Chapter 2 Relevant Political Developments in Palestine and Governance Under Hamas

Chapter 2 Relevant Political Developments in Palestine and Governance Under Hamas In this chapter, I compare the pre- and post-oslo economic environment under Israeli occupation policies and restrictions. 1 Following a brief discussion of the events that led to the collapse of the Oslo process the chapter will turn its attention to Hamas control of the Gaza Strip. I dedicate several sections to public administration under Hamas and the factors that helped the movement take control of institutions of governance based on the available literature and my own research. Understanding the institutional environment in which aid polices where planned and implemented contributes to assessing the impact of such policies on local priorities and governing structures. 2.1 The Situation on the Ground Before and After Oslo 2.1.1 The Palestinian Economy Before Oslo An examination of structure and development of the Palestinian economy is essential for an understanding of the extent of the damages Israeli occupation have inflicted on Palestinians and the institutions developed to manage their society. The analysis of Israel s economic and political policies provides readers with a holistic approach to understanding the political impasse between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) as well as the political and economic environment in which international donors were operating in support of the PA. Due to the unresolved conflict with Israel, the Palestinian economy was intentionally exposed to several conditions that have limited its activities and restrained its expansion and development. In 1967, the year Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip the Palestinian 1 Keywords: Governance under Hamas, Palestinian Economy, Gaza, Hamas, the 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary Elections, Public Administration, Operation Cast Lead, Education, Legal System, Islamization, De Facto Hamas Government. Springer International Publishing AG 2017 T. Qarmout, Delivering Aid Without Government, The Anthropocene: Politik Economics Society Science 7, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49661-0_2 11

12 2 Relevant Political Developments in Palestine economy lost its independence and came under the full control of Israeli occupation measures. Diwan/Shaban (1999) demonstrate that following 1967 the Palestinian economy was adversely affected by several structural weaknesses that would be only exacerbated by the negation of Palestinian sovereignty by Israeli occupation. The structural weaknesses of the Palestinian economy were the outcomes of four key factors that restrained its growth and development: asymmetric market relations with Israel, regulatory restrictions, fiscal compression and institutional under-development, and restricted access to natural resources. Asymmetric market relations with Israel retarded Palestinian development across multiple sectors of the national economy, captured by their Israeli competitors the domestic expansion of both agriculture and manufacturing activities was restricted by Israel. In addition, Palestinian goods had limited access to Israeli and other regional markets as a result of Israel s occupation policies and its control over international borders. While these efforts hampered Palestinian production, no restrictions were placed on goods produced in Israel and even other countries. This was even found in the labor market as manual laborers had free access to employment in Israel where they were considered a source of cheap labor. Often these asymmetries were brought about by regulatory restrictions. For instance, the expansion of the Palestinian private sector was held back when and where Israeli permissions and investment approvals were not granted to Palestinian investors. In addition, the existing environment of political risk and an uncertain legal and tax framework discouraged Palestinians and outsiders from investing in the private sector. Moreover, Israel shut down the formal Palestinian financial system from 1967 to 1993, creating a more restrictive environment for loans and financial transactions. This third factor, fiscal compression and institutional under-development, came about as a result of low tax receipts and a close-to-balanced budget practice by Israeli authorities in their rule over the occupied territories. Under Israeli military rule, spending on public goods was limited and under provisioned. Moreover, in contrast to international practices that allow state institutions to borrow from outside sources of funding to finance public projects, public utilities were prevented from borrowing for investment. Simultaneously, around 10% of the Palestinian GDP went to the Israeli treasury in the form of tax payments. Direct military rule and its support of the settlement project restricted Palestinian access to natural resources. The loss of sovereignty over land and water resources, under the guise of security necessary for expansive Israeli settlement projects, had a devastating impact on the Palestinian agricultural sector. Rich and fertile agriculture lands were confiscated for Israeli settlers use, and Palestinians usage of water was limited as they were denied access to water resources and were forbidden from digging new water wells. In addition, Israeli regulations created obstacles for industrial expansion in the occupied territories through restrictive public land utilization policies that denied Palestinian sovereignty and pragmatic resource usage for a growing population. In addition to the structural weaknesses tied to the long history of occupation, other factors prevented modernization and expansion, even contributing to a weakening of the Palestinian economy. In her seminal book, Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (2006), Sarah Roy addresses the primary

2.1 The Situation on the Ground Before and After Oslo 13 reasons behind the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process while exploring the issue of economic development in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs). Her book outlines and examines a constant pattern in Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. Roy argues that since the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the Israeli administration adopted a de-development economic policy, causing the Palestinians to become fully dependent on Israel for their basic needs. Through integrating specific parts of the Palestinian economy with its own, Israel successfully limited the scope of industrialization in Palestine, which destroyed any hope that Palestinians could survive on their own economically. Moreover, Roy (2006) convincingly argues that Israel utilized Palestinian land and resources to serve its economy. A segment of the Palestinian population was used to supply Israel with cheap labor, while the rest of Palestinian population remained dispossessed. The Palestinian economy kept operating under such constraints until Palestinians signed the Oslo Peace Agreement with Israel in 1993. 2.1.2 The Palestinian Economy Post Oslo The 1993 signing of the Oslo I Accord, between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Government of Israel (GoI), brought hope to the peoples of both nations that their decades-long conflict might be coming to an end. Under the terms of the Oslo agreement, Palestinians and Israelis were to hold negotiations for a transition to Palestinian self-rule over a period of five years. These negotiations were meant to result in the signing of a final peace agreement that would lead to the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. With the blessing of the international community, a new stage of negotiations and resettlement started with the hope of ending the conflict and creating a sovereign Palestinian state. Out of their commitment to push the peace process and provide financial and technical support for the newly established Palestinian National Authority (PA), state parties supportive of a deal held a donor conference in October 1993. At this conference, 42 donor countries and international institutions came together to adopt a strategy for providing assistance that would result in empowering the PA with creation of a viable Palestinian economy and robust state institutions (Said 2004). The economic reality faced at the time of Oslo I, however, shattered such hopes. The post-oslo Palestinian economy entered crisis mode as a result of Israel s intensification of closure policies imposed on the OPTs. On March 30, 1993, Israel imposed a permanent closure of both the West Bank and the GS. The imposition of closure policies on the Palestinian territories caused considerable damage to the already weakened Palestinian economy. Israel imposed strict travel restrictions on Palestinian workers and goods, leaving a large number of Palestinian families with no source of income. Furthermore, Israel, which had long depended on cheap Palestinian labor to build its infrastructure, started welcoming large numbers of foreign workers to replace Palestinians. In Gaza, the closure policies had dramatic

14 2 Relevant Political Developments in Palestine negative effects on the agricultural, fishing, and industrial sectors (Roy 1996). These policies eliminated whatever chance the Palestinians had to build an economy independent from that of Israel. Instead, Israel was able to further debilitate the economic wellbeing of Palestinians and force them into a state of near-full dependency on Israel for basic needs (Roy 2007). In this way, Israeli governments used Palestinian economic dependency as a method of control, allowing for collective punishment as well as the prevention of an independent Palestinian economy. At times, Israel would limit the food supplies going to the Gaza Strip, leading Roy (2006) to note, The Palestinian Ministry of Economics estimates that the Gaza strip requires a daily average of 275 tons of flour. In the first 28 days of the heightened closure [of March 1993] only 111 tons were permitted to enter Gaza daily. Gazans, therefore, had to wait for many hours in long lines at the front of bakeries with many returning to their families without bread. As we will see below, collective punishment of this sort remained a main feature of Israel s policy towards the Palestinians. In spite of the massive financial and technical support provided by international donors to the Palestinian Authority (see Appendix A), economic conditions nonetheless deteriorated rapidly in comparison to the pre-oslo period. In effect, the 1993 Oslo agreement created a constraining framework that handcuffed Palestinian policymakers. While the peace agreements were implemented in a risky and fragile negotiation environment, Israeli policies such as borders closures, restrained internal and external trade flows, and systematic destruction of basic infrastructure, had negative impacts in a wicked cycle that impaired the peace process (Roy 2006). Prior to Oslo I, Israel, as an occupying power, was responsible for the well-being of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Through that period, Israel had to bear the burden of securing employment for Palestinians, the financing of public expenditures on their behalf from their taxes (Diwan/Shaban 1999). Oslo I and Oslo II in 1995, brought limited freedom to Palestinians, with Israel remaining an occupying power that maintained control over crucial aspects of Palestinian sovereignty, including borders, land, and natural resources. The period between signing the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 and Hamas 2007 takeover of Gaza witnessed many intervening political and security developments. These culminated in the collapse of the Peace Process and include: the failed 2000 Camp David Summit; the 2000 Al-Aqsa Intifada (Uprising); the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the Bush-Sharon Alliance; the isolation and de-legitimation of Yasser Arafat and his controversial death in 2005; Israel s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip the same year; the election in January of that year of Mahmoud Abbas as the President of the PA; and, finally, the 2006 Parliamentary elections which led to Hamas takeover of Gaza and the start of a new political era characterized by an internal Palestinian split, the lack of any progress on the peace front, and three large scale military offensives against Gaza in 2008, 2012, and 2014 (Israel Profile Timeline 2015). Space limitations, time constraints and especially the intended focus on international aid, will prevent a detailed examination of these key developments. The focus will instead begin with Hamas takeover of Gaza, so as to allow for a mapping of the main developments that enabled and crafted their administration of Gaza.

2.1 The Situation on the Ground Before and After Oslo 15 2.1.3 Hamas Electoral Victory: The 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary Elections In August 2005, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip as part of a unilateral disengagement plan. Without a political agreement with the PA, the abrupt withdrawal merely resulted in the Israeli occupation of Gaza taking on a new form of multifaceted military control. While there was no longer a physical Israeli settler or military presence inside the Strip, the 2005 disengagement maintained Israeli control over entry to Gaza, introducing new realities for residents. Israel maintained full control of Gaza s borders and turned the Strip into an isolated territory with limited access to goods and services from the West Bank or the outside world (Petersen 2007). This Israeli maneuver marked an ongoing effort to undermine the efficacy and legitimacy of the PA. The isolation of Gaza from the West Bank challenged scheduled Palestinian elections scheduled for January 2006. The Palestinian people were stunned on January 25, 2006, when these long-awaited parliamentary elections took place under the supervision of the international community. Hamas, a terrorist organization in the eyes of the West and Israel, and a resistance movement in the eyes of many Palestinians, won a decisive majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament) elections. This victory ended the domination of its rival party, Fatah, which had dominated the Palestinian political scene since the establishment of the PA in 1994. Hamas electoral victory was attributed to a number of factors, including: (1) the failed peace process between the PA and Israel; (2) widespread corruption within PA institutions and among its senior officials; (3) high unemployment and poverty rates among Palestinians as well as the overall deterioration of the socio-economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and, (4) Hamas s success in providing a wide range of social services to poor and marginalized Palestinians in both territories, particularly in times of crisis and economic need (GlobalSecurity 2006). Long before the Oslo Accords and prior to becoming a formal political party with a strong military wing at the beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada (Uprising) in 1987, Hamas had been a constituent part of the Palestinian Islamist movement that was recognized by its civic activism and involvement in development and community work through a wide social network of Islamic institutions (Roy 2011). In her 2011 book, Hamas and Civil Society Engagement in Gaza, Sarah Roy refers to the existence of a strong Islamic social sector prominent prior to the emergence of Hamas. She explored the Islamic movement and found that it had exhibited more than six decades of engagement through civic and social work within Palestinian civil society. Moreover, her research showed that the movement was not homogeneous but rather quite diverse, both in its constituency and in its institutional leadership (Roy 2011: 11). More importantly, Roy refers to the first Intifada as an important junction for Hamas as it enabled the movement to reinforce its control over the Islamic social sector while providing the foundation for the emergence of new social institutions, which the Islamists were better positioned, and some cases uniquely poised, to support (Roy 2011: 7). Hamas s control over

16 2 Relevant Political Developments in Palestine the Islamic social sector allowed it to have a strong presence at the grassroots level. It s strong social presence and reputation were crucial for its political survival in difficult times (Roy 2011). Thus, Hamas has had a long tradition of Islamic community work at the grassroots level and, therefore, considerable experience that it could draw on when the time came for it to rule the strip. Although the evolution of Hamas as a political and social movement is not the focus of this research, it is important to briefly highlight these developments as it contributes to an understanding of Hamas s ability to rule the Gaza Strip from 2007 onwards. Apart from being a political party and military actor, Hamas s long presence in the social and economic sectors in the Gaza Strip has been an important factor that has enabled the movement to govern. The deterioration of the political and socioeconomic conditions in the Palestinian territories became evident in the years before the 2006 elections. Ismael (2002) comments on such deterioration: In a survey of public opinion conducted throughout the West bank and in the Winter of 2000 it appeared that Palestinians had lost faith in the peace process and that disenchantment with the PNA and its leadership was running high. Two-thirds of the respondents did not believe it would be possible to reach an acceptable final agreement with Israel. A full 70 percent viewed the PNA and its leadership as corrupt, especially those in the police and security agencies dominated by Fatah. Two-thirds of the respondents also felt that they could not criticize the PNA in a Public forum for fear of retribution, and that corruption would only increase in the future. Only 22 percent of respondents felt that a pluralistic and democratic society, respectful of human rights and freedoms, would develop under the current PNA leadership. This last grouping, respondents who viewed the future as potentially positive, was at its lowest level since polling began in 1996 (Ismael 2002: 30). Hamas victory triggered a harsh reaction from the main players in the peace process. Israel, the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and the Quartet vowed not to deal with a Hamas-led PA unless it renounced violence and recognized Israel. The EU and the US announced that the massive aid on which the PA relied (and continues to rely) for survival would be halted if Hamas did not respect these conditions. The newly elected Hamas asserted that it could not respect such stipulations prior to negotiations since they were in conflict with its own charter, which decidedly opposed recognition of Israel and called for resistance against Israeli occupation. Nevertheless, Hamas was willing to commit to a long-term truce with Israel, in return for an Israeli commitment to respect such a truce through non-intervention, to stop building settlements, and to free Palestinian prisoners (Global Security 2006). During the months following the election, the overall political, security, and economic situations continued to deteriorate dramatically. This was directly attributable to the combined effect of the simmering conflict between Hamas and Fatah and the cut-off of aid to the Hamas-run PA by the US and the EU. Moreover, in an effort to undermine Hamas, Israel, in collaboration with Egypt, imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip. The situation reached a point of no return when the Hamas-run security forces managed to overcome the Fatah forces and impose its full control over the Strip on June 15, 2007 (Urquart, Black and Tran 2007). The takeover of

2.1 The Situation on the Ground Before and After Oslo 17 Gaza by Hamas effectively turned the territories controlled by the PA into two entities, one in Gaza controlled by the Hamas Government, which was boycotted by Israel and Western states, with a second across the Fatah-controlled West Bank, which was recognized by Israel and Western states and therefore considered legitimate by the international community. On June 18, 2007, the primary donors, including the EU and the US, announced that they would support the Fatahmanaged, West Bank PA led by Mahmoud Abbas resuming direct aid. By that time, the Hamas-run de facto government in Gaza was completely isolated, with all international aid blockaded except for humanitarian aid delivered through United Nations agencies. The military and economic blockade of Gaza, from both the Israeli and Egyptian-controlled entry points denied such necessary support to some 1.8 million Gazans (Donnison 2011). 2.1.4 Public Administration Under Hamas As established in the framework agreed in 1993, the executive branch of the Palestinian Authority (PA) is the cabinet. It includes the prime minister and a maximum of 24 ministers, who report to the Palestinian President. Before taking their oath of office, the ministerial cabinet is subject to parliamentary approval, and it can be dissolved by either parliament s vote of no confidence, or an emergency Presidential decree (Jerusalem Media and Communication Center 2009). As a result of the geographical separation between Gaza and the West Bank, the PA executive branch, including ministries and other civil service institutions, had offices in both territories. That is to say, ministries and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), for example, had their own premises and staff in both Gaza and the West Bank. To perform their duties, Ministers and parliamentarians had to routinely travel between Gaza and the West Bank. As the West Bank and Gaza were not contiguous, the only route between them crossed Israel. Following its takeover of Gaza in June 2007, the de facto Hamas government succeeded in gradually taking control of the PA governance structures in the Strip. Hamas appointed their own ministers in Gaza and replaced a large part of the senior and mid-level public officials with Hamasaffiliated officials, including in the institutional staffs of PA security, health, economy, education, judiciary, as well as public infrastructure. Sayigh (2010) outlines the numerous reasons that Hamas was able to assume full control of governance in Gaza. First, the internationally recognized government in the West Bank, under the leadership of Prime Minister Fayyad, ordered 70,000 PA employees working in the Gaza Strip to step away from their duties in an attempt to paralyze and obstruct Hamas s governing of Gaza. This was even identified colloquially as the no-show policy by many Palestinians. The majority of these employees obeyed the instructions from the West Bank for fear of losing their salaries. Sayigh (2010) argued that such a decision paradoxically relieved Hamas from a huge burden, as the majority of these employees were loyal to Fatah. Had they been at their appointed duties they would have been well placed to handicap

18 2 Relevant Political Developments in Palestine the short-lived first Hamas-led government that was established immediately following the elections, by refusing to take orders form the Hamas cabinet. Moreover, Hamas was relieved from the burden of financing the wages of the 70,000 employees, who continued to receive their salaries, largely funded by donors. In parallel, the de facto government replaced this public sector workforce with Hamas members, sympathizers, and thousands of unemployed fresh graduates from Gaza s universities. In less than six months, Hamas replaced the entire edifice, with old PA cadres exchanged for its own cadres allowing it to assume full control of PA public institutions in Gaza. Qarmout/Beland (2012: 8) argued that, although the decision to order 70,000 civil servants to refrain from reporting to duty seemed to be directed by Palestinian leaders in the West Bank, that donors who funded the majority of the PA payroll budget bore equal responsibility for supporting the policy. They noted, While it was the Palestinian president, a political foe of Hamas, who decided to prohibit civil servants from working for the de facto Hamas government, donors share responsibility for sustaining and financing this misguided decision. The long-term human and financial impacts are yet to be assessed, for example, the human cost of forcibly un-employing 70,000 public servants for years. They stressed that, following five years of redundancy, If reconciliation efforts succeed and a unity government is in fact established, it is probable that such a government will have to accommodate both the former PA public servants and the new Hamas appointees. Additionally, Sayigh (2010) also argued that the smooth Hamas takeover of PA institutions in Gaza was due to the fact that in spite of the absence of the PA staff, Hamas had available to them the governing structures already in place. These structures, comprised of regulatory and legislative frameworks, administrative apparatus, and complete guidelines for managerial and technical procedures developed by the PA in conjunction with the technical expertise of donors, could be utilized by the newly Hamas-appointed cadres. This administrative apparatus, developed by the Fatah-dominated PA since 1994, had been supported by the large financial and technical assistance of donors. In addition, it relied on its members and supporters among university professors and graduates to deliver necessary training and skills to build the capacity of its new appointees. Forbidding the 70,000 PA employees from reporting to duty under the no-show policy did not deter Hamas from solidifying its grip and control over Gaza s PA institutions. To the contrary, it led to many Palestinian public servants remaining at home and increased the challenges for future unity negotiations, which will have to address the ramifications of absorbing Hamas cadres in an already overburdened public administration. 2.1.5 The Economy of Gaza Under Hamas In light of the donors financial boycott and the strict siege imposed by Israel and Egypt on the de facto Hamas government, it relied on three main sources to manage

2.1 The Situation on the Ground Before and After Oslo 19 and finance the Gaza economy. Sayigh (2010) identified three primary sources including: (i) a tunnel economy which relied on smuggling operations through tunnels dug under the Egypt/Gaza border; (ii) the services, programs, and salaries provided by international NGOs and UN agencies, especially those of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), provided to Palestinian refugees; and (iii) the salaries paid to public sector employees who had been ordered to not report to work at the PA. The de facto Hamas government also had access to other resources, including contributions from the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas s mother organization) and countries aligned with that movement, such as Syria and Iran. Hamas decided to avoid taxing civilian commodities coming from the tunnel trade, which contributed to keeping commodity prices at low and affordable prices for most Gazans. In summarizing the impacts of these policies on the ability of the de facto Hamas government to manage its budgetary polices, Saigh noted that, These inputs relieve[d] the Hanieh government of a considerable burden, much as a considerably greater scale of foreign aid relieves the Fayyad government. At $540 million, the Hanieh government s declared budget for 2010 is a fraction of the $2.78 billion budget of its West Bank counterpart; but with only 32,000 employees compared to the latter s 145,000, its costs are far lower (Sayigh 2010: 5). 2.2 Islamization and the Agenda of the de Facto Hamas Government 2.2.1 Developments in the Legal System Although there were concerns that upon taking power the Hamas government would start applying Islamic law as the basis of legislative and judicial systems, had this been the movement s goal, it appeared to be a task too difficult to accomplish. In his 2012 article Gaza five years on: Hamas settles in, Nathan Brown explained that Hamas refrained from Islamizing the Palestinian legal order to avoid both international condemnation as well as local resentment in Gaza. Instead, Hamas acted against the expectations of fellow Islamist movements in the region and hired secularly trained judges to replace those who refrained from reporting to work, including two female judges in Gaza. It also postponed a project to write a new criminal code based on Islamic law. Nevertheless, these developments did not mean that the legal system under Hamas was functioning efficiently and independently. Brown explained, The system is unmistakably authoritarian. There is no serious mechanism for democratic oversight or even for meaningful consultation with groups outside of Hamas. The government has used the tools at its disposal such as the licensing and reporting requirements for NGOs to police dissident voices. And where the legal tools have not existed, it has often acted anyway to shut down meetings, detain individuals, ban alcohol, harass opponents, and engage in its tit-for-tat contest with Fatah (Brown 2012: 13).

20 2 Relevant Political Developments in Palestine 2.2.2 Developments in the Education Sector Although the Hamas government evidenced a strong tendency to regulate and police Gazan society according to its conservative Islamic ideology, the political split with the PA did not allow it to change the education curriculum in accordance with its ideological leanings. According to Brown (2012), most governments in the Arab world chose to only accept certification from the Fatah-run ministry of education in the West Bank. By only recognizing diplomas and degrees issued by the PA ministry, they forced the Hamas-led education system in Gaza to coordinate and regulate all its activities with the Fatah-rum ministry in the West Bank. In addition, it limited changes to the curriculum to avoid being isolated. Apart from the large portion of the education system which is managed by UNRWA, which provides education to those Palestinian designated as refugees, and over which Hamas had no control, the rest of the education system had to be managed in a cooperative and coordinated manner. Very quietly, the two Ministries of Education manage[d] to work with each other and even consult and coordinate on all but the top political level. After some initial jockeying, the two ministries have jointly drawn up, graded, and released the results of the secondary school examination that is crucial for student evaluation and for university admissions. They have also worked to evaluate the current curriculum and make modest changes Brown (2012: 14). These are just a few examples of how Hamas governed the Gaza strip based on pragmatic accommodations within a hostile environment. 2.3 The Gaza War: Massacre and Operation Cast Lead In December 2008, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead, a large-scale military offensive with the stated aim of halting Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli assault on Gaza and its environs continued for 23 days, causing extensive Palestinian casualties (1430 dead and 5300 wounded), displacement, as well as the destruction of much property and civil infrastructure. The effects of the offensive were compounded by the economic blockade imposed on Gaza by Israel following the Hamas takeover of the Strip. While a unilateral ceasefire in January 18, 2009 nominally ended the military assault, attacks continued while the blockade remained in place (UNDP 2009). Following the Israeli withdrawal and cessation of attacks into the Strip a conference was held at Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt in early March 2009 at which the international community pledged to support reconstruction and early recovery efforts for the devastated Gaza Strip. In response to a needs assessment report prepared by UN member agencies, who worked in collaboration with INGOs and local NGOs working in Gaza, the international donor community pledged to support the recovery and reconstruction of Gaza to an amount of some USD $1.3

2.3 The Gaza War: Massacre and Operation Cast Lead 21 billion (PNA 2009). Based on the findings of extensive damage and needs assessments carried out on the ground, the 2009 2010 Gaza Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan outlined much needed interventions in the social, infrastructure, economic, governance, and environment sectors, and aimed to tackle immediate needs while preparing the ground for medium- to long-term recovery and development. In spite of the devastation hopes for a stable recovery were dashed as the 2008 Gaza War was soon followed by additional Israeli military operations into Gaza. A November 2012 offensive Israel dubbed Operation Pillar of Defense, was smaller in scale than the 2008 war, while in July 2014 a further assault Israel dubbed Operation Protective Edge inflicted major injuries on Palestinian civilians as well as damages to what remained of the Strip s infrastructure. Parsing the impacts of each wave of conflict is beyond the scope of this project, however, the recovery and reconstruction schemes initiated in response to the 2008 war were necessarily retarded by these follow on hostilities. Our objective here is to captures as many aspects of the efforts exerted in response to reconstruction and recovery beginning with 2008 as the conflicts that followed in 2012 and 2014 only added to the adverse political and socioeconomic conditions found in Gaza. 2.4 Conclusion It is important to acknowledge and understand Israeli occupation policies and the constraints they create for the Palestinian economy and development efforts. It is clear that the Oslo Accords failed to improve or alter the socioeconomic environment for Palestinians who continue to endure Israeli occupation. Rather, the negotiations allowed the Israel occupation to retain tacit control over Palestinian natural and human resources and their allocation. Moreover, the structure of the negotiation process restrained Palestinian leaders from utilizing the limited resources at hand to build an independent economy. The continuation of Israel s occupation and the cleavage of Palestinian political factions have combined to complicate the any resolution to the conflict. A viable peace and development process can be only achieved through an inclusive political process that involves all major actors on the ground and eliminates the socioeconomic constraints created and fostered by the occupation. As we will see it is also important to understand the governance environment under Hamas in light of the current division, which aided Hamas in their solidification of a leadership position in Gaza. In turn, this dynamic helps to explain the policy choices made by Hamas towards both donors and CSOs.

22 2 Relevant Political Developments in Palestine References Brown, Nathan J. 2012. Gaza Five Years On: Hamas Settles In. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/11/gaza-fiveyears-on-hamas-settles-in-pub-48470 (15 November 2016). Diwan, Ishac and Shaban, Radwan A. (eds.). 1999. Development Under Adversity: the Palestinian Economy in Transition (Vol. 489). Washington, D.C.: Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank. Ismael, Tareq Y. 2002. Arafat s Palestine national authority. Working Paper, University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. Petersen, Kris. 2007. The Gaza Strip: Disengagement two years on. The Electonic Intifada. https://electronicintifada.net/content/gaza-strip-disengagement-two-years/7228 (15 November 2016). Qarmout, Tamer and Daniel Béland, D. 2012. The politics of international aid to the Gaza Strip. Journal of Palestine Studies 41(4): 32 47. Roy, Sara M. 2011. Hamas and civil society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist social sector. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Roy, Sara. M. 2006. Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian Israeli conflict. London, UK: Pluto Press. Roy, Sara M. 1996. Economic deterioration in the Gaza Strip. Middle East Report 206: 36 39. Said, Nader Izzat. 2005. Palestine Human Development Report 2004. Development Studies Program. Birzeit University. http://sites.birzeit.edu/cds/research/publications/2005/phdr2004. pdf (15 November 2016). Sayigh, Yezid. 2010. Hamas rule in Gaza: three years on. Middle East Brief 41. Crown Center for Middle East Studies (March). https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb41. html (15 November 20).

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