DPI 440: MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY Tuesdays and Thursdays, 1:15 to 2:30 Land Hall, Belfer 400 Instructor: Tarek_Masoud@hsk.harvard.edu Course Assistant: Peter Knoetgen Faculty Assistant and Office Hours TBA DRAFT COURSE DESCRIPTION The Middle East, and particularly its Arabic-speaking, Muslim-majority core, is today wracked by dictatorship, underdevelopment, and civil war. In this course, we explore some of the principal explanations for this doleful state of affairs, as well as potential paths out of it. Readings draw on a variety of disciplines, from history to anthropology to political science, as well as essays by local actors and writers (in translation), and offer diverse and sometimes violently opposing perspectives. Students will emerge from the course with not just a deeper understanding of the Middle East, but also with a grounding in some of the principal analytic approaches in the comparative study of societies and political systems. Part I lays out the principal problems that will be our major focus throughout the course: authoritarianism, state weakness, the oppression of women, endemic violence, economic underdevelopment, and the routine violation of human rights. Part II then explores some tested explanations for these phenomena, ranging from religion and culture to colonialism and state formation to economic structures and the interventions of foreign powers. Part III explores attempts by Middle Eastern leaders, by foreign powers, and by ordinary citizens to lift countries of the region out of poverty and underdevelopment, and their mixed records of success. In Part IV, we explore yet another attempt to remake the region the phenomenon of political Islam. We pay particular attention to its violent manifestations and ask whether it is Islamists rather than secularists, leftists, or liberals who will inherit and shape the Arab future. In Part V, we apply what we have learned about democracy and development in the Arab world to one of that region s thorniest problems the longstanding conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The course concludes by asking whether the Arab world will achieve democracy in our lifetimes, and what we as potential policymakers can and cannot do to increase the likelihood of this happening. EXPECTATIONS, ASSIGNMENTS, GRADING This class combines lectures, discussions (both of specific cases and of conceptual issues suggested by the readings), and in-class exercises. Your full participation in class discussions is essential to making this course work. It is important that you complete the readings and come to class ready to participate, ask questions, debate with your colleagues, and contribute to our collective enterprise. 1
Attendance is mandatory, and 20% of your grade will be based on class participation. I will do my best to make it possible for everyone in this class to participate to their full potential. Assignments: The bulk of your grade will be based on three written assignments (two 1,200 word memos and a final, 3,000-word take-home exam). Due dates and the relative share of each assignment in your overall grade are below: Assignment Date out Due % of grade Memo 1 October 3 October 17 20 Memo 2 November 7 November 21 25 Final Exam (take home) November 30 December 7 35 (These dates may be subject to change in consultation with the class, but for now please plan accordingly.) Over the course of the semester, we will discuss what makes for a successful written assignment. But generally, I look for clear writing and logic, and close attention to the literatures we have read in class. Please note that your final grade for the course will not be based on your absolute score on any of the graded exercises, but rather on how well you performed relative to other students in the class. The Kennedy School s grading curve is as follows: the top 10 to 15% of the class will receive a grade of A; the next 20 to 25% will receive a grade of A-; the next 30 to 40% will receive a grade of B+; the next 20 to 25% will receive a grade of B; and the lowest 5 to 10% will receive a grade of B- or lower. Academic Honesty: It is important that you adhere to the Kennedy School s policies regarding proper academic practice. The academic code can be found here: https://goo.gl/58rjek Policy on laptops, tablets, and smart-phones: Tablets, laptops, and phones must be shut off during class. There is a wealth of research demonstrating that use of these devices in the classroom impedes not only the learning of students who use them, but those who are seated near them. A good summary of the current state of research is available here: http://bokcenter.harvard.edu/blog/use-mobiledevices-college-classroom Extensions and Late Work: These can only be granted for medical or family emergencies, and only with a note from a physician or the coordinator of your degree program. Please be advised that, even after securing instructor permission, late work may have to be graded after the conclusion of the semester and in such cases may result in a temporary grade of incomplete. SCHEDULE OF SESSIONS AND READINGS 2
All readings can be found at links below and/or on the Canvas course page. As you will see, some weeks have (slightly) heavier readings than others; please plan accordingly. PART I THE PROBLEM(S) 1. Introduction Thursday, August 31, 2017 In this session, we will discuss the main goals of the course. Prior to attending class, please prepare a brief, 250-word biography, including one or two sentences about why you are interested in this course, and bring a hard copy with you to class. Also, please make sure to read the following: Osama Bin Laden, Declaration of Jihad, August 23, 1996. Reprinted in Bruce Lawrence, ed. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, Verso 2005, pp. 23-30 Asmaa Mahfouz, I am going down on January 25, in Daniel Gumbiner et al (eds.) Now that We Have Tasted Hope: Voices from the Arab Spring, pp. 40-41 2. The Democracy Deficit Tuesday, September 5, 2017 One of the main questions this course asks is why the Middle East, and particularly its Arabic-speaking countries, is largely devoid of democracy. In this session, we look at the empirical record, and explore the reasons why this question is so important in the first place. Arab Human Development Report 2004, Toward Freedom in the Arab World, United Nations Development Programme, 2004. Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 79-100. Available at: http://www.arabhdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2004e.pdf Tarek Masoud, Has the Door Closed on Arab Democracy? Journal of Democracy, 2015 3. Violence and State Weakness Thursday, September 7, 2017 We have generally tended to view the Arab world as marked by states that are so strong as to dominate their peoples entirely. And yet, these states that have (generally) proven so capable in the field of repression have also proven stunningly incapable in other realms: such as fostering economic development, delivering social services, and protecting citizens and their property from violence and expropriation. In this session we assess the record. Arab Human Development Report 2009, Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries, United Nations Development Programme, 2009. Chapters 3 and 8. Available at: http://www.arabhdr.org/contents/index.aspx?rid=5 3
Nazih Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, I.B. Tauris, 1995. Chapter 1, The Middle East and the State Debate: A Conceptual Framework, pp. 1-37 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton University Press, 1988. Chapter 5, The Egyptian State Attempts to Transform Egyptian Society, pp. 181-206 4. Subordination of Women Tuesday, September 12, 2017 Despite admirable progress in recent years, Arabic-speaking countries rank near the bottom of countries with respect to gender equality. Women continue to face obstacles in gaining access to labor markets and to the halls of power. In this session, we explore the record, and begin grappling with potential explanations. World Bank, Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Development in the Middle East and North Africa, 2013, pages 1-31. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/33838146827987785 4/pdf/751810PUB0EPI002060130Opening0doors.pdf Michael L. Ross Oil, Islam, and Women, American Political Science Review, Vol. 102. No. 1 Feb 2008. Available at http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjogetfulltext?f ulltextid=1720696 PART II SOME PERSISTENT EXPLANATIONS 5. The Trouble with Islam? Thursday, September 14, 2017 The Arab world is the birthplace of Islam and home to a sizeable portion (but not a majority) of Muslims. It is perhaps natural, then, that some scholars would attribute the Arab world s political and economic dysfunctions to the religion with which it is so closely associated. In this class, we explore some of the most prominent arguments linking Islam with underdevelopment and unfreedom. As you read these works, think how you might test their arguments scientifically? What kind of evidence could you gather to prove or disprove them? Bernard Lewis, Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, pp. 52-63. Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v007/7.2l ewis.html David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some Are So Poor, W.W. Norton, 1998, pp. 392-421 Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East, Princeton, 2010, pp. 279-302. 6. Arab Culture and Other Immutables Tuesday, September 19, 2017 4
The experience of Muslims outside of the Arab world with democracy, as in Indonesia, Turkey, Bangladesh, and elsewhere, has led some scholars to wonder if the fault in the Arab world lies less with its religion than with some other features of its culture specifically its allegedly ingrained norms of patriarchy and a preference for authoritarian leaders. In this class, we put to the test a few of the more influential of these arguments. Mitt Romney, Culture Does Matter, The National Review, July 31, 2012. Available at: http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/312830/culture-doesmatter-mitt-romney Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 3-17. Available at: http://www.google.com.eg/books?id=txte20fvtvec&printsec=fr ontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false Abdellah Hammoudi, Master and Discipline: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism, University of Chicago Press, 1997, pp. 11-32 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind, Hatherleigh Press, 2002, pp. 1-42 7. Colonial Legacies I: Thursday, September 21, 2017 The economic and political development of the Middle East was shaped in large part by colonial powers that occupied huge swaths of the region beginning in the 19 th century, and who by some accounts largely determined the contours of the modern Arab state system. To what extent can this history of colonial control account for the region s current ills? Rami Khouri, Arab Mismanagement? Blame Colonialism, The Daily Star (Lebanon), September 3, 2008. Available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/opinion/commentary/2008/sep- 03/120349-arab-mismanagement-blame-colonialism.ashx Excerpt from Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, Harvard University Press, 1999. Pages TBA Eugene Rogan, Conclusion: The Fall of the Ottomans, in The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East, Basic Books, 2015 pp. 385-406 Robin Wright, How the Curse of Sykes Picot Still Haunts the Middle East, The New Yorker, April 30, 2016. Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-curse-ofsykes-picot-still-haunts-the-middle-east 8. Colonial Legacies II: Assessing the Record Tuesday, September 26, 2017 In this session, we explore recent social science research on the question of colonism s impact on the modern Middle East. Iliya Harik, The Origins of the Arab State System, International Spectator, vol. 20, no. 2, April 1985, pp. 20-32. 5
Hariri, J. (2015). A Contribution to the Understanding of Middle Eastern and Muslim Exceptionalism, Journal of Politics, March, 2015 Woodberry, Robert D. 2012. The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy. American Political Science Review 106: 2: 244 274 9. Sectarianism and Ethnic Conflict I: The Case of Syria Thursday, September 28, 2017 The Muslim-majority, Arabic-speaking countries of the Middle East are much more diverse than terms like Arab world imply. What are the effects of this diversity on the region s development? We explore this question by examining the role of sectarian diversity in the genesis of the current crisis in Syria. Ayse Tekdal Fildis, Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria. Middle East Policy 19.2 (2012): 148-156. Mohja Kahf, 2014. The Syrian Revolution, Then and Now, Peace Review, 26(4):556-563 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: From authoritarian upgrading to revolution? International Affairs, January 20, 2012. 10. Sectarianism and Ethnic Conflict II: The Sunni-Shia Divide Tuesday, October 3, 2017 Islam has numerous sects, but the two largest are the Sunnis (estimated by the Pew Research Forum to comprise between 87 and 90 percent of Muslims) and Shias (who account for the remaining 10 to 13 percent). The rivalry between these two sects, which stretches back almost 1,400 years, shapes politics between and within countries. Why has this rivalry proven so politically consequential? How can it be transcended? Madawi Al-Rasheed, Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism (11:3, 2011) F. Gregory Gause III, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War, Brookings Institution, July 22, 2014. Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, W.W. Norton, 2006, pp. 227-254 11. Meddling Outsiders I: The Case of Iran Thursday, October 5, 2017 Arab and Middle Eastern scholars and analysts seeking to diagnose the causes of the region s political and economic dysfunctions often implicate the machinations of the great powers. In this session, we discuss exhibit A in the case against the United States the US-backed overthrow of a democratically-elected government in Iran in 1953. Excerpt from Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran, pp. 1-49; pp. 198-210 12. Meddling Outsiders II: Theoretical Perspectives Tuesday, October 10, 2017 6
Are Middle Eastern phenomena such as persistent authoritarianism, state weakness, and economic underdevelopment attributable to the actions of the United States and other Western countries? If so, what makes the region so susceptible to foreign intervention? Amaney Jamal, Chapter 2: Jordan and Kuwait: The Making and Consolidating of US Client Regimes in Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy At All? Princeton University Press 2012. Jason Brownlee, Chapter 4: Gaza Patrol, in Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 98-122. Ian Lustick, The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political Backwardness in Historical Perspective, International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1997, pp. 653-683. Available at: http://web.ebscohost.com.ezp- prod1.hul.harvard.edu/ehost/pdf?vid=3&hid=7&sid=49d11384- b2cc-4be7-991d-af2cb5e50241%40sessionmgr2 13. The Effects of Oil Wealth I: Theoretical Perspectives Thursday, October 12, 2017 According to the World Bank, oil rents accounted for 23.5 percent of the Middle East s GDP in 2014. Scholars have long argued that this degree of reliance on hydrocarbon has distinctive (and largely doleful) political and economic effects. Are the Arabs cursed by oil? Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 1-14 Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics. April 2001. Available at http://muse.jhu.edu.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/journals/world_politics/v053/53.3ross.pdf Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo. "Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse." American Political Science Review, 105.01 (2011): 1-26. 14. The Effects of Oil Wealth II: The Case of Saudi Arabia Tuesday, October 17, 2017 Since discovering oil in 1938, the Kingdom Saudi Arabia has become the world s largest oil exporter and currently possesses 18 percent of the world s proven oil reserves (OPEC). It is also an absolute monarchy in which women are denied basic rights and a highly conservative religious establishment holds sway over society. Is Saudi Arabia the poster child for the so-called resource curse? What paths toward reform and liberalization exist in that country? Excerpt from Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia, chapter 6, The Wages of Oil, pp. 179-216 Excerpt from Pascal Menoret, Joyriding in Riyadh: Oil, Urbanism, and Road Revolt, Cambridge University Press, 2014. A Night with ʿAjib, pp. 1-20 7
Stéphane Lacroix, Is Saudi Arabia Immune? Journal of Democracy (22:4, 2011). 15. Authoritarian Statecraft Thursday, October 19, 2017 The Arab world during the second half of the twentieth century featured some of the most long-lived authoritarian regimes in the world. For some, the secret to autocrats success was the clever manipulation of institutions and opponents. In this class, we ll look at some of the ways in which seemingly democratic institutions were used by Arab autocrats to generate undemocratic results. We ll ask whether such machinations are sufficient to account for the dismal record of Arab democracy. Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp 37-95. Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Elite Management, in Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak s Egypt, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 48-64 Jason Brownlee, Low Tide after the Third Wave: Exploring Politics under Authoritarianism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 34: No. 4 (2002), pp. 477-499 PART III ESCAPES: FAILED, SUCCESSFUL, AND IN PROGRESS 16. Atatürk Remakes Turkey Tuesday, October 24, 2017 In 1923, a man named Mustapha Kemal (later Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) became the first president of the new nation Turkey the last remnant of the Ottoman Empire and immediately embarked on a set of reforms intended to do nothing less than turn an underdeveloped, Eastern society into a developed, Western one. How did he pull it off? And has it been a success? Does Ataturk point the way forward for other Middle Eastern leaders? Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as Founder of a State." Daedalus (1968): 793-828. John R. Perry "Language reform in Turkey and Iran." International Journal of Middle East Studies, 17.03 (1985): 295-311. 17. Habib Bourguiba Remakes Tunisia (a little) Thursday, October 26, 2017 Tunisia was ruled from 1957 to 1987 by a former lawyer and anti-french independence leader named Habib Bourguiba. Much like Ataturk, Bourguiba used his power to impose social reforms intended to minimize the influence of Islam over Tunisian social and political life. He ended up inaugurating a long period of authoritarianism. Today, however, Tunisia is the Arab world s sole democracy. Is this despite Bourguiba s legacy or because of it? 8
Habib Bourguiba, The Tunisian Way, Foreign Affairs, 44 (1965): 480. Dirk Vandewalle, "Bourguiba, charismatic leadership and the Tunisian one party system, Middle East Journal, 34.2 (1980): 149 18. George W. Bush Tries to Remake Iraq Tuesday, October 31, 2017 If democracy is hard to grow organically, can it be imposed from the outside? In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, ostensibly to rid that country of its strongman and his stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and inaugurate a democratic regime. Today, that country is (by some accounts) as bereft of democracy as it was under Saddam Hussein, and parts of it are under the control of the so-called Islamic State. Was the project to build a functioning democracy in Iraq doomed from the start? George Packer, War after the war: What Washington doesn t see in Iraq, The New Yorker, November 24, 2003. Andrew P. N. Erdman, Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons of the Past, Information Memorandum, United States Department of State, September 26, 2002 Zaid al-ali, The Struggle for Iraq s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence, and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy, Yale University Press, 2014, Chapter 5 19. The Arab Spring I: The People Have Their Say Thursday, November 2, 2017 In early 2011, protests erupted in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and elsewhere, resulting in the breakdown of several authoritarian regimes. This political opening was nearly unprecedented in the region s history. In this class, we explore the origins of the Arab Spring, and ask why scholars and policymakers at the time believed it contained the promise of Arab democracy. Rabab al-mahdi, Enough! Egypt s Quest for Democracy, Comparative Political Studies, August 2009, pp. 1011-1039 Laryssa Chomiak, The Making of a Revolution in Tunisia, Middle East Law and Governance, 2011, pp. 68-83 Brownlee, Masoud, Reynolds, Why the Modest Harvest? Journal of Democracy, October 2013 20. The Arab Spring II: Regimes Talk Back Tuesday, November 7, 2017 Five years after the onset of the Arab Spring, only one Arab country counts as an electoral democracy. Elsewhere, authoritarian breakdown has been followed either by civil war or the reconstitution of autocracy. Compared to previous waves of democratization in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab Spring cannot be viewed except as a failure. In this session, we come to terms with this failure, and ask whether it was inevitable. 9
Eva Bellin, Drivers of Democracy: Lessons from Tunisia, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, August 2013. Available online. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform, Oxford University Press, 2015, chapters 4 and 5 PART IV THE ISLAMIST ALTERNATIVE 21. Political Islam I: Origins of an Idea Thursday, November 9, 2017 Although we would presumably wish to see the Arab world become liberal and democratic, there are those who seek to forge a different path. Today, so-called Islamist movements, which call for the implementation of religious law, are among the most potent challengers to both current Arab regimes and to the idea of liberal democracy. In this session, we examine the intellectual origins of these movements in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 67-192 Available at: http://hdl.handle.net.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/2027/heb.00896 Nikki R. Keddie, The Pan Islamic appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid II. Middle Eastern Studies 3.1 (1966): 46-67. 22. Political Islam II: The Muslim Brotherhood and its Offspring Tuesday, November 14, 2017 The world s largest Islamist movement, with branches and offshoots from Morocco to Malaysia and in almost every Western country, is the Society of Muslim Brothers. In 2012 the movement came to power in Egypt, and in 2013, it lost it again. What does the Muslim Brotherhood want? What kinds of citizens support them, and why? And what role will they have in shaping the future of the Arab world? Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 1-35 Available at: http://hdl.handle.net.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/2027/heb.00919 Tarek Masoud, Are They Democrats? Does It Matter? Journal of Democracy, July 2008 Excerpt from Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power, Oxford University Press, 2014 Khalil Al-Anani, "Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," The Middle East Journal, 69.4 (2015): 527-543. 23. Political Islam III: Armed Jihad from Qutb to Bin Laden to al-baghdadi Thursday, November 16, 2017 Today, when we think of political Islam, we are more likely to think of the terrorists of al-qaeda and the Islamic State than we are to think of the conservative preachers and parliamentarians of groups like the Muslim 10
Brotherhood. Where did these movements come from, and how likely are they to persist? Does ISIS represent the future of the Middle East? Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, 1964. Introduction, chapters 3, 4, and 5. Available at: http://majalla.org/books/2005/qutb-nilestone.pdf Excerpt from William McCants, The ISIS apocalypse: The history, strategy, and doomsday vision of the Islamic State. Macmillan, 2015. PART V A DIFFICULT APPLICATION AND CONCLUSIONS 24. Israel and the Arabs I: Origins of the Conflict Tuesday, November 21, 2017 For almost 70 years, the Jewish and Arab inhabitants of the narrow strip of land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River have been locked in conflict. In this class and the next one, we explore the roots of the conflict and potential exits from it. We ask: How different is the problem facing these peoples from the problems facing the inhabitants of other Arab countries? Will they be easier or harder to solve? Martin Bunton, The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2013 ----Thanksgiving Break---- 25. Israel and the Arabs II: Negotiation or Nation Building? Tuesday, November 28, 2017 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has generally been framed as an ethnic or sectarian one. In this session, we ask if we might gain more traction on the problem if we view it as a problem of state-building. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton University Press, 1988. Chapter 4, Laying the Basis for a Strong State: The British and the Zionists in Palestine, pp. 142-175 Robert M. Danin, A Third Way to Palestine: Fayyadism and Its Discontents, Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, No. 1, 2011, pp. 94-109 26. Concluding Lecture Thursday, November 30, 2017 In this session, we assess the terrain we have covered and return to the question that motivated this course: What will it take for the Arab world to achieve liberal democracy and economic development? Lisa Wedeen, The Politics of Deliberation: Qat Chews as Public Spheres in Yemen, Public Culture 19:1, 2007. Charles Kurzman, Not Ready for Democracy? Theoretical and Historical Objections to the Concept of Prerequisites, Sociological Analysis, December 1998. Available at: http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman/cv/kurzman_not_ready_for_d emocracy.pdf 11
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