Lange 5 Challenges to P3

Similar documents
Empty Names and Two-Valued Positive Free Logic

The myth of the categorical counterfactual

Foreknowledge, evil, and compatibility arguments

Philosophy of Religion 21: (1987).,, 9 Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht - Printed in the Nethenanas

Lecture 1 The Concept of Inductive Probability

A Liar Paradox. Richard G. Heck, Jr. Brown University

How to Mistake a Trivial Fact About Probability For a. Substantive Fact About Justified Belief

Horwich and the Liar

Lecture 17:Inference Michael Fourman

ON THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF INDICATIVE AND COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS Wylie Breckenridge

In Defense of Truth functional Theory of Indicative Conditionals. Ching Hui Su Postdoctoral Fellow Institution of European and American Studies,

Creation & necessity

WHY PLANTINGA FAILS TO RECONCILE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE

Bayesian Probability

Ayer on the criterion of verifiability

10. Presuppositions Introduction The Phenomenon Tests for presuppositions

Wittgenstein s On Certainty Lecture 2

Philosophy 1100: Introduction to Ethics. Critical Thinking Lecture 2. Background Material for the Exercise on Inference Indicators

In this paper I will critically discuss a theory known as conventionalism

REVIEW: Marc Lange, Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature.

DISCUSSION NOTES A RESOLUTION OF A PARADOX OF PROMISING WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG

Fatalism and Truth at a Time Chad Marxen

Lecture 8 Keynes s Response to the Contradictions

Informational Models in Deontic Logic: A Comment on Ifs and Oughts by Kolodny and MacFarlane

How to Predict Future Contingencies İlhan İnan

UC Berkeley, Philosophy 142, Spring 2016

Puzzles of attitude ascriptions

Verificationism. PHIL September 27, 2011

Quantifiers: Their Semantic Type (Part 3) Heim and Kratzer Chapter 6

Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts

Postmodal Metaphysics

Counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents

2. Refutations can be stronger or weaker.

Prompt: Explain van Inwagen s consequence argument. Describe what you think is the best response

ON LEWIS S COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION

On Priest on nonmonotonic and inductive logic

Counterfactuals and temporal direction

REASONS-RESPONSIVENESS AND TIME TRAVEL

Wittgenstein and Moore s Paradox

Williams on Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism

INTRODUCTION. This week: Moore's response, Nozick's response, Reliablism's response, Externalism v. Internalism.

Lecture 3 Arguments Jim Pryor What is an Argument? Jim Pryor Vocabulary Describing Arguments

Intersubstitutivity Principles and the Generalization Function of Truth. Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh. Shawn Standefer University of Melbourne

Quantificational logic and empty names

Exercise Sets. KS Philosophical Logic: Modality, Conditionals Vagueness. Dirk Kindermann University of Graz July 2014

SAVING RELATIVISM FROM ITS SAVIOUR

Contradictory Information Can Be Better than Nothing The Example of the Two Firemen

Comments on "Lying with Conditionals" by Roy Sorensen

WORLD UTILITARIANISM AND ACTUALISM VS. POSSIBILISM

Nozick s fourth condition

1. My thesis: the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives

To tell the truth about conditionals

Some Good and Some Not so Good Arguments for Necessary Laws. William Russell Payne Ph.D.

Author's personal copy

Free will & divine foreknowledge

Chisholm s Paradox in Should-Conditionals

Chapter 9- Sentential Proofs

A Brief Introduction to Key Terms

Epistemic Freedom HUMANITIES

Could i conceive being a brain in a vat? John D. Collier a a

THE SEMANTIC REALISM OF STROUD S RESPONSE TO AUSTIN S ARGUMENT AGAINST SCEPTICISM

W. K. CLIFFORD AND WILLIAM JAMES ON DOXASTIC NORMS

Intermediate Logic Spring. Extreme Modal Realism

SOME RADICAL CONSEQUENCES OF GEACH'S LOGICAL THEORIES

Warrant and accidentally true belief

Jeffrey, Richard, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 140 pp, $21.99 (pbk), ISBN

Encounters with Jesus: Journey to Sight. John 9:1-41. I told you several weeks ago that some of the readings from John s Gospel are quite long.

Epistemicism, Parasites and Vague Names * vagueness is based on an untenable metaphysics of content are unsuccessful. Burgess s arguments are

Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond 1

AGENT CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: A REPLY TO FLINT

On Truth At Jeffrey C. King Rutgers University

Some Logical Paradoxes from Jean Buridan

BOOK REVIEWS. Duke University. The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVII, No. 1 (January 1988)

Elements of Science (cont.); Conditional Statements. Phil 12: Logic and Decision Making Fall 2010 UC San Diego 9/29/2010

Correct Beliefs as to What One Believes: A Note

Conditionals IV: Is Modus Ponens Valid?

Diagnosing and Treating Yellow Fever in Philadelphia, 1793 End of Unit Assessment Activity

Truth At a World for Modal Propositions

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethics.

Strawson On Referring. By: Jake McDougall and Siri Cosper

Selections from Aristotle s Prior Analytics 41a21 41b5

Conditionals II: no truth conditions?

Logical behaviourism

Counterfactuals and Causation: Transitivity

Russell: On Denoting

Truth and Molinism * Trenton Merricks. Molinism: The Contemporary Debate edited by Ken Perszyk. Oxford University Press, 2011.

the notion of modal personhood. I begin with a challenge to Kagan s assumptions about the metaphysics of identity and modality.

PART III - Symbolic Logic Chapter 7 - Sentential Propositions

Grokking Pain. S. Yablo. draft of June 2, 2000

First published Mon Apr 26, 2004; substantive revision Mon Oct 5, 2009

Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori

Replies to Glick, Hanks, and Magidor

Entailment as Plural Modal Anaphora

Leibniz, Principles, and Truth 1

A Solution to the Gettier Problem Keota Fields. the three traditional conditions for knowledge, have been discussed extensively in the

Could have done otherwise, action sentences and anaphora

IN his paper, 'Does Tense Logic Rest Upon a Mistake?' (to appear

THE PROBLEM OF HIGHER-ORDER VAGUENESS

Reasoning and Decision-Making under Uncertainty

Saying too Little and Saying too Much. Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul

Transcription:

Lange 5 Challenges to P3 (pp. 59 77) Patrick Maher Philosophy 471 Fall 2006

Counterfactuals and context The correctness of a counterfactual conditional can depend on the context in which it appears. Example (pp. 9 10) Context influences whether we should say: Had Babe Ruth been playing professional baseball this year, then he would have hit a great many home runs, even against modern pitching, because he was such an outstanding hitter. Had Babe Ruth been playing professional baseball this year, then he would have hit only a dozen or so homers, since after all, the Bambino would now have been about a hundred years old. The principle P3, as stated last time, did not mention context. Lange intends such principles to hold in all contexts (p. 55).

Today s topic P3 (stated with reference to context) If p U, then p Λ iff, for all q U consistent with Λ, q > p is correct in all contexts. This is false if there exists a p Λ, and a q U consistent with Λ, for which q > p is not correct in some context. Today we ll consider some examples that might seem to be of that kind. In his book, Lange presents these examples as challenges to another principle, that he calls Λ-preservation; but any such example is equally a challenge to P3.

Arsenic case Suppose that two physicians, after work, are discussing their day. One says to the other: The nurse rushed over to me and reported that the patient had been accidentally injected with the syringe marked A. That syringe was intended for the lab; it was filled with arsenic A for arsenic. So I hurried over to the patient s bedside, although I knew, of course, that there was nothing I could do. But the most remarkable thing happened: the patient did not die. So our dismay turned to excitement: we thought we had a reportable case on our hands, and prepared to write a stunning article for The New England Journal of Medicine. Then I checked the syringe. The label turned out to be H, not A. So it contained no arsenic after all. Though the patient was out of danger, I must say that we were a bit disappointed. Had the syringe been filled with arsenic, then we would have discovered that such a large dose of arsenic is not always lethal. (p. 59, last sentence modified)

The challenge to P3 Let p = Such a large dose of arsenic is always lethal, q = The syringe was filled with arsenic. p Λ q U and is consistent with Λ The physician asserts q > p, which seems correct in the context of the story If q > p is correct, then q > p is not correct So this seems to be a counterexample to P3

Lange s response (pp. 60 61) If someone asserts q > p, because r, but denies q > r, then r is an implicit part of the antecedent of the conditional, i.e., they are really asserting q.r > p. In the arsenic example, let r = The patient lived. Then the physician asserts q > p, because r, but would deny q > r. Therefore, the counterfactual asserted by the physician is really q.r > p, not q > p. Since q.r is inconsistent with Λ, this is not a counterexample to P3.

Darcy and Elizabeth Suppose that Darcy and Elizabeth (characters from Jane Austen s Pride and Prejudice) have recently quarreled. Then Elizabeth would be cross with Darcy and so it seems correct to say: (1) If Darcy were to ask Elizabeth for a favor, she would refuse. But Darcy, being a proud man, would not ask Elizabeth for a favor if they had just quarreled. So we seem to have: (2) If Darcy were to ask Elizabeth for a favor, it would be the case that they had not quarreled. And since Elizabeth is generous except when cross, we have (3) If Darcy were to ask Elizabeth for a favor and they had not quarreled, she would grant it. From (2) and (3) it follows that: (4) If Darcy were to ask Elizabeth for a favor, she would grant it. Problem: (1) and (4) appear to be inconsistent. (p. 67)

Lange s resolution of the paradox (p. 73) (1) is correct in some contexts and (4) is correct in other contexts but they are not both correct in the same context. In a context in which we are illustrating Darcy s pride, we should say that Darcy would have asked Elizabeth for a favor only if there had been no prior quarrel between them, in which case Elizabeth would have granted his request. If our concern is to explain why Elizabeth did not perform a certain favor for Darcy, we might assert that Darcy did not ask Elizabeth for the favor, and it is no wonder for he knew that if he had, she would not have granted it, in light of yesterday s quarrel.

The challenge to P3 (pp. 73 74) Lange believes that, in contexts in which (1) is correct, the past is held fixed in all respects; he calls these nonbacktracking contexts. In a nonbacktracking context, any counterfactual assumption implies a violation of some law, if the relevant laws are deterministic (as they are in this example). So in any nonbacktracking context, P3 is violated. Lange s accepts this criticism and modifies P3 to try to accommodate it.

My resolution of the paradox People think (1) is correct, so they accept: If Darcy were to ask Elizabeth for a favor, she would refuse because they recently quarreled. But they also think (2) is correct, so they deny: If Darcy were to ask Elizabeth for a favor, it would be the case that they recently quarreled. So, by Lange s own criterion, They have quarreled is an implicit part of the antecedent in (1), i.e., (1) means: If Darcy were to ask Elizabeth for a favor and they had recently quarreled, she would refuse. Hence (1) and (4) have different antecedents and are not inconsistent. They can both be correct in the same context. My response to the challenge to P3: There is no reason to believe in nonbacktracking contexts.

Questions 1 State a criterion that Lange gives for telling whether a fact is an implicit part of the antecedent of a counterfactual. 2 Lange describes an example in which it seems correct for a physician to say: Had the syringe been filled with arsenic, then we would have discovered that such a large dose of arsenic is not always lethal. Is this a counterexample to P3? Why, or why not? 3 Describe the paradox involving Darcy and Elizabeth; say what the two apparently inconsistent propositions are and why, in the context of the story, each seems to be correct. 4 Describe Maher s resolution of the paradox involving Darcy and Elizabeth.