HISAR SCHOOL JUNIOR MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017 Confronting Extremism Political Committee The situation in Mali RESEARCH REPORT Recommended by: Defne Karabatur
Forum: Political Committee Issue: The situation in Mali Student Officer: Defne Karabatur Introduction To understand the conflict in Mali, one must understand its roots, which are Mali s history and geography. Mali is a country that is split by the Niger River into two: the south and the north. The northern part/azawad is home to the Tuareg people while the southern part/bamako is home to the Mandé people. Although both the north and the south have been a part of Mali for a very long time, they have distinct ethnic groups with different economic and social foundations. Therefore, it has been difficult for these groups to have authority over one another. The map of Mali Around the 17 th century, Mali had a lot of gold and most of it came from the south. Consequently, when the French colonized Mali in the 19 th century, they focused on the south, believing that the north was a waste of resources. However, the French didn t want the north to be a no-man s land, so, they armed the local clans to fight with each other. For a very long time, the northern boarders of Mali kept on changing because a government wasn t fully built and French authorities couldn t decide if the wanted to keep the north. This increased the segregation between the two groups. In 1920, the French finally decided that Azawad should be a part of Mali. In 1960, almost 2 centuries after its colonization, Mali gained its independence from the French. It had to declare its authority on a large territory including the desert regions where Tuareg and Arab communities directly challenged the country s authority. Since its independence, Mali underwent 4 Tuareg uprisings, which have led the country to its current situation. It is important to understand that Mali is one of the many countries dealing with extremism. Although it has been trying to resolve the conflict between the north and the south, its previous attempts to confront these extremist uprisings have failed. This has affected its national unity and development. 1
Now, Mali depends on other countries to solve the conflict between the north and the south and regain its reputation as the poster child for democracy in Africa. Definition of Key Terms No-man s land: An area not suitable or used for occupation or habitation Poster child: A person or thing that represents a specified quality, cause, etc. Consensus: A general agreement Central state authority: An agency or organization that is designated to play a major facilitating role in the implementation and operation of an international treaty in public and private international law Goodwill: A kindly feeling of approval and support Territorial unity: The principle under international law that nation-states should not attempt to promote rebellious movements or to promote border changes in other nation-states Predecessor: A person who held a job or office before the current holder Military coup: The sudden overthrow of a government by a usually small group of people in or previously in positions of authority Sharia rule of law: The religious law forming part of the Islamic tradition General Overview During the colonization of Mali, French authorities focused their political and economic efforts on the useful part of Mali, the south. Gradually, this practice marginalized the north and the forced French authorities to enforce military rule on them. Although peace agreements were signed, none of them were successful in normalizing the relationship between the north and the south. After Mali gained its independence from France in 1960, international observers commanded Mali s democratic transition, institutions and overall political progress. They even illustrated Mali as an example for the entire African continent. However as time passed on, lack of goodwill, foreign influences and the questioning of Mali s territorial unity contributed to the tensions and distrust between the south and the north. Malian state officials had a deep resentment towards the north. Because the north wanted an independent Azawad, Malian state officials regarded the Tuareg people as the main obstacle against their national unity. The Tuareg Region 2
In 1962, Mali underwent its first unsuccessful Tuareg uprising. The two uprisings (1990 and 2006 uprisings) following the 1962 uprising were also unsuccessful. The MNLA flag In 2011, The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was created. It succeeded in gathering all of the rebellious groups that had been divided and weakened by political disputes over time. As a result, the MNLA achieved to represent all of the main communities of the north. Right after the creation of the MNLA, a military coup targeting Mali s government took place in 2012. The main reason for the coup was that the poorly equipped, badly trained and irregularly paid Malian military mainly composed of the southerners- feared fighting in the north where the MNLA rebellions were taking place. During the 10 days the coup lasted, the MNLA took initiative and overran the entire northern regions of Mali and by the end of April 2012 they controlled many northern cities. Although they were more prepared and organized, and above all, they possessed more equipment than their predecessors, the MNLA wasn t able to preserve Tuareg and Arab unity. A few days after the disagreement between the Tuareg and the Arabs, a new group called the Ansar Dine was created. The MNLA and Ansar Dine quickly began to fight because of their opposing views. The MNLA was mainly a non-religious group with democratic ideas, while Ansar Dine wanted a Sharia rule of law because its leader had a secret agreement with the AL Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) movement. After the rise of Ansar Dine in the north of Mali, with the help of AQIM and the Movement for Oneness and the Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the course of the rebellion changed and the MNLA began to lose its power. Thus, in the middle of 2012, Mali faced two critical political and security threats. On one hand, Islamist The military interventions in Mali groups, governing through different rules and law, were controlling half of Mali s territory and didn t recognize Bamako s constitutional authority. On the other hand, a military government had seized power in the south because most of Mali s legitimate authorities were imprisoned. In December 2012, the UN authorized the positioning of an African-led security force to Mali (AFISMA). This provided a legal international order for the use of force in Mali. The AFISMA was going to be composed of forces, drawn primarily from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 3
However, the speed at which Islamist forces were able to unite their hold over the cities in the north, contributed into France s decision to take action. In January 2013, Mali welcomed the French military intervention in the north. The French offered support since they didn t want to wait for the arrival of regional force. The United States and Canada also helped the military operations in Mali. Major Parties Involved and Their Views France Since the 19 th century, France has been involved with Mali. It colonized the southern parts of Mali to gain access to the country s rich resources and armed the local clans in the north because they didn t want to spend their political and economic efforts in that region. After three decades, they organized a military intervention, Operation SERVAL, in Mali in order to stop the Islamist forces ruling the north of Mali. United States of America The US provided logistical, technical, and intelligence support to Operation SERVAL, which included air tankers to refuel French jets and transport planes. Canada Canada sent one Royal Canadian Air Force C-17 cargo plane to Mali. Its initial goal was to be in operation and help the transportation of equipment and supplies to the Malian capital, Bamako. Canadian troops have also helped with the training of the Malian military. Libya Colonel Gaddafi, former prime minister of Libya, attempted to gain the support of Malian Tuareg communities in order to accomplish his ambition of forming a League of Grand Sahara Tribes and imposing himself as a continental leader. He promised he would support the Tuareg during their rebellious actions and the aftermaths. Therefore, he aided them with weapons for their 2012 rebellion. Algeria Algeria is Mali s northern neighbor. It faced its own national insecurity because of extremist Islamist groups. After the civil war in Algeria, many of the fighters refuged in the northern parts of Mali. They brought weapons and an expectation of living standards to Mali. Like Libya, Algeria also aided the MNLA with weapons. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) It was created in October 2011 by former Tuareg refugees in Libya with the goal of gathering all of the rebellious groups that had been divided and weakened by political disputes over time. As a result of its success, the MNLA managed to represent all of the main Tuareg communities in the north of Mali. In January 2012, the MNLA led the fourth Tuareg uprising, which was a success. 4
Ansar Dine Created in 2012, Ansar Dine wanted a Sharia rule of law in Mali since its leader had a secret agreement with AQIM. It quickly rose to power with the help of AQIM and MUJAO and changed the nature of the rebellion for its own benefits. AL Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and the Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) AQIM and its branch MUJAO have been a part of Mali s crisis since the creation of Ansar Dine. Since then, they have helped the extremist group in order to force the Sharia rule of law on the northern parts of Mali. Timeline of Events Date of Event Description of Event July 1960 Mali Becomes independent November 1962 The first Tuareg uprising Dissension May 1968 Drought in Mali devastates many Tuareg areas in the North April 1990 The second Tuareg Late 1991 National pact October 2002 New "government of national unity" is unveiled August 2003 First signs of brutality after new government 2006-2009 Third Tuareg uprising 2009 Sebha agreements with Libya June 2011 Large numbers of Tuareg, who had fought for Muammar Gaddafi in the Libyan civil war, return to their home country 2011 The creation of MNLA January 2012 The beginning of the fourth Tuareg uprising 22 March 2012 The Military coup in Bamako April-May 2012 Islamist forces take-over the rebellion January 2013 The French military intervention June 2013 Mali signs Ouagadougou Agreement with Tuareg nationalist rebels who agree to hand over northern town of Kidal that they captured April 2015 Northern rebels clash with UN peacekeepers in Timbuktu and seize town of Lere French military forces kill leading Al Qaeda commanders Amada Ag May 2015 Hama and Ibrahim Ag Inawalen in northern raid (they were both suspected of kidnapping and killing French citizens) Mali and ethnic Tuareg rebels sign peace deal aimed at ending decades of June 2015 conflict by giving the Tuareg more regional autonomy and dropping arrest warrants for their leaders 5
Treaties and Events The National Pact The ceasefire came into effect on 11 April 1992. Its main goal was to solve the conflic between the government of Mali and the Tuareg people. According to this pact, The Government of Mali is not opposed to the name Azawad for these regions. However it respects the right of the people to decide freely on the name local territory. Until the people have been able to exercise this right through elected local, regional or inter-regional representatives, and confronted beginning by the need to install peace in this part of the national territory, the two parties decided on the term: the North of Mali, for use in this Pact. The National Pact was constructed on four key points: peace and security in the north, national settlement, special incentives to encourage socio-economic development in the north, and giving the north a special status within the framework of Mali. It also intended to designate a new 'Commissioner for the North, who would be selected for a five-year renewable term and work directly under the president's authority and oversee the implementation of the agreement. The Ouagadougou Agreement This agreement was signed between the temporary Malian government and representatives of the armed groups, a year after the Islamist occupation of the north and several months after the launch of French-African military operations (SERVAL, MISMA, on 11 January 2013). The main focus of this agreement was the Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. These talks were supported by the United Nations and the African Union. It wanted to achieve a ceasefire that would pave the way for the upcoming presidential elections. It provided for the return of public services to the north. In addition, Article 21 specified that within 60 days of its power, the newly elected government of Mali would enter into inclusive peace talks with the agreement s signatories as well as with the northern communities of Mali. Evaluation of Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue It is clear to see from recent history that the situation in Mali is too complex to be easily resolved. The repetitive nature of the agreements and the resentments show that not much has changed since the first uprisings and that the northern region hasn t evolved. Although this impression is true, the past agreements have e partially addressed some of the problems at hand. There is now a track record that gives some indication of what works and what does not. Military solutions and counter-terrorism commitment are not sufficient in order to achieve long-term stability in Mali. Several international security and development programs have been implemented. However, their exclusive focus on fighting terrorists and security threats in Mali, with limited consideration for other civilian issues (such as economic development), turned these programs into accelerators of the tensions between the north and the south, and into symbols of the negligence of public needs in the north. 6
Although there have been several failures in the past, in order to solve the issue in Mali, the failures must be considered and all efforts must be made. Thus, better and improved solutions can be generated in order to revive Mali s old reputation. Possible Solutions It is important to understand that any effort to achieve sustainable peace in Mali needs to address the immediate run-up, the armed conflict in the country, and the conditions that account for the repetition of crises. Although several security initiatives have been previously taken, political dialogue and economic development need to remain in the center of the Malian normalization process. Internal and comprehensive approaches, such as taking time to organize proper elections, reintroducing foreign aid and reforming the Malian armed forces, could sustain long-term peace in Mali. Mali s political culture could be a great addition to international efforts and could help implement national and international stabilization strategies in order to maintain political unity. All possible solutions must be diplomatic before armed forces intervene with the situation. In order to accomplish this; current peace treaties should be re-implemented, mediators should be properly selected, and all aspects of the crisis such as the economic aspect- should be considered. Bibliography Chauzal, Grégory, and Thibault van Damme. The Roots of Mali s Conflict. The Roots of Mali's Conflict, www.clingendael.nl/pub/2015/the_roots_of_malis_conflict/conclusions/. A Timeline of Northern Conflict. IRIN, 1 Dec. 2015, www.irinnews.org/report/95252/malitimeline-northern-conflict. Stewart, Dona J. What Is next for Mali? the Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability. SSI, ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1185.pdf+. CaspianReport. Origins of Mali's Tuareg Conflict. YouTube, YouTube, 9 Apr. 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v=ilcpaut7dfy. Roots of the Mali Crisis. Video, video.nationalgeographic.com/video/news/mali-crisis-gwin2- vin?source=relatedvideo. Mali Map. www.operationworld.org/files/ow/maps/lgmap/mali-mmap-md.png+ BADALE, Raul-Ionuţ, and Diana-Cristina ISVORANU. Conflict Analysis Framework. Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis, pp. 20 40., doi:10.4135/9781446279366.n2. Tran, Mark. Mali: a Guide to the Conflict. The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 16 Jan. 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/16/mali-guide-to-the-conflict. 7
Pe zard Ste phanie, and Michael Robert. Shurkin. Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Aettlement. Rand, 2015. News, CBC. 9 Questions about the Mali Conflict. CBCnews, CBC/Radio Canada, 8 May 2013, www.cbc.ca/news/world/9-questions-about-the-mali-conflict-1.1302797. Mali Crisis: Key Players. BBC News, BBC, 12 Mar. 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 17582909. Mali: The Forgotten War. Al Jazeera English, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/mali-forgotten-war- 20149691511333443.html. Mali Profile - Timeline. BBC News, BBC, 28 June 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 13881978. The Conflict in Mali Timeline. Timetoast, www.timetoast.com/timelines/the-conflict-in-mali. Mali Crisis: Timeline. The Telegraph, Telegraph Media Group, 15 Jan. 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9801760/mali-crisistimeline.html. Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (08/06/2017), https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/national-pact, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. 1. The National Pact - Mali. Annex 2: Key Texts 2.1 National Pact (Pacte National) Signed on 11 April, 1992. 8