In such a suicide-averse culture as that of the Middle East, where traditionally suicide

The Arab Spring and Failed Political Legitimacy David Cook In such a suicide-averse culture as that of the Middle East, where traditionally suicide rates have been among the world s lowest, it is odd to realize that the Arab Spring began with a suicide that of Mohammed Bouazizi (who lingered a month, dying on January 4, 2011). Bouazizi s inability to gain a permit for selling fruits and vegetables led him to dowse himself with fuel and light himself on fire in protest. It was a death with which many in the Arabic-speaking Middle East could evidently identify, as the ramifications of his act continue to reverberate and have led to the collapse of two seemingly stable regimes (Tunisia and Egypt), virtual civil war in three others (Libya, Yemen, and Syria), and mass public demonstrations in almost all of the others (Sudan, Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, and the Palestinian Territories). Even such long-stable countries as Morocco and Saudi Arabia have seen demonstrations, although not on the scale of the other countries. It is apparent that the Tunisians and Egyptians who sparked this months-long revolt against the status quo did not care about the consequences because they had nothing to lose. (The Egyptian revolt was also sparked at least partially by self-immolation attempts in mid-january 2011.) Their lives were going nowhere and in many cases in North Africa, their only hope was to go to Europe. In 2007, a cobbler in Qayrawan, Tunisia, who was fixing a broken shoe, said to me, Do you think that any of us would be here if we could move to France? Everyone would be gone in a week if they would let us in! Economic desperation is usually associated with sub-saharan Africans who all too often have crowded boats going to Italy or the Canary Islands, and yet by the beginnings of the Arab Spring, North Africans, in spite of their apparent superior economic status, had David Cook is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University. His areas of specialization include early Islamic history and development, Muslim apocalyptic literature and movements (classical and contemporary), radical Islam, historical astronomy, and Judeo-Arabic literature. Cook s publications include Understanding Jihad (2005), Martyrdom in Islam (2007), and Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks (with Olivia Allison, 2007). 37

The Hedgehog Review / Fall 2011 reached a breaking point. Even in Egypt, economic desperation has been represented by a dramatic rise in suicide rates. We can interpret the Arab Spring through a number of different lenses: first of all as a domino effect, with Tunisia as one of the most Westernized and liberalized of all Arab countries being the first to feel the effects of the protests. Tunisia was almost immediately followed by Egypt, which is also superficially Westernized (certainly the elites, less so the masses), but what then? Both of these pro-western, authoritarian regimes fell surprisingly quickly, but the revolts against Libya s Muammar Qaddafi (beginning in February 2011) or against Yemen s Ali Abdullah Saleh (end of January 2011) quickly break the pattern. Nor have all of the revolts against pro-western regimes been successful in Bahrain, despite the preponderance of the Shiite protesters against the Sunni regime, protests were crushed by mid-february. Perhaps we can look at the Arab Spring in terms of classical political legitimacy. All of the countries that had revolutionary or Arab Socialist regimes (usually thinly veiled military-based authoritarian regimes) dating from the 1950s or 1960s have gone through severe turmoil during the past six months, with the exceptions of Iraq and Algeria. Both of them, however, are special cases and will be considered below. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the Sudan (a military regime dating from 1989) all suffer from the ageold Arab Muslim problem of political and religious legitimacy. Nasser or Qaddafi might be able to topple their respective monarchs and create a charismatic-based type of rule, but this authority has either been toppled or come into question. Assad could base his regime upon Arab nationalism (in spite of the alliance with Iran against Arab Iraq during the 1980s) and opposition to Israel, but this has not proved sufficient for the long haul. To date, the principal lasting political legitimacy in the world of Islam has been one based upon the family of Muhammad or the office of the caliph established by his successors (although in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the caliphal office was conferred because of the Ottoman family s aggrandizement of the Muslim world). All other dynasties or rulers, even medieval Turkish warlords, gained their legitimacy through the accepted institutions of relationship to the Prophet or the caliph. It is clear that fifty years after independence, Arab secular rulers have failed to gain political and religious legitimacy. Significantly those regimes thus far that have demonstrated the ability to weather the Arab Spring have been monarchical (Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia) and do not include the new monarchies of Syria (Bashar al-assad, son of Hafiz al-assad) or the would-be monarchies of Egypt (where Gamal Mubarak was being groomed for leadership) and Libya (where presumably Seif ul-islam Qaddafi was to succeed his father). It is indeed ironic that the medieval monarchies in Jordan and Morocco, both with dynasts claiming descent from Muhammad, who were despised by Nasser and his ilk during the 1950s and 1960s, have been able thus far to contain the protests. Even Bahrain, ruled by a minority Sunni dynasty, could be seen to have an essential political and religious legitimacy. And obviously other dynastically based regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman, have not been seriously challenged or in some cases even had measurable protests. Obviously the exceptions to the question of political legitimacy are Algeria and the Sudan, both of which are ruled by military regimes searching for some type of legiti- 38

The Arab Spring and Failed Political Legitimacy / Cook macy. It is interesting to note that both Algeria and the Sudan did have brief protests during January and February 2011, but these were quickly squelched. Algeria, however, is easily explained. The fear of opening up the Pandora s Box of another Algerian Civil War (1991 2003), which in some ways has never been resolved, is simply too great. Throughout North Africa, no one wants a replay of the brutality of those years, and it is apparent that the Algerian regime, as during the civil war, has been able to portray itself as the mainstay against chaos in spite of its unpopularity and the same economic issues that exist in next-door Tunisia. Probably the failure of the Sudan to experience the Arab Spring should be seen within the overall question of Sudanese identity which was being voted into oblivion by the South Sudanese even as the protests in Tunisia and Egypt were in full swing. The remaining parts of the Sudan, now mostly without its Christian component, can be expected to embrace its Arab and Muslim identity more fully in order to compensate for the loss of the south (independent on July 9, 2011). The ability of the ideologically bankrupt regime of General Umar Bashir (to use the characterization of the Muslim leader Hasan al-turabi to me in January 2009) to suppress the student-led protests should be understood in that light. The only other major exception to the political-legitimacy interpretation is that of Iraq, which of course had its Arab nationalist dictator Saddam Hussein removed forcibly in 2003. However, Iraq might very well be able to weather the question of legitimacy, as its elections (in 2005 and 2010), while problematic from an outsider s point of view, do constitute some form of legitimacy. As a scholar of Islam, I would also like to posit a religious interpretation for the Arab Spring that so far has been lacking. Tunisia s revolt could be seen as that of a moderate Muslim majority against a secularized Western elite. It seems likely that Muslim-based political parties lack the strength, however, to actually take power. Egypt s revolt was that of a joint Muslim-Copt alliance against the secularized elite. Its organizers were at some pains to declare this alliance to be a-sectarian. However, one should note that, since the fall of Hosni Mubarak, there has been a steady rise in anti-christian violence throughout the country, and unlike in Tunisia, it seems likely that specifically Muslim political parties (for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood) do have sufficient support to take power, as they probably will in the elections scheduled for October or November 2011. Whether the still-secularized Egyptian military will allow them to do so will be another question, and Egypt s situation in some ways parallels that of Algeria in 1990 1991 (leading up to the Algerian civil war). However, far and away the most interesting of all of the Arab Spring revolts has been that of Syria, where the majority Sunni population has been dominated by the extremist Shiite Alawite regime (which relies upon the Christian minority for some tacit support). Thus far the Alawite regime has garbed itself in pan-arabism and has succeeded in legitimizing itself by its opposition to Israel. However, it is clear from the months-long protests taking place all over the country, even in Damascus, that this sense of legitimacy has worn thin. Although there has been no decisive breakdown of the regime as of yet, neither has the regime succeeded in breaking the opposition. Probably the most interesting development from a religious point of view has been the downfall of the radical Muslim alternative (anti-governmental jihad) of the 1980s and 39

The Hedgehog Review / Fall 2011 1990s in every country going through the Arab Spring, and the concurrent rise of the mainstream Muslim political opposition as exemplified by the Muslim Brotherhood. I am by no means as sanguine about the current moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood and would prefer not to bank too much upon the moderate statements associated with the current crop of leaders and to be cautious as to the type of regimes they intend to establish. However, it is significant that all of them at present have disassociated themselves with the radical vision of pan-islamic Sharia states. The only exception to the above statement has been the rise of radical Islam in the form of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and the inability of the Yemeni government to eradicate it or the opposition forces to fully disassociate themselves from its agenda. The experience of the Iraqi civil war (2003 2009), just as the Algerian civil war prior to it (1991 2003), has been to delegitimize the radical Muslim option as one that is viable for the core Arab states (Egypt and Syria). Even in Libya the efforts of the Qaddafi regime to portray its opponents as radicals and Al Qaeda-style terrorists have failed to convince the world. The Assad regime in Syria has also tried this tack without any success. While Syria may still go down the torturous road of sectarian civil war, it is significant to note that the phase in Middle Eastern politics where authoritarian or dictatorial rulers could portray themselves as the only viable option to radical Islam and chaotic civil war has come to an end. Most likely, the Arab Spring will only exacerbate the decline of Arabic-speaking Christianity into social and demographic irrelevance (with the exceptions of Lebanon and Egypt) as moderate Muslim parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, come to power or become viable actors needing to be placated by various regimes. In that regard the experience of Iraq has most likely shown the future: while sectarian violence ran itself out during Iraq s civil war, the big losers were the smaller non-muslim religious communities such as the Christians and the Yezidis. The religious transformation, albeit unintended, in the Middle East will be to an overwhelming majority that is more homogenous, mainstream, and Muslim. I believe that the regime in Syria will indeed eventually fall, even if this takes some time. The intensity of the opposition has not abated in spite of savage reprisals; instead, it commands wide support. The future of the Arab Spring in Yemen and Egypt, however, is very open to question. In both cases the best scenario would probably be for a Muslim political party to come to power, which would hopefully (but not necessarily) temper its excesses. The worst case scenario would probably be for some type of military coup against a popularly elected government which could very well lead to civil war in Egypt and to the collapse of Yemen entirely. I think that there is a good chance that Tunisia may make the transition into genuine democracy. Other states that have not experienced the Arab Spring thus far will probably remain reasonably stable. Endnotes 1 See Jano Charbel, Egypt: Dramatic Increase in Suicide Rates, Al-Masry Al-Youm (17 September 2010): <http://she2i2.blogspot.com/2010/09/egyptian-suicide-rate-on-rise.html>. 40

The Arab Spring and Failed Political Legitimacy / Cook Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images. Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, then President of Tunisia. 10 July 2007. 41

The Hedgehog Review / Fall 2011 Harish Tyagi/epa/Corbis. Hosni Mubarak, then President of Egypt. 18 November 2008. 42

The Arab Spring and Failed Political Legitimacy / Cook Sabri Elmhedwi/epa/Corbis. Muammar Qaddafi, then Leader of Libya. 12 June 2010. 43

The Hedgehog Review / Fall 2011 Khaled Abdullah/Reuters/Corbis. Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of Yemen. 31 August 2009. 44

The Arab Spring and Failed Political Legitimacy / Cook Reuters/Corbis. Bashar al-assad, President of Syria. 6 October 2002. 45