J. G. FICHTE: REVIEW OF FREIDRICH HEINRICH GEBHARD, ON ETHICAL GOODNESS AS DISINTERESTED BENEVOLENCE (GOTHA: ETTINGER, 1792)

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM Volume XXXII, No. 4, Winter 2001 J. G. FICHTE: REVIEW OF FREIDRICH HEINRICH GEBHARD, ON ETHICAL GOODNESS AS DISINTERESTED BENEVOLENCE (GOTHA: ETTINGER, 1792) TRANSLATED BY DANIEL BREAZEALE This is the second of three book reviews published by Fichte in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung [ALZ]. It appeared, anonymously, on October 31, 1793. 1 Friedrich Heinrich Gebhard (1764 1838) was Hofkollaborator in Gotha and the author of several philosophical works of the popular variety. Fichte met him briefly in May of 1793, on his return journey from Danzig to Zurich. Gebhard s Uiber die sittliche Güte aus uninteressirtem Wohlwollen (Gotha: Ettiger, 1792) was the second of three books that Fichte reviewed for the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung. In a letter of May 25, 1793, to C. G. Schütz, editor of the ALZ, Fichte asked to review Gebhard s book, which he described as unimportant in its own right, yet worthy of a review, if only for the sake of a few general remarks that it might occasion, which are not unimportant. In the same letter, Fichte reported that he already had a copy of Gebhard s book, though he later claimed that he had not read it prior to working on his review. 2 Fichte s Nachlass includes three manuscripts related to the projected Gebhard review. Although much of this material represents no more than earlier drafts of the final, published review, it is not without interest to the student of Fichte s philosophical development. A lengthy passage (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 253 80) that has no precise parallel in the published review deals in systematic terms with the 1 This review is reprinted in Johann Gottlieb Fichtes sämmtliche Werke, ed. I. H. Fichte (Berlin: Veit, 1844 46) [SW], vol. 8, 418 26, and J. G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacobs, Hans Gliwitzsky, and Erich Fuchs (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1964 ) [GA], ser. 1, vol. 2, 21 29. 2 Gegenerklärung über des Hn. Prof. Schmid Erklärung, ALZ Intelligenzblatt, no. 29, March 26, 1794, in GA, ser. 1, vol. 2, 77. 297

DANIEL BREAZEALE general question of the various faculties or powers of reason and the place therein of pure practical reason. This passage is here translated in full and appended to the review. A few other, briefer passages that expand upon or help one understand the somewhat more tersely composed final version are translated in the notes. The particular moral system that is here contrasted with the Kantian system of morality and attacked so ineptly by Gebhard is described in the review as the system of benevolence associated with Adam Smith and David Hume. It is described in the draft version as the eudaimonian system (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 252). It is also known as the moral sense theory and is a familiar variety of ethical naturalism. A remark of Fichte s (which was deleted from the final, published version of his review) explains why he devoted so much energy to the review of this, otherwise, unimportant work by Gebhard: This system [of benevolence], if one presents in its most determinate form, is much more difficult to refute than has been believed hitherto, and, to the best of this reviewer s knowledge, it has not yet been refuted (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 263 64). Perhaps the most interesting feature of this review is Fichte s insistence that it must be proven that reason is practical and his cursory outline of a strategy for just such a proof. This strategy, which invokes practical reason as the ultimate ground of the unity of consciousness and thus attempts to demonstrate that even theoretical reason presupposes practical reason, is pursued in the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre and in Fichte s other systematic writings of the Jena period. In this review, however, Fichte is still wrestling with the crucial problem of determining the relationship between theoretical and practical reason. [Review of] Freidrich Heinrich Gebhard, On Ethical Goodness as Disinterested Benevolence (Gotha: Ettinger, 1792). It was not without great expectations that the reviewer took this book in hand, for it seemed to promise to solve a problem to which he had nowhere found a satisfactory solution. Moreover, the reviewer is convinced that the universal validity of the principle of Kantian morality depends upon a solution to this problem. The reviewer was very dissatisfied with himself for his inability, in most cases, to associate any precise thoughts with the author s assertions, until it finally became evident to him, thanks to a passage on p. 84, how far the author himself still must be from possessing any precise thoughts concerning the object of his investigation. The passage in question reads, moral feeling consists in approval or disapproval of an effect of practical reason, for otherwise there would be nothing present that could be approved or disapproved. Thus no moral 298

REVIEW OF FREIDRICH HEINRICH GEBHARD feeling impels us to disinterested activity; instead, the former is first produced from the latter (through practical reason) and from the consciousness of the same. The first three sections of Gebhard s book respond to an article in the Braunschweig Journal (June 1791), 3 which defends, against Kant, [Adam] Smith s claim that pure or disinterested benevolence [Wohlwollen] is the principle of morality. Section One [of Gebhard s book] defends Kant against the accusation, made by the author of the article in the Braunschweig Journal, that he has failed to define what is ethically good, and it defends him by citing Kant s own definition: The ethically good is what one ought to do in consequence of practical reason, which commands with necessity, and Mr. Gebhard then proceeds to expound Kant s overall principle of morality. If the author of the article in question had actually desired a real definition (for surely one should not assume that has remained unacquainted with the preceding, merely nominal definition [of ethical goodness]), then Mr. Gebhard would have provided him with a more satisfying answer if he had shown that and why the content [Materiale] of a purely formal imperative does not permit of being adduced, and thus that the challenge issued by the author of the article in the Braunschweig Journal already presupposes what he wanted to prove. Beneath its vast store of words, the reviewer finds nothing more in this first section than that Mr. Gebhard considers the precepts of the ethical law to be not purely negative (that is, mere limitations upon the sensible drive s presumption to determine the will), but also positive, and that he thinks that it is a duty not [simply] never to utter an untruth, but rather, always and every case to speak the truth directly. Section Two investigates whether pure benevolence can be the principle of morality. To judge by one passage, the author seems to have felt that such an investigation must be conducted not on the basis of controverted Kantian premises, but rather on the basis of premises that he shares with his opponent. We will see whether he remains true to this strategy. Pure benevolence [i.e., good will ] is a disinterested will. Interest can be pure or pathological. The later arises from the sensible drive and is therefore not what we are here concerned with. The former is supposed to be produced by the legislation of practical reason, and therefore this is also not what we are here talking about, since otherwise this system [of pure benevolence] would not be in conflict with the Kantian system. In response to this assertion, however, the opponent can make the well-founded objection that he (along with Kant, by the way) assumes that we possess an unselfish inclination [uneigennützige Neigung], which does not aim at the satisfaction of any 3 Neue Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, Letters 5 and 6, Braunschweigisches Journal 2 (1791), no. 6, 199 218. 299

DANIEL BREAZEALE sensible drive. His pure benevolence is thus based just as little upon any interest as Kant s higher faculty of desire, 4 though, like the latter, it engenders an interest. By no means, however, does he derive this acknowledged [moral] feeling from the absolute self-activity of the human mind; instead, he considers it to be one of the mind s fundamental drives, which cannot be derived from nor clarified with reference to any higher faculty. In order to show that the sort of disinterested benevolence that he ascribes to his opponent is simply impossible, the author shortly thereafter confuses interest, i.e. mental delight 5 in the mere representation of an object s existence, with enjoyment, i.e., the pleasure one takes in an object that is actually given through sensation. If the object of our benevolent drive were realized, then we would not lack a sensation of actual enjoyment, and thus our benevolence is certainly (pathologically) interested. At this point the opponent can ask Mr. Gebhard if the person who is determined by the law of practical reason does not feel any enjoyment when he senses that the object of the determination of his will has been realized? To this question from his opponent, the author responds quickly and correctly: But the representation of this enjoyment is not supposed to be the determining ground of the will in this case.[ ] But what is the determining ground? Is it reason? If so, then the opponent is a Kantian. The drive itself? Mr. Gebhard cannot understand this possibility, and nowhere in the book does he consider a third possibility: namely, that the will could be determined by an absolute self-activity [einer absoluten Selbstätigkeit]. Following this preliminary exercise, Mr. Gebhard finally formulates the point of contention quite correctly, as follows: Should one recognize the primacy of reason or of pure benevolence? There then ensues a tiresome and boring discussion of the fact that reason, even if one wishes to recognize it only as theoretical reason(?) must nevertheless adjudicate the applicability of the principle of benevolence to particular, given cases. The present reviewer would have thought that it is by no means reason (i.e., the faculty of original laws), but rather the power of judgment that, in the system defended by Mr. Gebhard s opponent, would subsume particular cases under the law that is established by this benevolent feeling (a law that it is the task of the understanding to formulate logically. Indeed, must not the same power of judgment also subsume [free actions] under the laws of practical reason in the same way? 6 At last the author arrives at 4 obere Begehrungsvermögen. See the First Remark to 3 of the Critique of Practical Reason Kants gesammelte Schriften [Akademie Ausgabe] (Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently de Gruyter, 1900 ), vol. 5, 22 25. 5 An early draft version of this passage has gemeines Wohlgefallen ( ordinary or customary delight ), instead of geistiges Wohlgefallen (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 260). The latter term, however, also appears in the final draft of the review (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 275), as well as in the published version. 6 Isn t the power of judgment needed in order to subsume free actions under the law of practical reason? (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 255). 300

REVIEW OF FREIDRICH HEINRICH GEBHARD what he calls the proof that reason, which is to say, practical reason, is entitled to primacy over pure benevolence. Why cannot one just leave the question concerning the value or lack of value of disinterested benevolence undecided just as one does in the case of thousands of other questions? (If his opponent is consistent, he will straightforwardly deny him permission to ask this question, since, for him, the value of such benevolence is absolute. It is that by which all other values must be judged, while it itself cannot be judged by any other value.) The question must be decided[, Gebhard continues,] because we are here dealing with a question of acting, and indeed of the error-free correctness of acting. But the necessity of acting, conjoined with this rule-governed regularity of the same, is here still not the concern of benevolence for this is precisely what is in question but is instead a concern of reason, and indeed, of practical and not of theoretical reason. If the reviewer understands these words correctly, then they assert the following: Benevolence cannot be the absolutely first law of acting; here I simply want to inquire concerning a higher ground [of acting]; therefore there is such a higher ground, and I will call this higher ground reason not indeed theoretical, but rather practical reason, etc. etc. And thus, concludes Mr. Gebhard, in italics, the subordination of disinterested benevolence to practical reason is clearly demonstrated. To be sure, but only if one assumes in advance that reason can be and actually is practical! What then is the name for reason as such, and how, precisely, is practical reason different from theoretical reason? The reviewer has searched the entire book in vain for some hint that would reveal that Mr. Gebhard has the faintest notion of what reason as such, as well as practical reason, might mean in the context of the Critical philosophy. Instead, he found the word reason employed sometimes as a synonym for understanding, sometimes for power of judgement, sometimes for will, and finally, even for ethical feeling in short, for almost everything the author was writing about. The principle of disinterested benevolence is indeterminate. Disinterest is an indeterminate concept. Disinterested, as was explained above, is a negative concept, but it is not an indeterminate one. It receives its determination in the course of experience from the interested [will] that opposes it, which, when determined by the sensible drive, becomes an inclination. Disinterestedness refers to happiness, and, because of the indeterminacy of the concept of happiness, disinterestedness too becomes indeterminate. This is certainly true of disinterestedness insofar as it is viewed theoretically, but not insofar as it is viewed as a principle determining the will, in which case its goal is not to produce happiness but merely to regulate it. A will that makes happiness actual outside itself, would be legal in this system [of disinterested benevolence], and one whose incentive [Triebfeder] is nothing but the representation of this goal would be moral. Mr. Gebhard makes it even easier for himself to contest this system inasmuch as he incorporates the distinction between one s 301

DANIEL BREAZEALE own happiness and that of others into the principle of the same, and thus, naturally, allows it to fall into conflict with itself whenever it is applied. But a consistent defender of such a system will seek to locate the basis of this distinction between one s own happiness and that of others solely in interested, sensible inclination, and he will describe the object of disinterested benevolence as happiness as such or in general, without any reference to the subject of the same. Furthermore, the principle is unintelligible. A principle must be something that is rationally thinkable, something that makes sense. This means either that it must be capable of being formulated in a determinate fashion for the purposes of science (and, in this case, why can the contested principle not be formulated as follows: Let the supreme and final goal of your actions be the production of what is, to the best of your knowledge, the greatest possible sum of happiness in the sensible world?), or else it means that the principle must hover before consciousness in this determinate formula when one determines one s will, and Mr. Gebhard insists chiefly upon this latter meaning. But if this principle has to be expressly formulated, why can t it be in the former way? And why must it be expressly formulated at all? Isn t the law of practical reason also given to consciousness through a feeling? 7 Does it follow that no action based solely upon this feeling, and not upon a clear, precise, and complete acquaintance with the categorical imperative is purely moral? The transformation of a feeling into an action cannot be comprehended. How then can the author make comprehensible the transformation of ethical feeling, which is based upon practical reason, into action? It is to be hoped that both Mr. Gebhard and the reader will by now have had enough of these proofs of the utter inability of this Kantian [i.e., Mr. Gebhard] to answer the controversial question before us. The reviewer therefore excuses himself from the boring business of continuing to summarize a book of this sort. The drive to benevolence, if it is supposed to be accompanied by the representation of happiness when it is applied to specific cases (a representation that must first be given through sense impression, in which case the formula, [You should] do unto other what you will that [that they do unto you] would mean You should do [unto others] what you desire by means of the sensible drive, what you would find agreeable )[,] cannot be a moral principle. This is shown in advance by our consciousness that we must recognize many things to be morally necessary which nevertheless appear to us to be the source of the greatest and most widespread misery. 8 But this reference to happiness by the 7 Doesn t Mr. Gebhard know that the ethical law itself is externally given to consciousness only through the feeling of an inclination of the higher faculty of desire? (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 263). 8 This somewhat obscure assertion is illuminated by the various draft versions of the same passage, the first of which reads: This circle is even more evident in the following example: one could, according to 302

REVIEW OF FREIDRICH HEINRICH GEBHARD acting subject itself is something accidental to this system [of benevolence]. The chief question is whether the feeling of what is simply right (and not the feeling of a benevolence that is intended to produce happiness), a feeling whose existence within consciousness the opponent can fully concede, can or cannot be derived from something higher, and indeed, from practical reason. Against anyone who would deny such a possibility, one cannot yet again appeal to a fact, for though such a person will concede anything that is an actual fact, it is not a fact that reason is practical, nor that it has the power to produce the feeling of what is simply right. 9 Nor can one refute such a person by appealing to the feeling of moral necessity (the previously mentioned ought ) that is united with this feeling [of what is simply right]; for even in the Kantian system this feeling of moral necessity arises from the determination of the higher faculty of desire (qua higher faculty) in the form of inclination. Nor can one appeal to an absence, within this system [of disinterested benevolence], of any basis for distinguishing the ethical from the unethical drive, since the the principle of benevolence, very easily permit a minor embezzlement that harms no one but which rescues a poor family, though this would nevertheless be opposed by the principle of practical reason. The consistent opponent will of course grant this unharmful but infinitely useful embezzlement and will declare his practical reason to be an illusion (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 262). See too the later draft version: The feeling of benevolence, insofar as it is related to happiness, can be refuted in advance by a fact of consciousness. In this case [viz., if the system of disinterested benevolence is accepted], the ethical drive would decide concerning the content of the same, and the expression, what you will that people do unto you would have to be explicated as what you would empirically desire, whatever would be pleasant for you, etc., must be capable of becoming the principle of the ethical law. But this can be refuted in advance by a fact of consciousness, inasmuch as we undeniably possess a feeling that directs us to leave many things undone, even if this should result in the deepest, greatest, and most widespread misery (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 270). The final draft version reads as follows: If the benevolent drive, when applied to specific cases, is supposed to be guided by the representation of happiness, a representation that must first be given through sensation in which case the law, what you will that people do unto you, etc., means exactly the same as what you would desire with the sensible drive, what you find would find pleasant, that is what [others should do unto you] then it cannot be the principle of morality. This can be shown in advance from our consciousness that we recognize many things to be right and morally necessary, which nevertheless appear to us to be source of the greatest and most widespread misery (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 278 79). 9 In order to refute the defender of this system [of disinterested benevolence], it is not sufficient to appeal to a fact; for he concedes this fact to the extent that the Kantian can assert it: that is, [he concedes] the existence within consciousness of a feeling of a necessary ought, along with the obligation that follows therefrom, the freedom of will that must be assumed for this purpose, imputation [of responsibility for actions], etc. The true dispute concerns whether this feeling is produced by absolute spontaneity or is given (originally given, to be sure, but nevertheless always given). Is reason also practical, or is the law that announces itself in this feeling, like all the other laws of reason, grounded in natural necessity in all of us (perhaps in the law of our nature, insofar as we are natural creatures)? (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 264). 303

DANIEL BREAZEALE defender of this system can assert the principle that whatever can universally, constantly, always, and in every case be thought of as a valid maxim for the subject is an effect of the ethical drive, and anything that, when thought of at this level of universality (for the subject), contradicts itself, is an effect of the unethical drive for if this feeling is supposed to be original and simple, then it cannot contradict itself. (To be sure, it cannot be distinguished from nonethical, animal instinct, but the system in question makes no distinction between the ethical drive and animal instinct, and treats the satisfaction of the latter as a duty. 10 ) Nor, finally, can one refute this system by appealing to the fact that it provides no ground for assuming the freedom of the will, for if such freedom is not a fact of consciousness but a mere postulate of the ethical law, a law that is itself assumed to be an effect of practical reason, then a system that does not need practical reason can get along very well without freedom. When there is no obstacle to its operation ethical feeling operates without hindrance. Genuine morality would of course be destroyed, and we would once again find ourselves fastened to the chain of natural necessity, 11 but the facts of our consciousness would nevertheless be explained satisfactorily and with the utmost consistency; everything that is incomprehensible within the Kantian system would be eliminated and such [Kantian] morality would be shown to be an illusion. In order to bring the aforementioned incentive of what is simply right into harmony with the rest of nature and to overcome the patent conflict between this incentive and the equally natural drive to happiness, we would be driven to hypothesize that this incentive is a natural arrangement that allows us to produce, without knowing it, a happiness of which we have no knowledge. Doing what is right would thus be understood as the final means to the highest, ultimate goal of nature, that is, to happiness. Even if we ourselves are unable to understand it in this way, now or in the future, this can nevertheless be grasped by some possible understanding. 12 The essential difference between a system of this sort and the Kantian system would be that in the former ethical feeling would indeed be an effect of reason (understood as the faculty of original laws), but of theoretical reason, and thus that this [ethical] law would be conditioned by the mechanism of our mind and would necessarily be applied to 10 Granted, it could not distinguish [ethical feeling] from non-ethical or natural instinct, but within this system the latter occupies the same rank as the former, and itself becomes ethical (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 270). 11 Genuine morality would of course be annihilated, and we would once again come under the sway of natural fatalism (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 271). 12 In the final draft of this passage, Fichte adds the remark that this hypothesis is a thought many very perspicacious thinkers still cannot renounce (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 280). 304

REVIEW OF FREIDRICH HEINRICH GEBHARD every case to which it is applicable. 13 (The appearance of independence from this mechanism, which is all that distinguishes this law from the other laws of theoretical reason, as well as the transformation of the feeling of must into the feeling of ought, which occurs whenever this law is applied, would arise from the fact that we are not as clearly aware of the obstacles to the application of this law to the cases to which it appears to be applicable as we are in the case of the other theoretical laws of reason.) In the latter, Kantian system, in contrast, ethical feeling would be the effect of a kind of reason which would, in this function, stand under no condition other than the condition of its own nature [Wesen] (namely: the condition of absolute unity and hence of uniformity) i.e., an effect of practical reason. The latter, however, can neither be described as a fact nor postulated in consequence of any fact whatsoever; instead, it must be proven. It must be proven that reason is practical. Such a proof, which well might also provide the foundation of all philosophical knowledge (with respect to the content of the same), must proceed somewhat as follows: The human being is given to consciousness as a unity (as an I). This fact can be explained only by presupposing something in human beings that is simply unconditioned; we must therefore assume that there is within human beings something simply unconditioned. What is simply unconditioned, however, is practical reason. And now, for the first time, it may be securely assumed that this ethical feeling, which is, to be sure, given as a feeling, is an effect of the practical reason that has now been demonstrated. 14 Section Four, [Concerning the Question:] Whether the Highest Principle of Pure Practical Reason Can be Combined with the Principle of Benevolence, examines Mr. Rapps treatise, Concerning the Unsuitability of the Principle of Universal and Particular Happiness to Become the Fundamental Law of Ethics 13 The only difference between the unselfish drive of the Kantian school and the unselfish benevolence that is here contested is that the former provides itself with its object, whereas the latter obtains its object from outside, from experience; the former is its own final purpose, whereas the latter takes over an external object, universal happiness (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 263). The only difference between the disinterested inclination of the Kantian school and disinterested benevolence is that the former simply has no further purpose, but is itself the final purpose, whereas the latter presupposes that the final purpose is universal happiness, even if this is never achieved or furthered. (They are thus different, inasmuch as the latter obtains its concept from something outside of itself, by means of theoretical reason which gives it the concept of happiness, whereas the former is supposed to give itself its object (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 257). 14 Such a simply unconditioned element is practical reason and only now might one with certainty take this appearance of ethical feeling in human beings for an effect of this now demonstrated practical reason (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 271 72). See too the following formulation of this important claim: In order that the human being be able to think of itself as a whole (an I), reason demands something 305

DANIEL BREAZEALE (Jena: Mauke, 1791). 15 Mr. Rapp begins by presenting the Kantian moral principle in its complete purity, but in the end he is inclined toward a syncretism of the theories of pure reason and of happiness. In the first sentence in this section, which challenges Mr. Rapp s assertion that the ethically good will is indeed the highest good, but, for just this reason, is not the final end of human beings, Mr. Gebhard maintains that the ethically good will is not the absolute good, even though it is the highest, and indeed the complete highest good. One could grant him this if only he had actually understood the ethical will as the ethical will. But since, here as always, he confuses practical reason with the will proper, it is clear that no one can understand him, because he has not understood himself. 16 absolute in it. All laws of speculative reason appear to be conditioned, thus, in addition to them, there must also be a law that is given to reason absolutely. (This is an inference that the defender of this system [of disinterested benevolence] will concede, though he would substitute for this absolute that law that is given by the feeling of universal benevolence.) Reason cannot think of anything as absolute that it cannot think of as produced by its own self-activity, and thus it must think of this ethical feeling in this way (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 264). Compare this with the following passage from the first draft: Assuming that this concept were true and that ethical goodness is what happens as a result of pure benevolence, could I not still ask, Why is this ethically good? [And, Gebhard claims,] the appropriate higher region would thereby be acquired for theoretical reason. By no means! The unconditioned can never be given in this way. In order to arrive at an absolute, practical reason has to be assumed (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 255). Yet another version of this central portion of Fichte s argument is found later in the same manuscript: The proof must go as follows: There must be something unconditioned if the human being is to possess a personality, then this unconditioned something must not be given to him; he must give it to himself, by means of his own spontaneity. The reviewer does not know whether such a proof has ever been carried out. Kant and his school assume practical reason as a fact. The defender of [Adam] Smith s system will concede this fact without any problem, and he will deny only that is given through the absolute spontaneity of reason through practical reason (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 256). See too the longer passage translated in the Appendix to this review. 15 Gottlob Christian Rapp (1763 94), Ueber die Untauglichkeit des Prinzips der allgemeinen und eigenen Glückseligkeit zum Grundgesetze der Sittlichkeit (1791). 16 One of the drafts of the Gebhard review contains the following, more detailed examination of the errors contained in the fourth section of Gebhard s book: The principle of happiness is supposed to be the formal principle of the power of desire, and the highest law of all our actions is supposed to be promote your own happiness (by means of ethical behavior [Sittlichkeit]). Yet Mr. Rapp does not wish this proposition to be viewed as the law that asserts how we have to act if we are to act correctly. Not whatever makes you happy is good, but whatever is good makes you happy. Against this, Mr. Gebhard raises the following points: (1.) The ethical will is not only the absolute good, but it is also the highest, indeed, the complete highest good. (2.) If it is the complete highest good, then it must also be the complete final purpose. (3.) The fundamental drive toward happiness cannot be coordinated with reason, for (a.) it is not formal, or, even if it were, it does not belong to the final purpose, and (b.) it is, instead, material. (4.) The highest law of our free actions is that we ought to strive in accordance with reason, and not etc. (5.) Duty and law remain binding upon human beings, quite apart from happiness, etc. We can admit the validity of the first point, if only Mr. Gebhard had actually understood the ethical will as ethical will. That is to say, the will is, first and 306

REVIEW OF FREIDRICH HEINRICH GEBHARD In his Foreword, the modest author appeals not for forbearance, but rather for salutary and enlightening instruction, and in the end this seems to be a serious request. Here the reviewer can only advise him to reflect for some considerable time upon the writings of Kant and other great independent thinkers. 17 If, after doing this, he still wishes to communicate the results of his reflections and wishes to be read, then he is advised to devote himself to the cultivation of a more precise and, more importantly, a simpler mode of expression. Where one expects to find specific explanations, it is unpleasant to stumble over trifles such as the following: There are characters and actions, whose sublimity and greatness shine down like an eternally flaming beam of the age of gray antiquity to the most recent human world. Wherever he is able to do so, the author inserts fragments from the same trove of ornamental style. APPENDIX: Clues for a Proof that Reason is Practical, Occasioned by the Gebhard Review. 18 It follows that benevolence, which employs sensible inclination as the criterion of its content, cannot maintain itself against the consciousness of duty s demands and my 19 arguments are false. foremost, affected by two distinct drives: the practical-rational drive and the sensible drive. Through obedience to the ethical law, the sensible drive itself become lawful in all cases where the [ethical] law does not forbid its satisfaction, and obtains a right. One now wills what is right, as determined ethically: not happiness itself, but happiness in accordance with the degree of the will s morality. And one wills this not for the sake of enjoyment, but for that of justice. One does not want happiness for oneself alone, as a sensible being, but one wants it because one belongs to the class of moral beings. Mr. Gebhard, however, is concerned only with the higher faculty of desire. He dispenses with the lower power of desire entirely, and the happiness he promises is nothing but the enjoyment of the consciousness of our fulfilled duty. Such a claim leads to Stoic self-sufficiency and cancels the moral proof for the existence of God. This is also the point from which to distinguish what is correct and what is incorrect in the propositions that follow (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 265 66). 17 Since the author is demonstrably unable to orient himself by Kant s writings alone, one can only advise him to read carefully the writings of other worthy Critical authors, in particular those of Reinhold (GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 267). 18 The following passage, from GA, ser. 2, vol. 2, 267 70, which has no analog in the published review, occurs in a draft version of the same, to which Fichte gives the general title that is here employed for the appendix. 19 The arguments in question are, presumably, those made by the opponent of Kantian morality and proponent of the system of disinterested benevolence. 307

DANIEL BREAZEALE But what about the feeling of what is right, considered as something originally given by the constitution of our nature, and not traced back to any specific self-activity of reason? Does such a feeling share all the advantages that can accrue to any other mere feeling, and can it also maintain itself against the consciousness [of duty s demand]? A.) It is easy to see how the feeling of what is right is related to happiness, since the former is, as it were, an inner revelation, the true pointer to the path of universal happiness. You should not allow yourself to be led astray, even if the world should collapse [as a result of your action]; [if] it is commanded of you, then it must therefore lead to happiness. But how can one prove this? It is a natural effect. Nature works to produce happiness thus probatio minor per analogiam ex experientia this is far too narrow and this important point would include within itself at least half of the whole. One could therefore only believe that right action produces happiness. This doesn t work, i.e., [it is not enough to get one] to act on this belief unless one is required in advance to act. But what should the criterion of the content [of one s action] be? What is right, according to this feeling? (For Kant, who assumes reason: [what is right is] what does not contradict itself when taken to be a universally valid maxim? This, however, is nothing but a norm of the understanding, an inference from the assumed legislation of practical reason.) What, when assumed to be a universally valid maxim for the subject, does not contradict itself? If the feeling is original, then it must be the same in every case. How does the legally binding form show itself? Through inclination, and this is also how Kant deduces the ought. B.) How then is this theory [which bases morality upon feelings of disinterested benevolence] different from Kant s? [For the former] the feeling in question is a natural effect. Not so for Kant. (1.) If it is a natural effect, does it follow from this that it is also a natural cause? Do you not assume, in addition, a supernatural faculty of self-activity? Yes, but it does not follow that it always operates; under the given circumstances, however, it, and nothing else, does operate. Two questions: (a.) Does this assumption make the assumption of freedom impossible? (b.) Is this assumption simply ungrounded? [To these questions I reply as follows:] (a.) No, if this feeling produces only an inclination, as it is supposed to, then a cause must always be added, which elevates it to willing. This cause can just as well be self-activity as passivity. (b.) Can I (α.) postulate [this]? (ß.) [Can I] experience [it]? ß [The alleged experience of freedom] could be an illusion. What justifies my postulating of α, ifα is a not a natural faculty? [This is an] ought, an imperative. That is [present] here as well. But can nature be dependent upon something that lies outside it? No. Therefore the freedom of the will is actually ungrounded. This is the kind of experience Crusius 308

REVIEW OF FREIDRICH HEINRICH GEBHARD talks about. 20 One cannot go any further and infer this [freedom of the will] by means of consistent, a priori reasoning. With this, morality falls away as well; the human being again becomes a machine of the senses, and morality is replaced with the supposition (and it is only a supposition) that, with him, nature ascends toward its goal of universal happiness by means of this specific mechanism of the drives. With this, everything would be cancelled [gehoben]; we would find ourselves once again on the sheer ground of natural right, and that moral feeling that we discover as a fact within ourselves and concede in all its aspects would be completely explained. To the extent that this feeling establishes an original ethical law, this law is also produced by reason, but by theoretical and not by practical reason. C.) What does it mean to assert that this [feeling] is not [the product of] a natural faculty, but is instead an effect of practical reason? Theoretical reason is a natural faculty, even if we cannot immediately see how. Its legislation is grounded in the structure of our spiritual mechanism, which is an inference that follows from the necessity with which we apply theoretical reason. [Practical reason, in contrast, is] ungrounded in any mechanism, not limited by any conditions outside of itself, taking nothing into account but itself standing under no conditions beyond those of its own nature. In more detail: Reason, the faculty of original laws, Either, What does higher Or, The application of mean here? Not The application of these laws is derived. these laws is conditioned, and Conditions for unconditioned, and hypothetically application. they are absolutely necessary. necessary. Laws govern relations. Their own nature consists in unity and self-identity. What distinguishes this representation [of the laws of practical reason] from the previous one[, that is, from the representation of the laws of theoretical reason]? In the latter case, the human being is related to the sensible world (how this occurs is here irrelevant); here, however, this is not the case. Here man is related to nothing whatsoever except himself. This is the meaning. One is not here justified in assuming such a representation on account of its sublimity or greatness 20 Es wird jene Crusianische der Erfahrung. Christian August Crusius (1715 1775) maintained that we know intuitively that our will is free and therefore must think of moral actions as both caused and uncaused. On Crusius, see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 394 402. 309

DANIEL BREAZEALE or because of the way it expands the soul. In contrast, the other representation [of the theoretical law] is more consistent and leaves us in the sphere of actual things. This representation [of the practical law] must be proven, and its proof might well deserve to be called the foundation of all philosophical knowledge. (The proof would proceed as follows: Reason is required to think of its I as an absolute unity; an absolute unity is thinkable only under the presupposition of something that is simply unconditioned; and thus we have to think that there is something simply unconditioned in human beings.) Only after this proof has been provided would it then be permissible to seek out within us some trace of this unconditioned element and to assume that what qualifies for this name is that ethical feeling we have been discussing. First fact: The human being appears to himself within consciousness as a unity. Reason can explain this fact only by assuming something absolutely unconditioned within the human being therefore reason must assume something absolutely unconditioned within the human being. 310