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Franciscan Institute Publications Knowing God through and in All Things: A Proposal for Reading Bonaventure's "Itinerarium mentis in Deum" Author(s): Gregory F. LaNave Source: Franciscan Studies, Vol. 67 (2009), pp. 267-299 Published by: Franciscan Institute Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41975475 Accessed: 19-07-2016 13:08 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41975475?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Franciscan Institute Publications is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Franciscan Studies

Knowing God through and in All Things: A Proposal for Reading Bonaventure's Itinerarium mentis in Deum Scholars of Bonaventure's thought labor under the difficulty that the Seraphic Doctor is more widely admired than read. Yet there is one advantage they may claim: the immense popularity down through the centuries of his magnum opus: the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, "The Journey of the Mind to God." The text is poetic, concise, and dense. It summarizes many points in Bonaventure's philosophy, theology, and spirituality - indeed, it has sometimes been called a summa of his spiritual theology. In the present essay, I offer a proposal for reading the Itinerarium. I do so with two types of readers in mind. One is the Bonaventure scholar, for whom I make certain arguments concerning the logic of the text and its relationship to other works of Bonaventure. The other is the non-specialist who wishes to teach the Itinerarium as a significant part of the Christian theological patrimony. To the latter, I offer a schematic to understand the different elements of the text in their relationship to each other. This guided reading will, I hope, help the teacher to present the scientific (in the Aristotelian sense) power of Bonaventure's theology.1 1 Translations of the Itinerarium will be taken from Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, Works of Saint Bonaventure 2, revised and expanded, trans. Zachary Hayes, introduction and commentary by Philotheus Boehner (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2002), except where otherwise noted. For a distinction between a symbolic and a scientific reading of Bonaventure, see below, section 5. With respect to the Itinerarium, the question for a scientific approach is, what exactly is the way in which, at each level, the mind is raised to God? And what are the metaphysical and epistemological claims that are necessary for this itinerary? Implicit is a further question: how do these claims compare to those of other Christian thinkers who speak about our natural and graced knowledge of God? ^ 267 Franciscan ^ Studies 67 (2009)

268 Gregory F. LaNave I. Preliminary Note My preliminary claim is that the Itinerarium is best understood as divided into two trajectories: one involves the three stages of seeing God through the visible world, the soul, and what is above the soul; the other involves the three stages of seeing God in the visible world, the soul, and what is above the soul. This claim might be criticized by readers of the text. Bonaventure gives several possibilities for understanding the structure of the text in the first part of chapter 1, and does not state that one should be privileged above the others.2 However, as he goes on to explain each stage, the division that keeps reappearing is that of seeing God through and in the visible world, the soul, and what is above the soul.3 I therefore regard that division as the most sig- 2 Fundamental to all the possibilities is the idea (Itin. 1.2) that the world is divided between more distant and nearer representations of God, and so there is a threefold progression: from the world (vestige, corporeal, temporal, outside of us), to our mind (image, spiritual, everlasting, within us), to the First Principle (eternal, absolutely spiritual, and above us). Bonaventure compares this triple progression (Itin. 1.3) to three days' journey in the wilderness, the threefold enlightenment of a single day (evening, morning, noon), the threefold existence of things (in matter, in the understanding, in the eternal art), and the threefold substance of Christ (corporeal, spiritual, divine). Then come three principal aspectus of the mind (Itin. 1.4): animality, spirit, and mind. Each of these three can be divided into two (Itin. 1.5): by considering God as Alpha and Omega; by considering him as through and as in a mirror; or by considering each way in itself or in conjunction with another. Having thus established six stages, Bonaventure speaks of six corresponding powers of the soul (Itin. 1.6): senses, imagination, reason, understanding, intelligence, and synderesis. 3 In chapter 7 he summarizes what he has done as follows: "our mind has beheld God outside itself through and in vestiges, in itself through and in the image, and above itself through the similitude of the divine light shining on us and in that light" (Itin. 7.1; my translation). The language here is a little deceptive, insofar as it suggests the following order of the text: stages one and two, vestiges; stages three and four, image; stages five and six, similitude. To be sure, the distinction of vestige, image, and similitude is a key Bonaventurean theme, but the way he commonly understands it does not correspond to such a division in the Itinerarium. The image of God is treated in stage three, insofar as the soul is both oriented to God as its object and is configured like God; the similitude of God is treated in stage four, insofar as the soul through grace has become like God. Stephen Brown has noted this in his commentary on the Itinerarium (Bonaventure, The Journey of the Mind to God, trans.

Knowing god through and in All things 269 nificant.4 In what follows, I first examine certain antecedents to the Itinerarium' s structural argument in earlier works of Bonaventure. I then outline the first trajectory, highlighting its similarities and differences with those earlier works, and then the second trajectory, highlighting its uniqueness and proposing a key by which it may be understood. I close with a brief statement of the significance of my reading in light of some recent scholarship. For reference, one may use the following chart, delineating the trajectories. Knowing God through Knowing God in what is chap. 1: the consideration c^ap- 2. the considerbelow the of God through his ves- atl n of G d this in visible is soul tiges in the universe vesvf 8 in this visible world chap. 3: the consideration chap. 4: the considerili e sou 1 0f God through his ima e ation of God in his ime sou 1 imprinted on our natural age reformed through powers the gifts of grace,. chap. 5: the consider- chap" 6: the consid" whatis,. ation of the divine unity eration of the most above the through itg primary blessed Trinity in its soul name which is Being name which is the Good II. Antecedents to This Kind of Consideration of God A) Knowing God through and in The distinction between seeing God through and in is not unique to the Itinerarium. It occurs earlier, in the Commen- Philotheus Boehner, ed. Stephen F. Brown [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993], 47). What "similitude" means with reference to stage five is not clear. 4 For an attempt to correlate all of these possible divisions of the text, see Jay M. Hammond, "Order in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum," in J. A. Wayne Hellmann, Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure's Theology, trans. J. M. Hammond (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2001), 191-271.

270 Gregory F. LaNave tary on the Sentences, in two places. Though the contexts and the language are slightly different, the content of the distinction is the same.5 To know God through creatures is "to be raised from the knowledge of the creature to the knowledge of God as by way of a intermediate ladder." To know God in creatures is rather to know "his presence and influence in the creature." Bonaventure says further that knowing God through creatures is characteristic of wayfarers, and is a knowledge that is always available to them, even after the fall, though the fall darkened the mirror of creatures. To know God in creatures is characteristic of the blessed, though it can be experienced partly in this life. Both kinds of knowledge are therefore suitable to the created intellect, and possible to us in this world. On the other hand, the sense in which the creature serves as a mediator is apparently different in the two cases, though Bonaventure does not elaborate on this point. Moreover, knowing God in is more of its nature dependent upon the action of grace.6 B) Knowing God by Reason and by Faith A different kind of antecedent to the Itinerarium may be found in the first of the disputed questions De mysterio Trinitatis. No distinction is made here between knowing God through and in, but Bonaventure does identify two distinct ways of approaching the knowledge of God. The question is divided into two articles. The first asks whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth. The second asks whether the 5 In I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un., q. 3, in Omnia Opera, I (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882), 74-75. The question is whether God can be known through creatures in every state of man - innocence, fallen, redeemed, glorified. In III Sent., d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, ad 5, in Omnia Opera, the question is whether faith is empty in the state of glory. The specific objection in the latter instance refers to St. Paul in the First Letter to the Corinthians, with a distinction between seeing now as in a mirror, but then face to face. The first text distinguishes knowing God through and in creatures; the second text distinguishes knowing God through and in a mirror. 6 The fact that in the Sentences commentary both kinds of knowledge have to do with creatures signals a difference with the Itinerarium: in the latter, the end of each trajectory is the consideration of God not through and in a creature but through and in what is above the soul.

Knowing god through and in All things 271 doctrine of the Trinity is a congruous and necessary belief. Each article presents three types of arguments in support of its contention. Structurally, therefore, this question shows at least a prima facie similarity to the two threefold trajectories of the Itinerarium. Moreover, the focus of each set of arguments is echoed in the Itinerarium. The terminus of each argument in the first article of De mysterio Trinitatis is the divine Being, which is likewise the terminus of each stage of the Itinerarium' s first trajectory. The terminus of each argument in the second article is the Trinity - and this is certainly the case in the second trajectory of the Itinerarium as well. In his recent book on Bonaventure, Christopher Cullen addresses the oft-discussed question of Bonaventure's philosophy by asserting that: Bonaventure's thought presents us with genuine philosophy, whose content and spirit can be studied without entering formally into theology, in part, because he carefully distinguishes between arguments from reason and those from authority.7 The disputed question we are looking at here seems to present just such a distinction. In the first article, Bonaventure offers twenty-nine arguments for the existence of God, divided into three ways: The first way says: Every truth that is impressed in all minds is an indubitable truth. The second way says: Every truth proclaimed by all creatures is an indubitable truth. And the third way says: Every truth which, in itself, is most certain and most evident is an indubitable truth.8 7 Christopher M. Cullen, Bonaventure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 35. 8 De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1 (Bonaventure, Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, Works of Saint Bonaventure 3, trans. Zachary Hayes, [St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1979], 107).

272 Gregory F. LaNave The three ways might be called the way of illumination, the way of causality, and the way of ontological affirmation. Each of these ways consists of a thoroughly philosophical approach to the question. All creatures proclaim the existence of God their cause; all rational minds are illumined by the impression of the divine Mind; and the most certain and evident truths, considered in themselves, show the indubitability of God's existence.9 The second article presents a somewhat greater range of argument. The credibility of faith in the Trinity is testified to through three "books": the book of creation, the book of Scripture, and the book of life. In the book of creation we see that creatures are either vestiges of God, which in one way or another point to a threefold distinction in God - that is, the Trinitarian appropriations - or images of God, in which the relationship of the powers of memory, intellect, and will function as an image of the Trinity. In the book of Scripture, there is an implicit witness to the Trinity in the Old Testament, and an explicit witness in the New Testament. The book of life refers to the illumination of the human mind. Bonaventure distinguishes here between the innate light of the mind and an infused light. Both come from God; the innate light belongs to us by creation, the infused light by grace. These two cooperate in our thinking about God, so that we can reason, in a way reminiscent of Richard of St. Victor, to the credibility of the Trinity.10 In brief, one is bound to think of God in the highest and most reverent manner possible. If one were to deny that God is capable - that he has the power - of producing an eternal beloved and co-beloved, one would not be thinking of him in the highest manner; if one were to admit that he is capable of this but deny that he wills to do so, one would not be thinking of him in the most reverent 9 For a detailed analysis of these types of proofs, see Tim Noone and R.E. Houser, "Saint Bonaventure," in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005). See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure. 10 Cf. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, book 3, ed, Jean Ribaillier, Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958).

Knowing god through and in All things 273 manner. The innate light of reason and the infused light of grace cooperate in this argument.11 Cullen's distinction between philosophy and theology seems to be verified here, in that the proofs of God's existence in the first article are all philosophical, and the arguments for the credibility of the Trinity in the second article are theological - if not based on arguments of authority, they at least require the illumination of faith in order to reach their conclusion. The content of this question can be summarized in the following outline: De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1: Whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth of reason The way of illumination: "Every truth that is impressed in all minds is an indubitable truth." The way of causality: "Every truth proclaimed by all creatures is an indubitable truth." The way of ontological affirmation: "Every truth which, in itself, is most certain and most evident is an indubitable truth." De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 2: Whether the doctrine of the Trinity is credible (i.e., congruous for belief and worthy to be believed) The book of creatures: creatures are either vestiges or images of God - Vestiges point to the Trinitarian appropriations - The intellectual soul, as image, points to the Trinitarian relations The book of Scripture: the testimony of faith - In the Old Testament, the Trinity is presented figuratively - In the New Testament, the Trinity is presented clearly 11 In a reply to an objection, Bonaventure says that fallen reason thinks that God cannot be both one and three, that innocent reason dictates something consonant with this, and that reason elevated by grace dictates the very truth itself. The argument is based not on reason in the light of nature, but on "elevated reason."

274 Gregory F. LaNave The book of life: the light that shines on our minds - In the innate light of nature, thinking of God most highly, we see that he is able to produce an eternal beloved and co-beloved - In the infused light of grace, thinking of God most reverently, we see that he does will to produce this eternal beloved and co-beloved C) The Relation of Creatures to God: Vestige, Image, Likeness A final, typical way Bonaventure has of schematizing his doctrine of our rising to the consideration of God is based on a triple distinction he makes between creatures. This is what Etienne Gilson has called Bonaventure's doctrine of "universal analogy."12 Every created thing can be described as a vestige, an image, or a likeness of God. In brief, non-rational natures are vestiges of God, the intellectual soul is an image of God, and the soul that has received grace is a likeness of God. Thus one may come to the knowledge of God through any creature; but the kind of knowledge that results depends on whether the creature is considered as a vestige, an image, or a likeness. This kind of argument occurs in several texts.13 Other texts simply refer to a distinction between the vestige and the image.14 It is typical of all these texts that they are not primarily concerned with constructing demonstrative arguments for the existence of God. Some of them have broader epistemological concerns, showing how true knowledge is possible for man because he is made in the image of God. Others have more to do with unfolding the different kinds of representations of God. Yet in the Breviloquium Bonaventure states forthrightly an integral point of his doctrine of cre- 12 Étienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, trans. Dom 111- tyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed (London: Sheed & Ward, 1940), ch. 7. 13 De sc. Chr., q. 4; Brev. 2.12; "Christus unus omnium magister," 16-17. 14 1 Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un., q. 2, ad 4; II Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1; De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 2.

Knowing god through and in All things 275 ation: in the state of innocence, God could have been known on the basis of this universal analogy.15 III. First Trajectory: Knowing God Through The bulk of my argument concerning the reading of the Itinerarium concerns the second trajectory. The first trajectory is rather more straightforward, and certainly is related to some of the other texts mentioned above. In this section, therefore, I will limit myself to drawing out those connections and commenting on a few distinctive marks of the first trajectory. Before turning to the individual chapters of the Itinerarium, one may make a more general comment. Looking at the antecedents of the Itinerarium in the Sentences commentary and De mysterio Trinitatis, one may expect that Bonaventure will equate knowing God through and knowing him in the way of philosophy. In fact, the Itinerarium! s retrieval of the earlier material is more complicated. Below is an outline of the first trajectory of the Itinerarium, showing its correspondence to De mysterio Trinitatis. Itin. 1: Through the vestiges of God in the visible world one sees the existence of the first principle (= De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1 [the way of causality] ) the Trinitarian appropriations (= De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 2 [the book of creatures]). Itin. 3: Through the image of God (i.e., the rational soul) one sees God as the object of its powers (= De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1 [the way of illumination] ) the Trinity by the relationship of its powers (= De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 2 [the book of creatures]) 15 Brev. 2.12.4. Nevertheless, this knowledge is made possible through grace: "when the image was not yet spoiled but rendered God-like through grace, the book of creation sufficed to enable human beings to perceive the light of divine Wisdom" (Bonaventure, Breviloquium, Works of Saint Bonaventure 9, tran. Dominic V. Monti [St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2005], 97).

276 Gregory F. LaNave Itin. 5: Ontological argument for the existence of the highest Being (= De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1 [the way of ontological affirmation]) In addition to the philosophical arguments, the first trajectory of the Itinerarium draws upon the disputed question's theological arguments regarding the book of creatures. A) Chapter 1 The vestiges of God are, most basically, a "distinction of essential properties" that point to the Trinitarian appropriations, not to the personal properties or the persons themselves. This is the teaching laid down in the Sentences commentary, and followed strictly in De mysterio Trinitatis and Itinerarium l.16 Every sensible reality allows one to rise to the consideration of its efficient, formal, and final cause, namely, the power, wisdom, and goodness of God. "The supreme power, wisdom, and benevolence of the Creator shines forth in created things as the bodily senses make this known to the interior senses" (Itin. 1.10).17 A striking point of the Itinerarium 's treatment of this topic is the broad range of things that are included under the "vestiges of God." In common with his fellow Schoolmen,18 and St. Augustine before them, Bonaventure finds support for the idea that every created thing is a vestige of God in the Vulgate translation of Wisdom 11:21: "You have disposed of all things in measure and number and weight." This triad, and others like it,19 which may be found in all creatures, points 16 1 Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un., q. 4, ad 3. 17 See also I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un., q. 2, ad 4. 18 See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 45, a. 7. 19 For a comprehensive listing of the possible triads, see I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, dub. 3. (1) Considered in itself according to the substance of its principles the creature consists of matter, form, and composition. (2) Considered in itself according to its situation it is disposed by number, weight, and measure. (3) Considered with respect to other creatures in terms of its natural action it acts by substance, power, and operation. (4) Considered with respect to other creatures in terms of its spiritual action it consists of that by which it is, that by which it is fitting, and that by which it is distinct. (5) Considered with respect to God in terms of its simple reference

Knowing god through and in All things 211 to the Trinitarian appropriations. The presence of such an argument here is only to be expected. More striking is the fact that Bonaventure includes as well the consideration of things that can be known only in faith. The believer comes to the power, providence, and justice of God in considering the origin, development, and end of the world (Ititi. 1.12). Furthermore, he comes to the immensity of divine wisdom in considering the order of divine laws, precepts, and judgments in Scripture, and the immensity of his goodness in considering the order of the divine sacraments, graces, and rewards ( Itin. 1.14). If this trajectory of the Itinerarium were concerned only with philosophical ways to God, such considerations would be entirely out of place, resting as they do on faith. Nevertheless, the terminus of such arguments is the same as the others in chapter 1: they come to the Trinitarian appropriations, not the Trinitarian relations.20 B) Chapter 3 In chapter 3, Bonaventure turns to the "image of God." The key consideration is that Bonaventure means two things when he speaks of this image. Generally speaking, "image" refers to similarity in configuration, the distinction and relationship of parts - as opposed to "likeness," which refers to to him it exists by mode, species, and order. (6) Considered with respect to God in terms of both its reference and assimilation to him it exists by unity, truth, and goodness. 20 Hammond, "Order in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum 228, in his symbolic reading (I will say more about this in section 5), does not wish to make too great a distinction between God as First Principle and God as Trinity. He puts it this way: "while God always relates to creation as one principle ( primum ), this one principle always remains a Trinity of persons (primitas) T What then is the terminus of the mind's ascent to God through his vestiges? God as First Principle, indeed, but the Trinity as well, inasmuch as, according to Hammond, one should never think of the one entirely without the other. To end at a pure First Cause that could just as well be unitarian as Trinitarian would undercut the symbolic value of this line of thought. Therefore, this view sees the power, wisdom, and goodness of God not so much as Trinitarian appropriations, but as pointing to - though not proving - the Trinitarian persons. Yet it is striking that, as Hammond acknowledges, there is only one explicit mention of the Trinity in this section (Itin. 1.14); see Hammond, "Order in the Itinerarium," 232 n. 139.

278 Gregory F. LaNave a similarity in quality.21 In this way, the rational soul is the image of God. Furthermore, as the image of God, the human soul has God as its object; it is invariably oriented toward him.22 The soul without grace has lost the likeness to God, but it bears God's image ( imago creationis ) because (1) it is one substance with three powers, and (2) these native powers, however deformed by sin, are ineluctably turned toward God. These distinctions, familiar from earlier texts, are recapitulated in Itinerarium 3. 23 Thus the consideration of God to which one is raised through the soul is twofold. In line with the sense of image as orientation to God, we rise from the soul to consider the reality of the divine Being, known in accord with Bonaventure's philosophical doctrine of illumination.24 In line with the sense of image as configuration, we rise from the soul to consider the Trinitarian relations, seen by faith through considering the analogy of the Trinity in the relation of the powers of the soul. There is no question here of a philosophical proof of the doctrine of the Trinity. It is thanks to the purification of the mind through faith that 21 Bonaventure, II Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1; d. 16, a. 2, q. 3. 22 See also Bonaventure, De sc. Chr., q. 4. 23 See also Brev. 5.4.4. 24 For a good account of this, see Andreas Speer, "The Certainty and Scope of Knowledge: Bonaventure's Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 3 (1993): 35-61. Bonaventure's epistemology draws from both Plato and Aristotle. From Aristotle he takes the notion of abstraction, and from Plato he takes the notion of illumination. Briefly, the soul is able to know things with certitude because it abstracts the form from the object known and judges it in light of the soul's orientation to God's knowledge of the form. Similarly, in discussing the powers of the soul in chapter 3 of the Itinerarium, Bonaventure speaks of their orientation to God. For example: the memory contains within itself simple forms that must be infused from above ( Itin. 3.2); the intellect can know with certitude only by means of an unchanging, uncreated light (Itin. 3.3); and the will can judge one thing as better than another only with an implicit appeal to the notion of the highest good, which is impressed on the soul (Itin. 3.4). This is again suggestive of the Trinitarian appropriations, with the will pointing to the highest goodness, the intellect to the highest wisdom, and the memory to the highest being (rather than power).

Knowing god through and in All things 279 one sees the proper force of the analogia Trinitatis,25 As in chapter 1, Bonaventure does not restrict himself to a purely philosophical argument. C) Chapter 5 Turning above the soul, in chapter 5, we come to a more direct consideration of the divine Being. This is the ontological consideration, the raising of the mind to that which is implied in its fundamental understanding of being, and therefore cannot be thought not to be. Anselm's ontological argument lurks in the background, obviously. And not for the first time. In fact, there are clear antecedents for this chapter in De mysterio Trinitatis, with the philosophical proof from that which is most certain, and in the Sentences commentary.26 Although we are not at this level looking at particular created beings, we may still speak of a knowledge of God through - that is, through the way that he is present to us. The object is the "light that is impressed upon our minds" (Itin. 5.1; my translation), also called the "similitude of the divine light" (Itin. 7.1). 27 Distinctive about the Itinerarium1 s treatment is that it does not stop at the affirmation of the existence of the divine Being, but goes on to say something about the essential attributes of that Being. The "most pure Being" is first, eternal, most simple, most actual, most perfect, and supremely one.28 Bonaventure is not interested in a mere enumeration of these attributes. The point of this chapter is the way in which simple attentiveness to that which is implied in every- 25 On this point, the Itinerarium is perfectly consistent with the earlier view of the Sentences commentary: I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, a. 3. 26 Bonaventure, De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1; I Sent., d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2. See Noone and Houser, "Saint Bonaventure," section 5, "God." 27 This is to be distinguished from the rational creature as similitude of God, which is the subject of Itinerarium 4. See note 3, above. 28 De mysterio Trinitatis likewise treats of the qualities of the divine Being {De myst. Trin., qq. 2-7), though the order is a little different: God is supremely one, most simple, infinite, eternal, immutable, and necessary. The significance of these orders requires further study. See Sébastien Perdrix, "Les Questions disputées sur le mystère de la Trinité : Le De Deo uno de saint Bonaventure?" Revue Thomiste 107 (2007): 591-624.

280 Gregory F. LaNave thing we know brings us to the thought of God. The terminus of the argument here is, as it was clearly in chapter 1, and more implicitly in chapter 3, the power, wisdom, and goodness of God (Itin. 5.7). It is not sufficient for Bonaventure to point to pure being and say, "and this is God." Only when we recognize the divine qualities, and what is implied in them, do we really gain an insight into the Trinitarian appropriations. The way this works in chapter 5 is as follows. First we come to recognize the divine qualities mentioned above. Then we come to realize that these imply other qualities. The pure being is first, and also last - and last precisely because it is first: For since it is first, it does all things for its own sake. Thus the first being is of necessity the final end, the beginning and the consummation, the Alpha and the Omega (Itin. 5.7). Again, the pure being is eternal, and also most present, and present because it is eternal: Because it is eternal, it does not come from another, and of itself it does not cease to exist, nor does it move from one state to another. Therefore it has neither past nor future, but its being is only in the present (Itin. 5.7). The same can be said of all the other qualities.29 All of these considerations flesh out the teaching that God is First Cause, Final End, and Exemplary Cause of creation - or in other words, that he is all-powerful, all-good, and all-wise. 29 Ewert Cousins, Bonaventure and the Coincidence ofopposites (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), famously called this the "coincidence of opposites," a term that has been picked up by such scholars as Jay Hammond and Ilia Delio (see Ewert Cousins, Insofar as the phrase suggests that the chief point of enumerating these mutually implied qualities is that Bonaventure would have us contemplate them as a symbol that brings us to the consideration of the divine, I find it uncongenial to my own reading of Bonaventure.

Knowing god through and in All things 281 We will see later that the consideration of the Trinity (in chap. 6) is even more important to Bonaventure's conception of God. To anticipate, recognizing God as good involves seeing in the relations of the divine persons the principle of selfdiffusive goodness; but this only comes insofar as one enters into the life of God. Here, the argumentative reduction is not to the inner life of God, but to his creative essence. And that essence is seen most clearly in recognizing the fullness of God's relation to the world. Cullen's claim regarding the distinction of philosophy and theology in Bonaventure is verified in this trajectory of the Itinerarium, for one can clearly distinguish those things that are known by way of reason and those things that are known by way of faith. But as part of the same trajectory they fall under a more encompassing category. In brief, I suggest that the knowing of God through in this trajectory of the Itinerarium is based in the consideration of what things are. If knowing what something is - for example, the course of history, or the image of the Trinity in the soul - requires faith, so be it. If the knowledge of what something is does not require faith, then it can be thought of on the level of philosophy simply, and opens the possibility for a philosophical demonstration of the terminus of the argument, that is, the existence of the divine Being. In either case, one is called to consider in the most precise - even analytical - manner possible, the nature of things, and to come to three distinct kinds of knowledge of God as a result. IV. Second Trajectory: Knowing God In If the first trajectory has to do with what things are, what is left for the second trajectory? Something new is going on in these chapters of the Itinerarium. In the Sentences commentary we read that to know God in a creature is to know his presence and influence in the creature, and it is a knowledge that appears to depend on grace; but little more is said there. The theological way of approaching the knowledge of the Trinity in De mysterio Trinitatis is mostly not on display here. A different key must be found for this trajectory.

282 Gregory F. LaNave I suggest that key is Bonaventure's doctrine of sensation. In chapter 2, he lays out this doctrine. Sensation involves three processes: apprehension, pleasure,30 and judgment. The sensible object generates a similitude, or likeness, of itself, which is apprehended by the perceiver. The received similitude causes pleasure in the senses, in accord with its proportionality to its source, its medium, or the object on which it acts; thus Bonaventure distinguishes three kinds of pleasure: beauty, sweetness, and wholesomeness. Finally, the received similitude is purified and abstracted from its sensible particularity by judgment so that it may enter the intellective faculty. All of these activities, Bonaventure says, "are vestiges in which we can see our God." This explains why he deals with them in this chapter, which is on the consideration of God in his vestiges. The ramifications of the doctrine of sensation extend further, however, through the other stages of this trajectory. The considerations of God in his image reformed by grace (chap. 4) and in the name of the blessed Trinity, which is Good (chap. 6), are likewise marked by the qualities of sensation. They include a direct apprehension of God in the soul and in what is above the soul, a capacity to receive pleasure in that apprehension, and a formation of the soul in conformity to what it perceives (corresponding to judgment). The following outline gives a summary of the function of the moments of sensation at each level of this trajectory. I tin. 2: Knowing God in his vestiges in the visible world Apprehension - The apprehension of an object through its similitude "manifestly suggests" the eternal generation of the Son from the Father. Pleasure - The experience of beauty "suggests" the perfect beauty which is the perfect correspondence between the Son and the Father. This perfect beauty is also seen to be most sweet and most wholesome. Judgment - Judgment is possible because our minds are by nature oriented toward the eternal Truth in God. 30 Following Hayes's translation, I use "pleasure" ( oblectatio ) and "delight" ( delectatio ) interchangeably in what follows.

Knowing god through and in All things 283 The fact of judgment points "in a way that is more excellent and more immediate" to that Truth, which we know in faith as the Word of God, the Second Person of the Trinity. Itin. 4: Knowing God in the soul reformed by grace Apprehension - Through grace, the soul has a direct apprehension of the Son, whether as mediator between God and man; as the uncreated, incarnate, and inspired Word; or as the Bridegroom. Pleasure - The soul is able to apprehend the Son in these various ways insofar as it is informed by the theological virtues, the spiritual senses, or the spiritual transports. Judgment - The soul thus informed becomes "a house of God," conformed to the angelic hierarchy, a dwellingplace for the Word. Itin. 6: Knowing the Trinity in its name which is Good (cf. De myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 2) Apprehension - Through its conformity to the Word, the soul perceives that he is the generated similitude of the Father because the law of the Trinity is the law of goodness. To see the goodness of God truly is to see that God must be a Trinity. Pleasure - Such perceptions fill the soul with amazement. The goodness of God displayed in the incarnation and crucifixion calls forth even more wonder. And the soul's delight is made perfect when it sees that through the incarnation and crucifixion it is made capable of union with God. Judgment - Union with God is accomplished through conformity to the Crucified. The pattern for contemplation is St. Francis, who was inflamed with love for Christ and so able to be conformed to him. A) Chapter 2 If chapter 2 is the key to what is new in this trajectory, it is also the most difficult to understand. Bonaventure begins

284 Gregory F. LaNave the chapter by talking about contemplating God in sensible creatures, "in as far as God is present in them by essence, power, and presence" (Itin. 2.1). This triad was well known to the Schoolmen, inherited from a comment in the Glossa ordinaria on Song of Songs 5:17. It was taken by them to refer to God's omnipresence, and Bonaventure indeed adverts to it in that context in his commentary on the Sentences.31 When he speaks of knowing God in creatures earlier in the same commentary, however, he uses a different expression: to know God in creatures is to know "his presence and influence in the creature."32 He also adds that this knowledge is perfect in the blessed and is partially accessible to man in via. As I have noted above, this suggests that such knowledge is in some way dependent on grace - and therefore is distinct from a purely philosophical knowledge of God's omnipresence. Bearing this in mind, we must suspect that whatever Bonaventure means by seeing God in creatures in his essence, power, and presence, he does not mean simply that God's causal power can and should be seen in the creature. This is a philosophical vision that has already been dealt with in chapter 1. The key to the chapter is Bonaventure's appeal to the doctrine of sensation. What does it mean - what could it mean - to say that one rises to the consideration of God in the process of sensation? One possible interpretation, which is indeed followed by some commentators, is as follows. It is simple enough to say that what we find in apprehension, with the object generating a similitude of itself, is like the perfect generation of the Son from the Father. Since I, as a Christian, know the fact of the eternal generation of the Son, I can be raised to the thought of it when I reflect on what happens in sensory apprehension. The natural generation of a similitude is thus 31 I Sent., d. 37, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2. For an exposition of Bonaventure's thought on this point, see Adrian Fuerst, O.S.B., An Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Omnipresence of God in Selected Writings between 1220 to 1270, The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology (second series) no. 62 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1951), 146-70. 32 See note 5, above.

Knowing god through and in All things 285 a suitable analogy for the Trinitarian procession.33 So much may be easily admitted. There is no difficulty in supposing that the human knower, especially as influenced by grace, can move so swiftly from the perception of a creaturely reality to the idea of God that he seems to find the very idea of God in the thing.34 My own reading is that our knowledge in faith of the Trinity is directly implicated in natural sensation. Our knowledge of the perfect generation in the Trinity conditions our experience of sensate apprehension, our knowledge of supreme delight in the Son conditions our experience of sensate delight, and our knowledge of the Son as the Eternal Art in whom lies the truth of all things is directly implicated in the judgments we make upon our sensations.35 It is most revealing to begin with judgment, which Bonaventure says points to God "in a way that is more excel- 33 Hammond, "Order in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum," 233-34 gives a very strong presentation of this line of argument. He reads the three moments of sensation in terms of a symbolic evocation of the Trinity. The content and ordering of the symbols is important. Hammond wants to find a one-to-one correlation between the moments of apprehension, pleasure, and judgment and Goďs essence, power, and presence. According to this view, Bonaventure is pointing to the mystery in an ordered and evocative way. This is neither simply a philosophical understanding of the creature, nor a theological eisegesis into the book of creation. It is a cooperation between the light of nature and the light of faith, each pointing to the other. 34 Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 18, a. 2 speaks of a cognition like this belonging to Adam before the Fall: "there were thus in man two kinds of knowledge of God, one, by which he knew God as the angels do, through an internal inspiration; the other, by which he knew God as we do, through sensible creatures. However, this second knowledge of his differed from our knowledge as the investigation of one who has the habit of a science and proceeds from things he knows to a consideration of things which he had once known differs from the investigation of one who is learning and strives to proceed from what he knows to things which he does not know/' 35 Contrary to a more symbolic reading, I would highlight the possibilities inherent in the strict objectivity of sensation. In apprehension I am really confronted with an object. My sense of pleasure comes from my capacity to be properly attuned to that object, and in judgment my perceptions are made firm and secure. In general, my argument is that this whole second trajectory of the Itinerarium ought to be seen in terms of a logic of sensation: Bonaventure is pointing us, in various ways, to a real object, a real capacity for that object, and a real transformation in us in relation to that object.

286 Gregory F. LaNave lent and more immediate" than do apprehension and delight. Judgment naturally occurs through our direct relationship to God. "Through [Eternal Art] our mind comes to judge about all those things which enter into it through the senses." Bonaventure is expressing here his version of Augustinián illumination theory. Briefly, the truth of any sensible thing lies in three places: in the thing itself, in our minds, and in the mind of God (the "Eternal Art"). Only in God does that truth exist immutably, and so only by reference to God's idea of the thing is the truth of the thing known with certitude. Sensory cognition therefore involves two aspects: the intellectual abstraction of the form from the thing, and comparison of this abstracted form to its eternal exemplar. This is a thoroughly natural process. The mind, created in the image of God, is ineluctably directed toward God, and therefore toward his eternal knowledge of things. From the fact of judgment we therefore rise, "in a way that is more excellent and more immediate," to the consideration of the eternal exemplarity of things in God.36 Judgment absolutely requires recurring to the Eternal Art. Delight and apprehension do not absolutely require advertence to the eternal procession of the Son or his perfect proportionality to the Father - indeed, to claim that they do would suggest the kind of natural proof of the Trinity that Bonaventure steadfastly eschews. Instead, delight and apprehension are conditioned by the eternal procession and proportionality. Regarding delight, Bonaventure says the Son, the eternal Likeness of God, is perfectly proportioned to the Father, and therefore is most beautiful, most sweet, and most wholesome. Moreover, "it is in God alone that the fontal and true delight 36 See Speer, "The Certainty and Scope of Knowledge." Hammond, "Order in the Itinerarium, 234, in his attempt to understand judgment symbolically, says that the natural experience of judgment is an analogy revealing that a thing's existence is eternally present in the Eternal Art. I do not see the analogy. Perhaps, if I judged a sensible object simply on the basis of the idea of the object pre-existing in my mind, then there would be an analogy between this and the pre-existence of all ideas in the divine Mind. But in fact Bonaventure's epistemology requires us to turn immediately to the ideas in the divine Mind. This is what allows us to judge.

Knowing god through and in All things 287 is to be found. So it is that from all other delights we are led to seek him" ( Itin. 2.8; translation modified).37 There is clearly an analogy between my natural experience of beauty - the proportion of a similitude to the object that generates it - and the perfect proportionality between the Son of God and the Father. But there are also the delights of sweetness and wholesomeness. That is experienced as most sweet which is best proportioned to the perception of the recipient, and most wholesome which best fulfills the needs of the recipient. Bonaventure says here that these qualities may be attributed to the Son, but he does not spell out how. The recipient in question is certainly the human being. If I, the perceiver, am to regard the Son as most sweet and most wholesome, it must be because I sense his proportion to my perceptive power and my needs. To make sense of this, I would introduce another key Bonaventurean theme, one we find elsewhere in the Itinerarium and throughout his works: to speak of the Son of God is to speak at once of the uncreated Word, the inspired Word, and the incarnate and crucified Word. Each of these corresponds to an element of Bonaventure's description of delight. The uncreated Word is most beautiful since he is the perfect expression of his source, the Father; the inspired Word is most sweet because the revelation of God38 is perfectly proportioned to the perceptive power of fallen man; and the incarnate and crucified Word is most wholesome because it is in these forms that the Word satisfies our deepest need - namely, the need for redemption. Therefore, when Bonaventure says that the 37 Hammond, "Order in the Itinerarium, 233, explains this by saying that "the divine emanation is the primordial source of all earthly delight." Furthermore, he says, delight reveals the Trinitarian influence upon a thing's power or operation. That is, visible things are beautiful because the delight they evoke in us points in a symbolic way to the primal beauty which is the Son, the perfect Image of the Father. So far as it goes, this reading is plausible. But Hammond's treatment of delight here is incomplete, precisely because in focusing on the correspondence between Father and Son, he attends only to the sense of beauty, and not those of sweetness and wholesomeness. 38 This revelation occurs in a variety of ways, most notably in Scripture and in the imitation of Christ that pertains to the life of the evangelical counsels.

288 Gregory F. LaNave experience of delight "suggests" the idea of the perfect delight in the primal similitude, I understand him to be saying that our experience of the Word in these various forms conditions our experience of sensible delight.39 Regarding apprehension, Bonaventure says that the process whereby an object generates a similitude which is united with the receptive organ of the perceiver "manifestly suggests that the Eternal Light begets of himself a Likeness or co-equal, consubstantial, and co-eternal Splendor... which is united by the grace of union to the individual of rational nature" in the incarnation. If, therefore, it is in the nature of all knowable things to generate a likeness of themselves, they clearly proclaim that in them as in mirrors can we see the eternal generation of the Word, the Image, and the Son eternally emanating from God the Father" ( Itin. 2.7).40 What is most notable about Bonaventure's account of apprehension is his introduction of the idea of the similitude. We apprehend sensible objects not directly, but only through the mediation of a similitude. This is an original solution of a dispute between an Augustinián and an Aristotelian account 39 See Gregory LaNave, Through Holiness to Wisdom: The Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure (Rome: Istituto storico dei cappuccini, 2005), 104: "when the believer, who knows the supreme wholesomeness of redemption, experiences wholesomeness in the perception of sensible objects, he is made to think of the supreme wholesomeness, for it is that which conditions his whole experience of the wholesome. To the unbeliever, the experience of pleasure in natural sensation will seem to be something quite other than what he perceives in the incarnation or the crucifixion, even if he is willing to concede that these doctrines say something about the goodness, or the humility, of God. The crucifixion in particular he might well judge to be ugly or distressing. But when one knows and loves what is present in the crucifixion, one has a different judgment about what is truly pleasureable." 40 Hammond s, Order in the Itinerarium, 233 reading of this is that in apprehension we perceive the essence of things, and find in there a symbol - namely, the object's generation of a similitude - that analogously represents the divine Trinitarian essence.