World-Wide Ethics. Chapter Seven. Virtue Theory

World-Wide Ethics Chapter Seven Virtue Theory An ancient approach to understanding moral principles, especially popular among the Greeks, was what is today known as virtue ethics. Although the Greeks recognized that actions may be good or bad, they tended to focus their attention in ethics on character, and on character development. Their thinking was that building good character in young people ensures that they will not only behave well throughout their lives, but that they will also live good lives. It was thought, too, that a good society requires citizens of good character. The Greeks recognized that good character is complex, consisting of a number of specific qualities, which are known as virtues. These are comparable to what we now think of as good habits; and their opposite qualities are known as vices, which are like bad habits. Four primary virtues valued by the Greeks often called cardinal virtues were: justice, wisdom, courage and temperance. Outstanding heroes and leaders in Greek society were praised for having these qualities in uncommon degrees, and parents wanted their boys to grow up to be great men of virtue. For this reason they were often willing to pay large sums of money to famous teachers promising to mold their young sons characters. Greek philosophers, of course, wanted to understand why moral principles like Courage is a virtue are correct. Is courage a virtue merely for those who admire courageous men? (subjectivism); or is it just because societies acknowledge that courage is a virtue? (cultural relativism); or, instead, is there something about courage itself that makes it a good quality, whether it is admired or not? (objectivism, absolutism). The ancient idea that building character in boys makes them good men, and good citizens, is still with us today. This is at least part of what the Boy Scouts of America see as their mission in society; and one way they aim to accomplish this is by cultivating a specific set of virtues in each scout. These virtues are listed in The Scout Law, which boys are expected to memorize in their initiation to scouting: A Scout Is... TRUSTWORTHY A Scout tells the truth. He keeps his promises. Honesty is part of his code of conduct. People can depend on him. LOYAL A Scout is true to his family, Scout leaders, friends, school, and nation. HELPFUL A Scout is concerned about other people. He does things willingly for others without pay or reward. FRIENDLY A Scout is a friend to all. He is a brother to other Scouts. He seeks to understand others. He respects those with ideas and customs other than his own. COURTEOUS A Scout is polite to everyone regardless of age or position. He knows good manners make it easier for people to get along together. KIND A Scout understands there is strength in being gentle. He treats others as he wants to be treated. He does not hurt or kill harmless things without reason. OBEDIENT A Scout follows the rules of his family, school, and troop. He obeys the laws of his community and country. If he thinks these rules and laws are unfair, he tries to have them changed in an orderly manner rather than disobey them. CHEERFUL A Scout looks for the bright side of things. He cheerfully does tasks that come his way. He tries to make others happy. THRIFTY A Scout works to pay his way and to help others. He saves for unforeseen needs. He protects and conserves natural resources. He carefully uses time and property. BRAVE A Scout can face danger even if he is afraid. He has the courage to stand for what he thinks is right even if others laugh at or threaten him. 1

CLEAN A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean. He goes around with those who believe in living by these same ideals. He helps keep his home and community clean. REVERENT A Scout is reverent toward God. He is faithful in his religious duties. He respects the beliefs of others. Ancient Virtue Theory Plato wrote about virtues, and had the absolutist idea that the qualities that make a society good will be the same for all societies. He also thought that the qualities that make a society good are the same qualities that make men good. Like most ancient philosophers, he thought that good men make good societies, and good societies, in turn, make men good. (You may have noticed that so far this has been all about the virtues of boys and men that has been intentional.) Aristotle, who was a student of Plato, had similar ideas. He went into much greater detail in explaining what the specific virtues are, and why they are good. Aristotle is remembered today for the great depth and comprehensiveness of his theory of virtue. His ideas have been widely admired by philosophers of all ages, even if he may have few followers today. Aristotle s main contribution to ethics was in showing how a whole system of virtues could be developed from a small set of relatively simple ideas. His virtue theory has been called The Doctrine of the Mean. The word mean is used here in the sense of average. Greek societies typically admired moderation, or moderate proportion. In their architecture and sculpture that survives we can see how so much of it followed rational plans, aiming at avoidance of extremes. For instance, it is said that Greek sculptors would model their figures not after any particular person s body, but after a kind of average of all the bodies they had surveyed. Some particular men s legs might be too long, while others legs might be too short. The sculptors sought to represent ideal figures in their sculptures, even if they could find no actual person with exactly the right proportions. Aristotle developed his theory of virtue around the Greek ideals of moderate proportion. He recognized that with regard to an admirable quality like courage, some men tended to be so cowardly in battle that they would typically be the first to run. But others would be so foolhardy that they would rashly take on enemy soldiers when they really should run; for example, even if they were outnumbered by the enemy. So the best soldier would be a kind of average of the two extremes. He would stand and fight even when he feared injury or death, though he would be keen enough to run if the danger were too great. The virtue of courage, Aristotle suggested, can be defined as a statistical mean between being excessively fearful and being excessively confident. Each of those extremes he called a vice, and labeled the men who had these excessive traits cowardly and foolhardy. Aristotle s Diagram for Courage ---- FEAR ------------ ------------------------- too mean too little much foolhardy courage cowardly vice of vice of deficiency VIRTUE excess In the diagram, the feeling of fear, called a passion, is represented by the horizontal line at the top. Located on the extreme left of the line is the condition of too little of the passion, while too much of it is located on the extreme right. The mean proportion is located in the middle. Those who typically feel too little fear, or no fear at all, are 2

foolhardy; while those who are excessively fearful are cowardly. The virtuous mean between those two vices would be the courageous man. Aristotle explained that all of the moral virtues can be identified by this model. In each case of a passion or personal quality prompting action, a virtuous man will exhibit a moderate degree. A vicious man, on the other hand, will be immoderate in one way or another: either to excess or to deficiency. To take another example, if someone thinks too little of himself (too little self-love), he has what today might be called the vice of low self-esteem. If he has the opposite problem, then he has the vice of arrogance. In the middle is the ideal. This person has what Aristotle called the virtue of pride. The proud man loves himself neither too little nor too much. Aristotle identified about thirty moral virtues, and so about twice as many moral vices. For some of the vices he found that his language did not have any words. In Aristotle s way of thinking, each virtue is related to some continuum : fear, in the example for courage, and self-love in the example for pride. In understanding his theory it is important to avoid a common mistake. It is sometimes assumed that a person with too much courage is foolhardy, or that someone with excessive pride is arrogant. But these assumptions are not correct. Courage and pride are virtues; so saying that someone has too much of either of them is saying that he is too virtuous. But this would not be meaningful, considering that Aristotle explained virtue in terms of moderation, or an average. Statistically, being too average, or too moderate, makes no sense. We must say, rather, that the foolhardy person has too much confidence, not too much courage. For Aristotle s theory, again, a vice is either an excess or deficiency of some continuumquality (fear, self-love, etc.), while a virtue is the mean between them, or moderation. The Unity of the Virtues Traditional thinking in virtue ethics has operated under the assumption that the various virtues form a unified and limited set. The idea is that there could be as many as a dozen virtues, or perhaps fewer, and there should be no conflicts, competitions, or even tensions among them. Ideally, in other words, everyone should be able to have all of the virtues. A person s cultivating one of the virtues should not make it more difficult or impossible for her to cultivate another; and some people s having a virtue should not make it harder for other people to have it. Some ancient philosophers even supposed that in order truly to have one of the virtues it is necessary to have them all. For example, suppose that loyalty is a virtue. How loyal a friend can you be if you lack the courage to stand by your friends in a dangerous situation? In opposition to the assumption that the virtues are unified, many have supposed that some pairs of virtues cannot be exhibited by the same person. When we think of a judge, for example, she is well qualified for her position if she is just and wise. But we also expect a good person to be merciful, or forgiving. If a sentencing judge is just, she would not hesitate to give convicted criminals the sentences they deserve. But if she were merciful, she would give them less severe sentences than they deserve; and that would be unjust. So how can we expect a judge to be both just and merciful? The more just her sentences, the less merciful she is. The same is true of college professors, by the way: the more fairly they grade, the less merciful they can be. So either one of those traits is not a virtue; or, they are both virtues as most people 3

think and the virtues are not unified as ancient philosophers thought. What is the problem if the set of virtues is not unified? As the ancients recognized, there can be multiple virtues only if there is ultimately be one reason why each of them counts as a virtue. Take away the one reason that makes any character trait a virtue, and all we have left is bundle of different qualities that may be admired by some people but not by others. The reason why one person thinks some quality is a virtue can be denied by another person who thinks of a competing characteristic as a virtue. This is comparable to the reason scientists offer a common definition of things like planets. There has to be a common reason why some heavenly bodies orbiting the sun count as planets and others do not. Notice, by the way, how Aristotle s definition coordinated each of the virtues in the set he explained. Each of the moral virtues is a form of moderation in the various passions typical for human beings. Notice also how it would be impossible for any of the virtues described in this way to clash or conflict. Since moderation is the avoidance of extremes, all the virtues can be harmonious, and a good person can have them all. Modern Virtue Theory In modern times, philosophers have offered explanations of virtues that more closely resemble some of the ideas that have been so influential in moral theory. It is somewhat easy to see how a modern utilitarian theory would explain the goodness of the traits making up good character. A trait would be seen as a virtue provided it tends to result in good consequences, especially overall happiness. According to the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-76), who was mentioned in Chapter 1, a virtue is a character trait that is useful or agreeable to oneself or others. Kindness is obviously useful to others, since a kind person is helpful to those in need. Ambition would be a trait useful to both oneself and others. While it can enable a person to get ahead, ambitious people tend to benefit others as they succeed. Being jolly or cheerful may be an agreeable quality for a person himself to have, because it makes life more enjoyable. Deontological theories, emphasizing duties, tend to regard virtues as traits it is a person s duty to have, or to try to develop. But explanations of virtues in these theories can be a bit strained. To take one example, if a deontological theory recognizes honesty as a virtue, then this will likely be for the reason that it is our duty to tell the truth. But it is unclear what is added to the theory by calling honesty a virtue. Once we are told that it is our duty to tell the truth, what new information do we receive if we are told that it is also our duty to be honest? It seems that having a duty to be an honest person would be the same as having a duty to tell the truth. So modern deontological theories have not contributed very much to our understanding of virtues. These theories tend to emphasize only a single virtue, which would be something like being dutiful, or conscientiousness. Conscientious people take their moral duties very seriously, and try always to do what is right, even if it sometimes requires personal sacrifice. Modern social contract theories have made some limited contributions to our thinking about virtues. These theories emphasize willingness to cooperate in order to enjoy the benefits of social living. So they prize fidelity to established social bonds, and patriotism. Civility, a strong sense of justice, and good citizenship are also recognized as necessary for members of a good society. But in emphasizing only these virtues, social contract theories do not offer us much guidance for thinking about being a good person on the whole, or living a good 4

life. For example, in terms of the social contract, it is not very easy to explain what would be wrong with being an arrogant person, or what would be admirable about generosity. It seems that a man could be a good and patriotic member of his society, even while also being insufferably vain, and stingy. Women s Virtues The focus of the discussion so far has been on the virtues of good men. This raises an interesting line of questioning. Do women have any virtuous qualities? Should they be expected to have the same virtues as men? Or can women be expected to have virtues of their own? If all people are supposed to have the same equal rights, morally, then why shouldn t men and women be expected to have the same virtues? But then, if men are typically more courageous than women if courage comes easier for men does that mean that men may typically be better than women, morally? Perhaps there are compensating virtues at which women tend to excel. If men are expected to be more courageous, then perhaps women are expected to be more caring, or empathetic. Hume, mentioned above, was among the first modern philosophers to suggest that men and women would have different sets of virtues. He thought, for example, that courage would be a manly virtue, while modesty (and chastity) would be virtues for women. Women, but not men, are admired for their purity. This double standard comes from the realization that the qualities it would be useful or agreeable for men to have, considering their roles in society and family life, could be different from those it would be useful or agreeable for women to have. Hume did suppose, however, that some virtues would be common for everyone: kindness, for example. In more recent times, feminist scholars have followed Hume in thinking that women s moral experience may be fundamentally different from men s, and so their virtues are not the same. They have also observed that throughout history the great contributions to ethical thinking have been made always by men. Women s voices have seldom been heard. Men and women have traditionally taken on different roles in domestic life, usually out of necessity. For this reason the primary preoccupation of women s lives has centered around child rearing. Men have been preoccupied often with competition in work outside the home, and too often in war. Some suggest that this can explain why the virtues of women are different from men s virtues. Men are admired for having the courage they need for manly pursuits, and are disparaged for exhibiting more feminine virtues, like sympathy and caring. Women, on the other hand, seem ridiculous for aspiring to compete in the man s world at least that s what some people think. It is not easy to see how to resolve the question over the differences between men and women with respect to character. It is an important question, nevertheless. One reason why it is important is related to moral education. In developing good character among boys and girls, we must know whether to treat them differently, or the same. Is it mistake to encourage girls to imagine they could one day be President of the United States? Should a boy wanting to become a nurse, like his mom, be encouraged to become a doctor, instead? Or is it that children s characters and life aspirations are fixed so early that parents and teachers really have no control? Perhaps the idea of molding children s characters through education is ultimately misguided. 5

Skepticism about Virtues The ancient assumption that a good person exhibits specific qualities of good character, called virtues, has recently been challenged. Researchers in human psychology have taken on the project of detecting and measuring virtues. But they seem so far to have been unsuccessful. Their reasonable assumption is that a virtue would be a quality like a skill or a talent. So they expect a person having a virtuous character trait to act in ways associated with it across a wide variety of contexts. A talented musician, for example, can be expected to perform well playing a variety of types of music, and sometimes even on a variety of instruments. Variations in performance venues should not matter, either. A good musician can perform well in concert halls, recording studios, outdoor stages, living rooms, and so on. But what psychologists have found is that people supposedly possessing virtues like honesty or sympathy for others in need do not seem to exhibit their virtues in a wide enough variety of circumstances, as expected. A famous experiment along these lines involved some students at Princeton Theological Seminary. They were told to prepare to give a short sermon on the parable of the Good Samaritan, found in the Bible. It is a story about helping others in need of medical care. Some of the students, but not all, were told that they must hurry to the auditorium where they would be speaking, in order to arrive on time. Along their paths the experimenters had planted a person slumped over in a doorway, in obvious need of medical attention. The different reactions to this person between those who felt the urgency of rushing to give their talk and those who did not were significant. We would expect that virtuous seminary students, prone to help others in need, would exhibit the virtue of caring for others regardless of the different circumstances in which the find themselves. But the results of the experiment showed otherwise. The study s authors concluded: A person not in a hurry may stop and offer help to a person in distress. A person in a hurry is likely to keep going. Ironically, he is likely to keep going even if he is hurrying to speak on the parable of the Good Samaritan, thus inadvertently confirming the point of the parable. (Indeed, on several occasions, a seminary student going to give his talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan literally stepped over the victim as he hurried on his way!) (106-7) Numerous psychological studies like this one seem to show that the ancient idea of good people s possessing morally significant character traits may be a myth. The traits known traditionally as virtues do not seem to be exhibited in a wide enough variety of circumstances. Chapter Summary A popular approach to ethics has focused on good character traits, or virtues. A good person is thought to be someone prone to do good deeds. The emphasis in virtue ethics is not so much on the person s deeds, but on what the person is like, and on the specific traits responsible for the way he or she acts. Aristotle provided a superb, theoretical model of understanding and identifying the virtues of a good person. His theory emphasized moderation, or the statistical mean. He found that specific virtues, like courage, are mid-way between two opposite extremes, or vices. The courageous person is neither foolhardy, on the one hand, nor cowardly, on the other. In more modern times, moral theories like utilitarianism and deontology, emphasizing right action, have not done especially well at explaining good character. Ancient philosophers believed in the unity of the virtues, as a set. Their idea 6

was that the set of virtues has to be harmonious. Two conflicting traits, like justice and forgiveness (mercy), cannot both be virtues. The more a person is devoted to justice, for example, the less likely he would be willing to forgive others who behave unfairly. The assumption of the virtues unity has some impact, therefore, one the traits we should be willing to acknowledge as virtues. Seemingly related to the idea of the virtues unity are the apparent differences between men and women. The sexes have traditionally exhibited different virtues. What it is to be a good man has seemed different from what it is to be a good woman. There have seemed to be manly virtues (e.g., courage) and feminine virtues (e.g., empathy); and people exhibiting virtues belonging to the other sex have been criticized for character flaws. But if the virtues are unified, as the ancients supposed, then perhaps the different admirable characteristics of the sexes may not be virtues, after all. If the virtues are unified, as a set, then everyone should be expected to exhibit the same virtues. Virtues would be personality traits. But in modern psychology, experimenters have not had much success in identifying and measuring such traits. If virtues are good qualities leading a person to act in specific ways across a variety of circumstances, then the psychological evidence of their existence has so far eluded experimenters. Works Cited Conclusion of This Book The philosophical study of ethics, as a field of knowledge concerned with morality, has been the subject of this book. Since this has been an introduction to the field, the various topics presented have merely scratched the surface. The book began with an explanation of moral reasoning, which results in valid moral judgments. In order to judge correctly, whether about others or ourselves, we need reliable moral principles. The reliability of these principles, in turn, is the focus of moral theory. That is why this book has been, on the whole, about various moral theories. Some have nearly obvious shortcomings, when they are subject to rational scrutiny. A number of others hold up somewhat better to criticism. Some have evident strengths, despite other weaknesses. We make moral judgments, even in thinking only about ourselves, and about what we are like as a person: good or bad. If we think we are good, at least for the most part, then we must have some reliable idea about what makes someone a good person. We must also have some reliable idea about what makes certain ways of acting right or wrong. Otherwise, our thought about our own goodness is so vague as to be pointless; and when this becomes evident to us, it diminishes self-esteem. Philosophers working in ethics apply both ancient and modern methods of thinking in the study of these important questions. In ethics, as in any other field of knowledge, progress is ongoing, and the work is never finished. Boy Scouts of America, The Scout Law, Boy Scout Handbook, 11 th ed. 1998. Darley, John M.; Batson, C. Daniel, From Jerusalem to Jericho : A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27 (July 1973), 100-108. 7