Ethics Comprehensive Reading List

Ethics Comprehensive List Robert L. Frazier 25/11/2017 Morality and Self-Interest Plato. Republic. Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1930. Book II, 357a 367c. Bishop Butler. Fifteen sermons. In J. H. Bernard, editor, The Works of Joseph Butler. SPCK, London, 1900. Sermon XI. Joseph Raz. The central conflict: morality and self-interest. In Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, editors, Well-Being and Morality: s in Honour of James Griffin, pages 209 238. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000. Kurt Baier. Egoism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 197 204. David Gauthier. Morals By Agreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986. Chs 1 & 2. Bernard Williams. Egoism and altruism. In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973. ISBN 0 521 29060 pbk. Gilbert Harman. The Nature of Morality. Oxford University Press, New York, 1977. Ch 12. Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. Collins, London, 1651/1962. Ch. 13. Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. Chs. 6 7, 9, 14. David O. Brink. Rational egoism and the separateness of persons. In Jonathan Dancy, editor, Parfit. Blackwell, Oxford, 1997. In the selection from Plato, what is suggested about the circumstances in which it would, and would not, be rational for a self-interested person to act morally? What is the theory of psychological egoism? Is it true? What implications would its truth have for morality? Is there really a conflict between morality and self-interest? If there is, could it be rational for people to act morally in cases where their doing so would conflict with their self-interest? 1

Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism. Fontana, Glasgow, 1863/1962. Chs 1 3. J. J. C. Smart. An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics. In Utilitarianism: For and Against J. J. C. Smart and B. A. O. Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, pages 3 74. Sec. 1 7, 9 10. B. A. O. Williams. A critique of utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism: For and Against J. J. C. Smart and B. A. O. Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, pages 77 150. Secs. 1 6. John L. Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Ch. 6. R. M. Hare. Ethical theory and utilitarianism. In Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, editors, Utilitarianism and Beyond, pages 23 38. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982. Philip Pettit. Consequentialism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 230 240. Brad Hooker. Ideal Code, Real World. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000. Ch. 4. Peter Railton. Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13, 1984. Shelly Kagan. The Limits of Morality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989. Ch. 1. What is the most reasonable form of utilitarianism? Are there any fatal criticisms of it? 2

Kantian Ethics Immanuel Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. 1785/1953. Chs 1 2. Ralph C. S. Walker. Kant. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978. Ch. 11, Sec. 1. Onora O Neill. Kantian ethics. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 175 185. John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. The Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971. Sec. 40. John L. Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Ch. 4. Christine M. Korsgaard. The right to lie: Kant on Dealing with evil. Oxford s in Philosophy, pages 530 552. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. Barbara Herman. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993. Ch 1. Bernard Williams. Persons, character and morality. In Moral Luck Bernard Williams. Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pages 1 19. What conditions, according to Kant, must be satisfied for it to be morally permissible to perform some action? How sensitive is this account to the various situations in which we find ourselves, e.g., when we find ourselves in a situation where it seems we should do something that otherwise would be wrong in order to avoid some great evil? Must moral action always be performed from a sense of duty? 3

Virtue Ethics Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1985. I 7; II 1 6; VI 1, 12 13; X 7 8. (Any translation will do.) J. O. Urmson. Aristotle s Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. Chs 2 & 6. Jerry Schneewind. The misfortunes of virtue. Ethics, 101:42 63, 1990. G. E. M. Anscombe. Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33:1 19, 1958. David Solomon. Internal objections to virtue theory. In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, editors. Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, volume XIII of Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988, pages 428 441. H. Irwin, Terence. The virtues: theory and common sense in greek. In How Should One Live?, pages 36 55. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996. James D. Wallace. Ethics and the craft analogy. In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, editors. Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, volume XIII of Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988, pages 222 232. John L. Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Pp. 186 189. Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, second edition, 1984. Ch. 15. Greg Pence. Recent work on the virtues. American Philosophical Quarterly, 21:281 297, 1984. John McDowell. Virtue and reason. The Monist, 62:331 350, 1979. Greg Pence. Virtue theory. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 249 258. What rôle should the notion of a virtuous person play in a moral theory? 4

Realism in Ethics G. E. Moore. Ethics. Oxford University Press, London, 1912. Ch. III. Dale Jamieson. Method and moral theory. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 476 487. John McDowell. Values and secondary qualities. In Ted Honderick, editor, Morality and Objectivity, pages 110 129. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, editor. s on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988. ISBN 0-8014-9541-5 (Pbk.). Introduction. David O. Brink. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Ch. 2. David Wiggins. Truth, invention and the meaning of life. Proceedings of the British Academy, 62: 331 378, 1976. Jonathan Dancy. Moral Reasons. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Ch. 9. Richard N. Boyd. How to be a moral realist. In Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, editor. s on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988. ISBN 0-8014-9541-5 (Pbk.), pages 181 228. ISBN 0-8014-9541-5 (Pbk.). 1,2 and 5. Mark Platts. Ways of Meaning. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979. Ch. 10.** Thomas Reid. s on the Active Powers of Man. John Bell, Edinburgh, 1788. III, part III, chs V and VI. Keith Lehrer. Thomas Reid. Routledge, London, 1989. Pp. 212-226. **Also in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, editor. s on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988. ISBN 0-8014-9541-5 (Pbk.). What are the arguments for realism? Are they persuasive? 5

Anti-Realism in Ethics David Hume. Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press, Oxford, second edition, 1740/1978. Bk. II, part III, I; bk. III part I, I and II. A. J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. Gollancz, London, second edition, 1946. Ch. 6 Robert J. Fogelin. Hume s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985. Chs 9 & 10. R. M. Hare. The Language of Morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952. Chs 1 & 11. Michael Smith. Realism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 399 410. John L. Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Ch. 1. Bernard Williams. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1973. Pp. 28 52. Bernard Williams. Internal and external reasons. In Moral Luck Bernard Williams. Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pages 101 113. Simon Blackburn. Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. Chs 5 & 6. Gilbert Harman. The Nature of Morality. Oxford University Press, New York, 1977. Chs 1 & 2. David McNaughton. Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988. Chs 1, 3 5. Thomas Nagel. The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press, 1986. Ch. 8. John McDowell. Values and secondary qualities. In Ted Honderick, editor, Morality and Objectivity, pages 110 129. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985. James Rachels. Subjectivism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 432 441. What are the arguments for anti-realism? Are they persuasive? 6

Quasi-realism and the Frege-Geach Problem A. J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. Gollancz, London, second edition, 1946. Ch. 6. Peter Geach. Assertion. PR, 74:1965, 1965 Simon Blackburn. Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. Chs 5 6. Simon Blackburn. Ruling Passions. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998. Chs 3 & 9. Allan Gibbard. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990. Part I. Charles Stevenson. The nature of ethical disagreement. In Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo, editors, Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, page?? Blackwell, Oxford, 2007. Alexander Miller. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003. Ch. 4. Bob Hale. Can there be a logic of attitudes? In Reality, Representation and Projection, page?? OUP, Oxford, 1993. What is the Frege-Geach Problem? Does it provide an insurmountable problem for expressivism? 7

Moral Relativism Judith Jarvis Harman, Gilbert & Thomson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell, Oxford, 1996. Section 1. Simon Blackburn. Ruling Passions. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998. Ch. 9. Bernard Williams. The truth in relativism. Proceedings of the Arisotelian Society, 75:215 28, 1975. T.M. Scanlon. What Do We Owe Each Other? Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998. Ch. 8. Alasdair MacIntyre. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988. Chs 18 19. D.B. Wong. Natural Moralities. OUP, Oxford, 2006. Chs 1 3. Judith Jarvis Harman, Gilbert & Thomson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell, Oxford, 1996. Section 2. Explain moral relativism. To what is morality relative? Is it the moral view that best supports tolerance of others behaviour and moral views? 8

Death and Taking Life Thomas Nagel. Death. In Mortal Questions, pages 1 10. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979. R. E. Ewin. What is wrong with killing people? Philosophical Quarterly, 22:126 139, 1972. Judith Thomson. A defense of abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1:47 66, 1971. Don Marquis. Why abortion is immoral. The Journal of Philosophy, 86:183 202, 1989. John L. Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Pp. 195 199. Jonathan Glover. Causing Death and Saving Lives. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Chs 13, 14 & 15. Joel Feinberg. Harm to Self, volume III of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986. Ch. 27. Fred Feldman. Confrontations with the Reaper. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992. Chs 11 & 12. When, if ever, should we prevent a person s voluntary death? When, if ever, should we prevent a woman having an abortion? 9

Principle of Double Effect/Acts and Omissions Doctrine Jonathan Glover. Causing Death and Saving Lives. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Chs. 6 and 7. Michael E. Bratman. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987. Ch. 10. Philippa Foot. The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. Oxford Review, 5: 5 15, 1967. Jonathan Bennett. Whatever the consequences. Analysis, 26:83 102, 1966. Bernard Williams. Utilitarianism and moral self-indulgence. In Moral Luck Bernard Williams. Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pages 40 53. Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, third edition, 1989. Pp. 120 150. What is the Principle of the Double Effect? Are there any sound arguments in support of it? Am I as morally responsible for my omissions as for my actions? 10

Responsibility Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1985. Bk 3, Chs 1 & 5. Richard Sorabji. Necessity, Cause, and Blame. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1980 Ch. 16. John L. Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Chapter 9. John L. Austin. A plea for excuses. In Alan R. White, editor. The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968, pages 19 42. Herbert L. A. Hart. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968. Chapter VI. Joel Feinberg. Action and responsibility. In Alan R. White, editor. The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968, pages 95 119. Charles Taylor. Responsibility for self. In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, editor, The Identities of Persons, pages 281 99. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971. Michael J. Zimmerman. Sharing responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly, 22:115 122, 1985. When is a person morally responsible for his or her actions? What can diminish this responsibility? Is a person ever responsible for something that he or she does not do? 11

Rights H. L. A. Hart. Are there any natural rights? The Philosophical Review, 64:175 191, 1955. Jeremy Waldron. Rights. In Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, editors, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, pages 575 585. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Joel Feinberg. Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980. Ch. 7. Ronald Dworkin. Rights as trumps. In Jeremy Waldron, editor, Theories of Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985. Joseph Raz. The Morality of Freedom. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986. Chs 7 & 8. Brenda Almond. Rights. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 259 269. Alan R. White. Rights. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. Chs 6 & 7. Kymlicka. Multicultural Citizenship. OUP, Oxford, 1995. Chs 3 & 6. J. L. Mackie. Can there be a right-based moral theory? In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, editors, Studies in Ethical Theory, volume III of Midwest Studies in Philosophy, pages 350 359. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1978. ISBN 0-8166-0971-3 (Pbk). What are rights and who has them? How central are they to our moral/political thought? 12

Collective Responsibility D. E. Cooper. Collective responsibility. Philosophy, 43:258 268, 1968. Virginia Held. Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible? The Journal of Philosophy, 67:471 481, 1970. Douglas N. Husak. Omissions, causation and liability. Philosophical Quarterly, 30:318 326, 1980. Michael J. Zimmerman. Sharing responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly, 22:115 122, 1985 When, if ever, can a collection of person be held responsible for the actions of some member(s) of the collction? 13

Free Will and Determinism General Ted Honderich. A Theory of Determinism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. John L. Mackie. The Cement of the Universe. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1974. Pp. 38 43. Richard Sorabji. Necessity, Cause, and Blame. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1980. Pp. 26 40. Robert Young. The implications of determinism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 534 542. Compatibilism 1 John Locke. An Concerning Human Understanding. Fontana Library, London, fifth edition, 1690/1964. ISBN 0 00 641040 5. Bk. II, Ch. 21. David Hume. Enquires Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Clarendon Press, Oxford, second edition, 1748/1966. 8. A. J. Ayer. Freedom and necessity. Polemic, page??, 1946. Daniel C. Dennett. Brainstorms: Philosophical s on Mind and Psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978. Pp. 286 99. Peter Van Inwagen. The incompatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies, 27: 185 99, 1975. Compatibilism 2 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. St Martin s Press, New York, 1781/1965. A444-5/B472-3, A532/B560 A558/B586. Immanuel Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. 1785/1953. Ch. 3. Peter Strawson. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48:1 25, 1962. Jonathan F. Bennett. Kant s Dialectic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974. Ch. 10. Lewis W. Beck. A Commentary on Kant s Critique of Practical Reason. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960. Ch. 11. Libertarianism Thomas Reid. s on the Intellectual Powers of Man. MacMillian, London, 1785/1941. 4, chs 1,2,4,6,7, & 8. Keith Lehrer. Thomas Reid. Routledge, London, 1989. Ch. XIV. C. A. Campbell. On Selfhood and Godhood. Allen and Unwin, London, 1957. Lecture IX. Roderick M. Chisholm. Human freedom and the self. In Gary Watson, editor. Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford, first edition, 1982, pages 24 35. 14

Mechanism Norman Malcolm. The conceivability of mechanism. The Philosophical Review, 77:45 72, 1968. Daniel C. Dennett. Mechanism and responsibility. In Gary Watson, editor. Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford, first edition, 1982, page 173. Alvin I Goldman. A Theory of Human Action. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1970. What is freewill? Do we have it? 15

Existentialist Ethics Jean-Paul Sartre. Existentialism is a humanism. In Walter Kaufman, editor, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, pages 295 298. Meridian, New York, 1956. Dagfinn Føllesdal. Sartre on freedom. In Paul Arthur Schilpp, editor, The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, pages 392 407. Open Court, La Salle, 1981. Charles Guignon. Existentialist ethics. In Joseph P. DeMarco and Richard M. Fox, editors, New Directions in Ethics, pages 73 89. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1986. David E. Cooper. Existentialism. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990. Chs 9 10. Gilbert Harman. The Nature of Morality. Oxford University Press, New York, 1977. Ch. 7. Mary Warnock. Existentialist Ethics. Macmillan, London, 1967. Charles Taylor. Responsibility for self. In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, editor, The Identities of Persons, pages 281 99. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971. Anthony Rudd. Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethics. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993. You might also have a look at Sartre s Being and Nothingness; Kierkegaard s Either/Or vol. ii, Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Fear and Trembling; and Heidegger s Existence and Being and Being and Time. Unfortunately, there aren t specific places in these texts to which I can refer you. Are there, according to existentialists, grounds for the evaluation of actions or persons? If so, what are they? 16

The Naturalistic Fallacy George Edward Moore. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1903. Ch. 1, 1 14; ch. 3, 39 44, 59-65. R. M. Hare. The Language of Morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952. Ch. 5. Charles R. Pigden. Naturalism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 421 431. Hilary Putnam. Reason Truth and History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982. Ch. 9. John L. Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Chs 2 3. William K. Frankena. The naturalistic fallacy. Mind, 48:464 77, 1939. John Skorupski. John Stuart Mill. The Arguments of the Philosophers. Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York, 1989. Ch. 9 2 4. What is the naturalistic fallacy? Is it really a fallacy? Does the open question argument show that all attempts to define goodness in naturalistic terms must fail? 17

Moral Relativism Judith Jarvis Harman, Gilbert & Thomson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell, Oxford, 1996. Section 1. Simon Blackburn. Ruling Passions. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998. Ch. 9. Bernard Williams. The truth in relativism. Proceedings of the Arisotelian Society, 75:215 28, 1975. T.M. Scanlon. What Do We Owe Each Other? Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998. Ch. 8. Alasdair MacIntyre. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988. Chs 18 19. D.B. Wong. Natural Moralities. OUP, Oxford, 2006. Chs 1 3. Judith Jarvis Harman, Gilbert & Thomson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell, Oxford, 1996. Section 2. Explain moral relativism. To what is morality relative? Is it the moral view that best supports tolerance of others behaviour and moral views? 18

Bibliography References Brenda Almond. Rights. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 259 269. G. E. M. Anscombe. Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33:1 19, 1958. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1985. John L. Austin. A plea for excuses. In Alan R. White, editor. The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968, pages 19 42. A. J. Ayer. Freedom and necessity. Polemic, page??, 1946. A. J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. Gollancz, London, second edition, 1946. Kurt Baier. Egoism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 197 204. Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, third edition, 1989. Lewis W. Beck. A Commentary on Kant s Critique of Practical Reason. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960. Jonathan Bennett. Whatever the consequences. Analysis, 26:83 102, 1966. Jonathan F. Bennett. Kant s Dialectic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974. Simon Blackburn. Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. Simon Blackburn. Ruling Passions. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998. Richard N. Boyd. How to be a moral realist. In Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, editor. s on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988. ISBN 0-8014-9541-5 (Pbk.), pages 181 228. ISBN 0-8014-9541-5 (Pbk.). Michael E. Bratman. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987. David O. Brink. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. David O. Brink. Rational egoism and the separateness of persons. In Jonathan Dancy, editor, Parfit. Blackwell, Oxford, 1997. Bishop Butler. Fifteen sermons. In J. H. Bernard, editor, The Works of Joseph Butler. SPCK, London, 1900. C. A. Campbell. On Selfhood and Godhood. Allen and Unwin, London, 1957. Roderick M. Chisholm. Human freedom and the self. In Gary Watson, editor. Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford, first edition, 1982, pages 24 35. D. E. Cooper. Collective responsibility. Philosophy, 43:258 268, 1968. David E. Cooper. Existentialism. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990. Jonathan Dancy. Moral Reasons. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. 19

Daniel C. Dennett. Brainstorms: Philosophical s on Mind and Psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978. Daniel C. Dennett. Mechanism and responsibility. In Gary Watson, editor. Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford, first edition, 1982, page 173. Ronald Dworkin. Rights as trumps. In Jeremy Waldron, editor, Theories of Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985. R. E. Ewin. What is wrong with killing people? Philosophical Quarterly, 22:126 139, 1972. Joel Feinberg. Action and responsibility. In Alan R. White, editor. The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968, pages 95 119. Joel Feinberg. Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980. Joel Feinberg. Harm to Self, volume III of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986. Fred Feldman. Confrontations with the Reaper. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992. Robert J. Fogelin. Hume s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985. Dagfinn Føllesdal. Sartre on freedom. In Paul Arthur Schilpp, editor, The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, pages 392 407. Open Court, La Salle, 1981. Philippa Foot. The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. Oxford Review, 5:5 15, 1967. Philippa Foot, editor. Theories of Ethics. Oxford s in Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967. William K. Frankena. The naturalistic fallacy. Mind, 48:464 77, 1939. Peter A. French, editor. The Spectrum of Responsibility. St. Martin s Press, New York, N.Y., 1991. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, editors. Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, volume XIII of Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988. David Gauthier. Morals By Agreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986. Peter Geach. Assertion. PR, 74:1965, 1965. Allan Gibbard. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990. Jonathan Glover. Causing Death and Saving Lives. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Alvin I Goldman. A Theory of Human Action. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1970. Charles Guignon. Existentialist ethics. In Joseph P. DeMarco and Richard M. Fox, editors, New Directions in Ethics, pages 73 89. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1986. Bob Hale. Can there be a logic of attitudes? In Reality, Representation and Projection, page?? OUP, Oxford, 1993. R. M. Hare. The Language of Morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952. R. M. Hare. Ethical theory and utilitarianism. In Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, editors, Utilitarianism and Beyond, pages 23 38. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982. Gilbert Harman. The Nature of Morality. Oxford University Press, New York, 1977. 20

Judith Jarvis Harman, Gilbert & Thomson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell, Oxford, 1996. H. L. A. Hart. Are there any natural rights? The Philosophical Review, 64:175 191, 1955. Herbert L. A. Hart. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968. Virginia Held. Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible? The Journal of Philosophy, 67:471 481, 1970. Barbara Herman. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993. Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. Collins, London, 1651/1962. Ted Honderich. A Theory of Determinism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. Brad Hooker. Ideal Code, Real World. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000. David Hume. Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press, Oxford, second edition, 1740/1978. David Hume. Enquires Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Clarendon Press, Oxford, second edition, 1748/1966. Douglas N. Husak. Omissions, causation and liability. Philosophical Quarterly, 30:318 326, 1980. H. Irwin, Terence. The virtues: theory and common sense in greek. In How Should One Live?, pages 36 55. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996. Dale Jamieson. Method and moral theory. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 476 487. Shelly Kagan. The Limits of Morality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989. Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. St Martin s Press, New York, 1781/1965. Immanuel Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. 1785/1953. Christine M. Korsgaard. The right to lie: Kant on Dealing with evil. Oxford s in Philosophy, pages 530 552. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. Kymlicka. Multicultural Citizenship. OUP, Oxford, 1995. Keith Lehrer. Thomas Reid. Routledge, London, 1989. John Locke. An Concerning Human Understanding. Fontana Library, London, fifth edition, 1690/1964. ISBN 0 00 641040 5. Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, second edition, 1984. Alasdair MacIntyre. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988. J. L. Mackie. Can there be a right-based moral theory? In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, editors, Studies in Ethical Theory, volume III of Midwest Studies in Philosophy, pages 350 359. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1978. ISBN 0-8166-0971-3 (Pbk). John L. Mackie. The Cement of the Universe. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1974. John L. Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977. Norman Malcolm. The conceivability of mechanism. The Philosophical Review, 77:45 72, 1968. 21

Don Marquis. Why abortion is immoral. The Journal of Philosophy, 86:183 202, 1989. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, editor. s on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988. ISBN 0-8014-9541-5 (Pbk.). John McDowell. Virtue and reason. The Monist, 62:331 350, 1979. John McDowell. Values and secondary qualities. In Ted Honderick, editor, Morality and Objectivity, pages 110 129. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985. David McNaughton. Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988. John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism. Fontana, Glasgow, 1863/1962. Alexander Miller. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams, editors. The Limits of Utilitarianism. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1982. G. E. Moore. Ethics. Oxford University Press, London, 1912. George Edward Moore. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1903. Thomas Nagel. Death. In Mortal Questions, pages 1 10. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979. Thomas Nagel. The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press, 1986. Onora O Neill. Kantian ethics. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 175 185. Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. Greg Pence. Recent work on the virtues. American Philosophical Quarterly, 21:281 297, 1984. Greg Pence. Virtue theory. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 249 258. Philip Pettit. Consequentialism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 230 240. Charles R. Pigden. Naturalism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 421 431. Plato. Republic. Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1930. Mark Platts. Ways of Meaning. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979. Hilary Putnam. Reason Truth and History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982. James Rachels. Subjectivism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 432 441. Peter Railton. Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13, 1984. John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. The Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971. Joseph Raz. The Morality of Freedom. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986. Joseph Raz. The central conflict: morality and self-interest. In Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, editors, Well-Being and Morality: s in Honour of James Griffin, pages 209 238. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000. 22

Thomas Reid. s on the Intellectual Powers of Man. MacMillian, London, 1785/1941. Thomas Reid. s on the Active Powers of Man. John Bell, Edinburgh, 1788. Anthony Rudd. Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethics. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993. Jean-Paul Sartre. Existentialism is a humanism. In Walter Kaufman, editor, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, pages 295 298. Meridian, New York, 1956. T.M. Scanlon. What Do We Owe Each Other? Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998. Jerry Schneewind. The misfortunes of virtue. Ethics, 101:42 63, 1990. Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991. John Skorupski. John Stuart Mill. The Arguments of the Philosophers. Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York, 1989. J. J. C. Smart. An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics. In Utilitarianism: For and Against J. J. C. Smart and B. A. O. Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, pages 3 74. J. J. C. Smart and B. A. O. Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973. Michael Smith. Realism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 399 410. David Solomon. Internal objections to virtue theory. In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, editors. Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, volume XIII of Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988, pages 428 441. Richard Sorabji. Necessity, Cause, and Blame. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1980. Charles Stevenson. The nature of ethical disagreement. In Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo, editors, Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, page?? Blackwell, Oxford, 2007. Peter Strawson. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48:1 25, 1962. Charles Taylor. Responsibility for self. In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, editor, The Identities of Persons, pages 281 99. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971. Judith Thomson. A defense of abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1:47 66, 1971. J. O. Urmson. Aristotle s Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. Peter Van Inwagen. The incompatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies, 27:185 99, 1975. Jeremy Waldron. Rights. In Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, editors, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, pages 575 585. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Ralph C. S. Walker. Kant. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978. James D. Wallace. Ethics and the craft analogy. In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, editors. Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, volume XIII of Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988, pages 222 232. Mary Warnock. Existentialist Ethics. Macmillan, London, 1967. Gary Watson, editor. Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford, first edition, 1982. Alan R. White, editor. The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968. 23

Alan R. White. Rights. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. David Wiggins. Truth, invention and the meaning of life. Proceedings of the British Academy, 62:331 378, 1976. B. A. O. Williams. A critique of utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism: For and Against J. J. C. Smart and B. A. O. Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, pages 77 150. Bernard Williams. Egoism and altruism. In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973. ISBN 0 521 29060 pbk. Bernard Williams. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1973. Bernard Williams. The truth in relativism. Proceedings of the Arisotelian Society, 75:215 28, 1975. Bernard Williams. Internal and external reasons. In Moral Luck Bernard Williams. Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pages 101 113. Bernard Williams. Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981. Bernard Williams. Persons, character and morality. In Moral Luck Bernard Williams. Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pages 1 19. Bernard Williams. Utilitarianism and moral self-indulgence. In Moral Luck Bernard Williams. Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pages 40 53. D.B. Wong. Natural Moralities. OUP, Oxford, 2006. Robert Young. The implications of determinism. In Peter Singer, editor. A Companion to Ethics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pages 534 542. Michael J. Zimmerman. Sharing responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly, 22:115 122, 1985. 24