Third Declension (Intro) Accommodates nouns that end in a, e, i, o, y, c, l, n, r, s, t, x. Third Declension (consonant stems) Masc. and fem. gender: Singular Example Plural Example N lux es luces V lux es luces G is lucis um lucum D i luci ibus lucibus Ac em lucem es luces Ab e luce ibus lucibus Neuter gender: Singular Example Plural Example N litus a litora V litus a litora G is litoris um litorum D i litori ibus litoribus Ac litus a litora Ab e litore ibus litoribus Third Declension (i stem nouns) Masc. and fem. gender: Singular Example Plural Example N nauis es naues V nauis es naues G is nauis ium nauium D i naui ibus nauibus Ac em nauem es/is naues Ab e naue ibus nauibus Neuter gender: Singular Example Plural Example N mare ia maria V mare ia maria G is maris ium marium D i mari ibus maribus Ac mare ia maria Ab i mari ibus maribus 1
Third Declension (2 consonant stems) Masc. and fem. gender: Singular Example Plural Example N urbs es urbes V urbs es urbes G is urbis ium urbium D i urbi ibus urbibus Ac em urbem es urbes Ab e urbe ibus urbibus Third Declension (r/l stem nouns) Masc. and fem. gender: Singular Example Plural Example N pater es patres V pater es patres G is patris um patrum D i patri ibus patribus Ac em patrem es patres Ab e patre ibus patribus 2
Latin Abbreviations in Regular English Use A.B. (Artium Baccalaureus) Bachelor of Arts B.A. (Baccalaureus Artium) Bachelor of Arts D.M. (Doctor Medicinae) Doctor of Medicine J.C.D. (Iuris Civilis Doctor) Doctor of Civil Law A.C. (ante Christum) before Christ A.D. (anno domini) in the year of the Lord ad inf., ad infin. (ad infinitum) to infinity ad int. (ad interim) in the meantime ad fin. (ad finem) near the end [of the page] ad loc. (ad locum) to the place ad val. (ad valorem) according to the value ae., aet., aetat. (aetatis) of age, aged Ag (argentum) silver A.M. (anno mundi) in the year of the world A.M. (ante meridiem) before midday A.M. (ante mortem) before death A.M. (Artium Magister) Master of Arts A.R. (anno regni) in the year of the reign a.u.c. (ab urbe condita, anno urbis conditae) from the founding of the city B.D. (Baccalaureus Divinitatis) Bachelor of Divinity B.L. (Baccalaureus Legum) Bachelor of Law B.Lit. (Baccalaureus Lit[t]erarum) Bachelor of Literature (or Letters) B.M. (Baccalaureus Medicinae) Bachelor of Medicine B.Mus. (Baccalaureus Musicae) Bachelor of Music B.Phil. (Baccalaureus Philosophiae) Bachelor of Philosophy B.S., B.Sc. (Baccalaureus Scientiae) Bachelor of Science c. (cum) with ca., cir., circ. (circa) about cf. (confer) compare D.D. (Divinitatis Doctor) Doctor of Divinity D.G. (Dei Gratia) By the grace of God D.Lit. (Doctor Litterarum) Doctor of Literature 3 d.s.p. (decessit sine prole) Died without issue D.V. (Deo volente) God willing e.g. (exempli gratia) for [the sake of an] example et al. (et alii, et alia) and others etc. (et cetera) and the rest, and so forth et seq. (et sequens, et sequentes, et sequentia) and the following ff. (foliis) on the [following] pages hab. corp. (habeas corpus) you may have the body H.J.S. (hic iacet sepultus) here lies buried H.R.I.P. (hic requiescit in pace) here rests in peace ib., ibid. (ibidem) in the same place id. (idem) the same i.e. (id est) that is in loc. (in loco) in the place J.D. (Iuris Doctor) Doctor of Law J.U.D. (Iuris Ultriusque Doctor) Doctor of both Civil and Canon Law lb. (libra) pound l.c., loc. cit. (loco citato) in the place cited LL. D. (Legum Doctor) Doctor of Laws loq. (loquitur) he (she, it) speaks m.(meridies) midday M.A. (Magister Artium) Master of Arts M.D. (Medicinae Doctor) Doctor of Medicine M.O. (modus operandi) method of operating N.B. (Nota bene) Note well no. (numero) by number non obst. (non obstante) notwithstanding non seq. (non sequitur) it does not follow N.P. (nisi prisus) no protest
n.r. (non repetatur) do not repeat ob. (obiit) he died op. cit. (opere citato) in the work cited p.d. (per diem) by the day per an. (per annum) by the year per cent. (per centum) per hundred Ph. D. (Philosophiae Doctor) Doctor of Philosophy P.M. (post meridiem) after midday p.r.n. (pro re nata) as the need arises pro tem. (pro tempore) for the time, temporarily prox. (proximo mense) next month P.S. (post scriptum) written after Q. (quasi) as it were, almost q.d. (quaque die) every day R. (regina, rex) Queen, King R.I.P. (Requiescat in pace) May he rest in peace Rx. (recipe) take S.C. (Senatus Consultum) decree of the Senate S.C.U. (Senatus Consultum Ultimum) final decree of the Senate (martial law) s.d. (sine die) without [appointing] a day seq., seqq. (sequentia) following s.i.d. (semel in die) once a day s.p. (sine prole) without issue S.P.Q.R. (Senatus Populusque Romanus) The Senate and the Roman People stat. (statim) immediately s.v. (sub vero) under the word tal. (talis) of such U.D. (ut dictum) as directed ult. (ultimo mense) last month vox pop. (vox populi) voice of the people vs. (versus) against v.s. (vide super) see above 4
Confessions of St. Augustine (Book X) [I 1] Cognoscam te, cognitor meus, cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum. Virtus animae meae, intra in eam et coapta tibi, ut habeas et possideas sine macula et ruga. Haec est mea spes, ideo loquor et in ea spe gaudeo, quando sanum gaudeo. Cetera vero vitae huius tanto minus flenda, quanto magis fletur, et tanto magis flenda, quanto minus fletur in eis. Ecce enim veritatem dilexisti, quoniam qui facit eam, venit ad lucem. Volo eam facere in corde meo coram te in confessione, in stilo autem meo coram multis testibus. [II 2] Et tibi quidem, domine, cuius oculis nuda est abyssus humanae conscientiae, quid occultum esset in me, etiamsi nollem confiteri tibi? Te enim mihi absconderem, non me tibi. Nunc autem quod gemitus meus testis est displicere me mihi, tu refulges et places et amaris et desideraris, ut erubescam de me et abiciam me atque eligam te et nec tibi nec mihi placeam nisi de te. Tibi ergo, domine, manifestus sum, quicumque sim. Et quo fructu tibi confitear, dixi. Neque id ago verbis carnis et vocibus, sed verbis animae et clamore cogitationis, quem nouit auris tua. Cum enim malus sum, nihil est aliud confiteri tibi quam displicere mihi; cum vero pius, nihil est aliud confiteri tibi quam hoc non tribuere mihi, quoniam tu, domine benedicis iustum, sed prius eum iustificas impium. Confessio itaque mea, deus meus, in conspectu tuo tibi tacite fit et non tacite. Tacet enim strepitu, clamat affectu. Neque enim dico recti aliquid hominibus, quod non a me tu prius audieris, aut etiam tu aliquid tale audis a me, quod non mihi tu prius dixeris. [III 3] Quid mihi ergo est cum hominibus, ut audiant confessiones meas, quasi ipsi sanaturi sint omnes languores meos? Curiosum genus ad cognoscendam [10.1.1] Let me know Thee, O Lord, who knowest me: let me know Thee, as I am known. Power of my soul, enter into it, and fit it for Thee, that Thou mayest have and hold it without spot or wrinkle. This is my hope, therefore do I speak; and in this hope do I rejoice, when I rejoice healthfully. Other things of this life are the less to be sorrowed for, the more they are sorrowed for; and the more to be sorrowed for, the less men sorrow for them. For behold, Thou lovest the truth, and he that doth it, cometh to the light. This would I do in my heart before Thee in confession: and in my writing, before many witnesses. [10.2.2] And from Thee, O Lord, unto whose eyes the abyss of man's conscience is naked, what could be hidden in me though I would not confess it? For I should hide Thee from me, not me from Thee. But now, for that my groaning is witness, that I am displeased with myself, Thou shinest out, and art pleasing, and beloved, and longed for; that I may be ashamed of myself, and renounce myself, and choose Thee, and neither please Thee nor myself, but in Thee. To Thee therefore, O Lord, am I open, whatever I am; and with what fruit I confess unto Thee, I have said. Nor do I it with words and sounds of the flesh, but with the words of my soul, and the cry of the thought which Thy ear knoweth. For when I am evil, then to confess to Thee is nothing else than to be displeased with myself; but when holy, nothing else than not to ascribe it to myself: because Thou, O Lord, blessest the godly, but first Thou justifieth him when ungodly. My confession then, O my God, in Thy sight, is made silently, and not silently. For in sound, it is silent; in affection, it cries aloud. For neither do I utter any thing right unto men, which Thou hast not before heard from me; nor dost Thou hear any such thing from me, which Thou hast not first said unto me. [10.3.3] What then have I to do with men, that they should hear my confessions as if they could heal all my infirmities a race, curious to know the lives of 5
vitam alienam, desidiosum ad corrigendam suam. Quid a me quaerunt audire qui sim, qui nolunt a te audire qui sint? Et unde sciunt, cum a me ipso de me ipso audiunt, an verum dicam, quandoquidem nemo scit hominum, quid agatur in homine, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? Si autem a te audiant de se ipsis, non poterunt dicere: "Mentitur dominus". Quid est enim a te audire de se nisi cognoscere se? Quis porro cognoscit et dicit: "Falsum est", nisi ipse mentiatur? Sed quia caritas omnia credit, inter eos utique, quos conexos sibi met unum facit, ego quoque, domine, etiam sic tibi confiteor, ut audiant homines, quibus demonstrare non possum, an vera confitear; sed credunt mihi, quorum mihi aures caritas aperit. [4] Verum tamen tu, medice meus intime, quo fructu ista faciam, eliqua mihi. Nam confessiones praeteritorum malorum meorum, quae remisisti et texisti, ut beares me in te, mutans animam meam fide et sacramento tuo, cum leguntur et audiuntur, excitant cor, ne dormiat in desperatione et dicat: "Non possum", sed evigilet in amore misericordiae tuae et dulcedine gratiae tuae, qua potest est omnis infirmus, qui sibi per ipsam fit conscius infirmitatis suae. Et delectat bonos audire praeterita mala eorum, qui iam carent eis, nec ideo delectat, quia mala sunt, sed quia fuerunt et non sunt. Quo itaque fructu, domine meus, cui cotidie confitetur conscientia mea spe misericordiae tuae securior quam innocentia sua, quo fructu, quaeso, etiam hominibus coram te confiteor per has litteras adhuc quis ego sim, non quis fuerim? Nam illum fructum vidi et commemoraui. Sed quis adhuc sim ecce in ipso tempore confessionum mearum, et multi hoc nosse cupiunt,qui me noverunt, et non me noverunt, qui ex me uel de me aliquid audierunt, sed auris eorum non est ad cor meum, ubi ego sum quicumque sum. Volunt ergo audire confitente me, quid ipse intus sim, quo nec oculum nec aurem nec mentem possunt intendere; credituri tamen volunt, numquid cognituri? Dicit enim eis caritas, qua boni sunt, non mentiri me de me confitentem, et ipsa in eis credit mihi. [IV 5] Sed quo fructu id volunt? An congratulari mihi others, slothful to amend their own? Why seek they to hear from me what I am; who will not hear from Thee what themselves are? And how know they, when from myself they hear of myself, whether I say true; seeing no man knows what is in man, but the spirit of man which is in him? But if they hear from Thee of themselves, they cannot say, "The Lord lieth." For what is it to hear from Thee of themselves, but to know themselves? and who knoweth and saith, "It is false," unless himself lieth? But because charity believeth all things (that is, among those whom knitting unto itself it maketh one), I also, O Lord, will in such wise confess unto Thee, that men may hear, to whom I cannot demonstrate whether I confess truly; yet they believe me, whose ears charity openeth unto me. [10.3.4] But do Thou, my inmost Physician, make plain unto me what fruit I may reap by doing it. For the confessions of my past sins, which Thou hast forgiven and covered, that Thou mightest bless me in Thee, changing my soul by Faith and Thy Sacrament, when read and heard, stir up the heart, that it sleep not in despair and say "I cannot," but awake in the love of Thy mercy and the sweetness of Thy grace, whereby whoso is weak, is strong, when by it he became conscious of his own weakness. And the good delight to hear of the past evils of such as are now freed from them, not because they are evils, but because they have been and are not. With what fruit then, O Lord my God, to Whom my conscience daily confesseth, trusting more in the hope of Thy mercy than in her own innocency, with what fruit, I pray, do I by this book confess to men also in Thy presence what I now am, not what I have been? For that other fruit I have seen and spoken of. But what I now am, at the very time of making these confessions, divers desire to know, who have or have not known me, who have heard from me or of me; but their ear is not at my heart where I am, whatever I am. They wish then to hear me confess what I am within; whither neither their eye, nor ear, nor understanding can reach; they wish it, as ready to believe but will they know? For charity, whereby they are good, telleth them that in my confessions I lie not; and she in them, believeth me. [10.4.5] But for what fruit would they hear this? Do 6
cupiunt, cum audierint, quantum ad te accedam munere tuo, et orare pro me, cum audierint, quantum retarder pondere meo? Indicabo me talibus. Non enim paruus est fructus, domine deus meus, ut a multis tibi gratiae agantur de nobis et a multis rogeris pro nobis. Amet in me fraternus animus quod amandum doces, et doleat in me quod dolendum doces. Animus ille hoc faciat fraternus, non extraneus, non filiorum alienorum, quorum os locutum est vanitatem, et dextera eorum dextera iniquitatis, sed fraternus ille, qui cum approbat me, gaudet de me, cum autem improbat me, contristatur pro me, quia siue approbet siue improbet me, diligit me. Indicabo me talibus: respirent in bonis meis, suspirent in malis meis. Bona mea instituta tua sunt et dona tua, mala mea delicta mea sunt et iudicia tua. Respirent in illis et suspirent in his, et hymnus et fletus ascendant in conspectum tuum de fratrnis cordibus, turibulis tuis. Tu autem, domine, delectatus odore sancti templi tui, miserere mei secundum magnam misericordiam tuam propter nomen tuum et nequaquam deserens coepta tua consumma imperfecta mea. [6] Hic est fructus confessionum mearum, non qualis fuerim, sed qualis sim, ut hoc confitear non tantum coram te secreta exultatione cum tremore et secreto maerore cum spe, sed etiam in auribus credentium filiorum hominum, sociorum gaudii mei et consortium mortalitatis meae, ciuium meorum et mecum peregrinorum, praecedentium et consequentium et comitum vitae meae. Hi sunt serui tui, fratres mei, quos filios tuos esse voluisti dominos meos, quibus iussisti ut seruiam, si volo tecum de te vivere. Et hoc mihi verbum tuum parum erat si loquendo praeciperet, nisi et faciendo praeiret. Et ego id ago factis et dictis, id ago sub alis tuis nimis cum ingenti periculo, nisi quia sub alis tuis tibi subdita est anima mea et infirmitas mea tibi nota est. Paruulus sum, sed vivit semper pater meus et idoneus est mihi tutor meus; idem ipse est enim, qui genuit me et tuetur me, et tu ipse es omnia bona mea, tu omnipotens, qui mecum es et priusquam tecum sim. Indicabo ergo talibus, qualibus iubes ut they desire to joy with me, when they hear how near, by Thy gift, I approach unto Thee? and to pray for me, when they shall hear how much I am held back by my own weight? To such will I discover myself For it is no mean fruit, O Lord my God, that by many thanks should be given to Thee on our behalf, and Thou be by many entreated for us. Let the brotherly mind love in me what Thou teachest is to be loved, and lament in me what Thou teachest is to be lamented. Let a brotherly, not a stranger, mind, not that of the strange children, whose mouth talketh of vanity, and their right hand is a right hand of iniquity, but that brotherly mind which when it approveth, rejoiceth for me, and when it disapproveth me, is sorry for me; because whether it approveth or disapproveth, it loveth me. To such will I discover myself: they will breathe freely at my good deeds, sigh for my ill. My good deeds are Thine appointments, and Thy gifts; my evil ones are my offences, and Thy judgments. Let them breathe freely at the one, sigh at the other; and let hymns and weeping go up into Thy sight, out of the hearts of my brethren, Thy censers. And do Thou, O Lord, he pleased with the incense of Thy holy temple, have mercy upon me according to Thy great mercy for Thine own name's sake; and no ways forsaking what Thou hast begun, perfect my imperfections. [10.4.6] This is the fruit of my confessions of what I am, not of what I have been, to confess this, not before Thee only, in a secret exultation with trembling, and a secret sorrow with hope; but in the ears also of the believing sons of men, sharers of my joy, and partners in my mortality, my fellow citizens, and fellow pilgrims, who are gone before, or are to follow on, companions of my way. These are Thy servants, my brethren, whom Thou willest to be Thy sons; my masters, whom Thou commandest me to serve, if I would live with Thee, of Thee. But this Thy Word were little did it only command by speaking, and not go before in performing. This then I do in deed and word, this I do under Thy wings; in over great peril, were not my soul subdued unto Thee under Thy wings, and my infirmity known unto Thee. I am a little one, but my Father ever liveth, and my Guardian is sufficient for me. For He is the same who begat me, and defends me: and Thou Thyself art all my good; Thou, Almighty, Who are with me, yea, 7
seruiam, non quis fuerim, sed quis iam sim et quis adhuc sim; sed neque me ipsum diuudico. Sic itaque audiar. before I am with Thee. To such then whom Thou commandest me to serve will I discover, not what I have been, but what I now am and what I yet am. But neither do I judge myself. Thus therefore I would be heard. [...] [...] [XX 29] Quomodo ergo te quaero, domine? Cum enim te, deum meum, quaero, vitam beatam quaero. Quaeram te, ut uiuat anima mea. Vivit enim corpus meum de anima mea et uiuit anima mea de te. Quomodo ergo quaero uitam beatam? Quia non est mihi, donec dicam: "Sat, est illic". Ubi oportet ut dicam, quomodo eam quaero, utrum per recordationem, tamquam eam oblitus sim oblitumque me esse adhuc teneam, an per appetitum discendi incognitam, siue quam numquam scierim siue quam sic oblitus fuerim, ut me nec oblitum esse meminerim. Nonne ipsa est beata uita, quam omnes uolunt et omnino qui nolit nemo est? Ubi nouerunt eam, quod sic volunt eam? Ubi viderunt, ut amarent eam? Nimirum habemus eam nescio quomodo. Et est alius quidam modus, quo quisque cum habet eam, tunc beatus est, et sunt, qui spe beati sunt. Inferiore modo isti habent eam quam illi, qui iam re ipsa beati sunt, sed tamen meliores quam illi, qui nec re nec spe beati sunt. Qui tamen etiam ipsi nisi aliquo modo haberent eam, non ita uellent beati esse: quod eos velle certissimum est. Nescio quomodo noverunt eam ideoque habent eam in nescio qua notitia, de qua satago, utrum in memoria sit, quia, si ibi est, iam beati fuimus aliquando, utrum singillatim omnes, an in illo homine, qui primus peccauit, in quo et omnes mortui sumus et de quo omnes cum misera nati sumus, non quaero nunc, sed quaero, utrum in memoria sit beata uita. Neque enim amaremus eam, nisi nossemus. Audimus nomen hoc et omnes rem ipsam nos appetere fatemur; non enim sono delectamur. Nam hoc cum latine audit Graecus, non delectatur, quia ignorat, quid dictum sit; nos autem delectamur, sicut etiam ille, si graece hoc audierit, quoniam res ipsa nec graeca nec latina est, cui adipiscendae Graeci Latinique inhiant ceterarumque linguarum homines. Nota est igitur omnibus, qui una voce si interrogari possent, utrum beati esse vellent, sine ulla dubitatione velle responderent. Quod non [10.20.29] How then do I seek Thee, O Lord? For when I seek Thee, my God, I seek a happy life. I will seek Thee, that my soul may live. For my body liveth by my soul; and my soul by Thee. How then do I seek a happy life, seeing I have it not, until I can say, where I ought to say it, "It is enough"? How seek I it? By remembrance, as though I had forgotten it, remembering that I had forgotten it? Or, desiring to learn it as a thing unknown, either never having known, or so forgotten it, as not even to remember that I had forgotten it? is not a happy life what all will, and no one altogether wills it not? where have they known it, that they so will it? where seen it, that they so love it? Truly we have it, how, I know not. Yea, there is another way, wherein when one hath it, then is he happy; and there are, who are blessed, in hope. These have it in a lower kind, than they who have it in very deed; yet are they better off than such as are happy neither in deed nor in hope. Yet even these, had they it not in some sort, would not so will to be happy, which that they do will, is most certain. They have known it then, I know not how, and so have it by some sort of knowledge, what, I know not, and am perplexed whether it be in the memory, which if it be, then we have been happy once; whether all severally, or in that man who first sinned, in whom also we all died, and from whom we are all born with misery, I now enquire not; but only, whether the happy life be in the memory? For neither should we love it, did we not know it. We hear the name, and we all confess that we desire the thing; for we are not delighted with the mere sound. For when a Greek hears it in Latin, he is not delighted, not knowing what is spoken; but we Latins are delighted, as would he too, if he heard it in Greek; because the thing itself is neither Greek nor Latin, which Greeks and Latins, and men of all other tongues, long for so earnestly. Known therefore it is to all, for they with one voice be asked, "would they be happy?" they would 8
fieret, nisi res ipsa, cuius hoc nomen est, eorum memoria teneretur. answer without doubt, "they would." And this could not be, unless the thing itself whereof it is the name were retained in their memory. [...] [...] [XXVII 38] Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova, sero te amavi! Et ecce intus eras et ego foris et ibi te quaerebam et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis inruebam. Mecum eras, et tecum non eram. Ea me tenebant longe a te, quae si in te non essent, non essent. Vocasti et clamasti et rupisti surdidatem meam, coruscasti, splenduisti et fugasti caecitatem meam, flagrasti, et duxi spiritum et anhelo tibi, gustaui et esurio et sitio, tetigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuam. [10.27.38] Too late loved I Thee, O Thou Beauty of ancient days, yet ever new! too late I loved Thee! And behold, Thou wert within, and I abroad, and there I searched for Thee; deformed I, plunging amid those fair forms which Thou hadst made. Thou wert with me, but I was not with Thee. Things held me far from Thee, which, unless they were in Thee, were not at all. Thou calledst, and shoutedst, and burstest my deafness. Thou flashedst, shonest, and scatteredst my blindness. Thou breathedst odours, and I drew in breath and panted for Thee. I tasted, and hunger and thirst. Thou touchedst me, and I burned for Thy peace. Extract from the Summa Theologica by St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., Doctor of the Church God s Love Deinde considerandum est de his quae absolute ad voluntatem Dei pertinent. In parte autem appetitiva inveniuntur in nobis et passiones animae, ut gaudium, amor, et huiusmodi; et habitus moralium virtutum, ut iustitia, fortitudo, et huiusmodi. Unde primo considerabimus de amore Dei; secundo, de iustitia Dei, et misericordia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo: utrum in Deo sit amor. Secundo: utrum amet omnia. Tertio: utrum magis amet unum quam aliud. Quarto: utrum meliora magis amet. ARTICULUS 1 Utrum amor sit in Deo Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in Deo. 1. Nulla enim passio est in Deo. Amor est passio. Ergo amor non est in Deo. 9 We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether love exists in God? (2) Whether He loves all things? (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another? (4) Whether He loves more the better things? Whether love exists in God? Article 1 Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God. Objection 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But
2. Praeterea, amor, ira, tristitia, et huiusmodi, contra se dividuntur. Sed tristitia et ira non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice. Ergo nec amor. 3. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, 4 cap. De div. nom.: Amor est vis unitiva et concretiva. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Io. 4,16: Deus caritas est. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, tendat in bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius et per se est obiectum voluntatis et appetitus, malum autem secundario et per aliud, inquantum scilicet opponitur bono: oportet naturaliter esse priores actus voluntatis et appetitus qui respiciunt bonum, his qui respiciunt malum; ut gaudium quam tristitia, et amor quam odium. Semper enim quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud. Rursus, quod est communius, naturaliter est prius: unde et intellectus per prius habet ordinem ad verum commune, quam ad particularia quaedam vera. Sunt autem quidam actus voluntatis et appetitus, respicientes bonum sub aliqua speciali conditione: sicut gaudium et delectatio est de bono praesenti et habito; desiderium autem et spes, de bono nondum adepto. Amor autem respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum. Unde amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et propter hoc, omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem, quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum amatum: neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter tristitiam, et cetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri, sicut in primum principium. Unde in quocumque est voluntas vel appetitus, oportet esse amorem: remoto enim primo, removentur alia. Ostensum est autem in Deo esse voluntatem. Unde necesse est in eo ponere amorem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vis cognitiva non movet, nisi mediante appetitiva. Et sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet mediante ratione particulari, ut dicitur in III De anima; ita appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante appetitu sensitivo. Unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis; et maxime circa cor, quod est primum principium motus in animali. Sic sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him. Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God. On the contrary, It is written: "God is love" (Jn. 4:16). I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (Q[19], A[1]), and hence we must attribute love to Him. Reply to Objection 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive 10
igitur actus appetitus sensitivi, inquantum habent transmutationem corporalem annexam, passiones dicuntur: non autem actus voluntatis. Amor igitur et gaudium et delectatio, secundum quod significant actus appetitus sensitivi, passiones sunt: non autem secundum quod significant actus appetitus intellectivi. Et sic ponuntur in Deo. Unde dicit Philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod Deus una et simplici operatione gaudet. Et eadem ratione, sine passione amat. Ad secundum dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira, ut dicitur in I De anima, materiale est accensio sanguinis circa cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi; formale vero, appetitus vindictae. Sed rursus, ex parte eius quod est formale, in quibusdam horum designatur aliqua imperfectio; sicut in desiderio, quod est boni non habiti; et in tristitia, quae est mali habiti. Et eadem ratio est de ira, quae tristitiam supponit. Quaedam vero nullam imperfectionem designat, ut amor et gaudium. Cum igitur nihil horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est materiale in eis, ut dictum est, illa quae imperfectionem important etiam formaliter, Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphorice, propter similitudinem effectus, ut supra dictum est. Quae autem imperfectionem non important, de Deo proprie dicuntur, ut amor et gaudium: tamen sine passione, ut dictum est. appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion. Reply to Objection 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element namely, the bodily change and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (Q[3], A[2], ad 2; Q[19], A[11]). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before (Q[19], A[11]). Ad tertium dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaerit sibi unire, inquantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva, etiam in Deo, sed absque compositione: quia illud bonum quod vult sibi, non est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra ostensum est. In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium, vult bonum illi. Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad seipsum. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva: quia alium aggregat sibi, habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum. Et sic etiam amor divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quae sit in Deo, inquantum aliis bona vult. 11 Reply to Objection 3: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown (Q[6], AA[1],3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to
ARTICULUS 2 others; yet it implies no composition in God. Whether God loves all things? Article 2 1. Quia, secundum Dionysium, 4 cap. De div. nom., amor amantem extra se ponit, et eum quodammodo in amatum transfert. Inconveniens autem est dicere quod Deus, extra se positus, in alia transferatur. Ergo inconveniens est dicere quod Deus alia a se amet. 2. Praeterea, amor Dei aeternus est. Sed ea quae sunt alia a Deo, non sunt ab aeterno nisi in Deo. Ergo Deus non amat ea nisi in seipso. Sed secundum quod sunt in eo, non sunt aliud ab eo. Ergo Deus non amat alia a seipso. 3. Praeterea, duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscentiae, et amicitiae. Sed Deus creaturas irrationales non amat amore concupiscentiae, quia nullius extra se eget: nec etiam amore amicitiae, quia non potest ad res irrationales haberi, ut patet per Philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Ergo Deus non omnia amat. 4. Praeterea, in Psalmo 5,7 dicitur: Odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem. Nihil autem simul odio habetur et amatur. Ergo Deus non omnia amat. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. 11,25: Diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus omnia existentia amat. Nam omnia existentia, inquantum sunt, bona sunt: ipsum enim esse cuiuslibet rei quoddam bonum est, et similiter quaelibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum: et sic oportet quod intantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, inquantum est volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum. Unde, cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos. Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab obiecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus, non est causa bonitatis ipsius: sed e converso bonitas eius, vel vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem quo ei volumus et bonum conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet: et ad hoc operamur. Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amans sic fit extra Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself. Objection 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself. Objection 3: Further, love is twofold the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things. Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things. On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q[19], A[4]) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness. Reply to Objection 1: A lover is placed outside 12
se in amatum translatus, inquantum vult amato bonum, et operatur per suam providentiam, sicut et sibi. Unde et Dionysius dicit 4 cap. De div. nom.: Audendum est autem et hoc pro veritate dicere, quod et ipse omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis, extra seipsum fit ad omnia existentia providentiis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint nisi in Deo, tamen per hoc quod ab aeterno in Deo fuerunt, ab aeterno Deus cognovit res in propriis naturis: et eadem ratione amavit. Sicut et nos per similitudines rerum, quae in nobis sunt, cognoscimus res in seipsis existentes. Ad tertium dicendum quod amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem: sicut et ad eas proprie benevolentia est. Creaturae autem irrationales non possunt pertingere ad amandum Deum, neque ad communicationem intellectualis et beatae vitae, qua Deus vivit. Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo, non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi concupiscentiae; inquantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et etiam ad seipsum; non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis et aliis. Ad quartum dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem secundum aliquid amari, et secundum aliquid odio haberi. Deus autem peccatores, inquantum sunt naturae quaedam, amat: sic enim et sunt, et ab ipso sunt. Inquantum vero peccatores sunt, non sunt, sed ab esse deficiunt: et hoc in eis a Deo non est. Unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio habentur. ARTICULUS 3 himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things." Reply to Objection 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves. Reply to Objection 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves. Reply to Objection 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him. Article 3 1. Dictur enim Sap. 6,8: aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus. Sed providentia Dei, quam habet de rebus, est ex amore quo amat res. Ergo aequaliter amat omnia. 2. Praeterea, amor Dei est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei magis et minus non recipit. Ergo nec amor eius. Non igitur quaedam aliis magis amat. 3. Praeterea, sicut amor Dei se extendit ad res creatas, ita et scientia et voluntas. Sed Deus non 13 Objection 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (Wis. 6:8). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally. Objection 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.
dicitur scire quaedam magis quam alia, neque magis velle. Ergo nec magis quaedam aliis diligit. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, Super Ioan.: Omnia diligit Deus quae fecit; et inter ea magis diligit creaturas rationales; et de illis eas amplius, quae sunt membra Unigeniti sui; et multo magis ipsum Unigenitum suum. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus. Et sic Deus non magis quaedam aliis amat: quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu voluntatis, et semper eodem modo se habente. Alio modo, ex parte ipsius boni quod aliquis vult amato. Et sic dicimur aliquem magis alio amare, cui volumus maius bonum; quamvis non magis intensa voluntate. Et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod Deus quaedam aliis magis amat. Cum enim amor Dei sit causa bonitatis rerum, ut dictum est, non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni maius bonum quam alteri. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicitur Deo aequaliter esse cura de omnibus, non quia aequalia bona sua cura omnibus dispenset; sed quia ex aequali sapientia et bonitate omnia administrat. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensione amoris ex parte actus voluntatis, qui est divina essentia. Bonum autem quod Deus creaturae vult, non est divina essentia. Unde nihil prohibet illud intendi vel remitti. Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligere et velle significant solum actus: non autem in sua significatione includunt aliqua obiecta, ex quorum diversitate possit dici Deus magis vel minus scire aut velle; sicut circa amorem dictum est. ARTICULUS 4 Objection 3: Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others. On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His onlybegotten Son Himself." I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said (A[2]), no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another. Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness. Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree. Reply to Objection 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love. Article 4 1. Manifestum est enim quod Christus est melior toto genere humano, cum sit Deus et homo. Sed Deus magis dilexit genus humanum quam Christum: quia dicitur Rom. 8,32: proprio Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora. 2. Praeterea, angelus est melior homine: unde in Psalmo 8,6, dicitur de homine: minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis. Sed Deus plus dilexit hominem 14 Objection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. Objection 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6). But God loved men
quam angelum: dicitur enim Heb. 2,16: nusquam angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora. 3. Praeterea, Petrus fuit melior Ioanne: quia plus Christum diligebat. Unde Dominus, sciens hoc esse verum, interrogavit Petrum, dicens: Simon Ioannis, diligis me plus his? Sed tamen Christus plus dilexit Ioannem quam Petrum: ut enim dicit Augustinus, super illud Io. 21, Simon Ioannis diligis me?: 'Hoc ipso signo Ioannes a ceteris discipulis discernitur; non quod solum eum, sed quod plus eum ceteris diligebat.' Non ergo semper magis diligit meliora. 4. Praeterea, melior est innocens poenitente; cum poenitentia sit secunda tabula post naufragium, ut dicit Hieronymus. Sed Deus plus diligit poenitentem quam innocentem, quia plus de eo gaudet: dicitur enim Lc. 15,7: Dico vobis quod maius gaudium erit in caelo super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente, quam super nonaginta novem iustis, qui non indigent poenitentia. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora. 5. Praeterea, melior est iustus praescitus, quam peccator praedestinatus. Sed Deus plus diligit peccatorem praedestinatum: quia vult ei maius bonum, scilicet vitam aeternam. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora. Sed contra, unumquodque diligit sibi simile; ut patet per illud quod habetur Eccli. 13,19: omne animal diligit sibi simile. Sed intantum aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis diliguntur a Deo. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere, secundum praedicta, quod Deus magis diligat meliora. Dictum est enim quod Deum diligere magis aliquid, nihil aliud est quam ei maius bonum velle: voluntas enim Dei est causa bonitatis in rebus. Et sic, ex hoc sunt aliqua meliora, quod Deus eis maius bonum vult. Unde sequitur quod meliora plus amet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus Christum diligit, non solum plus quam totum humanum genus, sed etiam magis quam totam universitatem creaturarum: quia scilicet ei maius bonum voluit, quia dedit ei nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut verus Deus esset. Nec eius excellentiae deperiit ex hoc quod Deus dedit eum in mortem pro salute humani generis: quinimo ex hoc factus est victor gloriosus; factus enim est principatus super more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. Objection 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore God does not always love more the better things. Objection 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety nine just who need not penance" (Lk. 15:7). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. Objection 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things. On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God. I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things. For it has been shown (AA[2],3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things. Reply to Objection 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The 15