Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, March 1994 25 On Sir Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism Keiichiro. KAMINO I Critical Rationalism is Sir Karl Popper's basic position. The word "rational ism', however, is equivocal. Sir Karl's position, for instance, is not that rationalism propounded by Descartes, or Leibniz, at the beginning of modern times. We can say that in modern times, not only rationalists, but also empiricists, tried to build their philosophy along the line of rationalism, which might be called justificationism. By rejecting justificationism, however, Sir Karl has solved many philosophical problems. We should first make clear in what sense his position is a kind of rationalism. Though rationalism has various forms, it is at any rate one of the pillars of Western thought. We should remind ourselves that rationalism was initiated by the ancient Greek philosophers. We can see its beautiful florescence in the activ ities of the early Greek natural philosophers. According to Sir Karl, however, the decisive point in their intellectual tradition is the critical attitude developed in the Ionian school (C.R,, chap. 5). The questions which the Ionian school tried to answer, Sir Karl Popper says, were primarily cosmological, but they were also questions about a theory of knowl edge. In view of this, Popper contends that we should return to cosmology and to a simple theory of knowledge. By saying 'simple', he probably means that we should not bother with trivial questions, or questions merely for the sake of questions. That is, he is concerned with the problem of understanding the world in which we live. This problem, of course, includes both our knowledge of the world and the theory of our knowledge of the world. In fact, cosmology was the original form of Western philosophy. The history of Greek philosophy from the Ionian natural philosophers to Plato is, in a sense, a history of cosmology. But whence comes the originality we see in their achievements, Popper asks, and his answer is that it emerged from their tradition of critical discussion. It is in this tradition of the ancient thinkers that Popper sees the source of their wonderful originality. This view underlies his recommendation of critical rationalism. Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Letters, Osaka City University, Sugimoto, 3-3-138, Sumiyoshi-ku, Osaka 558, JAPAN. -211-
26 Keiichiro. KAMINO Vol. 8 II One of the requirements of critical rationalism is the attitude of solving problems by an appeal to reason, i.e. to clear thought and experience. Popper, however, divides rationalism into two kinds, namely critical rationalism, and the other, after his way of naming, comprehensive rationalism (O.S.E., chap. 24). These are matters which anyone who knows something about Popper's philosophy should know. But the reason why I have deliberately mentioned this, is as follows. Bartley, who was once one of Popper's students, criticised Popper's critical rationalism by saying that it is a retreat to commitment, and that in this sense it contains an irrational element (cf. Bartley, R.C.). Popper appreciated this criticism very highly. But as it seems to me, he still stands on his critical rationalism (O.S. E., chap. 24 & Addendum; R.A.S., chap. 1). Why so? I should like to make this matter clear, because I think this consideration would lead us to a better understand ing of Ponner's own nhilosonhical position. III First I should mention briefly why Popper divided rationalism into two kinds. Anyone would agree that we should be responsible for our own judgements, decisions, and actions. This is an individualistic claim, and has a close connection with the attitude to try to see things clearly when acting, by an appeal to rational reflection. But, why should we be rational rather than irrational? This is obvious ly a moral question. Now, we could perhaps vindicate our choice, but would not be able to justify it logically. A defence of one choice or decision may be made by comparing the consequences which result from it, with those which would follow from some other choice. But of course, there are blind decisons that do not take any account of whatever consequences may result. No analysis of the consequences which are likely to result from the alternatives can justify blind decisions. Moreover, analysis or comparison presupposes the operation of reason. This means that we should first stand on the rationalist position, before we start to analyse or compare things. In order for us to be a rationalist, we should first make a moral decision to adopt rationalism; such a decision must therefore come first. And such a moral decison cannot be judgement deduced from mere facts. This fact Popper regards as the presupposition of his critical rationalism, and propounds a dualism of facts and decisions (O.S.E., chap. 5). The claim that the adoption of rationalism should be justified is logically impossible, because to take the position that we should make appeal only to reason and experience is to presuppose rationalism. The justification of the adoption of rationalism by an appeal to reason and experi ence only, therefore, is nothing but a question-begging of the justification of rational -212-
No. 4 On Sir Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism 27 ism by an appeal to rationalism. Broadly speaking, the adoption of rationalism is a matter of moral decision (O.S.E., chap. 24). We discard irrationalism, because we find it more dangerous than rationalism. Thus, extreme or comprehensive rationalism is, in itself, inconsistent. As far as only the adoption of such standpoints is concerned, therefore, irrationalism is logically superior to rationalism. We have, however, to narrow and minimize the room that we allow to irrationalism. Popper, accordingly, contends that a true rationalism consists in the intellectual modesty of those who know how often they err, and distinguishes it from extreme or comprehensive rationalism. Of course, he rejects comprehensive rationalism, and advocates critical rationalism instead. An appeal to arguments or experience can be effective as a method of solving problems, only to those who are already prepared to adopt an irrational faith in reason. Thus, the fundamental attitude of rationalism necessarily presupposes the self-knowledge of the limits of rationalism. The critical rationalist recognises this fact (O.S.E., chap. 24). Sir Karl Popper's critical rationalism, therefore, is in opposition not only to irrationalism, but also to comprehensive rationalism. It is not, however, incompat ible with empiricism; it includes empiricism as well as intellectualism. In so far as it denies authoritarianism which both rationalism and empiricism contain, it is, of course, in opposition to them. Rationalism is an attitude that seeks to solve as many problems as possible by appeal to reason and experience, an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. It is very similar to the scientific attitude (ibid.). From critical rationalism, we can draw many instructive consequences. It leads us, for instance, to the recognition of the need of social mechanisms or institutions to protect the freedom of criticism, i.e. the need for some defence of liberalism and the denial of authoritarianism. In the theory of knowledge, the denial of authoritarianism means the rejection of the inquiry into the origin of knowledge, and the task of the theory of knowledge would be to ask how we can hope to detect and eliminate errors (O.S.E., chaps. 10, 24). Both rationalists and empiricists in early modern times stood on some kind of authoritarianism, in so far as they have tried to justify knowledge by way of detecting its origins in intellect or experience respectively (C. R., Intro.). The method by which we can eliminate errors is 'by criticism', namely by criticising theories or conjectures of others and of our own as well (ibid.). The value of a theory will be increased not by defending the theory, but by the failure of severe attacks upon it. Therefore, it is very important for us to obtain environmental niches in which we can hold some mechanisms or institutions that allow us to criticise freely. In the theory of knowledge, one of the developments of critical rationalism may, for instance, take the form of the 'Kantian problem'. If criticisability ought to be -213-
28 Keiichiro. KAMINO Vol. 8 one of the conditions our knowledge should have, how to draw a line of demarcation between criticisable, i.e. rational beliefs, and irrational beliefs is rather an important problem. One of the forms which the demarcation problem may take is to distin guish scientific knowledge from non-scientific knowledge, and this is what Sir Karl Popper calls the 'Kantian problem' (ibid.). Another development of critical ration alism in the field of the theory of knowledge is his solution of the problem of induction (cf. L. Sc. D.). IV I have given only a very sketchy description of Popper's critical rationalism. But I hope that this would be enough to suggest its effectiveness. Now, as I already mentioned above, Bartley contends that the foundation of this rationalism is not solid enough. He propounds, therefore, his pancritical rationalism. And, although Popper appreciated this criticism, and made some corrections of such misleading expresions as could have given rise to the misunderstanding that he holds some kind of justificationism or other, he still holds to critical rationalism. Why so? In order to see the matter clearly, let us next try to see what Bartley's argument is. Bartley expounds the problem of rationality which he regards as one of the three principal problems of philosophy. The central problem in this is not to have a conflict within a theory of rationality itself, a conflict that appears when it is discovered that according to one's theory of rationality, rationality is impossible. This problem is also called the dilemma of ultimate commitment and the problem of presupposition (Bartley, R.C., chap. 4). The contention about the limits of rationality arises out of the problem to stem an endless regression to obtain the grounds for rationality, and from the fact that arbitrary dogmatic commitment seems the only way to do this. Bartley says as follows: No matter what bilief is advanced someone can always challenge it with: "How do you know?", "Give me a reason, or prove it". When such challenges are accepted by citing further reasons, these may be questioned in turn. And there will be an infinite regress. In order to avoid this regression, we should have some stopping points not open to any challenge. These will be the halting points for rational discussions, and should be simply accepted without any arguments. If we do not stop at such stopping points, then, Bartley argues, ultimate -214- V
No. 4 On Sir Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism 29 relativism results, because any way of rationally arbitrating among competing ultimate stopping points by appeal to a common standard is now excluded in principle (ibid.). So, in any case, justificationist rationalism, according to which rationality consists in justification on the basis of principles or self-evident presup positions will not stand, because, as we have seen, there cannot be any such principles or presuppositions. Bartley divides the possible conception of rationalism into three. In his words, (1) panrationalism (or comprehensive rationalism), (2) critical rationalism, (3) pancritical rationalism (or comprehensively critical rationalism) (ibid.). (2) includes not only Popper's critical rationalism but also Ayer's position. Bartley tries to escape the difficulties that haunt both comprehensive rational ism and critical rationalism (ibid., chaps. 4, 5). The former combines the rationalist idea with the justificationist one, and has a self-defeating character. It falls into an infinite regress, and is not able to defend its own position rationally, without arguing in a circle. The latter is vulnerable to the to quoque taunt. Bartley criticises Popper's critical rationalism, by saying that it contains a fideistic element (ibid., p. 103). Any adequate argument for rationality ought to escape fideism (ibid., pp. 104-5). As Popper's argument is fideistic, therefore it is inadequate, says Bartley (ibid., p. 104). After this criticism was raised, Popper made several corrections. Bartely, however, is not satisfied with the corrections Sir Karl Popper has made, and says that Popper's early fideistic approach has been corrected in only a patchwork manner, and as a result of this it remains in a confused situation (ibid., p. 105). According to Bartley, both comprehensive rationalism and critical rationalism are foreordained by the structure of the questions they emphasise and the criticism they put forward. Behind them there is the polluted meta-context of justificationist philosophy of true belief. He says (ibid., p. 109) that the Western philosophical tradition is authoritative in character, even in its most liberal form, and that this structure has been hidden by oversimplified traditional presentations of the rise of modern philosophy as part of a rebellion against authorities. Accord ing to him, modern philosophy has never discarded authoritarianism, but has entertained only one alternative to the practice of traditional authoritarianism. Bartley claims that nothing gets justified, but everything gets criticised (ibid., p. 112). Instead of positing infallible intellectual authorities to justify and guaran tee position, we should, according to him, build a philosophical programme for counteracting intellectual error. One should create an ecological niche for rational ity, so that we can maximize criticism. We should make shift from authoritarian justification to criticism. Indeed, the idea of criticising competing views rationally has been the main theme of modern philosophy. -215-
30 Keiichiro. KAMINO Vol. 8 VI What is Bartley's position like? Thinking that a new programme for rational ist philosophy is in a non-justificational approach, Bartley propounds pancritical rationalism. This permits a rationalist to be characterised as one who is willing to entertain any position and holds all his positions open to criticism; or one who never cuts off an argument by resorting to faith or irrational commitment. This attutide he calls pancritical rationalism, which is his position. Pancritical rationalism cannot imply comprehensive rationalism, because if it does, then the denial of comprehensive rationalism means the denial of pancritical rationalism. Someone who does not justify his belief irrationally (pancritical rationalist), is not necessarily thereby someone who justifies his belief rationally. The pancritical rationalist has discarded the ideal of justifying everything ration ally. In this point, he is different from a comprehensive rationalist. A pancritical rationalist also differs from a critical rationalist, for, in Bartley's opinion, any critical rationalist contends that although the rationalist position cannot be rationally justified, it can be irrationally justified. I do not think this is true, at least as far as Popper's position is concerned. As a matter of fact, when Bartley says so, he is referring to Ayer, not to Popper (ibid., p. 118). Bartley says that Ayer is confused. But as it seems to me, it is rather Bartley himself who gets confused. In fact, his attempt to show that pancritical rationalism is free from any contradiction, somehow reveals his justificationist desire. In addition to this, I should think that his word 'irrational justification' is just as contradictory as is `round square'. VII Bartley correctly distinguishes rationalism from justificationism. He says that if rationality lies in justification, it is severely limited by the necessity for commit ment, but that if rationality lies in criticism, and if we can subject everything to criticism and continued test, including the rationalist way of life itself, without leading to infinite regress, circularity, the need to justify, or any other such difficulty, then rationality is in this sense unlimited. The pancritical rationalist does not justify at all. If all justification rational as well as irrational is really abandoned, there is indeed no need to justify irrationally a position that is rationally unjustifiable (Bartley, R.C., chap. 5, pp. 118-9). I entirely agree with this position, except that I am not very happy with the expression 'irrational justification'. And I rather gather that Popper too would agree with Bartley's statement. Bartley continues to say that a position may be held rationally, without needing justification at all, provided that it can be and is -216-
No. 4 On Sir Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism 31 held open to criticism and survives severe examination (ibid.). The question how well a position can be justified is quite different from the question how well it is criticisable. So far what Bartley claims is good, but the problem is if pancritical rationalism is consistent. I suspect that pancritical rationalism is just as problematic as compre hensive rationalism. As we have seen already, Bartley says that nothing gets justified, but everything gets criticised. I agree with the first half of this, but rather doubt if the latter half could be maintained literally. My question is: Is pan critical rationalism criticisable? Or if I may use Bartley's own expression: Can the programme of following an argument where it leads and of holding everything open to severe criticism itself be held open to criticism and survive it? Does not a paradoxical situation arise in regard to the criticism of the practice of argument just as it did in regard to the justification of the practice? In answer to this, Bartley says that the practice of critical argument can be criticised without contradiction or any other logical difficulty (Bartley, R.C., p. 119). If he is corrct, then, within non-justificational, pancritical rationalism, the dilemma of ultimate commitment can be resolved and the to quoque argument avoided (Bartley, R.C., p. 120). VIII Now, I raised the question above, because there are some arguments purporting that Bartley's argument is not corrct. Watkins and Post both produced some logical criticisms against it respectively (Watkins [1969], [1971]; cf, Bartley, R.C., AppendiƒÔ 4). Here I am not able to deal with these aruguments in any detail. I have to be very brief. Watkins claims that the defender of pancritical rationalism can be assured of victory over his critics however good their criticism. Therefore, Bartley's argument, according to Watkins, is not criticisable. Post contends that Bartley's position includes self-reference, that because of that self-referential struc ture, it results in a paradox, and that, therefore, it can be refuted. Well, although I am very sympathetic to Bartley's argument, I think that the arguments produced by Watkins and Post are logically superior to Bartley's. And if Bartley regards his pancritical rationalism not as a recommendation or a direction for our practice of debates, but as a true proposition, then he should be regarded as offering us a synthetic a priori proposition. Of course, such cannot be his intention. And if he is proposing his thesis as a direction for a rationalist to adopt, then it requires a decision. And if pancritical rationalisim is logically impossible, it would not be possible for a pancritical rationalist to be rational about his own rationalism. It is not rational to suggest that one should do what is logically impossible. It is not rational to try to be rational about what can not be rational. Or I should rather say that it is not rational for one to try to be rational about one's own rationalism. -217-
32 Keiichiro. KAMINO Vol. 8 I do, however, highly evaluate Bartley's intention of treating everything rationally. I might seem contradictory. But that is not so. On the contrary, I think that Popper's critical rationalism shows that what I said is not necessarily contradictory. IX now snouia a rationalist try to De rational? A gooa guiae ior tills woaiu ue what Watkins offers us as a simple and naive formulation of the position a rational ist can adopt (Watkins [1969]). It says as follows: (W) He [a rationalist] should try to be as rational as he can about the beliefs and opinions he holds. We have already seen that other formulations such as `He should try to hold all his beliefs and opinions rationally', or `He should try to hold all his beliefs and opinions rationally, except his belief in rationalism', led us to some troubles. Watkin's formulation neither requires itself to be held rationally, nor to be held irrationally. It requires only that the rationalist should try to be as rational as he can about his rationalism. It may require that we restrict our criticisms more or less to those which have some empirical content, although meta-contextual criticisms may be allowed as long as they effect certain criticisms of some empirical content. A rationalist can neither justify his rationalism, nor argue out that rationalism is criticisable, indeed. But he can produce some moral reasons for preferring rational ism to irrationalism. Watkins's position will be exposed to the taunt of to quoque from an irrationalist. Still a rationalist ought to admit that despite his best critical endeav ours, many of his beliefs and opinions are actually held by him in an irrational way. As a matter of fact, we human beings are organisms, and so we human beings cannot be rational in any other way than that which Watkins suggests. For organisms do not necessarily always live in a rational way. Maybe it is only human beings that can live rationally. And even many human beings often live irrationally. In fact, there are many irrationalists in this world. An irrationalist may draw some comfort from this. But he [an irrationalist] may not be able to draw much comfort from this fact. Watkin's position prohibits him saying to a rationalist : "You [a ration alist] hold your fundamental beliefs in the same irrational way that I [an irrationalist] hold mine". Any ratonalist will try to eliminate from his position, by way of criticism, as many errors as possible, but an irrationalist will not try to do so. Therefore, he, as Watkins says, is not entitled to taunt the rationalist. -218-
No. 4 On Sir Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism 33 X We human beings are organisms. Organisms do respond to stimulations from the environment and react to them with some expectations. But when reacting, organisms do not vindicate their behavioural pattern before they take action. The evaluation of their actions should come after the action. Then we can be rational. That is, critical reflections about the actions should come later. Of course, in due course of time, human beings would have begun to consider whether they should be rational in taking action, and then the rationalist attitude might have been adpoted by some human beings. This adoption of the stance may be tentative. And it can be subjected to criticism; it may be compared with other choices. The critical attitude itself can be criticised too. The fact is that so far it has survived criticism. And I think that Sir Karl Popper's critical rationalism, taking all these factors into account, seems to suggest that on the one hand we should make moral decision before we start philosophical reflection. But, on the other hand, it is a position that makes it possible for us to develop a theory of knowledge which would reflect the biological, evolutionary way of living of human beings. The progress of knowledge in human beings has a very similar structure with the process of adaptation of organisms to their environment. The great difference between human beings and other organisms is that we human beings can and do have theories, which can and should be the objects of criticism. Organisms, if they fail to adapt to their environment, will be killed and die. But human beings may survive, letting theories be killed in place of human beings themselves. Such theories, however, will become more powerful and therefore more helpful through critical discussion. References W.W. Bartley V [1984]:The Retreat to Commitment, 1984. (Bartley, R.C.). Popper, Karl:Open Society and Its Enemies. (O.S.E.) Logic of Scientific Discovery. (L.Sc.D.). Conjectures and Refutations. (C.R.). Realism and the Aim of Science. (R.A.S. ). Watkins, J.W.S. [1969]:Comprehensively Critical Rationalism, Philosophy, vol. 44, No. 167. [1971]: CCR:A Refutation, Philosophy, vol. 46, No. 175. (P.S.:This paper is the English version of the paper which I read at the work-shop for the study of Sir Karl Popper's philosophy on November 12, 1992. The work-shop was held on the occasion of his visit to Japan : He was awarded the Kyoto Prize of the year for his achievements in philosophy, and came to Japan to receive it. He stayed for a week or so in Kyoto. A copy of this paper was sent to Sir Karl some time before the work-shop, so that he might take a view of it in advance. And he was kind enough to make several friendly -219-
34 Keiichiro. KAMINO Vol. 8 comments on it. In fact he expressed his opinion not only personally to me, before the formal session, but also publicly to the audience during the debate at the work-shop itself. What he said to me personally was almost the same as what he said to the public. I appreciate his kindness very much. Among the remarks he made, I think, the following two points are particularly worth mentionig here. In the first place, he pointed out the fact that he had never joined the C.C.R. debates, and also emphasized that he liked the late Bartley, and admired his academic talent. Secondly, he referred to the misunderstandings people had about his critical rationalism, and explained that it is neither a thesis, nor a proposition, nor a theory, but an attitude, which, therefore, cannot be true or false, although it can be criticisable. As we naturally need a name to call a thing or whatever, so we need a name to call an attitude, And so, Popper felt he needed to give his attitude a name. That, he explained, is the reason why he has introduced the term ' critical rationalism'. Popper's second point that critical rationalism is not something which can be true or false, is, indeed, what I have tried to argue in my paper.) -220-