Medieval Philosophy The fall of Rome in 476 c. e. is taken as the traditional date for the beginning of the Middle Ages. As with all historical eras, it is largely arbitrary and historiographically controversial. Two events are used to justify this date. The barbarian invasions had more or less ceased and the Germanic invaders were now in a process of settling into their domains. The origins of the European nation states begin here. The second event connects with the first. The Roman Catholic Church also starts a process in this nascent Europe by which it attempts to be truly catholic. These two events merge into one, for the early rulers of Europe would need the skills of the Catholic Church in order to convert their holdings into true states. This would lead to a merger of the political and the religious that would have a profound effect on western philosophy. Augustine was born in 354 and died in 430 c. e. This would place him outside the Middle Ages if we take the above date as its beginning. Nonetheless, from a philosophical point of view, Augustine is more medieval than ancient. Augustine was a bishop of the church and later canonized as a saint, yet his philosophical credentials are impeccable. He does what all philosophers do: think critically and establish a dialogue with the tradition. He did, however, draw a line, for if any rational argument contradicted a Christian dogma, the latter was given credence as a matter of faith. Augustine belongs to the period of medieval philosophy because he engages Christianity in a dialogue with the classical tradition of philosophical thought, the main feature of the period s thought. Augustine Augustine s family reflects the transitional period of the time. His father was a pagan and his mother a Christian. Augustine himself was a pagan until his conversion to Christianity at the age of thirty-three. Before his conversion, he had studied rhetoric, Plato, Academic Skepticism, and Neo- Platonism. Hence, by the time he converted, he was steeped in a rich philosophical tradition. When asked what he wanted to know, Augustine answered God and the soul. It follows that both are knowable entities in his view. God is truth: we can only know about creation, including the soul, through Him. God is reality; therefore, reality is truth, which of course is a very Platonic idea. Now, if philosophy is love of wisdom, and God is wisdom, it follows that philosophy is also love of God. This argument contains the essence of medieval philosophy, namely, that religion and philosophy do not exclude each other, but rather complement each other. Faith and reason constitute the living forces of our souls, and so philosophy deals with both God and the human soul. Augustine had followed the doctrines of the Academic Skeptics during his early adulthood. He had also been a follower of the Manicheans, a religious sect that was popular in northern Africa at the time. Neither of these world views provided Augustine with the certainty he was looking for. Certainty, along with its counterpart doubt, is an important concept in philosophy. Against the Skeptics, Augustine finds certainty in the awareness that we doubt. Descartes would make his I think, therefore I am the cornerstone of his philosophy centuries later, yet his insight owes a great deal to Augustine s: I doubt, therefore I am. Notice that certainty is defined in subjective terms. Truth, on the other hand, is objective. As Plato does, Augustine believes truth is innate; however, the source of truth is God. Man does not create truth: he discovers it. He uses the same analogy Plato presents in the Republic (VI, 508a). The eye requires light to see; the mind requires God to know. This theory of illumination is also Platonic if you keep in mind that knowledge is defined by Augustine as universal and necessary (as opposed to empirical knowledge, which may be general, but not universal, probable, but not necessary.) Illumination, the union of God and soul, is how we comprehend reality. Augustine uses the existence of universal and necessary truths as the premise for God s existence. The notion that God s existence can be rationally demonstrated by way of an argument is
another feature of medieval philosophy. Augustine parts ways with Plato and Neo-Platonism with one key notion. The world is a creation of God and not something constructed by a demiurge or by the emanation of some distant entity. The notion of creation eliminates the possibility of confusing the world and God, for it implies a gap between creator and creation. Augustine dealt with one of the most difficult problems of Christianity. If the world was created by a loving God, how is evil possible? The Manicheans explained evil by positing two forces in eternal battle: good and evil. Naturally, Christianity cannot accept such an explanation, for it has no God of evil. Here s Augustine s argument: Evil is corruption Something corruptible must have been good at some point Though not absolutely good, for if so it would not have become corrupt But not absolutely evil, for if so corruption is not possible For something to be good (as defined) it must exist Thus, everything that exists is good Since God has created everything, his creation is good However, it is not absolutely good, for then it would be God Nor is it absolutely evil, since God, who is absolutely good, cannot create evil Therefore, evil does not exist; only deficient objects do Augustine s argument explains what may be called metaphysical evil, the notion that creation implies imperfection and thus evil, understood as badness. The main idea behind it is that God cannot create gods a basic notion in any transcendent metaphysics. Metaphysical evil, by the way, manifests itself as physical evil, that is, as pain, illness, and suffering. You may be wondering about that other kind of evil; the one we are more familiar with on earth. Moral evil is simply sin, and the cause of sin is our free will, or rather, an inappropriate use of it. People do not use their free will well when they choose something over God. Moral evil does not exist either, but is a deficiency of the will. Augustine draws a distinction between free will and freedom which is rather obscure, but one he needs to explain the need for grace. It seems Adam was free to choose between good and evil, yet always chose the former due to his innocent nature. When Adam sinned he lost his freedom, and all that he had left was his free will. The notion of original sin extends Adam s fall to all of mankind; however, in God s infinite goodness he sent his son to die on the cross so we may find salvation through Him. The backdrop for all of the above is human history. The Greeks had viewed history as a circular cycle without any beginning or end. Augustine s view of history is linear; that is, there is a beginning and an end to it. His view is expressed in The City of God, a book he wrote in order to refute those who thought Christianity was to blame for the fall of Rome. He draws the distinction between the City of God, or the city of believers, and the City of Satan, the city of nonbelievers. As such, human history is played out in a wider eschatological context of divine justice. Though human beings will be judged by divine justice, Augustine had something to say about what constitutes a just war. In fact, many think he originated the concept. Rulers of nations have the duty to maintain peace, and so war is justified when this is the aim. However, no ruler may ask his people to act contrary to divine law. Moreover, war must be conducted in the proper fashion. There is no room for cruelty, revenge, revolt, or lust of power. As to Augustine s legacy, Paul Spade sums it up rather neatly: His authority has been felt much more broadly, and for a much longer time, than Aristotle s, whose role in the Middle Ages was comparatively minor until rather late. As for Plato, for a long time much of his influence was felt mainly through the writings of Augustine. For more than a
millennium after his death, Augustine was an authority who simply had to be accommodated. He shaped medieval thought as no one else did. Moreover, his influence did not end with the Middle Ages. Throughout the Reformation, appeals to Augustine s authority were commonplace on all sides. His theory of illumination lives on in Malebranche and in Descartes light of nature. His approach to the problem of evil and to human free will is still widely held today. His force was and is still felt not just in philosophy but also in theology, popular religion, and political thought, for example in the theory of the just war. Scholasticism During the early centuries of the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church was the sole center of learning in Western Europe. However, with the exception of Augustine, it was not a period of much originality in philosophy. The Church mainly preserved a considerable portion of the Classical legacy. Texts were collected, copied, and stored in monasteries across Western Europe. These very texts tell us that many Classical codexes were lost, yet Western civilization owes a great debt to the Roman Catholic Church s efforts to preserve and perpetuate the cultural legacy of the past. Despite the ravages of time and war, a great body of learning has come down to us today. Moreover, the Catholic Church served as a unifying force at a time when Europe was politically fragmented. The Germanic princes of the time had little interest in education, as they were chiefly occupied with the defense or conquest of territory. Their concern for writing or reading was limited to its use as an administrative tool that helped them control their realm more efficiently. All this would change with one man: Charlemagne. He consolidated an enormous empire that gave Europe some degree of political unity, though this achievement proved temporary. His greatest accomplishment lies in his interest in culture and learning. He gathered a group of scholars to help him open schools and set up a curriculum for them. These learned men based the curriculum on the Roman tradition of the seven liberal arts; that is, the trivium, or the literary arts (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic), and the quadrivium, or the sciences (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music). Theology was taught in the most important of these schools. The study of dialectic renewed the interest in philosophy. Schools and teachers were a bit different back then. The magister scholae or scholasticus would read from a text and then make comments. (Students did not have their own books; they had to copy them as the magister scholae read out loud.) Both the reading of the text and the comments were meant to bring up a dialectic, metaphysical, or psychological problem. The purpose was to awaken the students mind and get them started on how to conduct research. Here we find the seeds of the greatest period of medieval philosophy: scholasticism. Scholasticism was a collective endeavor that sought to create a great system of thought and faith. By the 9 th century c. e. Christian dogma had already been formulated by the Fathers of the Church during the Patristic period (2oo to 500 c. e.), and various councils had basically set them in stone. Scholasticism sought to harmonize this body of faith with the body of knowledge that had been preserved from Greece and Rome. Two approaches were adopted. The mystical approach saw reason as the handmaiden of faith. Its task was to help achieve a deeper understanding of Christian dogma, never to go beyond it or go against it. The rational approach believed reason could do this and more: it fervently believed that at the deepest level, reason could not contradict faith. Scholasticism may be said to begin with John Scotus Erigena (810? 877?). However, his ideas were not generally accepted. In fact, his main book, On the Division of Nature, would be condemned by the Church in 1225. It seems he leaned dangerously close to pantheism. The problem that would definitely launch scholastic thinking in the 11 th and 12 th centuries was not a new one to philosophy, namely, the nature of universals. The most widely used book on logic during the early period of scholasticism was Boethius translation of Aristotle s Categories along with Porphyry s Introduction to the same book. Porphyry poses the problem along these lines. Are universal concepts (genus and species) substances or do
they only exist in the mind? If they are substances, are they corporeal or incorporeal? Do they have a separate existence from things or are they in the things themselves? Two answers were offered: realism and conceptualism. Realism argues that universals have an objective existence. There are two versions of realism, the Platonic (universals exist separately from things) and the Aristotelian (universals exist within things). Platonic realism is a somewhat transcendent view, while Aristotelian realism is an immanent view. Conceptualism believes universals are merely mental representations that are the result of the mental act of induction. Nominalism is a conceptualist theory that states that universal are merely names that do not entail universality or necessity. The problem of universals captured the attention of scholasticism because it is intimately connected to theological problems, such as the nature of God or the trinity. Anselm The problem of universals during the Middle Ages must be viewed within the more general context of how faith and reason are to be understood. Anselm of Canterbury (1033 1109) makes use of Augustine s principle credo ut intelligam; that is, one must believe in order to understand. Furthermore, because God is the ultimate source of absolute truth, knowledge cannot be attained without faith. Dialectic on its own is not enough, although reason must try to understand faith. However, reason cannot question faith, for the dogmas of the Church are infallible. Against nominalism, Anselm argues that universals are archetypes in the mind of God. As such they are real, both in God s creation and in our minds. Anselm also follows in the footsteps of Augustine by posing an argument for the existence of God. Anselm begins his argument with a definition of God as something than which nothing greater can be imagined. He then refutes the fool who believes God, as just defined, does not exist. Here is the complete argument. But certainly this same fool, when he hears this very thing that I am saying something than which nothing greater can be imagined understands what he hears; and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it is. For it is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding and another to understand that a thing is For when a painter imagines beforehand what he is going to make, he has in his understanding what he has not yet made but he does not yet understand that it is. But when he has already painted it, he both has in his understanding what he has already painted and understands that it is Therefore even the fool is bound to agree that there is at least in the understanding something than which nothing greater can be imagined, because when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding And certainly that than which a greater cannot be imagined cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is at least in the understanding alone, it can be imagined to be in reality too, which is greater Therefore if that than which a greater cannot be imagined is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot be imagined is something than which a greater can be imagined. But certainly this cannot be There exists, therefore, beyond doubt something than which a greater cannot be imagined, both in the understanding and in reality. Anselm s argument was widely accepted during the Middle Ages; however, on close inspection it has at least two problems. Peter Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux The most ardent defender of the use of reason was Peter Abelard (1079 1142). He agrees that the basis of Christian dogma is revelation; however, he thinks many of these dogmas can be demonstrated without the aid of revelation. His solution to the problem of universals is
conceptualist. Universal are not real, nor are they just names. Universals are names that signify what is abstracted from real things. Abelard s greatest rival was Bernard of Clairvaux (1091 1153). Bernard fought against the vanity of reason, defined as the belief that reason could somehow aid or replace the mystical experience which allows the soul to confront its own misery, purify itself, and contemplate God. The mystical experience is based on Christian humility; that is, on the imperfect human condition. Reason, and particularly dialectic, glories in its self-sufficiency. The Thirteenth Century By the thirteenth century European universities had achieved enormous importance. At the time most schools were either part of a monastery, itinerant, or an annex of a cathedral. The great universities of Europe, such as Paris, Oxford, Salamanca, and Bologna were founded in this century. Moreover, new translations of lost or unknown books were carried out in Sicily, Constantinople, and Spain. Sicily was a melting pot of Latins, Greeks, Jews, and Muslims. Constantinople had survived the destruction of the Western Roman Empire. The Greek empire of Byzantium preserved many texts in the original Greek. The crusades brought the Latin west in contact with the Greek east. Travelers returned with copies of Aristotle, Plato, and Epicurus among others. Most of Spain had been conquered by the Moors in the eighth and ninth centuries. They brought with them translations into Arabic of the classical texts of ancient Greece they found in the lands Muslim armies had conquered. Jews also brought their own translations in Hebrew. In Toledo, these texts were translated again this time into Latin. The fact that different translations of these texts circulated accounts for the varieties of interpretations that existed. The Church s initial reaction to this avalanche of texts was to ban Aristotle in 1205 and 1215. Nevertheless, Pope Gregory IX ordered a revision and correction of his works, so they did not contradict Church dogma and could thus be read. Those that defended Aristotle posited the doctrine of double truth, which argued that truth is both philosophical and theological each one is autonomous of the other. The issue of Aristotelian truth divides thirteenth century scholasticism into two schools of thought: the Franciscan and the Dominican. The latter is anti-aristotelian and openly Platonic as interpreted by Augustine. The former takes Aristotle s thought and frees it of the Neo-Platonic and Muslim influence it had accumulated over the centuries. It then offers a purely Christian interpretation. Its greatest scholar is Thomas Aquinas, hence, the name of Aristotelian Thomism. Thomas Aquinas The religious and intellectual climate of Europe, and particularly the challenge posed by the doctrine of double truth, demanded a clear distinction between religious and philosophical thought. Thomas Aquinas (1227 1274), one of the greatest theologians and arguably the most important philosopher of scholasticism, provides such a distinction. Philosophy relies on truths that anyone can be expected to know about the world. Likewise, it offers to lead to new truths on the basis of such truths and only on that basis. Religion is based on discourse whose cogency not formal, but substantive depends upon our accepting as true such claims as that there are three persons in one divine nature, that our salvation was effected by the sacrifice of Jesus, that Jesus is one person but two natures, one human, one divine, and the like, is theological discourse. Any discourse that appeals to an authoritative scriptural source as the necessary nexus in an argument is religious and not philosophical. Both are different ways of knowing: it should be noted that different ways of knowing (ratio cognoscibilis) give us different sciences. The astronomer and the natural philosopher both conclude that the earth is round, but the astronomer does this through a mathematical middle that is abstracted from matter, whereas the
natural philosopher considers a middle lodged in matter. Thus there is nothing to prevent another science from treating in the light of divine revelation what the philosophical disciplines treat as knowable in the light of human reason. This position highlights the tension between knowledge that is based on preconceptions or prima facie assumptions and philosophy as an activity that in theory must question everything. Against the doctrine of double truth, Aquinas follows the basic assumption that true knowledge is of one kind; therefore, even though the starting points may differ, a real philosopher will ultimately arrive at the same truth as a believer. If philosophy contradicts Church dogma, it is the task of the philosopher to find where philosophy has erred and correct it. The fact that Aquinas called Aristotle the Philosopher seems proof enough that his philosophy is Aristotelian. So much is true; nevertheless, there are Platonic and Neo-Platonic elements in his philosophy as well. Augustine is a large influence. What follows is presentation of Aquinas views that differ from Aristotle s. Aquinas physics or natural philosophy follows Aristotle s basic notion that the natural way of studying nature is by advancing from universals to particulars; for it is a whole that is more knowable to sense-perception and a universal is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. Aquinas also agrees with Aristotle that there are no general physical objects, only particular ones. Aquinas psychology and metaphysics are somewhat Aristotelian, too. Naturally, Aquinas must differ with the Philosopher in each of these areas. First, all material substances exist contingently. In other words, existence is not their essence. Second, the passive and active souls are both faculties of the immaterial human soul. Third, Aquinas offers an unequivocally transcendent reading to Aristotle s metaphysics. A transcendent God is the cause of all contingent being and becoming. God s essence is being. Aquinas moral theory is based on the objective order of things: God, man, things. An action is objectively good or bad because it follows or doesn t follow this order. For instance, placing man before God is objectively bad, as is placing things before man. An action is subjectively good or bad depending on whether the agent consciously does it or not according to the objective order. The moral norm is the conscious practice (reminiscent of Aristotle s emphasis on habit) of actions that agree with the objective order. Aquinas believes volition follows human understanding; thus, knowledge precedes desire. However, desire determines the judgments the understanding makes. Freedom is thus the power of self-determination, or the power to decide between what is good or bad, which in turn is based on our understanding of the moral norm. Aquinas political theory asserts that it is the role of government to protect people s rights and the welfare of the community. Rebellion against a tyrannous government is justified. Even though the role of government and Church are different, both should be guided by the natural law which God has put in each of us. Positive law, or man-made law, must be in accordance with natural law. Furthermore, Aquinas argues that the state is subordinate to the Church, since its goal as intermediary between God and mans is loftier than that of government. The greatest critics of Aristotelian Thomism were the Franciscans at Oxford. At the head of this offensive are John Duns Scotus and his rival William of Ockham. Both of these thinkers would bring an end to scholasticism. John Duns Scotus The debate over the proper understanding of reason and faith continued into the late thirteenth century and well into the fourteenth. John Duns Scotus (1214 1294) did not accept Aquinas solution. He argues they must be completely separated. The dogmas of Christianity are not open to any rational discussion: they are merely based on faith. This is so because rational
demonstration is only possible by means of a deductive syllogism whose conclusion is true only if its premises are true. The concepts that make up these premises must be known a priori. But, since we do not have an adequate understanding of the concept of divine essence, the body of Christian dogmas cannot be inferred from them. Hence, theology cannot be supported rationally: its basis is revelation, not demonstration. Duns Scotus opens the way for the separation of faith and reason, a process that would ultimately lead to the independence of philosophy. The above position did not keep Duns Scotus from getting into philosophical debates. Against Aquinas, he states that volition is prior to understanding. In other words, desire desires what it wants simply because it desires it. This position might seem irrational, yet Duns Scotus has a deeper meaning behind: knowledge is sterile unless it wants to love God, and of course, this desire is an act of volition. Duns anti-intellectual position is expressed in the view that God did not create the world as it is out of rational necessity, but because he wanted it that way. A similar argument holds for the moral law. Duns Scotus also proposes a solution to the problem of universals. The fundamental basis of universals is the essence of things, which is neither universal nor individual. Essence presents itself in individual things. When the human intellect finds that a certain essence repeats itself, it proceeds to universalize it. Therefore, a universal is the name by which the intellect refers to an essence that is present in a multiplicity of things. It is not simply a name, as William of Ockham believes. William of Ockham Perhaps no other medieval philosopher foreshadows the advent of modern thought more than William of Ockham (1287 1347). He is mostly famous for his nominalist theory of universals and ontological parsimony, though he held other important beliefs. The principle of ontological parsimony was well known during the Middle Ages. The basic notion is that plurality should not be assumed without necessity. What this means is that we should not posit ontological entities unless we know for certain they necessarily exist. Ockham, however, believed that the only existing necessity is God; the world itself is completely contingent. Thus, any theory that proposes more entities than God has multiplied entities unnecessarily. This principle is known as Ockham s razor and basically denies the principle of sufficient reason which asserts that everything that happens does so for a reason. Ockham thought our understanding of necessity was far form clear. However, he did think that there are methodological reasons for affirming the existence of things. He formulated three rules for doing so: nothing ought to be posited without a reason given, unless it is self-evident, or known by experience, or proved by the authority of Sacred Scripture. Ockham s nominalism goes against Duns Scotus compromise between nominalism and realism. He believes that there are no metaphysical universals, that ontological categories should be kept to a bare minimum, and that abstractions are not universals. Universal entities do not exist, only universal concepts do. The latter are singular entities like all others; they are universal only in the sense of being predicable of many. Ockham s nominalism leads him to reject the theory of species which states that if abstraction results in a universal concept, it must have already been in the object. In other words, universals have a real existence. Ockham s ethics is also based on volition. All that counts is the intention of our desire. As such, actions are morally neutral. There is, however, a natural or divine law which is part of our God-given nature. Ockham s political theory is rather unusual for his time. He advocated the separation of Church and state, and thought the latter had supremacy in worldly matters. These conceptions are informed by his belief that faith and reason should also be separated.
William of Ockham exercised considerable influence over 13 th century and beyond. His antimetaphysical position would lead Nicholas of Autrecourt to reject the principle of causality and the concept of substance, thus foreshadowing empiricism, particularly David Hume s. Ockham s hostility towards Aristotle paved the way for modern science. His influence on Nicholas of Oresme may have led him to review how bodies fall. Finally, his insistence on the separation of religion from philosophy accentuated the move towards mysticism within the Catholic Church. The End of Scholasticism The philosophy of Duns Scotus and Ockham bring about the end of the scholastic project. Scholasticism would continue for another hundred years, but a new conception of natural philosophy, as well as a renewed interest in man s worldly condition, would seduce the minds of most creative thinkers. This period of European history would be called the Renaissance. The title of this book is an Introduction to Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. One view is that the Middles Ages came to end with the Renaissance in the second half of the fourteenth century. However, there is little agreement. Our view is that the Renaissance is a period of transition. Some of it is medieval in flavor; some of it modern. This assertion is somewhat supported by the school of thought that considers Rene Descartes as the father of modern philosophy. His two most important books were published between 1637 and 1641, almost three hundred years after the beginning of the Renaissance. In the following section we will go as far as the 16 th century, focusing specifically on Italian and Northern Humanism. We will start book III with Descartes and Francis Bacon, since so much of early modern philosophy turns around the debate over which epistemological theory is correct, rationalism or empiricism. The Renaissance The Renaissance is an artistic and intellectual movement that began in the second half of the fourteenth century and ended at the end of the sixteenth or beginning of the seventeenth century. While this definition is highly debatable on several grounds, we cannot get into such a debate. This section will offer a brief historical outline, focusing on the events that would affect the intellectual landscape of European philosophy from the death of William of Ockham to the time of Bacon and Descartes. Six philosophers are emblematic of the period: Pico Della Mirandola, Bernard Telesium, Niccolò Machiavelli, Michel de Montaigne, Giordano Bruno, and Erasmus of Rotterdam. The two most important intellectual events of the Renaissance are the advent of Humanism and experimental-mathematical science. Both of these were the result of a rising inconformity with the shape scholarship had taken during the High Middle Ages. The Humanists disagreed with the emphasis given to man s depravity or sinful nature. Early modern scientists found that the deductive approach was too restrictive. In both cases, the authority of the Church lay behind these beliefs; although, it would be a mistake to think that early either Humanism or early modern science was bent on attacking Church dogma (although Humanists would later attack Church practices). Nevertheless, Humanists did have a critical attitude. As we just saw, the final stage of scholasticism had insisted that faith and reason were two different worlds, and reason at its best is critical. Francesco Petrarch is generally regarded as the father of Humanism. He is the first to assert that the Middle Ages had been a dark age:
Each famous author of antiquity whom I recover places a new offence and another cause of dishonor to the charge of earlier generations, who, not satisfied with their own disgraceful barrenness, permitted the fruit of other minds, and the writings that their ancestors had produced by toil and application, to perish through insufferable neglect. Although they had nothing of their own to hand down to those who were to come after, they robbed posterity of its ancestral heritage. He believed the role of the scholars of his time was to unearth the brilliant legacy of the Classical Age in the shape of its texts. Medieval scholars take offense at the term Dark Ages. Most would like us to know where Petrarch, Bracciolini, or Valla to name three of the most renowned ancient manuscript hunters unearthed these texts: Medievalists must always smile a little over these discoveries, for we know where the Humanists discovered those classical texts namely, in medieval monasteries, where medieval scribes had been carefully preserving them for mankind over the centuries. This is a fair observation; however, it does nothing to invalidate the Humanists belief that they had in fact brought back to life a culture long forgotten. Now, since we know that scholasticism also relied on many classical texts, there must be something new and refreshing about the ideas the Humanists found in the unearthed manuscripts. These new ideas concerned how the Greeks and Romans viewed themselves, and in general the human condition. They seemed to have a lust for life and a fondness for civic duties. They were pagans, albeit virtuous ones. They did not seemed tied down by the notion of some sort of inherent badness in human nature. They admired and enjoyed beauty, especially the beauty of the human body, which their art glorified. When the Humanists compared this worldview with that of the Middle Ages, the latter seemed somber and bleak. Economic prosperity, artistic innovation and patronage, and intellectual ferment made Northern Italy especially attractive to artists, scientists, and philosophers. The decay of the Byzantine Empire brought many Greek scholars, along with their manuscripts, to Italy, and with it, a renewed interest in all things Greek. Florence, Bologna, Padua, Pisa, and Milan became centers of intellectual and artistic innovation. The Italian Renaissance would spread like a wildfire throughout most of Northern Europe. The printing press accelerated the pace of innovation by spreading ideas more quickly and with less censorship. There were many other technological innovations. New lands, peoples, and cultures were discovered. Old ideas and ways of doing things suddenly seemed like oddities from a past that was being left behind by the speed of innovation. Science in particular was quick to see the benefits of observation, experimentation, and the application of mathematics to its thought processes. The Roman Catholic Church did not lose its socio-political influence during the period; however, due to its own practices, it would soon lose its hegemonic position in the spiritual life of Europe. The Protestant Reformation destroyed the only unity Europe had maintained after the fall of Rome. Despite the religious fragmentation, a new notion began to take hold in Europe. The discovery of America and the opening of direct trade routes to the East created a sense of uniqueness in the European psyche: we began to mean we Europeans, although it is safer to refer to the intellectual psyche of Europe. After all, the vast majority of Europeans did not read or write or leave the region they were born in. Furthermore, this cultural Europe had a cradle Greece and a heritage the Graeco-Roman tradition. Thus, the Renaissance was an era that looked backwards and forward. In Greece and Rome it found inspiration; in the future it saw the ground for advancement and innovation. Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola (1463-1494),
Della Mirandola s Oration on the Dignity of Man has been called the manifesto of Renaissance Humanism. It is a view of the world, God, and man from a human perspective. Whereas many medieval thinkers believed God could not be known through his creation, Della Mirandola argues that all of creation is a symbol of God. God has granted man many gifts or faculties, among them, the power to understand his creation from our earthly perspective. Man s dignity lies in the correct use of these faculties. Here is an excerpt that captures his thought. At long last, however, I feel that I have come to some understanding of why man is the most fortunate of living things and, consequently, deserving of all admiration God the Father, the Mightiest Architect, had already raised, according to the precepts of His hidden wisdom, this world we see, the cosmic dwelling of divinity, a temple most august. He had already adorned the supercelestial region with Intelligences, infused the heavenly globes with the life of immortal souls and set the fermenting dung-heap of the inferior world teeming with every form of animal life. But when this work was done, the Divine Artificer still longed for some creature which might comprehend the meaning of so vast an achievement, which might be moved with love at its beauty and smitten with awe at its grandeur. When, consequently, all else had been completed (as both Moses and Timaeus testify), in the very last place, He bethought Himself of bringing forth man. Truth was, however, that there remained no archetype according to which He might fashion a new offspring, nor in His treasure-houses the wherewithal to endow a new son with a fitting inheritance, nor any place, among the seats of the universe, where this new creature might dispose himself to contemplate the world. All space was already filled; all things had been distributed in the highest, the middle and the lowest orders. Still, it was not in the nature of the power of the Father to fail in this last creative spirit At last, the Supreme Maker decreed that this creature, to whom He could give nothing wholly his own, should have a share in the particular endowment of every other creature. Della Mirandola goes on to say that the light of natural philosophy can bring us knowledge of divine things. In other words, the furniture of the world can lead us to knowledge of God, and the whole study of philosophy should be undertaken with this purpose in mind. The Oration exhibits the main features of Renaissance Humanism: its Christian faith, reliance on ancient texts, individualism, and critical thought. Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466 1536) Erasmus was the most important northern Humanist of his time. He had a profound influence on the Protestant Reformation by attacking the excesses of the Roman Catholic Church, though he never renounced his own Catholicism. The third edition of his translation of the New Testament into Latin was used as the basis for translations into the different vernaculars of Europe. As all Humanists, Erasmus saw the classical age as a guide for the present; however, whereas Italian Humanists were chiefly concerned with the legacy of Greek and Roman philosophy and letters, northern Humanists, and Erasmus in particular, focused on the Patristic or primitive period of Christianity. Erasmus believed that this early period of Christianity was its purest and had to be revived. This idea was in tune with the general spirit of the time in northern Europe and would ultimately lead to the Reformation. Erasmus was a fiercely independent individual who fervently believed that Europe would be a better place if learning was its main goal. In the Praise of Folly he attacks corruption in the church, tradition for tradition s sake, and popular superstition. As a true philosopher, Erasmus solution to these problems is learning. Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 1527)
Most people are more familiar with the term Machiavellian and the dictum that gives it its meaning. A Machiavellian person is unscrupulous because she believes the ends justify the means and acts accordingly. Together with his other dictum, it is better to be feared than to be loved, it has given Machiavelli a reputation of being immoral, perhaps even amoral. Machiavelli wrote two books on politics: The Prince and Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy. The former has been the most widely read and is the basis of how he has been viewed ever since. The essential idea of The Prince states that political power is not based on moral goodness but on the coercive power of the state. The task of the prince is to stay in power by whatever means necessary. Naturally, his view was condemned by his contemporaries, yet Machiavelli thinks he is simply stating a fact. The Prince was written after he had lost his position as Second Chancellor of the Republic of Florence when the Medici family came back to power. Since it is dedicated to Lorenzo Medici, the general view is that he wrote it to gain favor with him. The Discourses offer a different picture of politics. He draws a clear distinction between minimal and a full conception political order: A minimal constitutional order is one in which subjects live securely (vivere sicuro), ruled by a strong government which holds in check the aspirations of both nobility and people, but is in turn balanced by other legal and institutional mechanisms. In a fully constitutional regime, however, the goal of the political order is the freedom of the community (vivere libero), created by the active participation of, and contention between, the nobility and the people. As such, the best form of government is not a tyranny by a prince, but a republic where citizens actively participate in political affairs. It is easy to see the contradiction between Machiavelli s two books. Nederman explains the contradiction as indicative of Machiavelli s position, trapped between innovation and tradition, between via antiqua and via moderna. In any case, Machiavelli represents the Humanist of his time. He is an admirer of classical learning, but also a man of action. The philosophical ideal of contemplation is complemented by the need to actively participate in civic life. Machiavelli s admiration and love of the ancients and action is exhibited in the following excerpt. On the coming of evening, I return to my house and enter my study; and at the door I take off the day's clothing, covered with mud and dust, and put on garments regal and courtly; and reclothed appropriately, I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where, received by them with affection, I feed on that food which only is mine and which I was born for, where I am not ashamed to speak with them and to ask them the reason for their actions; and they in their kindness answer me; and for four hours of time I do not feel boredom, I forget every trouble, I do not dread poverty, I am not frightened by death; entirely I give myself over to them. Bernardino Telesio Three trends would be foreshadowed by Telesio (1509 1588): the emphasis on method, the rise of empiricism and scholarly independence from the grip of the university. His philosophy is fervently anti-metaphysical. He presumes God created the universe, but nature is not created, governed and sustained by Him. This self-sustaining universe is made up of matter and the forces of heat and cold, and thus can only be understood empirically. Human understanding is nothing more than sense perception and memory. A rational conclusion is nothing more than comparing new experiences to old ones and adding something new. Telesio argues that the whole of philosophy consists of the study of nature. Telesio left the University of Padua in order to pursue his studies of nature more independently, thereby starting a trend that would only end in the eighteenth century. (For instance, in 1673 Baruch Spinoza would politely turn down a chair in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg so he could conserve his independence.)
The problem of method which dominates Telesio s writing would dominate the intellectual landscape of Europe during the 17 th century, to the point this century is sometimes called the century of method. Michel de Montaigne (1533 1592) Montaigne is best known for his Essais, or literally attempts. At the age of thirty-seven, he retires to his library to engage in the vita solitaria. He reads extensively but soon discovers that too much knowledge is as harmful an obstacle to the development of our free judgment as too much passion. Montaigne believes we must come to know ourselves by experience and not by relying on dogmatic tradition. This position leads him to adopt a kind of skepticism and relativism. Montaigne s reading of Sextus Empiricus left a large impression on him. His most famous dictum, What do I know? testifies to the skeptical nature his thought took on. Nevertheless, Montaigne s skepticism is not dogmatic, since it based on the notion that there is no final position that can be held as true. The best we can do, and a reading of the Essais attests to it, is balance our own views as we encounter new experiences. Hence, his skepticism is not Pyrrho s thesis that we abstain from judgment, but that we abstain from any final judgment. Montaigne s skepticism is also informed by his belief that that there is nothing custom will not or cannot do. It is important to remember that Montaigne lived during the Age of Discovery when Europe was constantly receiving reports about strange cultures and customs from around the world. Montaigne did not see these people as savages or barbarians, but as normal people who had adopted different customs from our own. Thus, relativism is one of the chief characteristics of his thought, a feature that is coherent with his skepticism and reliance on free judgment. Giordano Bruno (1548 1600) The mixture of new and old is especially present in the life and thought of the Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno. Originally a Dominican monk, Bruno left the order under suspicion of heresy. He traveled widely, living in Paris, Oxford, Geneva, Frankfort, and Venice. In this last city, he was accused by a pupil of heresy before the Tribunal of the Inquisition. He was sent to Rome and spent seven years in prison. He would not give up his philosophical views and was burned at the stake on February 17 th, 1600. Bruno s thought is philosophy of the infinite. He takes Copernicus heliocentric theory but adds that the universe is infinite: it has no limit and no absolute reference point. As such, any view of the universe is relative. Furthermore, the infinite universe has an infinite number of worlds that move around a solar center. However, it is not a mechanical universe but an organic one that is moved by the divine force that is immanent. To support his thesis, Bruno offers two arguments, one from consciousness and one from causality. Our mind can always generate new intuitions. It can always add one number to another, one magnitude to another magnitude. Bruno believes there must be an infinite universe that corresponds to infinite possibility of our consciousness. The other argument is based on the infinity of God. It is manifestly contradictory to believe that an infinite cause, God, can only have a finite effect. Thus, the universe is infinite. Bruno s universe is guided by an intelligent principle, reminiscent of the Stoic logos. Its essence is harmony; any contradiction or imperfection is dissolved once we comprehend its beauty. Following Heraclitus, Bruno thinks all things are ultimately one. The multiplicity of the universe is the result of our perception of it. The totality of infinite effects is what constitutes nature; God is the infinite force that generates these effects. However, we may never really know God. Religion is a matter of faith.