Appraising the Threat of an Islamist Military Coup in Pakistan

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:18 Page 181 Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 181 192, June 2010 Appraising the Threat of an Islamist Military Coup in Pakistan Julian Schofield Department of Political Science, Concordia University, 1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd West, Montreal, H3G 1M8, Quebec, Canada INTRODUCTION A widespread preoccupation with the threat posed by terrorism since 11 September 2001 has placed a global focus on the stability of Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal. 1 One worrying outcome is the possibility of a military coup led by Islamist extremists seizing control of the government, a possibility fueled by the close relationship between Islamist elements in Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Given that Pakistan has been the main source of recent nuclear proliferation, the US has elaborated plans to secure Pakistan s nuclear weapons in the event of an unfriendly regime taking power in Islamabad. 2 An Islamist coup would also undermine NATO s position in Afghanistan and undermine attempts to isolate Iran. The widespread concern of an Islamist coup scenario taking place in Pakistan is overblown and relies on a poor understanding of the Pakistan state and her Army. Islam as a justification and impetus for unifying Pakistan is strongly supported, but there is little public interest in Islam playing a role in governance. Rather, the Pakistani military is in a strong position to actively counter any internal or external challengers, Islamist or otherwise. Further, the military remains firmly in control of most of the domestic Islamist groups, as it relies on them for use in its domestic and foreign policy. 3 This article begins with a sketch of a coup scenario, followed by a discussion of its prospects, and is followed by a more elaborate examination of the structure of the Pakistan Army. ISLAMIST MILITARY COUP On 6 October 1981, Army Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli assassinated the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat during a military parade, in what could have been a trigger for a military take-over. On 30 June 1989, Colonel Omar al-bashir led a successful Islamist coup in Sudan and imposed Sharia Law the following year. In Pakistan s case, an Islamist coup would be manifested by either the intervention of the 111th Brigade, ISSN 1475-1798 print; 1475-1801 online/10/020181-12 2010 Taylor & Francis 181 DOI: 10.1080/14751791003658586

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 182 182 JULIAN SCHOFIELD tasked with protecting the government, or its neutralization by units of the 10th Corps, which protects Islamabad (the seat of government), Rawalpindi (the location of GHQ, or the General Headquarters of the Army), and Kahuta (the nuclear weapons fuel production facility). Units under the command of middle-range officers assigned during the tenure of Pakistan President General Zia ul-haq (the Zia Bharti, or Zia recruits) would likely be involved, as well as units drawn predominantly from Islamist-saturated Pashtun and urban Punjabi recruiting areas. 4 Islamist groups in the Punjab, and Pashtuns bussed in from the Northwest Frontier would likely assist the Islamists as a Jihadist militia to preempt any secular countercoup. This is very likely to be similar to the plan of the failed coup conspirator, Islamist General Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi, who was caught and arrested with his co-conspirators in 1995 for planning the overthrow of the regime of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Despite this setback, there are plenty of other retired general officers with Islamist sympathies around which a coup could coalesce. For example, Aslam Beg, former Army Chief of Staff, or Mohammed Aziz, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as recently as 2007, or any of a number of former Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Director Generals, such as Hamid Gul, Javed Nasir, or Mohammed Ahmed. 5 Some senior Pakistan generals sympathetic to the Jihadist cause have warned that the military would not oppose an Islamic uprising if it happened because of the large number of adherents in its ranks. 6 Many hypothesize that Islamists have significantly infiltrated the Army over the years dating back to the previous military regime of General Zia ul-haq, who is believed to have been promoted on the basis of his support for Islamist ideals. 7 In practice, this involved allowing the Islamist political party, Jamaat-i-Islami, access to provide religious services within the military. 8 Military recruiting has since shifted from the traditional and rural north Punjab of the Potohar Plateau, towards more Islamist segments of society, including the petit bourgeoisie of the central and southern urban Punjab. 9 Some estimates suggest that upwards of 30 percent of the military s officer corps currently has an Islamist orientation. 10 Debate, however, continues on whether this number represents any real concern since no evidence exists suggesting that as a proportion, the number of Islamists in the Army is any more than in the rest of Pakistani society. 11 Any conclusion must also be tempered by the fact that while Zia was an Islamist, he did not exclude secular officer promotions and he never questioned the importance of maintaining the military s dominant role in society. During his tenure, the primary effect of his policies was to skew recruiting away from the traditional Pakistani elite to the more religious lowermiddle classes 12 Furthermore, the shift in recruiting within the Punjab towards more Islamist elements of society has been counterbalanced by a dramatic increase in the proportion of recruits from the Sindh, where Islamists are comparably weak. 13 Some have pointed out that another formerly militant Islamist movement (now political party), the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shriat-e-Mohhamadi, has strong support among retired senior officers, 14 such as General Hamid Gul. They may be patiently waiting for a catalyst that would propel them to power. Pakistan President Pervaiz Musharraf s unprecedented reshuffling of senior military positions after the 1999 coup seems to have indicated that the military hierarchy was at least partially influenced by jihadist sympathies. 15 The near-miss assassination attempts on Musharraf in 2002 and

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 183 APPRAISING THE THREAT OF AN ISLAMIST MILITARY COUP IN PAKISTAN 183 2003 indicate that there is at least some penetration of the military by pro-jihadist elements and that they are at least able to obtain vital intelligence as to his whereabouts. 16 THE MILITARY AS POWER CENTER The basis for the cohesion of the Pakistani military is two-fold. First, its institutional discipline is reinforced by the constant threat of attack from India. Second, there is a broad consensus among the political elite of the Punjab and Sindh (which also populates the bureaucracy), that a secular and technocratic military is a necessary pillar of Pakistan s strength. 17 An unrestrained Islamist ideology is viewed as a threat to both the current elite and Pakistan s ability to obtain from its allies, primarily China, the technology it needs to counter India. 18 The Islamist coup scenario becomes even more remote when viewed in the context of the military s institutional power in Pakistan. Three considerations are important in this regard: the traditional weakness of Pakistan s intelligence organizations; the nature of the Pakistan Army s consensual decision-making process; and the history of coup d états that indicate the approval constraints that limit violent changes in government. Power misplaced: Pakistan s intelligence organizations The ISI is a possible nucleus for an Islamist coup because of its disproportionate Pashtun membership and its close links with the Islamist militants it has helped organize in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan. 19 Consequently, many ISI employees are sympathetic with the Jihadists. The ISI is composed of 9,000 civilian and military employees, of which most of the latter serve two- to three-year tours. Those who served in the ISI along the Northwest Frontier and Kashmir, however, generally had extended tours and this could contribute sufficient cohesion for the ISI to participate in a coup. 20 Control of the intelligence organizations in Pakistan, however, provides far less independent leverage over domestic political power than is typical for other developing countries. The main reason for this is that the Pakistan military is not coup-proofed in a way that is typical of most developing countries. For example, military units are not deployed in layers to block each other s access to the capital; rather, they are deployed at the frontier in preparation for war against India. Pakistani officers are not compartmentalized for fear they would conspire against the government; instead, they are permitted the freedom of inter-unit movement necessary to maintain inter-arms cooperation and training. Officers are not under excessive counter-espionage restrictions. Although the ISI is responsible for the surveillance of military personnel (as is the MI Military Intelligence), this is a routine function present also in the militaries of many developed states. 21 Rather, the military maintains the allegiance of its members through the provision of welfare through its vast holdings of economic enterprises. 22 The Air Force s Shaheen, the Army s Fauji, and the Navy s Baharia foundations, operate schools, hospitals and an assortment of welfare programs. 23 The consequence of this for the likelihood of an Islamic coup is that the military is not sufficiently compartmentalized by the intelligence services to be paralyzed by a sudden Islamist

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 184 184 JULIAN SCHOFIELD takeover. Instead, the main force Army units are likely to react with speed against any changes not approved of by the senior military command. For example, the Army s Special Services Group commandos, who work in close association with the ISI, conducted without delay the controversial assault on the Red Mosque in 2007, killing a large number of moderate Islamists. 24 The balance of power between the intelligence services in Pakistan oscillates between changes in government, particularly between civilian and military regimes. During periods of civilian leadership, usually the Interior Ministry s IB (Intelligence Bureau) predominates. It typically reports to the Prime Minister and was often used for surveillance of the ISI and MI (Military Intelligence). 25 Under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the IB and ISI were under the control of the Office of the Prime Minister. 26 Under Zia, the ISI and MI were under the control of the Office of the President, though under Musharraf, the Prime Minister appoints the ISI Chief, and the President (Musharraf) appoints the Head of MI. 27 In addition, the IB and Special Bureau were subordinated to the office of the President (Musharraf) and had less authority than the ISI. 28 Under President Ali Asif Zardari, there is a move to re-strengthen the IB. There is, therefore, considerable plasticity of the chains of command, depending on the particular arrangements of a regime at the time. Usually the ISI hold a disproportionate amount of influence because it is most commonly tasked with counterespionage, manipulating domestic elections, and operating militants in Afghanistan, Kashmir and India. 29 In power politics, the ISI is a weak player when measured in contrast to the military s main force units. When the militants who were being transshipped from Afghanistan to Kashmir were falling beyond Pakistan s control in 1993, the new Director General of the ISI, General Javed Ashraf Qazi, purged the ISI of its Pashtun and Islamist inclinations and ended prayers. During the civilian Administration of Prime Minister Nawaf Sharif, because of his nominal control of the ISI, the military s GHQ used the MI instead to conduct operations in Kargil in 1999, in part because it was viewed as a more obedient organization. 30 Many former ISI members continued, however, to provide freelance support for Islamists. 31 It is therefore no surprise that when Musharraf believed that members of the ISI would co-operate with the Sharif regime in replacing him, the Army executed a coup and the assorted intelligence organizations played only a minor role. 32 A dominant military: Organization and hierarchy Real power in Pakistan is dominated by a Council of its nine principal Army Corps Commanders, and the GHQ staff, comprising nearly 30 generals. 33 These technically non-legal, but institutionalized meetings determine or approve important domestic as well as international policies, such as military coups. 34 The key position at GHQ is that of the Chief of the General Staff, who commands Military Intelligence and Military Operations and, as the Chief Operations Commander for the Corps Commanders, is able to check any coup attempt. 35 Corps are self-contained multi-branch miniature armies comprising between 20,000 and 60,000 soldiers and effectively are able to intervene in their respective regions. The two most important Corps are those deployed near the Army s GHQ (moved from Rawalpindi to Islamabad), particularly Strike Corps North (1st Corps) deployed

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 185 APPRAISING THE THREAT OF AN ISLAMIST MILITARY COUP IN PAKISTAN 185 at Jhelum, and 10 Corps at Rawalpindi, with the responsibility of defending GHQ and the seat of government in Islamabad. The next tier of Corps comprises those located in the Punjab, including the 31 Corps at Bahawalpur, 2 Corps at Multan, 4 Corps at Lahore, 30 Corps at Sialkot. The third tier of Corps is those located outside the Punjab, including 12 Corps at Quetta, 5 Corps at Karachi, 9 Corps at Peshawar, and the Northern Army in Muzzaferabad. Nuclear weapons are most likely under the operational control of the Air Force, but since Sargodha air base falls into the 10 Corps area of responsibility, it is likely to come under their administrative control. Pakistan s first indigenous military Chief, Defense Minister, and ultimately President, General Ayub Khan, controlled the military through its hierarchy and appointments. The tradition of collective military decision-making began, therefore, with Pakistan s President General Yahya Khan in 1969, Pakistan s second military leader, whose weak position vis-à-vis old Ayub supporters required him to seek policy coalitions. The nexus for this was the principal staff officer s conference at GHQ, which was dominated by the military Chiefs of the principal strike corps, the Intelligence Chiefs, Divisional Commanders, and included civilian appointees. 36 General Gul Hassan consulted the cabinet before Yahya s ejection from power in 1971. 37 Zia ul-haq was advised by the Army commanders prior to his coup in 1977. 38 Musharraf consulted the Corps Commanders when the US demanded Pakistani co-operation on 14 September 2001. 39 The absence of military dissent is an indication that it was the Corps Commanders, rather than Musharraf alone, who had decided to acquiesce to the US requests for basing rights and assistance in the fight against al-qaeda. 40 All evidence is that Musharraf s rule was strongly supported by the key Punjab Corp Commanders. 41 Musharraf added to the informal process of consulting with the Corps Commanders at GHQ with linkages with non-military agencies in Pakistan. In 2004, the Pakistan parliament established, with his assent, a National Security Council that has primarily military representation, coupled with that of the President, Foreign Minister, the civilian Intelligence Chiefs, and other stakeholders depending on the situation under consideration. Its principal impetus was for a broader national strategy encompassing nuclear weapons. 42 A single exception to the dominance of the Corps Commanders is operations in Kashmir. 43 In both 1947 and 1965 under Ayub Khan, and then in 1999 under Nawaz Sharif, local military leaders (General Akbar Khan, General Akhtar Malik, and Mohammed Aziz Khan, respectively), conducted military operations without consulting the GHQ. 44 In the 1965 case this was because of Ayub s personal oversight of the operation; in the last case it had to do with the political space opened by the confrontation between Nawaz Sharif and GHQ. In both cases, Kashmir was considered a special case, where ethnically-kashmiri commanders were typically pre-authorized to conduct unconventional warfare. The implication for an Islamic takeover of Pakistan is that it is unlikely without the assent of the Corps Commanders and, in particular, the key Punjabi Corps Commanders who are the least likely of all Pakistanis to be driven by religious considerations. It also indicates that any religious coup would likely face a rapid and aggressive response by a military intent on protecting its corporatist interest. Furthermore, assassination attempts are unlikely to result in dramatic changes in policy but simply a transition to

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 186 186 JULIAN SCHOFIELD the next most senior consensually-supported military general officer, as occurred following the 1988 assassination of Zia ul-haq and his temporary replacement by General K. M. Arif. As mentioned above, the 10 Corps is the gatekeeper for access to Islamabad and its subordinate 111 Brigade has been involved in every military coup. 45 For an Islamist coup to succeed, not only would the commander of 10 Corps have to be an Islamist acceptable to the other corps commanders, but he would also have to be able to act and consolidate his position before the other Punjab corps commanders, who command more powerful formations, intervened. One very unlikely nightmare scenario includes the 10 Corps drawing on its access to nuclear weapons, (it is responsible for the security of the Kahuta nuclear weapons complex) to counter the reaction of any countervailing corps commanders. Lessons learnt: The coup d état Within the context of a military dominated by its Corps Commanders, coups are rarely attempted and never succeed without their approval. 46 Those that were discovered were all at an early stage of planning and were never likely to be feasible. In effect, an Islamist coup is an unlikely outcome, because there is little prospect of subsequently securing the approval of the Corp Commanders and currently the political influence of Islam among military officers is subordinated to corporatist military interests. While Islamist coups are a likely prospect, given the presence of a substantial portion of military officers radicalized by Pakistan s involvement in Afghanistan, these officers are in a minority and more likely to use their positions to further domestic terrorism within Pakistan. Coups Attempts In Pakistan Conspirator Target Approval Success 1. February 1951 Akbar Khan Civilian No No 2. October 1958 Ayub Khan Civilian Bureaucracy Yes 3. March 1969 Yahya Khan Ayub Khan Military Yes 4. December 1971 Tikka Khan Yahya Khan No No 5. March 1973 Farooq Adam Z. A. Bhutto No No 6. July 1977 Zia ul-haq Z. A. Bhutto Military Yes 7. September 1994 Zaheer ul-islam Benazir Bhutto No No 8. October 1999 Pervaiz Musharraf Nawaz Sharif Military Yes The earliest coup attempt, that of the Pindi conspiracy of February 1951, involved a planned military revolt against the civilian government to reverse its Kashmir policy and resume the war with India. Ultimately, the seventeen conspirators (including Air Commodore Mohammed Khan Janjua, General Nazir Ahmad, Brigadier Siddiq Khan, and Brigadier Latif Khan), led by General Akbar Khan, decided against action, but

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 187 APPRAISING THE THREAT OF AN ISLAMIST MILITARY COUP IN PAKISTAN 187 were discovered and imprisoned. 47 Ayub Khan subsequently led a successful coup in October 1958 and brought to power Pakistan s first military government. 48 This coup had been considered as early as October 1954, when the Presidency, in collusion with the bureaucracy, obtained special powers that neutralized the political parties. When it was ultimately executed, Ayub had the support of the national bureaucracy and key Punjabi elites (such as the Nawab of Kalabagh); the political parties had self-abnegated themselves by declaring martial law earlier that month. 49 The third coup involved the military removal of the increasingly unpopular Ayub Khan during a tumultuous period of public protests. 50 When Ayub declared martial law in 1969 and then sought to empower a political party hostile to military interests, the military compelled him to resign. 51 Ayub thereupon appointed General Yahya Khan as his successor. 52 This military coup was relatively seamless, but is illustrative that the Council rather than the military Chief is the final arbiter of power. 53 The fourth attempt was a possible veto coup. Following the defeat of Pakistan by India in December 1971, the Punjab Divisional Commanders, including the Chief of the 6th Armored Division, demanded the removal of Yahya Khan. With the support of the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim League political parties, they proposed his replacement with General Tikka Khan. 54 The senior military planners, believing the military had lost the confidence of the Pakistani people, blocked the move and instead withdrew the military from power and transferred authority to a civilian politician, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. 55 The military subsequently uncovered a coup plot (known as the Attack Conspiracy ) against Bhutto by 59 of its members in March 1973, largely in response to a widely held belief that he was responsible for the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. Many of the conspirators in this fifth coup attempt were prisoners from the defeat in East Pakistan and were imprisoned. These included Major Farooq Adam, Major Nadir Pervez, and Brigadier Wajid Ali Shah. The sixth coup was the overthrow of Bhutto by General Zia ul-haq in July of 1977. This was largely in response to the unprecedented corruption and economic stagnation of Bhutto s regime, as well as his personal ambitions to dominate both Pakistan and the military. Zia was assassinated in 1988 by unknown parties, possibly either the remnants of Afghan intelligence, the KHAD and their Soviet allies, or secular elements within Pakistan society who had become critical of his Islamist policies. 56 This led the military to accelerate a process towards civilian government that was already in progress under Zia. The seventh coup attempt was the failed September 1994 plot led by Islamist General Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi and Major Mustansar Billah. This was essentially an Islamist conspiracy to attack the GHQ and displace the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto for her lack of support for the war in Afghanistan. This conspiracy was facilitated by Islamist sympathies fed by the ISI s involvement in Afghanistan and by the Army s close links with domestic Islamist groups in Pakistan, starting in the late- 1970s, such as Jamaat-i-Islami, which was popular among the lower- and middle-ranked soldiery and officers. 57 The Abbasi conspiracy was easily uncovered, either by Military Intelligence or the Joint Counter-Intelligence Bureau (JCIB) of the ISI, which is the principal military counter-intelligence agency responsible for military reliability. 58 Paradoxically, once the plot was uncovered, the conspirators were betrayed

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 188 188 JULIAN SCHOFIELD by Qari Saifullah Akhtar, one of its most religious members. 59 Even had the coup initially succeeded, Abbasi s Sunni extremism would have alienated the significant Shia segment of the Pakistani population and military. Furthermore, other prominent Islamist sympathizers, such as General Aslam Beg, harbored inclinations towards pan- Islam, including improved relations with Iran, something that was considered anathema by Abbasi. The aftermath of the Abbasi conspiracy reinforced confidence within the Pakistan Army of the shallowness of its Islamist sympathies. 60 The last and eighth coup attempt in Pakistan was General Pervaiz Musharaf s displacement of Nawaz Sharif in October 1999, the immediate impetus being the latter s threat to the military s appointment process (as well as economic mismanagement). Musharraf had consulted with the Corps Commanders to hold a coup as early as mid- September, but he was not backed at that time. 61 While Musharraf himself was the target of three assassination attempts in 2002 and two in 2003 by Islamist military personnel, they were not coups, stricto sensu, since any success would not have altered either the underlying policy of the military regime or the consultative process among the senior military leadership to appoint a successor. They nevertheless led to a reshuffling of command appointments and the responsibility for the security of the military leadership was transferred from the ISI to MI, because of the former s historical association with Islamists. 62 A number of mid-level officers were also arrested. 63 CONCLUSION An Islamist take-over from within the military in Pakistan is unlikely for two reasons: first, the military s decision-making process is not coup-proofed like that in Syria or Egypt, where the senior leadership and the different military branches are isolated from each other so as to minimize collusion against the government, and are under constant counter-espionage surveillance. 64 In contrast, high-level decision-making in Pakistan is based on a process of the consensual consultation of the senior commanders. 65 Historically, coups in Pakistan during periods of both civilian and military governments have been planned through semi-official channels of consultation among the senior military leadership (originally the Divisional Commanders and, currently, the Corps Commanders) and in consultation with key members of the bureaucracy and/or the traditional Punbjabi elite. 66 No coup has succeeded without the approval of the majority of the members of this process. Any Islamist movement would have to navigate this process of consultation. Without broad support, a dedicated Islamist movement would not win support among the military unit commanders and would not therefore survive. Also, despite the alleged influence of the ISI, which has close links with Islamists because of its use of their services, the ISI has historically played no role in determining leadership selection during coups. 67 Precisely because the mainstream military commanders did not trust the ISI it was replaced as the lead agency with Military Intelligence to conduct the Kargil operation in 1999. The Army leadership even successfully vetoed the appointment of former ISI Chief, Lieutenant-General Ziauddin Butt, by Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif to the command of the Army and resisted Sharif s appointment of the Islamist Javed Nasir to the ISI. 68 The internal transparency of the military command

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 189 APPRAISING THE THREAT OF AN ISLAMIST MILITARY COUP IN PAKISTAN 189 structure, therefore, makes it difficult for an Islamist conspiracy to penetrate and then play off different internal factions to seize power. Second, despite alarmist claims that Islamist sympathizers have gained a foothold within the Army, any disaffection in the military s ranks does not as yet appear to be wide or deep enough to cause institutional fractures or trigger intra-organizational conflict. The military thus far has been able to dismiss extremists and suppress domestic Islamist threats without much consequence to the allegiance of its members. 69 Those Islamists that remain do not have access to the institutional controls necessary to conduct a coup, even if they could convince whole battalions, brigades or even divisions to participate. Pan-Islamic sympathizers, such as the former Chief of the Pakistan Army, Mirza Aslam Beg, concede that the military is too professional and well organized to submit to any Islamist movement. Since Pakistan separated from British India to become an independent Muslim state in 1947, there has never been a religious cleavage within the military, either Sunni Shia, or Barelvi Deobandi. 70 Nevertheless, the military has nurtured a climate of insecurity while portraying itself as the sole alternative to an Islamist regime in order to win the favor of western, and primarily US, governments. 71 For example, at the 60th Formation Commanders Conference in 2008, Musharraf identified domestic Jihadists as the greatest immediate threat to Pakistan. 72 In effect, the prospect of an Islamist coup from within the Pakistan military is very unlikely. The argument of this article is, that despite the strength of Islamist groups in Pakistan, it is the military itself that is the key to power; as such, its institutional design will continue to insulate Pakistan from Islamist threats. NOTES 1. Lyubov Pronina and Ellen Pinchuk, Russia Concerned About Safety of Pakistan s Nuclear Arsenal, cited on 7 April 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid =20601091&sid=aHuINoymG0Hc&refer=india. 2. David Sanger, Obama s Worst Pakistan Nightmare, The New York Times, 8 January 2009; Ahmad Faruqui, Musharraf s Crisis of Legitimacy, in Syed Farooq Hasnat and Ahmad Faruqui (eds), Pakistan Unresolved Issues of State and Society, Lahore: Vanguard, 2008, p. 45; Kerr and Nitikin, Pakistan s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, 1 November 2007, p. 10. 3. Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, London: Viking, 2008, p. 155. 4. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 477, 572. 5. Stephen Burgess, Pakistan s Security Dilemma and Quest for Strategic Stability, in Amit Gupta (ed.), Strategic Stability in Asia, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 127 141, 132; Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, op. cit., p. 467. 6. Subodh Atal, Extremist, Nuclear Pakistan An Emerging Threat?, Policy Analysis, No. 472, 2003, p. 6; Robin Wright, The Chilling Goal of Islam s New Warriors, Los Angeles Times, online 6 June 2005, available from http://www.angelfire.com/a14/terror/article22.htm; Hassan Abbas, Pakistan s Drift into Extremism, London: M.E. Sharp, 2005, p. 240. 7. Ajay Behera, Is Musharraf Spooked by His Spy Agency?, Brookings Institute 2002, online 7 June 2005, available from http://brook.edu/printme.wbs?page=/pagedefs/cc0985a45b00ff 3b7e55aa6b0a141465.htm; Colonel Anil Athale, Is Pakistan Unraveling?, 2004, online 7 June 2005, available from http://rediff.com/cms/print.jsp?docpath=/news/2004/jul/26 guest1.htm. 8. Dr Pervaiz Chima, interview, Institute of Regional Policy, Islamabad, 18 July 2001. 9. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, op. cit., pp. 3, 5, 571.

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 190 190 JULIAN SCHOFIELD 10. Sean Winchell, Pakistan s ISI: The Invisible Government, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 16, 2003, p. 377. 11. Frederic Grare, Policy Brief 45 Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, p. 3. 12. Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), A History of Pakistan and Its Origins, p. 80; Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 259; Mandavi Mehta, Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions, Washington DC: CSIS Report on Pakistan s Future, 2002, p. 14, online 19 June 2005, available from http://www.csis.org/saprong/islaminpakistan.pdf; Ajay Behera, op. cit. 13. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, op. cit., p. 571. 14. SATP, Terrorist Groups of Pakistan: Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohhamai, online 9 June 2005, available from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/ terroristoutfits.htm. 15. Hassan Abbas, op. cit., p. 233; Sean Winchell, Pakistan s ISI: The Invisible Government, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 16, 2003, p. 384; Joseph Palermo, Undermining Musharraf, History News Network, 2001, online 6 June 2005, available from http://hnn.us/articles/printfriendly/358.html. 16. Sharmeen Obaid, Power Struggle After Musharraf Will be Very Fierce: Ahmed Rashid, 2004, online 9 June 2005, available from http://www.satribune.com/archives/ apr4_10_04/p1_rashid.htm. 17. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, op. cit., p. 585. 18. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Can Pakistan Work?, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2004. 19. Zia al-huq s Defense Secretary Ijlal Haider Zaidi, interview, Islamabad, 29 April 1999; Owen Bennett Jones, op. cit., p. 241. 20. Owen Bennett Jones, op. cit., pp. 239, 241; Zia al-huq s Defense Secretary Ijlal Haider Zaidi, interview, Islamabad, 29 April 1999. 21. Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 31, 96, 102; Owen Bennett Jones, op. cit., p. 238. 22. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Can Pakistan Work?, op. cit. 23. C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge, Washington DC: USIP, 2008, p. 23. 24. Sabrina Tavernise et al., United Militants Threaten Pakistan s Populous Heart, The New York Times, 13 April 2009. 25. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2005, p. 223; Hassan Abbas, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, op. cit., p. 157. 26. Husain Haqqani, op. cit., p. 111. 27. Hassan Abbas, op. cit., pp. 98, 150; Zia al-huq s Defense Secretary Ijlal Haider Zaidi, interview, Islamabad, 29 April 1999. 28. Zia al-huq s Defense Secretary Ijlal Haider Zaidi, interview, Islamabad, 29 April 1999. 29. Husain Haqqani, The Role of Islam in Pakistan s Future, The Washington Quarterly Vol. 28: No. 1 Winter 2004, p. 87. 30. http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper146.html. 31. Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 18, 28, 31, 34 43, 45, 53 55; Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, op. cit., pp. 467 468. 32. Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms, London: Verso, 2002, p. 249. 33. Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan, p. 66; Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 77. 34. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, op. cit., p. 258; Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, op. cit., p. xlii. 35. B. Raman. Pakistan: The Mullas Blue Eyed General, South Asia Analysis Group, 2000, online 6 June 2005, available from http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper146.html. 36. Kamal Matinuddin (Lt. Gen.), Tragedy of Errors (East Pakistan Crisis, 1968 1971), Lahore: Wajidalis, 1994, p. 132; G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, Bloomington:

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 191 APPRAISING THE THREAT OF AN ISLAMIST MILITARY COUP IN PAKISTAN 191 Indiana University Press, 1974, p. 56; Mohammed Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War, New Delhi: S. Chand & Co. Ltd. 1972, p. 95; Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan Pakistan s First Military Ruler, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993, p. 425. 37. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, op. cit., pp. 89 90. 38. Ibid., p. 125. 39. Hassan Abbas, op. cit., p. 219; Owen Bennett Jones, op. cit., p. 3. 40. Samina Ahmed, The Myth of the Good General Musharraf, Observer, online 6 June 2005, available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2241&1=1. 41. http://www.satribune.com/archives/dec21_jan3_04/p1_lead.htm. 42. K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan s Domestic Political Developments, CRS Report for Congress 2004, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, P. CRS-9. 43. Hassan Abbas, op. cit., p. 171. 44. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, op. cit., p. 250; Hassan Abbas, op. cit., p. 170. 45. Owen Bennett Jones, op. cit., p. 39; Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 210, 233. 46. Owen Bennett-Jones, op. cit., p. 255; A. H. Amin, Possible Coup in Pakistan, SA Tribune, 2003, online 6 July 2005, available from http://www.satribune.com/archives/feb_24 mar1_03/opinion_coup.htm. 47. Akbar Khan (Maj. Gen.), Raiders in Kashmir, Karachi: Pak Publishers Limited, 1970, p. 162. 48. Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State The Case of Pakistan, Chatham: W&J Mackay Limited, 1979, p. 138. 49. Mohammad Ahmad, My Chief, Lahore: Longmans, Green and Co., 1960, p. 86; for the text, see Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947 86, New Delhi: Konark Publishers Limited, 1988, pp. 265 271; M. S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, 1947 1958, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982, p. 396; Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 134; K. L. Kamal, Pakistan The Garrison State, New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1982, p. 30. 50. Sarbjit Johal, Conflict and Integration in Indo-Pakistan Relations, Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1989, p. 134.; G. W. Choudhury, op. cit., p. 19. 51. K. L. Kamal, op. cit., p. 74. 52. Asaf Hussain, op. cit., p. 139; according to interview by Matifnuddin of Altaf Gauhar, cited in Kamal Matinuddin (Lt. Gen.), Tragedy of Error, (East Pakistan Crisis, 1968 1971), Lahore: Wajidalis, 1994, p. 120; Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan Pakistan s First Military Ruler, p. 408; Robert Laporte, Jr., Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison State, Asian Survey, Vol. 9 No. 11, November 1969, p. 851. 53. Kamal Matinuddin (Lt. Gen.), op. cit., p. 121. 54. Dilip Mukerjee, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Quest for Power, Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1972, p. 6; Observations on Pakistan Military Services in the Light of Recent Arrests, 16 May 1973, in Roedad Khan (ed.), The American Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 912. 55. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, p. 235; Mohammad Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics Pakistan 1958 1982, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1983, p. 45 46.; Dilip Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 9. 56. General Tajammul Hussain Malik allegedly attempted a coup against Zia in 1980, but he may simply have been a political rival. See Syed Saleem Shahzad, Purging Pakistan s Jihadi Legacy, Asia Times, 22 December 2004, accessed 7 September 2009, http://www. atimes.com/atimes/south_asia/fl22df03.html. 57. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, op. cit., p. 90. 58. Maloy Krishna Dhar, Fulcrum of Evil, p. 48; Hassan Abbas, Pakistan s Drift Into Extremism, p. 152.

26.2 Master.qxp:D&SA 19/4/10 07:19 Page 192 192 JULIAN SCHOFIELD 59. Mohammad Amir Rana, Gateway to Terrorism, London: Millenium, 2003, p. 276. 60. Owen Bennett Jones, op. cit., pp. 254 257. 61. Ibid., p. 39. 62. Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, London: Viking, 2008, pp. 231, 239. 63. C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan, Washington DC: USIP, 2006, p. 21. 64. James T. Quinlivan, Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East, International Security, Vol. 24 No. 2, Fall 1999, pp. 131 165. 65. Rodney Jones, The Prospect of State Failure in Pakistan, 2001, online 9 June 2005, available from http://www.policyarchitects.org/pdf/pak_statefailure_exsumm.pdf#search= islamic%20extremist%20groups%20in%20pakistan ; Newsmax.com Wire Service, Analysis of Pakistan s Nuclear Weapons, 19 September 2001, online 29 May 2005, available from http://www.newsmax.com; K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan s Domestic Political Developments, CRS Report for Congress 2004, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, P. CRS-20. 66. B. Raman, Pakistan: The Mullas Blue Eyed General, South Asia Analysis Group, 2000, online 6 June 2005, available from http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper146.html; A. H. Amin. Possible Coup in Pakistan, 2003, online 6 July 2005, available from http://www.satribune.com/archives/feb_24mar1_03/opinion_coup.htm. 67. Samina Ahmed, The Myth of the Good General Musharraf, Observer, 2005, online 6 June 2005, available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2241&1=1; Newsmax.com Wire Service. Analysis of Pakistan s Nuclear Weapons, 19 September 2001, online 29 May 2005, available from http://www.newsmax.com; Gaurav Kampani, The Military Coup in Pakistan, Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999, online 7 June 2005, available from: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/guarav.htm. 68. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, New York: Free Press, 2006, p. 115; Hassan Abbas, op.cit, p. 148; Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, op. cit., p. 292. 69. Issue Brief, Nuclear Watch: Pakistan, 2004, online 30 May 2005, available from http://www.nti.org/e3_38b.html. 70. Newsmax.com Wire Service, Analysis of Pakistan s Nuclear Weapons, 19 September 2001, accessed from http://www.newsmax.com on 29 May 2005. 71. Frederic Grare, Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the US and Europe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 4 5, 7 (pp. 4 55); Kfir, 2007, p. 75. 72. Ibid.