Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 5, (2002), pp.193-204. NOMINALISM AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION Eric M. Rubenstein Indiana University of Pennsylvania While the Medievals spilled much ink over the Problem of Individuation, the Moderns scarcely mention it. 1 following to say. For instance, while Descartes ignores the problem entirely, Locke has only the From what has been said, tis easy to discover, what is so much enquired after, the principium Individuationis, and that tis plain is Existence it self, which determines a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind. 2 Berkeley, in turn, is content to simply declare his Nominalistic allegiance and leave the matter at that. But it is a universally received maxim, that everything which exists, is particular. 3 Now a philosopher committed to the principle that significant changes of philosophical outlook are not simply matters of changing taste- that disappearances of great philosophical problems are not akin to changes in fashion- must wonder what lies behind the disappearance of what was such an important problem for so long a time. That said, my aim here is to explore what philosophical reasons, as opposed to historical or sociological ones, lie behind the disappearance of a philosophical problem that vexed minds for centuries. 4 This is not to deny the role of those other factors. The decline of Scholasticism, the rise of science, and the role of the Enlightenment are certainly important factors. 5 But my concern here is with a rational reconstruction, as it were, one concerned with philosophical reasons for the great disappearance. Certainly, one part of the story is the increasing concern with epistemological matters in the Modern period. This has been discussed by others; I too have put forth my own 1 The exception being Leibniz. His Scholastic roots and subsequent concern with the Problem of Individuation certainly warrant a paper of their own. I have taken up these matters in my Wittgenstein s Monadology, unpublished manuscript. 2 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (EHU), 1975, p.330. 3 Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (TD), 1979, p.28. 4 We should note that contemporary discussions of the problem are far different from traditional Medieval concerns. I have in mind recent debates about the identity over time of an individual under a sortal. As we ll see, this is only loosely connected with earlier debates. 5 Cf. Gracia, 1994. Here, as in many places, my understanding has been greatly aided by Gracia s work. 1
views elsewhere. 6 I am concerned here, however, with more traditional metaphysical questions and how metaphysical issues may be part of the cause for the disappearance of the problem. Towards explaining the disappearance I shall examine closely the views of Ockham and Suarez on the Problem of Individuation. Though in some ways their views are quite similar, I will argue that Ockham s is to be preferred, and that to the extent the Moderns followed Ockham there were good reasons to do so. In short, while both Ockham and Suarez believe that only individuals exist, only Suarez thinks the Problem of Individuation is a legitimate problem. Ockham, on the other, argues that acceptance of Nominalism dissolves the Problem of Individuation. To his mind, if only individuals exist it is plausible to suppose there is no need to look for their principle of individuation. There is no problem to be solved, if there are no entities except individuals. I will try to show that Ockham is right and that the Moderns, at least those with Nominalist allegiances, were right to follow Ockham s lead in ignoring the Problem of Individuation. One explanatory strand among others for the disappearance of issues of individuation, then, is the increasing influence of Nominalism in the Modern period. 7 I. Nominalism and The Problem of Individuation Before proceeding it is necessary to be clear about various terms that I have used. The Problem of Individuation (herein PoI ), in particular, has many incarnations. Here, Gracia has laid the foundation for many of the topics I wish to examine. 8 He notes six central issues which have to be clearly distinguished when talking about individuation: 1) the intension of individual, 2) the extension of individual, 3) the ontological status of individuality, 4) the principle, cause, or explanation of individuation, 5) the discernibility of individuals, and, 6) how reference to individuals is secured. For our immediate purposes, the most important distinction is between Gracia s (4) and (5). Gracia takes this to be the difference between asking, on the one hand, what makes an individual an 6 For instance, Barber and Gracia, 1994, p.4. My views on the rise of epistemology and their effect on the debate appears in Rethinking Kant on Individuation, forthcoming Kantian Review. 7 This is not to claim that all Moderns were Nominalists. Showing that would take a paper of its own; and various figures might well resist the characterization. My goal here is the more modest one of showing why those who were Nominalists in the Modern period had good reason to ignore the Problem of Individuation. I intend this to be perfectly compatible with there being other reaons that drove those opposed to Nominalism to a similar dismissal of the Problem of Individuation. 8 In particular, Gracia, 1988. 2
individual, and on the other, how we go about knowing an individual as an individual. As Gracia rightly points out, the move from (4) to (5) is properly a move from metaphysics to epistemology. 9 There is another distinction at work here, however, that needs to be brought out. True enough, to discern an individual requires knowing it as the individual it is, as one among many. But alongside the epistemological question of how one discerns the difference between two individuals, there is the metaphysical issue of what makes one individual distinct or different from another individual. The latter metaphysical issue is one we find Castañeda, for instance, at pains to distinguish from the question of what explains an individual s being an individual- Gracia s (4). 10 Castañeda motivates the distinction this way. Thus, if we are not to take the individuality of Nous-A and Nous-B as primitive, then we have the ontological problem of providing an account of their individuality. That is, we must describe that ingredient or structure in Nous-A that makes Nous-A an individual, i.e. constitutes the individuality of Nous-A. Similarly for Nous-B. But this genuine problem of individuation has nothing to do with the contrast between Nous-A and Nous- B. The distinctness or diversity that creates a problem about individuality is the contrast between individuals and non-individuals, and it has nothing to do with the plurality of individuals. [E]ven if there were, perhaps only per impossible, just one individual in the world, so that in a sense there would be no problem about individual plurality, there would still be a problem of individuation, namely: the problem of accounting for the individuality of that lone individual. 11 Accordingly, an account of individuality or individuation focuses on the individual itself, explaining its being an individual as opposed to a non-individual. The contrast class for the Problem of Individuation, again, is individual versus non-individual. To wonder about diversity, on the other hand, is to inquire what makes an individual different from other individuals- contrasting individuals with other individuals, not with non-individuals, as does PoI. What lies behind Castañeda s view, I take it, is the conceptual priority questions of individuation have to questions of diversity. To ask for a principle of diversity is to inquire about what makes for the distinctness of two individuals. That, in turn, presupposes an account of what it is to be an individual. There must be one before we ask how that one differs from others. 12 Bringing all this together, there are really two issues which involve diversity, both of which are distinct from the question of what makes an individual an individual. The latter, PoI, was 9 Gracia, 1988, p.179. 10 We should keep in mind throughout that I am not concerned with issues of identity over time. 11 Castañeda, 1975, p.133. 12 Popper too distinguishes these problems, and uses the distinction to criticize Anscombe and Lukasiewicz. But he then goes on to conflate questions of individuation at a time with identity over time. See Popper, 1953. 3
suggested to be conceptually prior to the other two. Let us then distinguish questions of diversity from ones of individuation, recognizing the former as including two separate questions. D1 here corresponds to Gracia s (5), while D2 is Castañeda s ontic formulation. Diversity Individuation (PoI) D1) How does one discern one individual from another? What makes an individual an individual? D2) What makes one individual distinct from another? When I speak of PoI, I will be speaking of how one accounts for the individuality of an individual. The next problematic term is Nominalism, which too is said in many ways. I will use the term to simply indicate the endorsement of only individuals into one s ontology. I will do so while ignoring the issue of what kinds of individuals there are; whether there are individual accidents in addition to individual substances, for instance. By my use of the term, it is clear that both Ockham and Suarez are properly classified as Nominalists. They write, respectively: Every thing outside the soul is really singular and numerically one. 13 All things that are actual beings or that exist or can exist immediately, are singular and individual...for this reason, therefore, it is necessary that every thing, insofar as it exists in reality, be singular and individual. 14 II. Three Strategies Having now articulated PoI, I turn to traditional attempts to solve it. Using Gracia s terminology, this will be to explore the ontological status of individuality. As I see it, attempts at solution have all taken one of three ways. That is, I take the following lines of response to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive: 1) The Principle of Individuation is itself an individual. 2) The Principle of Individuation is a non-individual. 3) 'Individuality' is a primitive notion. Strategy (1) attempts to explain the individuality of an individual by appeal to some ingredient or structure which itself is an individual. Thus for any ordinary individual, x, there is some y which is an ingredient of x, such that y is an individual in its own right, and by being present in x, accounts for the individuality of x. Importantly, to prevent a regress, there must be some term, perhaps y itself, which is self-individuating; needing nothing further to explain its individuality. As instances of this strategy we find such ontological creatures as bare particulars 13 Ockham, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals (FTPU), 1994, p.171. 14 Suarez, Suarez on Individuation (SI), 1982, p.64. 4
and individual accidents. 15 Additionally, one may hold that the ordinary individual is its own individuator; that is, x=y, with x itself being the individuator. In the last case, as advanced by Suarez, no additional ingredient is required to explain the individuality of the original individual. We will discuss this in detail below. Strategy (2), on the other hand, seeks to explain individuality by recourse to elements or structures or components which themselves are not individuals. Individuality here is essentially an emergent phenomena: individuality arises from non-individuality. A prime example is the Aristotelian tradition which invokes matter, which is common to many and thus not individual, as the principle of individuation. More exact formulations here include matter under terminate dimensions, and matter under interminate dimension. Within this strategy we also find those who account for individuality by recourse to bundles of qualities. Other versions of this include attempts to explain individuality by recourse to some property or relation which is sufficient to distinguish some individual from another. 16 from non-individual components or aspects of the individual. In all such attempts, again, individuality is bestowed Finally, there is (3), a position most famously held by Ockham. According to him, Every singular thing is singular by itself, and more fully: Hence each thing outside the soul will be by itself a this. One does not have to look for a cause of individuation (except perhaps the extrinsic and intrinsic causes, when the individual is composite.) Rather, one has to look more for a cause why it is possible for something to be common and universal. 17 Any theory, obviously, has to have primitives. A convenient way to deal with PoI is to simply make being an individual an unexplicated notion. This seems to be Ockham s position. And as mentioned at the outset, if one believes that everything which exists is individual it might make sense to think there is no need to locate the source of an individual s individuality. PoI, as we have seen, is the problem of explaining the individuality of an individual- to wonder about the contrast between individuals and non-individuals. If that is the problem, then maintaining all existents are individuals would seem to bring with it the abandonment of the problem. Prima facie, again, one takes on PoI when one allows for non-individuals; one is forced to 15 Scotus haecceties are thought to be another famous instance of this strategy. But that is a mistake, I believe. Unlike bare particulars, haecceities are not numerical unities. They have unity, a oneness, that is less than numerical. Scotus more properly belongs in what I call Strategy (2). 16 Though as we have seen, this looks to conflate issues of diversity with questions of individuation. 17 Ockham, FTPU, 1994, p.171-2. 5
explain how these non-individuals are related to or are contracted into individuals. But Ockham s sustained arguments against the existence of non-individuals relieves him of this task, we might think. That is, Strategy (3) is not so much a solution to PoI but a rejection of the problem. It is to maintain that there is no need to begin down the path so well-worn by the Medievals. III. Puzzles and Paradoxes in Individuation With these options in mind I now turn to criticism. The basic strategy will be to show that once the question of ontological status is decided in favor of Nomalism, PoI cannot arise as a genuine problem. 18 In particular, I begin by raising objections against Strategy (2). That will leave us either Strategy (1) or (3) as live options. The next move will be to suggest that Strategy (1) ultimately collapses into (3). This will show that Suarez s use of (1), and his belief that Nominalism is compatible with a serious engagement of PoI, are both problematic. In the end, we will be left with only Strategy (3), the Nominalist s gambit. The lesson will be that Ockham was right to ignore PoI, and that the Moderns who followed Ockham in this approach had good reason to. To Strategy (2) then. Ockham, in fact, provides the impetus for the objections I wish to raise. He writes, Moreover, as what is singular is related to being singular, so what is universal is related to being universal. Therefore, just as what is singular cannot become universal or common through anything added, so what is common cannot become singular through anything added to it. 19 Of particular moment is the claim that what is common cannot become singular through adding anything to it. Yet this is exactly the gambit of Strategy (2). For instance, we find Castañeda arguing that to reject the necessity of an individual ingredient as the individuator of an ordinary individual, [I]s to prepare oneself for a position which accounts for individuation by means of a certain structuring of components none of which is an atomic or par excellence individual. That is, individuality is an ontological emergent that accrues to certain complexes. 20 Castañeda's own solution is that individuality arises from a complex of 1) a set of properties and 2) operators (syncategorematic, abstract entities) which "enter as constituents of complexes in which they connect with properties or sets of properties, but do not connect with them as predicates 18 I ower this helpful way of putting the point to a referee of this journal. 19 Ockham, FTPU, 1994, p.171. 20 Castañeda, 1975, p.137. 6
of those properties. 21 Importantly, both properties and operators are non-individuals, but when a suitable complex is made of them, an individual results. Castañeda offers this account of individuation as an alternative to Strategy (1)- that individuality must reside in an individual par excellence. While we will discuss this later, we should ask now whether the alternative fare any better. I fear it does not. Upon closer inspection, Castañeda's story generates more puzzles than it resolves. For starters, how does the operator ('c' for concretizer in Castañeda's story) work? What is its nature? How does it combine with a set of properties to yield an individual? More deeply, what is lacking in Castañeda's account, and what is problematic about this strategy as a whole, is that there is no intelligible account of how individuality can arise from nonindividual components, be they operators or qualities bundled together. Being told individuality is an emergent feature, without more being said, amounts simply to a hand-wave in the direction of a solution. If individuality can arise from non-individual components, what conditions must be met? What kind of non-individual components are required? What sort of organization is required? How does the emergence occur? And the list goes on. Without addressing these we are left with but a stipulation of a solution; we have defined the problem away by simply saying that individuality arises from non-individual components. In short, I take Ockham s point to be that maintaining non-individuality can be a principle of individuality is at best paradoxical: How can individuality come from non-individuality? And it would take extensive elucidation to convince one otherwise, argument that is not forthcoming from advocates of Strategy (2). 22 A similar problem arises for those who advocate, following Aristotle, that matter is the principle of individuation. Being present in many things, matter is thus common, and therefore not 21 Castañeda, 1975, p.138. 22 Now I am open to the possibility that complexes can have properties their components lack: thinking can accrue to a complex of non-thinking parts; life to a complex of non-living parts. But what is required in the present case, and what is lacking, is elucidation of how such emergence occurs. A Platonist, one who endores non-individuals, might choose to deny there are any individuals. That would sidestep the objection I ve raised, to be sure. But it would require at least an explanation of the appearance of individuals. The Platonist here might also choose to take individuality as primitive. This would ironically put the Platonist in tow with Ockham, at least on questions of individuation. The remaining debate would involve the reasons for thinking there are non-individual entities. On my reading of the dialectic, this is the best the Platonist can hope for. Thanks are due here to a referee for this journal who pointed out the other options available to the Platonist. 7
individual. How such non-individuality can give rise to individuality remains mysterious. 23 appeal to matter in either terminate or interminate dimensions will be of no help here either. For talk of dimensions amounts again to more non-individual features, in this case, spatial qualities or relations. 24 The moral Ockham draws, as we have seen, is that individuality should be left as a primitive notion. If there are only individuals, as he maintains, then perhaps there is no problem to be solved. We are free to unproblematically seek shelter in the primitiveness of individuality. This, however, is to ignore the possibility of Strategy (1) and the detailed formulation of by Suarez. Let us look more closely then at Suarez. First I need to defend more carefully the claim that Suarez advocates Strategy (1). Then I will address his reply to Ockham. In defense of the former, we need note, first, that Suarez believes PoI does arise. First, it is accepted by all authors that the individual adds to the common nature a negation, which formally completes or constitutes the unity of the individual. This is evident from the notion of unity explained above...for this whole entity is not conceived as one singularly and individually until it is conceived as incapable of being divided into many [entities] of the same kind [as itself]. Therefore, the present difficulty does not concern this negation, which it may formally pertain to the notion of this unity or not...the difficulty concerns rather the foundation of this negation. For, since it does not seem that [the negation] can be founded in the common nature alone...we ask what there is in the singular and individual by reason of which such negatino comes to it. 25 A crucial premise here is that the intension of individual is the inability to be divided into entities of the same kind. If this is what it is to be an individual, we must ask what explains this fact about individuals. That is, the individuality of individuals consists in their non-divisibility. If this is what it is to be an individual, Suarez thinks this fact about individuals needs explaining or accounting for. As he puts it, we need to inquire into the ground of the negation attaching to individuality- namely, an individual's not being able to be divided. What, that is, in the individual accounts for its individuality? It is clear that a principle of individuation is being sought here. What then is Suarez s answer? Here Suarez s options are limited, given his allegiance to Nominalism. What he argues is that the principle of individuation- what needs to be added to the And 23 For a defense of this traditional view, see Cohen, 1984. For an objection to this reading, see Whiting, 1986. 24 What s more, it is not even clear that matter can be used as a principle of individuation, but perhaps only a principle of diversity. Aristotle himself looks to betray this when he speaks of matter as that which makes two persons different. 25 Suarez, SI, 1982, p.97. 8
individual s nature to explain its individuality need not be a real entity- something ex natura rei. 26 This, because, the nature of an individual is merely conceptually distinct from the individual. [S]ince the common essence and the singular entity are not distinguished ex natura rei, but by reason alone, therefore, formal and individual unities cannot be distinguished ex natura rei, but only by reason. 27 But if the nature is only conceptually distinct from the individual, it follows that the individual is only conceptually distinct from the nature. Thus what gets added to the nature to make the individual an individual is merely conceptually distinct. What the principle of individuation turns out to be, then, is simply the entity itself. 28 Every singular substance is singular in itself, that is, by its entity and needs no other principle of individuation in addition to its entity, or in addition to the intrinsic principles which constitute its entity. 29 IV. Ockham s Triumph As we have seen, Suarez argues against Ockham that PoI is a real problem and that there is a genuine solution to be had. In our terminology, his use of Strategy (1) was supposed to be an alternative to Strategy (3). This is what I now want to call into question. For I believe that a thorough examination of Suarez s use of Strategy (1) reveals its ultimate collapse into Ockham s Strategy (3). I begin with a general indictment of Strategy (1), which holds that an ordinary individual is an individual in virtue of an ingredient individual- in Castañeda's terms, an individual par excellence. 30 As we have seen, attempts to explain individuality by reference to an ingredient individual must ultimately countenance an individual that is self-individuating; this in order to prevent a regress. 26 Which is Scotus line. 27 Suarez, On Formal and Universal Unity: Disputation VI (FUU), 1964, p.53. 28 Even should one resist this straightforward interpretation of Suarez, arguing that the distinction between an individual and its nature is neither conceptual nor a real, but perhaps something in between, Suarez s views on individuation are problematic. For should one take this other option, moving perhaps in the direction of the formal distinction of Scotus, one would then left to explain the individuality of an individual by reference to a less than numerical unity. But that would put Suarez squarely in the camp of Strategy 2, with all of its problems. 29 Suarez, SI, 1982, p.108. The difference, from Suarez s perspective, is that Ockham thinks the only way to individuate is by the addition of something real, and that for something to be real requires there to be a real distinction between it and other things. That, in turn, would require the individuation of one individual by another, which Ockham believes is unnecessary. As we have seen, for Ockham, if something is an individual then it is already individuated. Note that Ockham too has his own negation which needs explaining- the fact that an individual is not the sign of many things. Presumably Ockham would take this feature as fundamental. 30 Castañeda, 1975, p.136. 9
Relying as it does on the notion of self-individuation, advocates of (1) owe us an account of this. Importantly, this is true for both the case in which an ordinary individual is individuated by the presence of some other individual, and in the case in which what explains the individuation of the ordinary individual is the individual itself, as we find in Suarez. Now exactly what it means to be self-individuating is by no means clear. (Likewise we may say, for talk of self-justifying beliefs and self-caused beings.) I submit that the only sense we can make of these 'self-xing's' is that the question of how they have the particular feature they do is to be rejected. What justifies a self-justifying belief? Itself. What does that mean? It means that there are certain beliefs for which it does not make sense to ask about their justification. And if one believes in self-caused beings, one accordingly believes it does not properly make sense to ask of their cause. So too I claim for self-individuators. What accounts for the individuation of some ordinary individual? According to (1), some other entity (or itself) which is in turn self-individuating. This must mean it means it is not appropriate to ask about the individuation of that basic individual. The question of how it is an individual does not arise. If we then take the strategy of explaining individuality by recourse to an ingredient that is an individual, we are ultimately forced to appeal to a self-individuating entity. But to explain what it means to be self-individuating, it seems, requires a rejection of the question. To do that, however, is to make the notion of being an individual, at least for that self-individuator, a primitive notion. Thus Strategy (1) ultimately appeals to individuality as a primitive notion. As an instance of this problem, J. P. Moreland could not be clearer. In analytic ontology, one eventually comes to primitives and, on the bare particular view, qua simples, bare particulars and the role they play as individuators are primitives. 31 Again, Strategy (1) appears to offer a substantive answer to PoI but ultimately reveals itself as rejecting the question- seeking shelter in a primitive notion of individuality. What makes this problematic is that Strategy (1) was presented as alternative to Strategy (3) which takes individuality to be primitive. It is most problematic to find the two views collapsing into one. Here is how this general objection cuts against Suarez in particular. As I ve explained, Suarez seeks to explain the non-divisibility of the individual. What explains this fact? For Suarez it is that the individual itself is non-divisible. But in virtue of what is it non-divisible? That is the 31 Moreland, 1998, p.258. 10
question we started with. We answer the question by appeal to that very individual which is nondivisible. We ve come full circle. We explain the non-divisibility of the individual by simply noting that as a matter of brute fact the individual is non-divisible. It is taken simply as a brute fact that an individual is indivisible; and this answers the question, Why is the individual not divisible?. But here is the crunch. To simply appeal to the unexplicated fact that an individual is nondivisible is just to say that individuals just are self-individuating. It may be true to say that individuals provide their own principle of individuation, as Suarez maintains. But no explanation of individuation, nor of non-divisibility, has been supplied. We ve simply taken it as a brute fact that individuals are self-individuating. But that is to take individuality as a primitive notion. Being an individual requires no explanation- it is a basic, undefined, term. Suarez s view collapses into Ockham s. The moral, I conclude, is that Suarez is wrong in thinking PoI is a genuine, solvable problem for those who advocate Nominalism. To the extent that Ockham s Nominalism carried the day into the Moderns, it is understandable, philosophically, that the Moderns would also turn a deaf ear to PoI. V. Reflection on Primitives The final question I wish to address concerns the acceptability of taking individuality as primitive. A full answer, I suspect, requires a complete theory of primitives, but I can at least briefly sketch some broad points. To be sure, taking individuality as primitive does make short work of the Problem of Individuation. And it is surely understandable, as a psychological fact, given the at times exasperating debates of the Medievals. But is this move philosophically satisfying? To answer that requires some general constraints on use of philosophically contentious terms as primitives. I propose that the acceptability of x as a primitive term requires that: a) x has not plausibly been shown to have been defined or reduced. b) x is not introduced as a primitive to solve a problem out of existence unless: i) there is reason to think the problem is a pseudo-problem, or ii) systematic gains of taking x as primitive far outweigh gains of not taking x as primitive. 11
c) clear examples of x abound- for the elucidation (not definition) of x. Turning to the use of individual as primitive, it is clear that all parties to the debate agree that there are clear examples of individuals. (c), therefore, is quickly satisfied. Further, I have suggested above, in essence, that attempts to solve PoI are proposals to define or reduce individuality. I have argued, however, that Strategies (1) and (2) are both dead-ends. The former collapses into Strategy (3), while (2) is hopelessly paradoxical. That suggests, according to (a) that individuality has not been plausibly defined or reduced. Now if we are focusing on the debate between Ockham and Suarez, the most pressing question is whether PoI is a pseudo-problem for Nominalists- as in (bi). If you believe that there are entities with a less than numerical unity you do apparently have an obligation to explain how they differ from individuals, how they are related to individuals, how individuals come from them, etc. This does carry with it the importance of the problem. On the other hand, endorsing only individuals does lessen the obvious need for a solution to PoI. And again, if there are reasons to suspect that attempts to solve the problem from within a Nominalist framework ultimately amount to taking individuality as primitive, this makes plausible the claim that PoI is a pseudo-problem. If I m right about these matters, and if you have accepted Nominalism, as many Moderns did, then the invocation of individuality as primitive is reasonable. Perhaps then it was rational, not merely a change of taste, that brought about the disappearance of the Problem of Individuation. And as to whether the systematic gains of taking individual as primitive are worth the cost of the move (bii), I fear I can plead only that this is to ask a question too grand to be answered here. 32 REFERENCES Barber, K.F and J.J.E. Gracia (ed.) Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). Berkeley, G. [TD] Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1979). Castañeda, H. N. "Individuation and Non-Identity" American Philosophical Quarterly, 12 32 I d like to thank Mary MacLeod, Dan Boone, and Lisa Shapiro for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to two anonymous referees for their valuable input. 12
(1975). Cohen, C.M. "Aristotle and Individuation", New Essays on Aristotle ed. by F.J. Pelletier and J.King-Farlow (Guelph: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1984). Press, 1988). Gracia, J.J.E. Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics (Albany: SUNY Gracia, J.J.E. Individuation in Scholasticism in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650. ed. by J.J.E. Gracia (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). Locke, J. [EHU] An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. ed. by Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Moreland, J.P. Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79 (1998). Ockham, [FTPU]Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, trans. by P.V. Spade (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1994). Popper, K. The Principle of Individuation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume. XXVII, (1953). Suarez, F. [FUU] On Formal and Universal Unity: Disputation VI, trans. by Ross (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964). Suarez, F. [SI] Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and Its Principle, trans. by J.E. Gracia, in Suarez on Individuation (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982). 13
(1986). Whiting, J. "Form and Individuation in Aristotle", History of Philosophical Quarterly, 3 14