Ungoverned Spaces and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Mali

Ungoverned Spaces and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Mali Robert B. Lloyd SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 36, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2016, pp. 133-141 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2016.0012 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/625118 Accessed 10 Mar 2018 15:21 GMT

Ungoverned Spaces and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Mali Robert B. Lloyd Across the Sahel and Sahara regions of West Africa, large swaths of territory are essentially ungoverned. Criminal organizations, militant Islamist groups, and ethnic separatist movements created and now enjoy these ungoverned spaces as bases of operation. The case of Mali is of particular interest due to the success of militant Islamist groups in capturing and holding territory, the impact of ungoverned space on the growth of such groups, and the means by which the international community and state checked the militants. In turn, this paper examines factors related to the creation, maintenance, and elimination of ungoverned space in the western Sahel region of Africa. Using the aforementioned case study, it will investigate how militant Islamist groups use ungoverned spaces to their advantage, the spaces impact on regional security, and the responses of states and international organizations to threats posed by such groups. Introduction In order to understand the conflict in Mali, it is crucial to first examine the geographical context of the region. Mali is on the western flank of the Sahel ( shore in Arabic), a swath of land stretching across the African continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. The Sahel marks the southern edge of the Sahara Desert, and transitions to the more fertile savannah regions that lie to the south. Equal to roughly half the land area of the United States, this region forms a broad buffer between North and sub-saharan Africa, both geographically and culturally. The Sahel and the regions to its north are populated predominately by Arab and Berber groups, which are mostly Muslim by faith and traditionally semi-nomadic. South of the Sahel is sub-saharan Africa, which is largely Muslim in its northern reaches but predominantly Christian in the south. Along with the immediately adjacent desert areas to its north, this region of Africa makes up a major zone of ungoverned spaces on the continent. States in the Sahel tend to contain weak economies, internal political conflict, and areas of land where the formally sanctioned government exercises little or no control. Northern Mali lies largely within this zone. A landlocked country in West Africa, Mali borders Mauritania and Algeria on its north, Niger on its Robert B. Lloyd received his PhD from the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is a professor of International Relations at Pepperdine University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council s Africa Center in Washington, DC. SAIS Review vol. 36 no. 1 (Winter Spring 2016) 2016 Johns Hopkins University 133

134 SAIS Review Winter Spring 2016 east, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast on States in the Sahel tend to contain its south, and Guinea-Conakry and weak economies, internal political Senegal on its west. Mali occupies a strategic location along trans-saharan trade routes. conflict, and areas of land where the formally sanctioned government exercises little or no control. ing the Mali Empire, controlled this Pre-colonial African empires, includ- region. In the late nineteenth century, Northern Mali lies largely within France recognized the area s geostrategic importance and took control of this zone. what is now Mali. The country achieved independence from France in 1960, but retained close political and economic ties with its former colonial ruler. Mali is tropical and arid with a mostly flat topography. While the country is rich in mineral resources, only 4 percent of its land is arable. Its economy is based largely on irrigated farming and fishing along the Niger River. Mali exports cotton and gold, but foreign aid is critical to its economy. Mali s estimated GDP (measured by purchasing power parity) in 2007 was US 14.18 billion. 1 By comparison, the GDP of the Atlanta metropolitan area in the United States was nearly twenty times that of Mali s in the same year. 2 Mali s 2015 estimated population is approximately seventeen million people. The country is experiencing rapid population growth, with a median age of 15.8 years and a fertility rate of 7.34, among the highest in the world. 3 Bamako, the political and economic capital of Mali, had a 2015 estimated population of approximately 2.5 million. With sixty-six languages spoken in the country, Mali is ethnolinguistically diverse. 4 Although French is the official language, approximately half of the country s population speaks Bambara. Bambara speakers are predominantly located in the southwest part of Mali, which includes the capital of Bamako. The country s northern part is composed largely of Tuaregs of the Berber language group and Hassaniya Arabic speakers. Expanding Ungoverned Spaces Mali s trajectory at independence was similar to most African states that became independent in the 1960s: the establishment of authoritarian regimes marked by single-party rule, military coups, and economic stagnation. Mali also experienced the wave of political liberalization that swept sub-saharan Africa in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992 Mali adopted a democratic system with multiple political parties. Meanwhile, to Mali s north the Algerian Civil War of the 1990s gathered force, which would eventually lead to a future war in Mali. 5 One of the militant Islamist groups fighting the Algerian government, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), aimed to establish an Islamic state in Algeria. As the decade drew to a close and the Algerian government became increasingly successful in defeating the Islamist militants, the GSPC sought refuge in the vast ungoverned spaces of the Sahara and Sahel. For several years, the GSPC sustained itself through smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping. By 2006

Ungoverned Spaces and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Mali 135 the GSPC had rebranded itself as al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 6 The organization s criminal enterprises continued to provide it with resources. Starting in late 2010, a wave of demonstrations, riots, and revolutions began sweeping the Arab world. The catalyst for what became known as the Arab Spring occurred in Tunisia December 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor, set fire to himself to protest his treatment by the police. Protests spread, toppling governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. The Arab Spring caused widespread insecurity in Libya. This proved to be advantageous for AQIM and other militant Islamist groups, which were able to procure arms from depots located in the desert regions of southern Libya. As sociologist and political analyst Laurence Aïda Ammour wrote: The war in Libya has made weapons flow in great numbers in North Africa as well as the Sahel. The proliferation of heavy arms, combined with the porosity of borders has introduced a new threat for Libya as well as the entire region. The numerous arsenals accessible to racketeers, smugglers and mercenaries, harbour a rich diversity of arms: Kalashnikov assault rifles, rockets, mines, shells, chemical weapons, SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles, of which Libya has a stock of 20,000 units, and Russian SA-24 missiles, among the latest generation [of] aerial missiles capable of shooting down fighter jets. 7 AQIM s growing relative strength reflected not only new access to Libyan weapons, but also armed and trained pro-gaddafi Tuareg mercenaries returning to their native Mali. Some mercenaries directly joined forces with AQIM or affiliated militant Islamist groups, such as Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Others linked up with different Tuareg rebellion groups, in turn forming the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). This organization, a secular and nationalist militant group, sought to establish an independent territory called Azawad in northern Mali. 8 The MNLA formed a broad alliance with AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJWA to fight the Malian military. Together, the rebels launched their offensive against government forces in January 2012. By April they had captured the region of northern Mali, proclaiming it as an independent Azawad. In March 2012, the Malian military deposed Mali s president, Amadou Toumani Toure, arguing that the democratically elected government was not providing the military with sufficient resources to fight. 9 Opposition to the coup further weakened Mali domestically and isolated it internationally. The MNLA and its Islamist allies, taking advantage of the confusion, extended their control even further. In July 2012, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2056, giving official blessing to the efforts of the African Union and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) to reconstitute constitutional authority in Mali. 10 In October 2012, the Security Council approved Resolution 2071, authorizing a planning process for use of force as a Chapter VII operation. 11 Resolution 2085 followed two months later, establishing the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) as the military response of ECOWAS. 12 While international efforts to defeat the opposition forces were gathering steam, the alliance between Ansar Dine, MUJWA, and the MNLA ended due to ideological differences. The Islamist groups expelled the more secular

136 SAIS Review Winter Spring 2016 MNLA from northern Mali. With the northern Mali cities of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu now under their rule Islamist allies Ansar Dine and MUJWA also began implementing shari a law, which included impos[ing] harsh behavioral and dress codes on local residents... carr[ying] out amputations and executions, and target[ing] historic and cultural sites, including UNESCO World Heritage-designated ancient mosques and tombs. 13 Having already lost northern Mali and facing more defeats due to a renewed Islamist rebel push into central Mali, the Malian government at this time acting under the authority of interim President Dioncounda Traore requested foreign assistance on January 10, 2013. The French military, well aware of the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Mali, responded the next day with Operation Serval. The operation s objectives were to (1) eliminate militant Islamist forces in Mali, and (2) restore the integrity of the Malian state. The French were concerned that their military actions might be seen as an exercise in French neocolonialism, or what has been called Françafrique. To emphasize the French objective, then Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stated explicitly: I want to stress that this intervention falls strictly within international law. It responds to a formal request by the Malian President and is being conducted in accordance with the UN Charter, in compliance with UNSCRs 2056, 2071 and 2085. 14 In January 2013 the French commenced a series of air strikes and combat operations. AFISMA troops from a number of West African states, including Nigeria and Burkina Faso, soon joined the French forces. Within a month Islamist forces were defeated in northern Mali. During this time the MNLA also announced its willingness to seek a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The group abandoned its support for an independent Azawad, stated that it would seek limited autonomy within the Malian state, and joined forces with the anti-islamist alliance. Within one month, the foreign coalition had defeated militant Islamist forces and the Malian government had reasserted The foreign intervention prevented its control over the entire territory. the defeat of the Malian government The foreign intervention prevented and the likely establishment of a strict the defeat of the Malian government and the likely establishment Islamic regime. However, fighting had of a strict Islamic regime. severely weakened the Malian state. However, fighting had severely weakened the Malian state. Recognizing the fragility of the Malian state, in April 2013 the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 2100. 15 This resolution sought to strengthen the Malian state through calling for new elections and providing international forces for security and support during the country s transitional period. As a result, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) superseded AFSIMA forces on July 1, 2013. The UN peacekeeping force of 6,000 soon expanded to about 12,000 police and soldiers. 16

Ungoverned Spaces and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Mali 137 Defeated in direct military confrontation, the Islamist rebels retreated to the ungoverned areas of northern Mali. There, the rebels began engaging in insurgent attacks against UN peacekeeping forces in the country s northern desert regions. As before, criminal activities such as smuggling financially and materially sustained rebel efforts. In July 2014, recognizing the transnational character of the Islamist and criminal groups operating in Mali and its adjacent countries, France created a new regional operation to combat terrorism in the region. Operation Barkhane, which replaced the earlier Operation Serval, sought to assist the Sahel countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in fighting terrorism and preventing such groups from operating freely in the Sahara and Sahel. In addition, France and Mali signed a new defense agreement in July 2014 that replaced a 1985 treaty and cemented military ties between the two countries. In spite of these efforts, the continued security threat posed by Islamist groups remains in Mali. On November 20, 2015, Islamist militants attacked the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, killing twenty people. AQIM and a related Islamist group, al-mourabitoun, claimed joint responsibility for the attack. 17 Ungoverned Spaces An ungoverned space is marked by the absence of central government control over a region and its people and challenges to the state s authority by one or more groups. An ungoverned space differs from de facto subnational secession. In the latter case, a replacement government effectively rules over a territory still claimed by the central government. Examples of this are seen in the present-day Federation of Northern Syria- Rojava and Somaliland. In contrast, an ungoverned space lacks both a central An ungoverned space lacks both a central and replacement rule. All contenders for control lack, to varying degrees, the capacity to enforce their rule. and replacement rule. All contenders for control lack, to varying degrees, the capacity to enforce their rule. The Mali case provides insight into understanding the external and internal factors that lead to the creation, maintenance, and elimination of ungoverned spaces. Four external factors fostered the creation of them in this case study. The first factor is geography. The Sahara Desert, arid and sparsely populated, divides amongst the regional states, existing as a type of backyard for all of them. For North African states such as Algeria and Libya, deserts to the south of the countries are on the periphery of their core-populated regions, which border the Mediterranean. For the states of sub-saharan Africa, the core-populated areas tend to be located along the rivers of the Sahel, with the country s peripheral areas located in the north. Thus, the Sahara Desert is like a vast inland sea of sand, with the countries on its shores exerting little actual sovereignty over it due to vast distances and terrain.

138 SAIS Review Winter Spring 2016 An absence of effective control does not, however, necessarily mean the existence of an ungoverned space. A second factor in this case is the existence of armed groups that contest the control of central governments, but which themselves are unable to fully displace government control. This is true for Mali case, as well as for the other countries in this broad zone stretching across much of the Sahara Desert, although admittedly to relative extents country-depending. A third factor fostering instability in the region is motivation. Islamist militants have an objective: the creation of an Islamist state. AQIM used the lack of restrictions afforded by the Sahara s ungoverned spaces to challenge the state s authority in both Algeria and Mali. Such groups can, as seen during the Algerian civil conflict of the 1990s, operate in areas where a stronger central government exists, but an ungoverned space provides greater strategic depth to operate against the state. Ungoverned spaces do allow greater freedom for such groups to challenge the government. This ideological motivation also differentiates Islamist groups from more directly criminal groups that seek profit in areas where state power is weak. Absent such an ideological motivation, an ungoverned space would still exist, but would-be challengers would lack organization and ambition to overthrow a government. In the case of Mali, failure to agree on these objectives due to differing motivations led to a falling out among the rebels, a development that the government was able to exploit to recover lost territory. A final factor contributing to this case study is the ready availability of lethal arms. As mentioned prior, Libya s collapse prompted a surge of both rebels and arms into Mali. This bolstered the power of challengers relative to the power of the central government. The result could have been regime replacement, fragmentation of the state (subnational secession), or anarchy. In the case of Mali, the objective was both regime replacement and subnational secession. Internal factors also explain the existence of ungoverned spaces. In the case of the ungoverned space that includes the Sahara Desert and parts of the Sahel, the primary factor is weakness of the African states. This, of course, begs the question: what are the reasons for the weakness of African states? Factors leading to general state weakness are both political and economic. Poor governance is one such factor. This includes high levels of official corruption, policies that inhibit pluralism and inclusion by all segments of the population, and illegitimate and authoritarian governments. A second factor is internal divisions within the state. The states included in this ungoverned area are ethnolinguistically diverse and further divided by regionalism. Economic stagnation is a third factor, undermining the ability and prospects of the population to make a living. This is particularly important in a state that has a relatively young and fast-growing population. All these factors increase the challenges of forging a strong state that has the capacity and popular support to govern throughout its territory. The maintenance of ungoverned spaces depends upon the capacity and willingness of the state to enforce its authority against the capacity and motivation of groups existing within the ungoverned space. All parties are thus engaged in benefit/cost analyses of how best to deal with contending authority in the ungoverned space. This reflects perceptions of power, motivation, and objectives maintained by the parties that seek to replace an ungoverned space

Ungoverned Spaces and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Mali with their own rule. In Mali, a state s core region was directly threatened by distant developments that infused rebel groups with additional power and determination. In this case, developments in one part of an ungoverned space namely Algeria and Libya directly affected the ungoverned space in another part: Mali. Elimination of ungoverned 139 spaces lies in the establishment or re-establishment of central government control. This is accomplished through the removal of non-state (or meddling state) actors that undermine the state s monopoly on power, the strengthening of the capacity of the state, the establishment of a reasonably legitimate regime, and international support. The Mali case illustrates how this can work in practice. The military coup, far from providing additional resources to combat the rebels, actually hindered the new government s ability to respond due to domestic opposition and international condemnation. Subsequent elections and the restoration of a democratic system enhanced the legitimacy of the Malian government and its ability to respond to the militants. The military intervention of France and ECOWAS, working under a mandate of legitimacy provided by the UN and African Union, made rapid progress in rolling back rebel control, shrinking the zone of ungoverned spaces and restoring the territorial integrity of Mali. The subsequent creation of the UN peacekeeping force recognized the long-term threat posed by groups operating in ungoverned spaces. The military contributions of France through Operation Barkhane and the United States with drone intelligence through its Africa Command (AFRICOM) have also been crucial in combatting terrorism, criminality, and insecurity in the region. Militant Islamist attacks against UN peacekeepers in northern Mali and against softer civilian targets such as at the Radisson Blu in Bamako show that militant Islamist forces continue to exist and seek to undermine a fragile state, but are more limited in their freedom of action. Mali also illustrates how ungoverned spaces pose broader threats to international security. First, what happens there does not stay there, but spills out to surrounding regions, and in some cases, to more distant parts of the world. The rapid collapse of the The maintenance of ungoverned spaces depends upon the capacity and willingness of the state to enforce its authority against the capacity and motivation of groups existing within the ungoverned space. Mali also illustrates how ungoverned spaces pose broader threats to international security. What happens there does not stay there, but spills out to surrounding regions, and in some cases, to more distant parts of the world. Qaddafi regime and the rise of al-qaeda and ISIS in Libya, for example, pose a threat outside the region. Second, militant Islamist and nationalist groups in the ungoverned spaces both cooperate and compete with one another for power. A very real concern is that such transnational groups would join forces

140 SAIS Review Winter Spring 2016 and operate on a much larger scale. Such cooperation would pose an even greater threat to the states that are adjacent to the ungoverned spaces of the Sahara and Sahel. In West Africa, for example, the militant Islamist group Boko Haram has destabilized parts of Nigeria. Boko Haram operates not only in Nigeria, but also in neighboring Cameroon and Chad. AQIM operates not only in Algeria and Mali, but claimed responsibility for a January 15, 2016 attack against the Splendid Hotel and Cappuccino restaurant in Burkina Faso s capital of Ouagadougou. 18 In conclusion, the Mali case shows that ungoverned spaces exist due to challenges against established government by motivated opposition groups in the face of state weakness in the country and surrounding region. This state weakness and the resulting ungoverned spaces that arise foments insecurity both within and outside the Sahel region. Coordinating local, regional, and international efforts make possible the suppression, but not outright elimination, of groups that employ ungoverned spaces for their objectives. Notes 1 Central Intelligence Agency, Mali, CIA World Factbook, http://www.ciaworldfactbook.us/ africa/mali.html. 2 Matthew Boesler, 12 American Cities that Rank Among the Biggest Economies in the World, Business Insider, July 20, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/12-american-cities-that-rankamong-the-biggest-economies-in-the-world-2012-7?op=1. 3 Central Intelligence Agency, Mali, CIA World Factbook. 4 SIL International, Mali, Ethnologue: Languages of the World, http://www.ethnologue.com/ country/ml. 5 Jeremy Grunert provided valuable research assistance in this section on AQIM and Algeria. 6 Jean-Luc Marret, Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A Glocal Organization, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008): 541, 543. 7 Laurence Aïda Ammour, Security Issues Emerging in the Maghreb and Sahel after the Arab Spring, European Institute of the Mediterranean 130 (2012), http://www.iemed.org/observatorien/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2012/ammour_en.pdf. 8 Paul Rogers, Mali: The Risk of Intervention, Oxford Research Group Monthly Global Security Briefing, June 2012, 2, http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/junen12.pdf. 9 Christopher Fomunyoh, Addressing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North, Statement to US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, December 5, 2012, http://www.ndi.org/files/christopher%20fomunyoh%20 Senate%20Testimony%20on%20Mali.pdf. 10 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2056, Gives Full Support to West African States, African Union, Transition; Expresses Readiness to Consider UN Mandate for West African Stabilization Force, July 5, 2012, http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10698.doc.htm. 11 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2071, Security Council Demands That Armed Groups Cease Human Rights Abuses, Humanitarian Violations in Northern Mali, October 12, 2012, http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10789.doc.htm. 12 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2085, December 20, 2012, Security Council Authorizes Deployment of African-Led International Support Mission in Mali for Initial Year- Long Period, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/2085%282012%29. 13 Alexis Arieff, Crisis in Mali, Congressional Research Service, January 14, 2013, 1, http:// www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/r42664.pdf; Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) Report, International Criminal Court, January 19, 2013, 9, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/ icc/situations%20and %20cases/situations/icc0112/Documents/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicRep orteng16jan2013.pdf.

Ungoverned Spaces and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Mali 141 14 Laurent Fabius, press conference January 14, 2013, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/laurent- Fabius-on-French-actions. 15 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2100, On Establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), April 25, 2013, http://www. un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/documents/mali%20_2100_e_.pdf. 16 FISMA Transfers its Authority to MINUSMA, July 2, 2013, http://www.peaceau.org/en/ article/afisma-transfers-its-authority-to-minusma. 17 Jason Hanna, Ed Payne, and Steve Almasy, Deadly Mali attack: They were shooting at anything that moved, CNN, February 20, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/20/africa/malishooting/. 18 Kevin Sieff, After Deadly Hotel Attack, Burkina Faso Contemplates a Future with Terrorism, Washington Post, January 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/military-regains- control-of-hotel-stormed-by-armed-attackers-in-burkina-faso/2016/01/16/c002e4f6-bc31-11e5- b682-4bb4dd403c7d_story.html.