Russell on Denoting. G. J. Mattey. Fall, 2005 / Philosophy 156. The concept any finite number is not odd, nor is it even.

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Russell on Denoting G. J. Mattey Fall, 2005 / Philosophy 156 Denoting in The Principles of Mathematics This notion [denoting] lies at the bottom (I think) of all theories of substance, of the subject-predicate logic, and of the oppositions between things and ideas, discursive thought and immediate perception. (Principles of Mathematics, Section 56). A concept denotes when, if it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not about the concept, but about a term connected in a certain peculiar way with the concept. Any finite number is odd or even. The concept any finite number is not odd, nor is it even. So, the concept any finite number denotes in the proposition Any finite number is odd or even. In general, any concept beginning with all, every, any, a, some, and the denotes. Denoting in On Denoting The subject of denoting is of very great importance, not only in logic and mathematics, but also in the theory of knowledge. No general characterization of denoting is given, only a list of denoting phrases. A man, Some man, Any man, Every man, All men, The present King of England. A phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form. 1

Denoting Phrases and Denotation A denoting phrase may or may not denote an actual object. In 1905: The present King of England denoted a certain man. The present King of France denoted nothing at all. Some denoting phrases denote ambiguously. In I saw a man, a man denotes an ambiguous (or undetermined) man. A good theory of denoting will accommodate all three kinds of cases without paradox. Variables The notion of a variable is fundamental to the theory of denoting. A variable x is essentially and wholly undetermined. Variables play three key roles in the theory, allowing for: A general characterization of a proposition, Generalization, Cross-reference. These roles of the variable will become apparent in succeeding slides. The Proposition A proposition is always of the form C(x). In terms of Principles of Mathematics, C is the assertion and (x) stands for the subject about which the assertion is made. A proposition results from replacing the variable with a denoting phrase, as with C(a man). Russell s general thesis is that propositions containing denoting phrases are reducible to propositions not containing them. 2

The Truth of Propositions and Values of Variables C(x) is always true is taken to be ultimate and indefinable. In symbolic logic, this is expressed as C(x) for all values of x. In other words, what is asserted in the proposition truly applies to all things. In what follows, we will use the symbolic logic formulation, which is clearer and simpler. C(x) for some values of x is equivalent to It is not the case that, C(x) for no values of x. The Reduction C(a man) means C(x) and x is human for some values of x. I met a man means I met x, and x is human for some values of x. C(all men) means If x is human, then C(x) for all values of x. All men are mortal means If x is human, then x is mortal for all values of x. We now say that a man and all men are contextually defined: they have meaning only when embedded in a larger context. Definite Descriptions Denoting phrases preceded by the are by far the most interesting and difficult of denoting phrases. We now call them definite descriptions. Like the other denoting phrases, definite descriptions are contextually defined. Strict use of a denoting phrase in the sentence The father of Charles II was executed involves: Existence: x was father of Charles II, for some value of x. Uniqueness: if y was father of Charles II, then y is identical with x, for any value of x who was father of Charles II and any value of y. 3

The Reduction of Definite Descriptions The definite description the father of Charles II may occur in propositions of the form C(the father of Charles II). The father of Charles II was executed. The general analysis of C(the father of Charles II) combines existence and uniqueness: For some value of x, x was father of Charles II, and C(x), and if y was father of Charles II, then y is identical to x, for any value of y. So equivalent to The father of Charles II was executed is: For some value of x, x was father of Charles II, and x was executed, and if y was father of Charles II, then y is identical to x, for any value of y. A Puzzle About Identity One merit of the contextual definition of definite descriptions is its ability to solve philosophical puzzles. One such puzzle is a variant of Frege s case of the morning star and the evening star. George IV wished to know whether Sir Walter Scott was the author of the novel Waverly. In fact, Scott was the author of Waverly. It seems to follow from the identity that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott, which is very unlikely. One approach is to say that identicals may not be freely substituted for identicals in intentional contexts such as George IV wished to know that.... Analysis of an Identity Proposition Containing a Denoting Phrase According to Russell, Scott is the author of Waverly is not a simple assertion of an identity, due to the occurrence of the denoting phrase the author of Waverly. Instead, it should be analyzed as follows: For some value of x, x wrote Waverly, and Scott is identical with x, and if y wrote Waverly, then y is identical to x, for any value of y. In English: One and only one man wrote Waverly, and Scott was that man. 4

Primary and Secondary Occurrence of Denoting Phrases The sentence George IV wished to know whether Sir Walter Scott was the author of Waverly is ambiguous. George IV wanted to know whether there was one and only one man who wrote Waverly and Scott was that man (normal meaning). There was one and only one man who wrote Waverly, and George IV wanted to know whether Scott was that man (alternate meaning). In the first case, the denoting phrase has a secondary occurrence. It is analyzed within the context of the subordinate sentence Sir Walter Scott was the author of Waverly. In the second case, the denoting phrase has a primary occurrence. It is analyzed within the context of the whole sentence, George IV wished to know whether Sir Walter Scott was the author of Waverly. Meinong s Theory According to Meinong s theory, all denoting phrases denote. Thus, the round square denotes even though there are no round squares. The denoted object is said not to subsist, but it remains an object. But this allows one to derive a contradiction. The round square is round. The round square is square, and since whatever is square is not round, the round square is not round. On Russell s account, both sentences are false, in the way the first one is: x is round and x is a square, and x is round, for some value of x. Frege s Theory Frege distinguishes between the meaning (Sinn, sense) and denotation (Bedeutung, reference, nominatum) of denoting phrases. The meaning expressed by the author of Waverly is complex, involving authorship and the book Waverly. The denotation of the author of Waverly is simple, a single person. The identity in Scott is the author of Waverly is at the level of denotation. But Scott and the author of Waverly have distinct meanings. Thus, George IV can be construed as wondering whether the two meanings have the same denotation. 5

Criticism of Frege s Theory Frege must account for the denotation of denoting phrases such as the round square and the present King of France. The sentence The King of England is bald (uttered in 1905) is about a person. By parity of reasoning, The King of France is bald (uttered in 1905) should be about a person. There is no such person, so it seems that the sentence would have to be nonsense. But the sentence makes sense and in fact is false. Russell can account for the fact that the sentence makes sense although the denoting phrase it contains has no denotation. Frege concocts a denotation, but this procedure, though it does not lead to actual logical error, is plainly artificial, and does not give an exact analysis of the matter. A Very Brief Treatment of a Second Criticism Frege s theory also suffers from some curious difficulties which show that it must be wrong. When a denoting phrase is embedded in a proposition, the proposition is about the denotation of the phrase. The first line of Gray s Elegy states a proposition. The curfew tolls the knell of parting day states a proposition. The only way to make an assertion about the meaning of the denoting phrase is to put it in quotation marks. The first line of Gray s Elegy But to get the meaning we want, we really should be putting the denotation in quotation marks: The meaning of The curfew tolls the knell of parting day, not The meaning of The first line of Gray s Elegy. But a quoted denotation is not the meaning of a denoting phrase: the meaning is based on the components of the phrase. 6

Acquaintance and Description The theory of denoting has conequences for knowledge. We know things in two ways: By being acquainted with them, Through descriptions of them. If we can apprehend (think about) a proposition, then we are acquainted with all its constituents. If we know an object (say, someone else s mind) only by description, then our knowledge can be expressed in propositions with denoting phrases, which do not contain the object itself. We then know only the properties of the object and do not know any propositions which contain the object itself. 7