking on the existing literatures. This study attempted to fill this gap to a certain extent. The paper is divided into 5 major parts, which extensively examined the nature and the impact of the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments on the religious and economic wellbeing of the Muslim community in the post-war Sri Lanka. Following the introduction, the next part deals with the methodology adopted in this study for data collection and analysis. This section is followed by a brief historical review of the status of the Moors or Muslims as a minority business community under the threat of Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka. The next part extensively analyzes the nature of anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments expressed by the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces in the postcivil war era, and their impact or expected impact, particularly on the economic wellbeing of the Muslim community. In the discussion section, the real economic motives of the antihalal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments that have been developed throughout the history of Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism are analyzed. A particular concern was given in this section to identify the economic motives of the anti-halal and anti-slaughtering sentiments and their expected impacts to the Muslim community as well as to the country s larger economic sector in future. In the concluding remarks, few suggestions or 82

recommendations are provided concerning how to enhance religious tolerance and ethnic reconciliation in pluralistic societies such as Sri Lanka. METHODOLOGY This study is qualitative in nature, and mostly used secondary data collected from different sources. In particuar, research articles, books, newspaper cuttings, reports and internet materials collected from libraries and research centers were the major sources used in this study. Through analysising the existing sources, this study has attempted to examine the nature of the anti-muslim sentiments, particularly of anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments expressed by the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces in the postcivil war era and their economic impacts on the lives of Muslim community. Also, the economic motives of the anti-halal and anti-slaughtering sentiments are analysed through interprivie expression and argument. SRI LANKAN MUSLIMS AS A MINORITY COMMUNITY UNDER THE THREAD OF SINHALESE-BUDDHIST NATIONALISM: A HISTORICAL REVIEW The Sri Lankan Muslims officially labelled as Moors in ethnic grouping, form 9.3 percent of the country s national population (Department of Census and Statistics 2014). Out of the 1.95 million Muslims, two-thirds live outside the north-eastern region and coexist with the Sinhalese who form about 74.5 percent of the country s population. The rest of the Muslims live in the north-eastern region where Tamils predominantly reside. While the origin and the history of the Muslims are still debatable, it is found that Muslims have been permanently living in Sri Lanka from the 8 th century (Ali 2002 & 2004; McGilvray 1998; Ismail 2013; Yusoff et al. 2014 & Razik et al. 2015). Being mostly the descendants of Arab traders, the Muslims in Sri Lanka have initially settled in the identified port cities around the country, coexisting with the local communities, whilst maintaining strong socioeconomic, cultural, and political ties with them (Ameen 2000; Rifai 2013 & Yusoff et al. 2014). Majority of the Sri Lankan Muslims have been highly involved in trading and commercial enterprises. The traditional image of the Muslims as traders may have been due to the fact that they wanted to maintain the traditions of their forefathers who came from the Arab peninsula. Originally these Muslim traders integrated well into Sri Lankan society and ultimately became critical as trade brokers between rival Sri Lankan kingdoms and even advised kings on foreign affairs (McGilvray & Raheem 2011:90). Muslim community through their hard work, commitments, and long tradition of private entrepreneurship has been well established in the field of export and import industries. It is noticeable that originally Muslims and Sinhalese seem to have coexisted relatively harmoniously for several hundred years. This harmonious living was not so evident in the case of the colonial authorities, or even with the Tamils, the second majority ethnic group in the country (See: Dewaraja 1994; MicGivray and Raheem 2011 & Yusoff et al. 2014). However, Muslims who were found by the Kings as very energetic and enterprising community were subjected to all types of restrictions during the colonial and postindependence era, particularly in the post-war era. Muslims in Sri Lanka gradually lost their hold on their business through number of laws and reform policies adopted by the successive governments. During the colonial period, the adaptation of many acts and imposition of different forms of taxes on trade and business activities by the Dutch rulers 83

compelled the coastal Muslims who were influential in trade and commercial activities in the major coastal towns to move into the interior part of the country (Sameem 1997; McGivlray and Raheem 2011 & Ali 2014). The riots of 1915 were directed against the Muslims who were carrying on a comparative trade with the Low-County Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. The 1915 anti-muslim riots were the first notable witness of the Buddhist nationalist sentiments and oppositions towards the economic uplift of the Muslim community in the country. The riots of 1915 were directed against the Muslims but more especially at a section of the Muslim community, called Coastal Moors who were the recent immigrants from the Malabar Coast and were carrying on a competitive trade with the Low-Country Sinhalese in the central region of Sri Lanka. Since the Low-Country Sinhalese traders were an influential group within the Buddhist movement that urged political reform in the country, religious sentiment often gave a sharp ideological focus and a cloak of respectability to sordid commercial rivalry (Sameem 1997). As Stewart (2016) points out, ostensibly, the Sinhalese-Muslim riots of 1915 was explicitly rooted in Buddhist sentimentality, but De Silva has suggested that the underlying cause of the violence was a desire to eliminate business rivals who just happened to be Muslim. According to him, the ubiquitous activities of the Coast Moors in retail trading brought them in contact with the people at their most indignant levels they were reputed to be more willing than their competitors to extend credit, but they also sold at higher prices. This earned them hostility alike of the people at large and of their competitors among the Sinhalese traders (mainly Low Country Sinhalese), who had no compunctions about exploiting religious and racial sentiments to the detriment of their well-established rivals (De Silva 2005:474-475). Similarly, Jayawardena (1970) has also confirmed that the economic disparity was a key factor in the 1915 riots. She writes that with the aggravated economic hardships the poor had to face after the outbreak of the First World War, fierce resentment developed against profiteering, directed mainly against Moor traders. Nonetheless, Sinhala nationalist groups depicted the conflict as a religious and ethnic struggle, where the very existence of the Sinhala-Buddhist civilization was under threat (Jayawardena 1970). According to Tambiah (1996), the anti-muslim riots of 1915 looked organized. However, as Sameem (1997) pointed out, due to timely actions of the British government, the Muslims were saved from the 1915 massacre in Sri Lanka. The 1915 riots, however, have left a scar in the Sinhalese- Muslim relationship in Sri Lanka, which the Muslims have never forgotten. In the post-independence era, clashes between Sinhalese and Muslims occurred in many periods and many of them were highly motivated for either opposing their economic raising or their ethno-religious revivalism. The passage of Citizenship Act of 1948, which disfranchise thousands of Indian Muslims, dealt a severe blow to the business activities of the Indian Muslims. Due to the colonization and nationalization policies of the postindependence governments, Muslims particularly in the eastern province lost thousands of acres of their agricultural lands that reduced the Muslim ownership of agricultural lands (See: Mohideen 2008 & Yusoff et al. 2015). Especially the measures such as the ceiling on the ownership of house and property, the take-over of the export and import trade, and the expansion of the co-operative system in the sphere of the local trade, broke the backbone of the Muslim bourgeoisies (Sameem 1997). In 1976 police shot several Muslims in Puttalam after clashes between Muslims and Sinhalese, apparently provoked by disputes over jobs and land. There were sporadic incidents in the 1990s, including attacks on shops in Nochchiyagama in Anuradapura in 1999. In April 2001, Sinhalese mobs attacked Muslims in Mawanella in which two Muslims died, and dozens of business centers and vehicles were destroyed. The riots seemed to have been sparked by Muslim complaints of 84

police inaction over an assault on a Muslim storeowner by three Sinhalese racketeers. Sometimes these incidents may stem from small personal disputes but there are often accusations of underlying nationalist campaigns against the Muslim business, in some cases instigated by extreme Buddhist-nationalist factions linked to local business or mafia groups (ICG 2007). The targeting of Muslims enterprises by the nationalist forces continued even in the post-civil war era, through opposing the mode of production, halal certification process and export and import activities of some products, including with the imposing of violence. The anti-halal and anti-slaughter sentiments among Sinhalese-Buddhist in post-war Sri Lanka, which have roots in the anti-colonial struggles combine religion, nationalism and materialism. Buddhism became the core of ethnic Sinhalese nationalism and was involved in the identity of politics during anti-colonial movement in Sri Lanka. But, the post-war anti-muslim agitprop that feeds off the Islamophobia now trending globally was especially rife under former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, whose majoritarian ethno-religious policies were dictated by the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist ideology. The Rajapaksa years (2005-2014) saw Buddhist supremacy flaunted on television and in movies and newspapers, Buddha statues erected in Muslim and Tamil areas in the north-eastern region (DeVotta 2016). The following sections extensively analyze the expression of the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments, their impacts, and the major factors that motivated and induced this kind of sentiments particularly against Muslims in the post-civil war era in Sri Lanka. POST-CIVIL WAR ANTI-HALAL AND ANTI-ANIMAL SLAUGHTERING SENTIMENTS AND OPPOSITIONS The post-civil war era has been a challenging period for the Muslims in Sri Lanka in terms of fostering their religious identity and ensuring their economic wellbeing. In number of ways, Muslims became the target and victims of Sinhalese-Buddhist ethno-nationalism hatred and violence. Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces mostly the monks organizations, movements and parties were the major forces that conceptualized and instrumentalized the anti-muslim and anti-minority sentiment. These monks and forces claimed that Buddhism is under threat of aggressive Muslim conversation and that Islam represents a danger to other religion, culture, race and economy (Gravers 2015). Anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments and oppositions played vital roles in consolidating anti-muslim sentiment in general. With the print media, they employed modern social media such as facebook and twitter intensively to spread their messages and rumors against the Muslims and to mobilize and recruit their followers. The Bodu Bala Sena (Army of Buddhist Power or BBS), Sinhala Ravaya, Ravana Balakaya, Sinha Handa are the major Buddhist nationalist forces that have been expressing and intensifying the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments and oppositions in the post-war years. Some nationalist political parties such as Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Heritage Party or JHU), Jathika Nidahas Peramuna, Pivithuru Hela Urumaya were also supporting these anti-muslim nationalist forces. Anti-Halal Sentiments and Oppositions The oppositions and agitations against consuming halal foods and the labeling of halal certificate on food items have been and are viewed as threat to the religious practice of Muslims in post-war Sri Lanka. Many of the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces were very much critical of halal foods and halal certification process because halal meat preparation is considered by safe Buddhism as immoral and is believed that this is 85

unacceptable. They argue that Sri Lanka is a Buddhist nation and therefore to associate it with Islam or halal is a great disservice and virtually an insult to the nation (Stewart 2016). But, one of the major fundamental teachings of Islam is that its followers must adhere to halal and haram in their daily life. Accordingly, halal is lawful and permissible, and haram is prohibited and should be avoided under Islamic (Sharia) law. Muslims therefore are advised to live by halal and refrain from haram. From 2000 onward, the All Ceylon Jamiatul Ulama (ACJU), the main theological decision-making body for Sri Lankan Muslims, has been in-charge of monitoring and issuing halal certificates. The International Certification Organization called World Halal Council based in Indonesia granted this certifying authority to it. ACJU s halal certification process started due to the requests from the business sector, and that was because businesses recognized the potential of it as a marketing tool. From the viewpoint of the businesses, halal certificate is a tool to increase the demand for products in local and international market. Following the requests, the ACJU formed the Halal committee to issue the certificates. The act of which was not seen as a serious problem until the BBS started its hate campaign in 2012. Since then, the halal issue became the centerpiece of the BBS campaign, which has led to post-war Muslim concerns, and quickly received the international attention (Hussain 2014). Galagoda A. Gnanasara Thero, the leading monk of the BBS, which is a group of selfproclaimed saviors of the nation, is accused of increasing anti-muslim sentiments and violence in general, and anti-halal opposition in particular, in the post-war years. The BBS was formed in July 2012 and embraced anti-muslim and anti-christian (mainly antievangelical) rhetoric from the beginning. The immediate predecessor to the BBS was the JHU, which was formed in February 2004 (DeVotta 2016). BBS claim that Buddhism is not protected and faces a big danger in Sri Lanka. They criticize the government and authorities for not protecting Sinhala nation, race and Buddhist religion (Gravers 2015). While justifying their anti-muslim sentiments and violence, Gnanasara Thero augured that we are not terrorists and it is the sole right of the Sinhalese-Buddhist to protect Sri Lanka from all other forces (Colombage 2014). Also, these Sinhalese nationalist forces claim that Muslims are fundamentalists and seeking to make Sri Lanka an Arabian country. Additionally, Gnanasara Thero questioned the legal authority of ACJU in issuing the halal certificates. According to him, in September 2007 the Act pertaining to halal certification was cancelled. From there on the issuing of this halal certification an offence and it was done illegally, as there was no provision by law to carry on the process. The people who obtained the halal certification as well as those who were engaged in issuing it were both doing so against the law (Thiruppathy and Nathaneal 2013). Similarly, Gnanasara Thero argued that this is a Sinhala-Buddhist country. We have a Sinhala-Buddhist culture. This is not Saudi Arabia. But you must accept the culture and behave in a manner that doesn t harm it (The Economist 2013). The BBS and other extremist Buddhist groups have manipulated and magnified these exaggerations and misconceptions to claim that Islamist fundamentalism is threatening the island (DeVotta 2016). While intensifying their antihalal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments and oppositions, they were directly active in the mobs, throwing stones and destroying Muslim shops, religious worshiping and teaching centers. Historically, Muslims were not facing any issue in terms of halal foods and food processing, and opposition to it. But, as Hussain (2014) rightly pointed out, with the wide spread of packaged synthetic foods, identification of halal foods suddenly became a real problem because these foods could contain forbidden ingredients that have not been declared on the packages. On the other hand, this halal certification process was also 86

requested by the traders exporting food items to foreign countries as to be refrained from being handicapped in certain markets without halal certification. Therefore, there was a need for halal certification, and the ACJU obliged by meeting all these needs. There was nothing secret, nothing criminal, and nothing deleterious to the national interest of Buddhist-Sinhalese or the country in regard to the actions of the ACJU in issuing halal certificates. However, the BBS and other Buddhist nationalist groups have openly called for boycotting halal consumer products that are associated with the Muslims. Their antihalal sentiments and campaigns became severe particularly in the year 2013 and 2014. According to them, ACJU makes money from halal certification and uses it for nefarious purposes such as to propagate Islam, to expand Islamic communities, and to build mosques (Jones 2015). These forces, in fact, mobilized the network of Buddhist organizations and groups to boycott halal-labelled foods through electronic media. All these agitations have ultimately led to stop the halal certificate issued by the ACJU and transferred that certification function to Halal Accreditation Council (HAC), a limited guarantee company from 1 st January 2014 (Ranabahu 2014). The ACJU has also agreed to leave the halal certification process in order to avoid Muslims being instrumental for a larger communal crisis in the country. In fact, the government authorities have failed to take any action to stop or to control the emerging anti-halal sentiments and oppositions, until they have done too much in wrecking the Sinhalese-Muslim relations. All these anti-halal campaigns and agitations that the BBS and other nationalist forces are doing is to threaten manufacturers to remove the halal certification emblem from their packaging. Otherwise these forces may use the media to persuade the Sinhalese-Buddhists to refrain from purchasing halal products. This is the easy way for them to sabotage the trade and business industries running by the Muslim community. Oppositions To Animal Slaughtering The Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces such as BBS and Sinha Handa, and political forces such as JHU were so much critical of animal slaughtering particularly of cow slaughtered for human consumption and religious rituals particularly performed by the Muslims. They attack Islam on the basis that it is a religion that mistreats cows. Islamic principles guide its followers on how to slaughter animals for food and other ritualistic purposes. The tendency of Islamic law (Sharia) is to make the process of slaughter more humane by reducing the suffering of the animal in the best possible manner. The idea in Sharia is to stop cruelty to animals; so in a sense this is a common ground for decent people, both believers, and non-believers of Islam (Frase 2013). Scientists have also found the Quranic process of slaughtering as the healthiest way. However, in post-civil war era, it has not only been this Quranic process of slaughtering but also the slaughtering of cattle for meals and other purposes, such as rituals have been very much questioned and opposed by the Buddhist nationalist forces by arguing that it is inhumane and is an affront to Buddhist values and the majority s sensibilities. The opposition to animal slaughtering has caused a number of difficulties for the Muslim community when it comes to performing their religious rituals. This is especially true during the annual Haj festival celebration where Muslims perform udhuiya or Qurbani by slaughtering cattle. This is not only a religious duty for Muslims but also strengthens social solidarity by distributing meat to relatives, friends, and the poor. In other words, the festival becomes an occasion for affirming social solidarity and compassion for the poor. There is 87

nothing in these practices that warrants the Buddhists moral objection against cattle slaughtering to perform udhuiya (Hussain 2014). However, due to the anti-animal slaughtering campaigns of these nationalist forces, during the Haj festival in 2012, some local government offices reportedly refused to issue permits to animal slaughters. Especially, in September 2012, the Kandy Municipal Council also passed a resolution banning animal slaughtering within the municipal council limits (Senarathne 2012). This caused Muslims more financial and other kind of burdens in slaughtering cattle for rituals and business purposes. This anti-animal slaughtering issue has been continuing in many parts of the country to mainly oppose the Muslims religious practices and with other motives particularly of economic. At an extreme level of opposition to halal foods and halal labeling process, and animal slaughtering, on 24 May 2013, a Buddhist monk known as Bowatte Indaratana Thera succumbed to his injuries and died after setting himself on fire in front of the Kandy Dalada Maligawa (Temple of the Tooth), which is considered as one of the major holy temples of Buddhism (Tissainayagam 2013). Indaratana Thera was a strident advocate of halal abolitionism. He believed in it so strongly that he was willing to draw attention to the cause by committing suicide in its name. He has since become a cult like hero amongst the halal abolitionist movement (Stewart 2016). This incident intensified the anti-halal and antianimal slaughter sentiments and protest of the BBS and the other extreme nationalist forces, causing a tense situation in the following months in many parts of the country. More importantly, with the continued pressures from the BBS and other Buddhist nationalist forces, the country s President, in January 2016, ordered the relevant government authorities to find possible ways to import meat to cater for the local requirement from foreign countries and ban the slaughtering of cattle for meat (Wimalaweera 2016). This has created suspicions among the Muslims who consider it as a strategic step to sabotage their economic activities as well as their religious practices. Animal slaughtering, especially slaughtering cows, remains a very sensitive issue among certain sects of the Sinhalese- Buddhist community, which they use to sow hatred and exacerbate division among the communities. DISCUSSION As a minority ethnic group, Muslims have been living in Sri Lanka for centuries co-existing with the major ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Muslims were granted freedom and privileges in order to perform their ethno-religious norms and duties, and their traditional livelihood activities such as trade and business. Historically, the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Muslims (Moors) was formed and developed through their religious-cultural attachment and practice. Therefore, Muslims have been paying high concern in practicing their ethnicity features and religious guidelines in all aspects of their daily activities as to poster and promote their ethnicity and identity. However, the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces in the pre-and-the post-independence era, particularly in the post-civil war era have seriously targeted the ethnic and religious features and their religious practice of Muslims in public life. Respecting the religious-cultural distinctiveness of all groups and freely allowing them to practice their religion are the pre-conditions to establishing ethnic cohesion in any plural society. In fact, all religions teach the importance of respecting the faith and principles of other religious groups, including that of minorities. Muslims in Sri Lanka have also been practicing their religious and cultural beliefs and norms without harming others. Up until the emergence of the extreme nationalist forces among the majority Sinhalese-Buddhist, there was no serious opposition in the country regarding the 88

practice of Islamic fundamentals, halal foods, animal slaughtering, and other Muslim religious affairs. However, the post-civil war anti-muslim sentiments and violence were not a sudden emergence among the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalists. The root of these sentiments emerged during colonial period. The Muslims dominance in trade and business and their economic prosperity in the country induced the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalists to question the origin and the modes of livelihoods of Muslims. There were number of writers, dramatists, journalists and monks who wrote extensively, glorifying the heroic deeds of the Sri Lankan Kings, recalling the victories against foreign invasions and also denouncing foreign traders and urging Sinhala people to boycott the shops of Muslim traders. In particular, the writings of Anagarika Dharmapala during this period were mainly targeting the economic uprating of Muslims. For example, in 1915, he wrote as follows: The Muhamadans, an alien people by shylockian methods became prosperous like the Jews. The Sinhalese, sons of the soil, whose ancestors for 2358 years have shed rivers of blood to keep the country from alien invaders are in the eyes of the British only vagabonds The alien South Indian Muhamadan come to Ceylon, see the neglected villagers without any experience in trade. The result is that Muhamadan thrives and the son of the soil goes to the wall... (Quoted by Jayawardena (1985:24 25). Dharmapala was also propagating that Buddhist civilization is in danger. Therefore, his writings highly motivated the Sinhalese-Buddhist to develop strong anti-muslim sentiments in the following years. This ended with the historic anti-muslim riots in 1915 that destroyed millions worth of trades and business properties of a section of Muslims in Sri Lanka, as explained in the section 3 of this paper (Also see: Jeyawardena 1970;1985 & Stewart 2016). In the post war era, particularly since 2010 there have been further examples of such intense anti-muslim sentiments and violence. In the most recent cases of anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments and campaigns, the motivation appears to be more explicitly religious in character, but economic motives have also highly influenced. The series of mob violence and attacks imposed by these nationalist forces particularly those targeting the halal foods and animal slaughtering, together with the attacks on Muslims economic enterprises such as textiles and shopping centers, have other purposes than religion, and they are often politically organized or induced. Also, Sri Lankan constitution has guaranteed the religious rights to all religious groups and freedom to practice them without the invention of others, and the constitution has ensured the role of state apparatus to protect and promote the religious groups. But, in the ethnic conflict, civil war and the post-civil war contexts, minorities opportunity to practice their religious freedom was highly challenged partly due to the state s failure to establish a cohesive and conducive sociopolitical environment to protect and promote inter-religious harmony and tolerance. It also indicates the incapacity of the political and security structures of Sri Lanka to accommodate ethnic and religious diversity within the larger political sphere. There are worries among the liberal Buddhist-Sinhalese that for many years, instead of practicing what Buddha has preached such as Ahimsa (non-violence), Karuna (compassion), Metta (affection), and Maithriya (loving-kindness towards fellow humans), the Buddhist clergy in Sri Lanka has instead engaged in un-buddhist practices such as racist politics, even promoting Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and hatred towards minorities. As Steward (2016) rightly pointed out, as far as halal abolitionism is concerned, it is 89

imperative understand that the movement is not simply a peaceful animal welfare movement. The underlying motives are actually ethnic, religious, and material wellbeing. In this instance, anti-halal and animal welfarism is just a vehicle for attacking Muslims religious practices and businesses. It is part of a wider anti-muslim movement, a movement that appeals to general Buddhist principles that on the surface seem reasonable, but in reality is used as a device to target and marginalize Muslim communities from the trade and business sectors in the country. On the other hand, the nationalist forces which intensify the anti-halal and anti-muslim hatred sentiments must understand that these sentiments and oppositions will also definitely impact in the trade and commercial activities, economic and diplomatic relations of Sri Lanka with the Muslim world, particularly of Islamic countries in the Middle-East. Most of the Islamic counties in the Middle-East, not only are the major markets of Sri Lankan products, such as tea, spices, garments and coconut-related items, including many halallabelled products, but also helping the improvement of country s socio-economic status through foreign aids, long-term loans, and most importantly through offering job opportunities for hundreds of thousands of skilled and unskilled laborers. Throughout the civil war and the post-civil war context, these countries have been supporting Sri Lanka s recovery process and helping it to propagate and obtain international supports to the government initiatives. If many of these Muslim counties discontinued their relations with Sri Lanka, all these economic benefits would be questioned. It is worth noting that many Islamic or Arab countries individually or collectively requested or warned the Sri Lankan government authorities to stop anti-muslim sentiments and violence in the post-war context. There is no guarantee that these counties would continue to help Sri Lanka when their ancestors become the continuous target of ethnic and religious hatred and violence. On the other hand, the labelling of halal in food items is also equally importance for non- Muslims, particularly for Sinhalese who have been exporting their products to the Muslim countries that need halal certificate for their consumers. In fact, as equal or more than to Muslims, Sinhalese traders have also been exporting their products to many Arab countries. The ceasing of halal lebel would definitely limit their business activities in these countries and will impact the economic sector of the country as well. As twinned with the history of anti-muslim sentiments and oppositions among the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces, there is an economic motive of the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments expressed particularly in the post-war era. Muslim community through their hard works and commitments, in some industries, particularly of textiles and gems related industries, animal husbandry as well as import and export of wholesale commodities, have been highly influential for the last few decades. The beef supply, for instance, is entirely conducted by the Muslim traders through out the country, since slaughtering cows is prohibited in Buddhism. As a business and trading community, Muslims have been, to a certain extent, influential in the commercial activities of the major towns and cities in Sri Lanka. Muslims have been great value for the Sinhalese and were labelled as trustworthy traders by them. Therefore, Sinhalese have been conducting their business activities with Muslims traders through partnership and exchange of raw materials and products. This partnership has tightened their ethnic and socio-economic relationship too. This economic and societal influence and ties of Muslims with the Sinhalese may also have induced the nationalist forces to intensify anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering sentiments and oppositions in the post-war era. But, it is worth noting that when any forces attempted to break or undermine this societal set-up, it would definitely affect the socioeconomic conditions of not only the Muslims but also the majority Sinhalese. 90

As Jeyatilleke (2013) rightly pointed out, for pragmatic and strategic reasons, the Sinhalese and the government have to understand that the anti-muslim surge is profoundly counterproductive and almost suicidal and that it will only lead to further isolation of the country and the majority Sinhalese. The minorities who are seen by Sinhalese nationalist forces as Trojan horses are in fact the bridges between the Sinhalese and the outside world, given that there is no other collectivity or concentration of Sinhalese elsewhere. Therefore, the government authorities, and the motivating force behind the anti-muslim and anti-minority sentiments, campaigns and violence must think about the future of the country, so as to build ethnic harmony and religious tolerance. Both of which are highly needed in the postwar ethnic reconciliation and economic development processes in Sri Lanka. In spite of all what has happened, Muslims have also contributed in various ways to the Sinhalese rulers during and in the aftermath of civil war. They have continued to be the trustworthy traders and business partners to the Sinhalese public and their rulers, apart from being as good neighbors and citizen loyal to the state. Although, Muslims have been facing challenges in terms of practicing their ethno-religious and cultural duties and norms, and doing their livelihood activities independently, due to the nationalism sentiment and government policies and programs, they never resorted to violence and seek any outside forces to rescue, and provide safety and security for them. Instead, they used non-violent means such as dialogues and discussions to appeal and present their issues to the rulers in order to find solutions based on the teachings of Islam. In addition, until the formation of a Muslim political party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) in 1986 in the wake of intense ethnic conflict and civil war, Muslims also avoided setting up their own ethnic party and worked instead through the major parties of other ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils. During civil war, Muslim politicians lobbied Muslim countries in the Middle-East to support Sri Lanka at international forums. Almost all Muslim political parties were with the government side headed by the Rajapacksa, showing their loyal to the country (See: Yusoff and Sarjoon 2016 & DeVotta 2016). All these justify the commitment of Sri Lankan Muslims and their leaders towards promoting ethnic relations, ethnic harmony, as well as national and territorial integration of the country. But, as Imtiyas and Saleem (2015) rightly pointed out, the anti-muslim sentiment and violence the BBS unleashed, consequently, surprised and terrified the Muslims, even as it made them feel used and abused. This clearly justifies the argument that all these anti-muslim sentiments and oppositions, including the anti-halal and anti-animal slaughtering issues were motivated as part of the post-war project of depriving the Muslims economically and undermining their religious upraising. Therefore, these anti-muslim sentiments and violence are hardly justifiable and really indicate the incapacity of societal and state set-ups in accepting and tolerating religious diversity. The change of regime after the presidential election in the early 2015 has put a temporary end to the Buddhist nationalist agenda of anti-muslim hatred and violence. Under the new regime of President Maithripala Sirisena, these nationalist forces have less opportunity to intensify their anti-muslim sentiments and opposition as they did under Rajapaksa regime. But, Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalists have consistently manipulated Buddhism and promoted anti-minority sentiment when seeking to mobilize masses. As DeVotta (2016) rightly pointed out, given the economic challenges and various crosscutting cleavages facing the island, there will be ample opportunity for the Buddhist nationalist force to continue to do propagate anti-halal or in generally anti-muslim sentiments and violence in different forms and levels. 91

CONCLUDING REMARKS The foregoing suggests that the reemergence of ethno-religious nationalism among the majority Sinhalese-Buddhist in the post-civil war context has seriously affected the practicing of norms and duties of ethno-religious minorities, and their socio-economic wellbeing, particularly of Muslim community in Sri Lanka. As a religiously bounded ethnic minority, Muslims have been living in Sri Lanka for centuries as a privilege community while maintaining cordial relationship with ethnic majorities the Sinhalese and the Tamils. As the descendant of the Arab traders, majority of the Muslims in Sri Lanka have also been involved in trade and commercial activities that led them to be influential in the economic activities of the major towns and cities in the country. They were not faced with any problem in doing their business and performing their rituals based on their religious norms and guidelines, accept few cases of opposition mostly motivated by nationalism and economic factors, such as the anti-muslim riots in 1915. After the 1915 riots, latent oppositions and violence were hardly motivated in opposing the religious and economic upraising of Muslims in Sri Lanka. However, with the end of 30-year old civil war that was also motivated by the majoritarian ethno-religious nationalism, Muslims once again became the target of Sinhalese-Buddhist ethno-nationalist forces that claimed to be protecting the Sinhalese and Buddhism in Sri Lanka from the threats of Islam and Islamic revivalism. Sentiments and violence were highly motivated by these forces opposing some basic principles of Islam being practiced by the Muslims. Intensified anti-halal and antianimal slaughtering sentiments and violence were among the major issues, which received national and international attentions and highly influenced the sentiments against practicing of Islamic principles and economic wellbeing of Muslims in the country. These forces have taken umbrage that non-muslims have also been subjected to this halal food practice and have taken up cudgels to protect Sri Lankans from the practice of halal, which when translated just means permissible nothing more, nothing less. In the post-war context, Buddhism in Sri Lanka is characterized as being violent per se. In fact, both the rulers and the nationalist forces have used the religion as a hegemonic means to extent their dominance in society and sustain themselves in power. The post-war Buddhist-nationalism is multi-facial and the anti-muslim sentiment is also having number of motivations. Together with the religious motive that of consolidating a strong Sinhalese-Buddhist nation state, undermining the economic uprising of Muslims and marginalizing them from the economic and industrial sectors in Sri Lanka is also another motive. Whatever the challenges facing by the Muslims due to the intensified anti-halal and animal slaughtering sentiments and oppositions, it is advisable to the Muslim community not to make this as serious issue which can further undermine the preserved dignity of the community as peace-loving and trustworthy one within the Sri Lankan society, and to escalate communal tensions in the country. As minority ethnic group living on the margin of ethnic accommodation in the socio-economic and political set-ups, Muslims must try to cope up with these issues strategically and peaceful, while ensuring the long existence of their community and practicing their ethno-religious norms and duties without harming others and managing oppositions from others. Islam teaches Muslims how to resolve conflicts and crisis within and between communities. It also clearly teaches its followers on how to deal with matters of halal and haram and the Islamic ways of slaughtering animals for human consumption and rituals. It is therefore the religious duty of the Muslims to try and know what food item is halal and haram, and they must avoid consuming any 92

item if they find it suspicious rather complaining for its non-halal label. Good Muslims in general will always adhere to their practice of eating halal. On the other hand, practicing halal and haram is compulsory only for Muslims and the halal method of animal slaughtering may be much healthier method for all human being, but Islam never force any of its principles upon non-islamic fallowers. Islam also teaches religious tolerance and respect for the culture and norms of others. Muslims, being instrumental in making these anti-halal and animal slaughtering sentiments into serious issues may harm the cordial relationship that has been maintained for centuries between Muslims and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. It would also deprive the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in a greater level. Although, Muslims have suffered, they show their keen interest in resolving conflicts and prejudices on the brouhaha over the halal matter by agreeing to cease the labelling of halal certificates in products, which were considered permissible to the Muslims, in order to put an end to the issue, and to avoid a larger ethnoreligious crisis in the country. However, the zeal of some of the Buddhist clergy clearly justifies the divisive and dangerous efforts of Buddhist-nationalist force to create disharmony among religious groups in Sri Lankan. This is the time for all not just talk of reconciling ethnic and religious differences, but to really put words into action. Respecting plurality and religious sentiments of all groups is an important condition for building social and ethnic harmony in any plural society. REFERENCE Ali, A. 2014. Muslims in harmony and conflict in plural Sri Lanka: a historical summery from a religio-economic and political perspective. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. 34(3): 227-242. Ali, A. 2004. The Muslims of Sri Lanka: an ethnic minority trapped in a political quagmire. Inter-Asian Cultural Studies. 5(3):372 83. Ali, A. 2001. Plural identities and political choices of the Muslim community. Colombo: Marga Institute. Ameen, M.I.M. 2000. Ilankai muslimkalin varalarum kalasaramum 1870-1915 (The history and culture of the Muslims of Sri Lanka). Hemmathagama: Al-Hasanath Publication. Colombage, D. 2014. Sri Lanka quizzes monk over anti-muslim riots. Aljezeera.com (Online): http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/07/sri-lanka-quizzes-monkover-anti-muslim-riots-20147312386658616.html (Accessed on 10 August 2014) De Silva, K.M. 2005. A History of Sri Lanka. Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications. Department of Census and Statistics. 2014. Census of population and housing-2012 (New) final report. Colombo: Department of Census and Statistics. (Online): http://www.statistics.gov.lk/pophousat/cph2012visualization/htdocs/index.php? usecase=indicator& action=map&indid=10 (Accessed on 24 October 2015). DeVotta, N. 2016. Engaging Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism and countering religious animus in Sri Lanka: recommendations for the incoming U.S. administration. The Review of Faith and International Affairs. 14(2):76-85. Dewaraja, L. 1994. The Muslims of Sri Lanka, 1000 years of ethnic harmony 900-1915 AD. Colombo: Lanka Islamic Foundation. Frase, K. 2013. Slaughter of animals: why Halal meat is Harm. The Sunday Times. 5 May. (Online): http://www.sundaytimes.lk/130505/sunday-times-2/slaughter-ofanimals-why-halal-meat-is-haram-43092.html (Accessed on 12 January 2016). 93