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STUDIES IN RELIGION, SECULAR BELIEFS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VOLUME 5

Does God Believe in Human Rights? Essays on Religion and Human Rights Edited by Nazila Ghanea Alan Stephens Raphael Walden LEIDEN BOSTON 2007

Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com www.ebook777.com A c.i.p. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Printed on acid-free paper issn 1871-7829 isbn-13: 978 90 04 15254 0 isbn-10: 90 04 15254 7 2007 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishers, idc Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and vsp. http://www.brill.nl All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. Designed and digitally typeset by BooKraft @ googlemail.com Printed and bound in The Netherlands.

CONTENTS Preface page vii Foreword xi Introduction 1 malcolm evans Section One religious perspectives Christian Perspectives 1 The Complimentarity between Secular and Religious Perspectives of Human Rights 19 richard harries 2 Religious Truths and Human Coexistence 29 roger ruston 3 Religion in a Democratic Society: Safeguarding Freedom, Acknowledging Identity, Valuing Partnership 45 michael ipgrave A Muslim Perspective 4 Conflicting Values or Misplaced Interpretations? Examining the Inevitability of a Clash between Religions and Human Rights 65 javaid rehman Jewish Perspectives 5 Religion and Human Rights with Special Reference to Judaism 89 norman solomon 2

vi Contents 6 Religion and Human Rights: Redressing the Balance 107 avrom sherr 7 Human Rights and Its Destruction of Right and Wrong 115 melanie phillips A Bahá í Perspective 8 A More Constructive Encounter: A Bahá í View of Religion and Human Rights 121 john barnabas leith Section Two models, tensions and frameworks 9 Human Rights, Religion and the Secular : Variant Configurations of Religion(s), State(s) and Society(ies) 147 paul weller 10 Freedom of Religion and Belief in the Light of Recent Challenges: Needs, Clashes and Solutions 181 dennis de jong 11 Triumphalism and Respect for Diversity 207 conor gearty 12 Phobias and Isms : Recognition of Difference or the Slippery Slope of Particularisms? 211 nazila ghanea 13 Inciting Religious Hatred: Balancing Free Speech and Religious Sensibilities in a Multi-Faith Society 233 peter cumper 14 Theoretical and Institutional Framework: The Soft Spot where Human Rights End and God Begins 259 frederik harhoff Contributors 267

PREFACE It is important that we constantly analyse the relationship between human rights and religion and keep reminding ourselves of our obligation to be aware of the diversity of the views represented in this book. The moral values created by many faiths have been among the foundations upon which societies have based their attitudes. These values have not only been successful in creating a feeling of identity, but have also laid down very clear moral codes on which their adherents, and others, have based their lives. It is particularly sad that, in spite of the existence of these moral codes, distilled by people throughout the ages, intolerance, bigotry and disregard for those of different beliefs seem to be undergoing a resurgence. The human rights developments of the nineteenth century, which played such a great role in emancipating people from serfdom, enabled societies to alter and to respect their poorest members through complex forms of social welfare, irrespective of faith-led institutions. Both human rights and religion have been catalysts for the improvement of man s welfare, and attempts to underpin this through the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and through regional and universal human rights covenants, have succeeded in making people judge their conduct against new, non-religious benchmarks. Despite this, we see many appalling failures from one side of the globe to the other. The debates summarised in these papers will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the complexities of the problems confronting us all. Religion may create a feeling of tension in the human heart; the believer may be filled with anxiety because of the remoteness of God and a longing for His proximity. There may be a conflict between human rights and religion, but we should rejoice in the spiritual conflict which perhaps fortifies this. vii

viii Preface We need to broaden and better structure the dialogue between faiths even between those that do not appear to be mutually compatible in order to distil principles that will protect human beings and give them dignity where this is lacking. It is, of course, important that we do not give a platform to those who wish to destroy or suppress others. Human rights may have to face limitations if societies are to remain intact. We fervently hope that the debates which we have tried to promote through our meetings and conferences, such as those highlighted in this volume, will help to create something that may ultimately strengthen our spiritual understanding of the apparently incomprehensible. A book of lectures written at the end of the nineteenth century by Thomas Masaryk, first president of Czechoslovakia, was published in Prague in 1938. In these lectures, he emphasised the danger inherent in compromise: in the end it affected all principles. Thus, it should only be accepted on matters of minor importance. If a principle were endangered, then a compromise should be morally impossible. There were really very few occasions, he stated, in which insignificant matters only were at stake. Compromise, for him, most frequently meant that a party gave in; and thus originated the ethical and political dilettantism so common today. The necessity for religion in society is to prevent a fall into chaos. Hume, Kant, Compte, Herbert Spencer and Smetana each appealed to atheism or agnosticism but were, in the end, forced to fall back on more or less religious concepts. In his book After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985), Alastair Macintyre highlighted why the eighteenth century enlightenment project failed. All the philosophers were deeply influenced by their own religious backgrounds, which they claimed were relatively unimportant but which, to a marked extent, contributed to the foundations on which much of their argumentation was based. Of course, Kant denied that morality was based on human nature. Kierkegaard no longer attempted to justify morality, yet his account has precisely the same structure as that shared by the accounts of Kant, Hume and Diderot. If we look at the framework of theistic beliefs, whether Jewish, through Maimonides, Christian, through Aquinas, or Islamic, through Ibn Rushd, they were all influenced by non-theological sources. The fall of man in the biblical sense, on the other hand, was one of the first arguments for

Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com www.ebook777.com Preface ix the frailty of human conduct. Here the rights of man were perhaps biblically highlighted when God asked Adam why he had stolen from the tree and Adam was entitled to reason and defend himself! Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the Shoresh Charitable Trust for their support of this project. Clemens N. Nathan

FOREWORD The genesis of this collection is in a colloquium of the same name held on 28 February 2005 by the Clemens Nathan Research Centre, the University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Presenters at the conference were invited to tackle head-on the question of whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between religious principles, teachings and laws and international and regional human-rights systems that have developed in the period since 1945. Where there is such a conflict, who should give ground? Should religions always be expected to find ways to interpret their teachings so as to conform to the current human-rights system? Or should existing human-rights standards allow for sufficient flexibility to take on board religious sensitivities? Presenters largely rose to this challenge, and their responses and observations are shared with you in the chapters that follow. The essays in this collection are revised versions of the papers that were delivered at that conference. In presenting this volume, we would like to express our deep appreciation to the authors for the trouble they have taken in delivering the original papers, as well as in revising and preparing them for publication. We would also like to express our thanks to Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, and especially to Lindy Melman, for their continued interest particularly in the field of religion and human rights. The following is a brief summary of the essays included in this volume. 1. Richard Harries, The Complimentarity between Secular and Religious Perspectives of Human Rights Despite numerous suspicions surrounding the relationship between religion and human rights, Harries challenges the notion that human rights is fundamentally a secular concept. He does this through a historical assessment. He argues, from a Christian perspective, that rights xi

xii Foreword are grounded in the dignity of human beings all of whom enjoy free will. Since God made human beings in his own image, He too respects the worth and dignity of humanity. Human rights is therefore necessary to protect the value of each person. The basis of human rights from this perspective is thus rooted in human dignity. Human rights is necessary because human dignity is too often denied in practice. This religious perspective, Harries suggests, complements the secular perspective on human rights which calls for valuing human beings in themselves and for themselves. Whilst through the ages some Christians have called for the need to sacrifice or waive rights, Harries challenges this position. Though a person may feel the compassion or charity to waive his own rights, he argues, one cannot waive the rights of others without the risk of reinforcing politically oppressive rule. Human rights constitutes a dynamic historical process that is legally enshrined. However, rights are also grounded in values and in a moral perspective. Just as human rights are evolving, the full implications of our moral values need to be worked out over time too. In this way, moral insights grounded in a religious perspective come to be realised and turned into law. Harries gives a number of examples of where religion has played such a role in promoting the rights of the most vulnerable not out of charity but as a basic and necessary requirement of justice. 2. Roger Ruston, Religious Truths and Human Coexistence Ruston argues that the tensions between the secular regime of human rights and the conduct of particular religious traditions puts both states and religious bodies to the test and requires reflection and response. Ruston, drawing on the Catholic tradition, puts forward the hypothesis that human rights can only be fully understood as originating from a theological perspective of human beings as creatures of God. This is the position of natural justice, that of our common humanity, of being created in the image of God and being part of a global common good. This position also holds that we have obligations or duties towards those outside our own religious tradition because of our common humanity. He argues that Catholicism and other religious traditions uphold an irreducible minimum of duties and respect we owe to other persons that cannot be overridden even by any supposed divine commands seeming to suggest otherwise. If all religious believers accepted this as the true

Foreword xiii understanding of their religious belief, it would have profound implications. Ruston acknowledges that the particularist claims of religions often obscure this truth. Nevertheless he holds that the biblical position of what he refers to as a basic equality would prove almost impossible to support from a secular perspective. The natural law tradition is examined through a number of historical examples, from Thomas Aquinas to Bartolomé de Las Casas and finally John Locke. All three believed that we owe natural duties of benevolence towards other human beings, and that this benevolence is in the nature of true religion. These positions, Ruston argues, also support the overriding duty of the State to prevent the denial of human rights; they further imply, controversially perhaps, that civil authority has the duty to intervene in the conduct of religious bodies that deny basic natural rights to its members. In this way, the secular discourse of human rights can be seen as actually having grown from within a Christian religious tradition in response to reflection on God s presence in the world. 3. Michael Ipgrave, Religion in a Democratic Society: Safeguarding Freedom, Acknowledging Identity, Valuing Partnership Ipgrave discusses the issues raised by the existence of religious communities within the framework of plural, democratic and secular society. He singles out three issues. First is the safeguarding of religious freedom in public life. Whilst in principle human rights law distinguishes between the forum internum, in which religious freedom is absolute, and the forum externum, where it may sometimes be subject to derogation, in practice, Ipgrave argues, derogation from the latter may impinge on the former both in public life and within religious communities. On the one hand, there is the pressure for aspects of religious life to be privatised; on the other, religious beliefs are made public in assessing candidates for public office. The second issue is recognition of religious identity as a constitutive strand of self-understanding and hence of citizenship. This is particularly significant where members of religious communities feel vulnerable and disadvantaged. Whilst there is the temptation to extend legislation in the field of racial discrimination to cater also for religious discrimination, Ipgrave identifies a number of criteria by which the two identities should be recognised as being different. Thirdly and finally, he discusses forms of partnership between religious communities and

xiv Foreword public authorities. He explores the forms this has taken in the UK and problematises these various relationships, focusing particularly on consultation and service delivery. 4. Javaid Rehman, Conflicting Values or Misplaced Interpretations? Examining the Inevitability of a Clash between Religions and Human Rights Despite the widely held position that a clash between religion and human rights is inevitable, Rehman argues for the critical role of interpretation both of religion and human rights. With sensitive interpretation, he argues, there are numerous possibilities of a rapprochement between religions and human rights. He explores these possibilities using the example of Islam and the way Sharia can be used to support rights. He counters positions that believe Islam to be a religion of violence and aggression, whilst acknowledging the need to understand problematic concepts such as jihad and the status of minorities. He does so within the historical context of revelation, with consideration of all relevant verses in the Qur an and also the practice of the Prophet Muhammad. A range of possible interpretations can be given to key Islamic concepts, a fact that insular, myopic and archaic views of the Sharia try to inhibit. Both human rights law and religious law are malleable, and allow for sympathetic readings such that they support one another. Rehman argues that interpretations of the Sharia that fully support modern human rights law are both necessary and timely. 5. Norman Solomon, Religion and Human Rights with Special Reference to Judaism Solomon digs below the assertion that religion is against human rights. It is the followers of religion interpreting a holy text through an authoritative teacher, then applying it through judges that implement decisions that are accepted by the religious community, that brings about the context for religion having a negative impact on human rights. However, the religious community concerned will assert that these interpretations and laws have been divinely guided and are absolute, and therefore need to be distinguished from mere human law. This gives rise to the dilemmas of authority and of rights. Solomon explores these dilemmas in relation to the Jewish tradition. The dilemma of authority is that if the ulti-

Foreword xv mate authority in religion is God, then what should be the relationship with legitimate government? And in the case of rights, which source of authority is to be obeyed? The rights Solomon explores are those of life, in relation to the Biblical sanction of capital punishment; liberty, in relation to slaves; thought, speech and conscience in relation to blasphemers, idolaters and other believers; and the equality of women with men and equality before the law that we may be equal before God but we are not necessarily equal before the law. In all these potential clashes with human rights, Solomon s question is who should give way to whom? He asks to what extent disagreements about these issues between the Jewish tradition and modern human rights cause real difficulty today. He concludes that it is the attachment of believers to tradition and doctrine rather than people that ultimately causes clashes, not religion or God. 6. Avrom Sherr, Religion and Human Rights: Redressing the Balance Sherr outlines the strong similarities between types of religious obligations and human rights in the sense that both comprise sets of ideals that are constantly developing and being interpreted in relation to particular contexts. This can make religious beliefs and human rights competitors in terms of their regulatory systems, which moves Sherr to his key question of whether there are any themes or rules developing which can help us identify whether religions should trump human rights, or vice versa, in particular situations. He examines this question within a Jewish framework. The questions of slavery, murder and women s rights form part of this examination from within a religious framework. From within a human rights framework, the question is to what extent human rights is culturally contextual and to what extent it is culturally imperialistic. To what extent can human rights accommodate culture and religion and in which situations should human rights prevail over the practice of particular religious traditions? Sherr teases out some thought-provoking questions and puts forward the need for a balancing of rights. He concludes that at present there is not enough jurisprudence examining tensions between religious practice and human rights to allow us to draw out rules for deciding which should trump the other, but some themes assisting in the making of such decisions are emerging.

xvi Foreword 7. Melanie Phillips, Human Rights and Its Destruction of Right and Wrong Phillips asserts that modern human rights are in direct conflict with religion and are replacing Judeo-Christian values with godless secular values that are destroying society. The fundamental distinction between human rights and religions such as Judaism and Christianity is that these are religions of duties, duties to God and to man, because humanity is made in the image of God. Duties are prior to rights; so, for example, human freedom is predicated on constraints on human behaviour. In contrast, human rights has put freedoms first and created a culture of entitlement. Human rights, to Phillips, is anti-democratic in its attempts to overrule different cultures that are rooted in religious principles. This puts the vision of the society implicit in human rights and that envisioned by religious cultures fundamentally at odds with one another. To Phillips, the precondition for the flourishing of society is that we all accept that we have duties to each other, as opposed to being set up against one another as different victim groups demanding duty-less rights, which is the human rights position according to this author. Human rights has become a demand for freedom from all authority that might constrain the liberty of the individual and an engine for a culture of extreme individualism. In its promotion of equal entitlements, human rights has effectively destroyed discrimination between all moral judgements and between right and wrong, leading to what Phillips terms identicality rather than equality. She concludes that religion emphasises duties, not rights, and is actually crucial to securing rights to life and liberty, whereas secular human rights culture is actually threatening them. 8. John Barnabas Leith, A More Constructive Encounter: A Bahá í View of Religion and Human Rights In this chapter, John Barnabas Leith elaborates the clear theological foundations and commitment of the Bahá í Faith to universal human-rights values. He draws on both the Bahá í sacred writings and the practice of the Bahá í International Community, a UN non-governmental organisation, in support of his position. Bahá í sacred writings are centrally concerned with questions of good governance and judicial, social and economic justice. This is rooted, at least in part, in the concern that all

Foreword xvii individuals should be allowed to develop their qualities and capacities for their own good and the good of society as a whole. It is further developed, Leith argues, in the principle of the oneness of humankind which lies at the core of Bahá í teachings. This has wide-ranging implications for societal justice, from the abandonment of prejudice to the embracing of diversity. Each and every human being, in Bahá í perspective, is worthy of moral protection and the holder of inalienable human rights; each human being is a trust of the whole of humankind. These principles are explored further in relation to the freedom of all individuals to investigate reality for themselves, the freedom of religion and belief, human dignity, and in the development of a peaceful and united global civilisation. These principles are then examined in relation to a number of Bahá í human rights activities particularly the defence of the human rights of the Bahá ís in Iran. 9. Paul Weller, Human Rights, Religion and the Secular : Variant Configurations of Religion(s), State(s) and Society(ies) Both religion and human rights have a plurality of meanings associated with them whether in theory or practice. Furthermore, the relationships between them are many and various. Many religions have been reluctant to extend religious freedom to others, but some have come to the position of pragmatically accepting its desirability. Many religions have questions concerning the rights duties tension in human rights. Many have also prioritised those human rights that they accept as deriving from religion over those that do not for example regarding gender roles and sexual orientation. The nostalgia of some religions for an age in which they were dominant socially and politically is problematic to Weller, as such dominance has often threatened human rights. Weller s central argument is that a critical understanding of and engagement with the secular is central to the question of the relationship between religion and human rights. Some claim that the secular spirit enables religious coexistence; however, secularism like religion has expressed itself in a number of different historical forms and should also be situated within the context of the debate about religion and human rights. Weller examines a range of different kinds of secular states; the constitutional, legal and practical consequences that follow from each of these models; and the implications of each of these for the

xviii Foreword relationship between religion and human rights. Weller then identifies four basic patterns of the secular, citing as examples the USA, France, the Netherlands and India. All in all he argues that in examining the relationships between religions and human rights, we should not neglect the question of the relationship between secular models and human rights. Secularism emerged in many social contexts as a reaction to particular dominant national religions, and some of these models are now worthy of contemporary review. In conclusion, Weller s point is that the secular dimension is a highly pertinent, but often invisible, dimension to the discussion about religion and human rights and is thus worthy of greater consideration. 10. Dennis de Jong, Freedom of Religion and Belief in the Light of Recent Challenges: Needs, Clashes and Solutions Dennis de Jong begins his chapter with an examination of the context wherein religion finds itself: secularisation, decolonisation, the relationship between religion and state identity, and the impacts of cultural globalisation. All of these impact the role of religion in society. Can human rights itself be reduced to an aspect of cultural harmonisation? De Jong answers in the negative and expands on how the relationship between international human rights law and religions or beliefs is a complicated one, serving sometimes to advance them and at other times to limit them for example, by liberating religious minorities or restricting religious practice. Human-rights law upholds non-discrimination on the basis of religion or belief, requires free access to information about competing religions or beliefs, forbids coercion in matters of religion or belief, allows the right of individuals to convert to another religion or belief, and prohibits religiously inspired violence. Human rights further upholds non-discrimination on the basis of sex, which sometimes runs counter to religious positions or practice, and it forbids incitement to religious or other hatred. De Jong suggests that governments need to recognise the importance of religion or belief in meeting people s spiritual needs, adopt a non-discriminatory approach to religions or beliefs, strike a balance between the rights of the adherents of clashing beliefs (in part by promoting dialogue between them), and promote debate on the interpretations that can emerge from different readings of religious precepts. These methods, de Jong believes, would allow governments not only to avoid

Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com www.ebook777.com Foreword xix undue restrictions on religion or belief and clashes between religions, beliefs and human rights but to actually recognise the significance of religions or beliefs for their societies. 11. Conor Gearty, Triumphalism and Respect for Diversity Gearty draws a parallel between the claims of universality of human rights and religion, a claim that sometimes becomes a universalist triumphalism that contains elements of cultural imperialism. However, religion and belief both share some deference, but not a surrender, to the local. Another commonality is that both, at their core, share a commitment to the dignity of the individual and of others. To Gearty, human rights requires one to imagine the situation of individuals beyond one s own sphere and empathise with it a requirement and compassion that is almost religious. Beyond these commonalities, however, are the challenges both, but especially religion, have with post-modernism. Both have to not only deal with difference but engender a respect for difference. Human rights is concerned with creating a society in which everyone is given the chance to personally flourish. Religion needs to better accommodate such a respect of diversity. 12. Nazila Ghanea, Phobias and Isms : Recognition of Difference or the Slippery Slope of Particularisms? Ghanea questions the utility of the typology of language that has emerged in the UN for the racial and religious discrimination suffered by various groups Christianophobia and Islamophobia being added to the existing category of anti-semitism. She argues that these are not special rights uncovering new areas where human rights violations were going unnoticed. The way these terms are being used is actually divisive and particularistic, distracting attention away from the wider scourge of religious or racial hatred and discrimination. They would be much better identified together rather than separated at the international level, in order not to dilute the fight against hate and discrimination. Separation downgrades this wider concern into a sectarian matter and dismembers the possibility of a unified mobilisation of the international community against it. At the regional or national levels, however, separate identification may serve

xx Foreword the sharper purpose of being able to bring about legislation and policies to tackle them effectively. Existing international instruments already deal with racial and religious hatred, hate speech, incitement and non-discrimination; these are clearly sufficient in accounting for the hatreds of Islamophobia, Christianophobia and anti-semitism. Ghanea concludes that this separation of language is not victimcentred; the creation of these new global victims does not serve to alleviate their plight. It detracts from the fact that these areas of discrimination are already well catered for at the level of principle at the international level. Attention needs to be given, instead, to ensuring enjoyment of freedom from discrimination and hatred. 13. Peter Cumper, Inciting Religious Hatred: Balancing Free Speech and Religious Sensibilities in a Multi-Faith Society Cumper examines where the line should be drawn regarding freedom of expression from the perspective of religious communities with regard to criticism, offence and provoking hatred. Attacks on religious figures and beliefs can provoke outrage, unrest and violence, as a number of cases have demonstrated. So how, for example, should the rights of artists to offend faith groups be balanced against the rights of faith groups to be protected from such attacks? Cumper believes that human rights norms offer little guidance, as they recognise both freedom of expression and of religion. He explores this issue from within a UK context, with regard to the attempt to bring about new legislation on incitement to religious hatred, which runs the risk of eroding freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is clearly not an absolute right, but how will the proposed Racial and Religious Hatred Bill come to be interpreted once it is brought into law? Problems surround how broadly or narrowly religious hatred will come to be defined, how a distinction will be drawn between attacks on faith communities (which will be outlawed) and on religious doctrines (which will not be protected), and how incitement to hatred will be differentiated from legitimate free speech. Cumper questions the position of those who assume that this bill would enhance good community relations, that an analogy can actually be drawn between religion and race in the context of incitement to hatred, and that religious speech itself will be sufficiently safeguarded through the European Convention on Human

Foreword xxi Rights. Overall, Cumper suggests that this bill will not be as benign as has been suggested by government officials and carries real risks and challenges within it. 14. Frederik Harhoff, Theoretical and Institutional Framework: The Soft Spot where Human Rights End and God Begins Frederik Harhoff begins with the position that human rights and religion are interrelated in that they both address the substance of the good life. Religion and human rights have impacted one another normatively, but these norms are subject to different standards of interpretation and apply differently depending on whether they are being considered in the context of one or the other. Taking the position that what human rights and religion share is their normative function, Harhoff then assumes a hierarchy between the two with religion as the overarching framework within which human rights operates within a much narrower legal context. He argues that religious doctrine has played an important role in the development of human rights and has brought to it the charitable impulse and non-consumerist attitude to the demand for rights. In examining what role human rights could play in the development of religion, he argues that the universality of human rights may provide a transformative global framework whereby religions come to be interpreted in a manner consistent with fundamental rights. Nevertheless, he admits that differences remain between the frameworks, interpretation, monitoring and enforcement of norms depending on whether they are being examined from a religious or human rights perspective. Furthermore, the transformation of a norm from a religious one to a legal one may strongly impact its quality, insofar as it needs particular conditions to make it amenable to practical application. Therefore, the norms and values which appear to be common to religion and human rights, he asserts, exist in a polycentric environment, whereby they acquire different and possibly even irreconcilable meanings. The Editors July 2006

introduction Does God Believe in Human Rights? A reflection Malcolm D. Evans The purpose of this edited collection is to reflect on the question Does God believe in human rights? It is, of course, a rather presumptuous question to ask, and one which I am not particularly well placed to answer. Indeed, the most sensible response might be to decline to enter into a debate on this topic at all. However, with a subtle reformulation it is possible to devise a question that can be reflected upon, and that might also cast some light on whatever answer to the larger question might some day be vouchsafed to us. The problems posed by that larger question are manifest, the most obvious being what do we mean by God? and what do we mean by human rights? I am not a theologian, and I have nothing to say on the first of these questions. My experience as an international lawyer working in the area of human-rights protection does, however, permit me to observe that any answer that is given to that question what do we mean by God? is unlikely to remain unchallenged by those who seek to answer the second question what do we mean by human rights? which is almost as problematic. The reason for this is that many human-rights lawyers have developed what can best be described as a quasi-transcendental approach to their own calling, and have little difficulty in failing to discern the divine in that which does not accord with their own revelation. And herein lies the crux of the difficulty we have to face up to: we are seeking to probe the interrelationship between two of the most controversial ideas with which humankind wrestles. The tense is deliberate. I am not about to embark on a history of religious consciousness, since it is hardly necessary to do so in order to make a case in support of the proposition that the search for God, or the search for an absence of God, has been, and remains, a force in human affairs. Like gravity, it must be acknowledged as a force to be engaged with, irrespective of whether we choose to bow to it, or seek to harness it, or, indeed, overcome it. The case is perhaps less clear as regards 1

2 Introduction human rights, since this expression has only entered our collective consciousness as a distinct concept in relatively recent times.1 Nevertheless, humankind has always been interested in the subject matter of human rights (or the lack of human rights), albeit that the concern has not been couched in these terms. For we are, in essence, considering the manner in which individuals and groups of individuals may be treated, or their needs and treatment by others be responded to, by those who are in a position of authority over them. Both religion and law seek to influence and direct the conduct of individuals, communities and societies, and so it is not surprising that the treatment of others is a central concern of both. It is, then, hardly surprising that there has always been a very close relationship between law and religion: our idea of law is, arguably, religious in origins if not in nature, and it has also been argued that human rights are themselves ineliminably religious in nature.2 The difference lies in the manner in which the concern for the treatment of others is understood and articulated by believers.3 If the focus of one s religious understanding is on humankind s individual or collective relationship with a / the deity(ies), the manner in which individuals are treated by each other is, to be blunt, little more than a by-product of that primary relationship. The influence of religious belief upon relations between individuals can be at any point on the spectrum from the wholly benign (e.g. sacrificial self-giving and service to others) to the utterly malign (e.g. ritual human sacrifice), depending on what (one thinks) the tastes of one s god actually are. Approached in this fashion, one cannot really speak of good or bad religion, just different religions. The role of the individual is fixed a static actor whose role is 1 For an excellent account, stressing the novelty of the concept from a legal perspective, see A. W. H. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (Oxford: oup, 2001). 2 See M. Perry, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: oup, 1998), Chapter 1, arguing that this flows from the inescapable reality that the idea of the human person as sacred foundational to human rights thinking is itself inescapably religious. 3 The manner in which ideas are presented matters. It has, for example, always struck me that the much vaunted Golden Rule is little different in substance from the much derided lex talionis. The difference lies in the manner in which the idea is presented, the former in the language of responsibility and restraint, the latter in the language of revenge. The practical implications of adopting one approach rather than the other are, of course, enormous.

Introduction 3 to respond to the demands placed upon him by the tenets of his belief. One might question the demands that one s religion places upon believers, but the call of the religious is to comply, not complain. If, on the other hand, the focus of one s religious understanding is on the deity s relationship with individuals, with believers and with humankind in general, then religious believers are not merely believers but also become part of the subject matter of that religious belief: we assume a place within a broader scheme of relationships which in their totality add to the description and definition of that belief system. How we perceive ourselves to be affected by the outworking of religious belief and practice becomes a criterion by which we can determine our response. This is so irrespective of our understanding of the content and consequences of beliefs which might (indeed, must) change over time. Not only do we have beliefs, we have a mission and a methodology. We also have an evaluative tool since, as subjects of the system, we have been granted status. As an international lawyer, I cannot fail to notice parallels with the evolution of my own discipline as regards its engagement with individuals and with human rights.4 International law emerged in its current form in the sixteenth century, largely separating itself from theology and ideas of governance based on notions of divine order. It has since undergone a number of transformations but has become rigidly focussed on the law between peoples, inter-gentes, and, as gentes crystallised into states, the law between nations: inter-national law. It is true that we are now witnessing many challenges to this approach, with the state-centric model under pressure from many quarters. Although often presented as a consequence of globalisation, this term might better be seen as a conceptual catchall which embraces many of the more incremental steps toward the fragmentation of the State as the legitimising vehicle for global discourse. Examples might include the recognition of national liberation movements, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, as voice-bearers of peoples in states the legitimacy of which they seek to deny; in the 4 I am also alive to the possibility that it is in fact because I am an international lawyer that I see matters pertaining to religion in this fashion. An outstanding general account of the (re)engagement of international law with human rights from a conceptual perspective remains P. Sieghart, The Lawful Rights of Mankind (Oxford: oup, 1985). For an excellent contemporary account see C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford: oup, 2003).

4 Introduction inclusion of non state actors in the development of international law (such as ngos); in the influence of international organisations such as the European Union, the wto, the imf, the World Bank and, indeed, the UN itself, all of which, though rooted in States, develop and pursue their own institutional policies and practices which frequently transcend their intergovernmental origins. Indeed, despite concerns to the contrary, we live in a multilateral age in which unilateral action taken outside the context of the political global commons is increasingly challenged and its legitimacy called into question.5 Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that the basic paradigm remains dominant,6 and although not forgotten, the manner in which this international legal system treated individuals was secondary to its primary function of facilitating co-existence between sovereign entities. The manner in which states treated those individuals who were subject to their exclusive jurisdiction was, by and large, a matter of little concern. There were, of course, exceptions, such as the extensive body of law concerning the treatment of individuals caught up in international armed conflict and, particularly following the end of the First World War, concern for the treatment of national minorities.7 The experiences of the Second World War changed this, and gave birth to the modern human rights era in which individuals have increasingly been regarded as subjects of the international legal order, and the manner in which individuals are treated by states under international law has become a touchstone by which to judge not only the states themselves, but the very system 5 For example, how else can one explain the quixotic fixation with the need for a second Security Council resolution before the launching of hostilities against Iraq in 2003? For general discussion of this issue see, inter alia, D. McGoldrick, From 9 11 to the Iraq War 2003 (Oxford: Hart, 2004), Chapter 4 and, in more iconoclastic terms, P. Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (London: Allen Lane, 2005), Chapter 8. 6 See Alston who forcefully points out that the very language of non-state actors points to the centrality of the State in contemporary legal thinking. See his editor s introduction in P. Alston (ed.), Non State Actors and International Law (Oxford: oup, 2005). Warbrick has concluded that international law is mainly to do with States and, where it is to do with something else, it is because States have chosen to make it so (C. Warbrick, States and Recognition in International Law, in M. Evans (ed.), International Law (2nd edn, Oxford: oup, 2006), 218). 7 For good contemporary examinations from both a legal and historical perspective see, e.g. P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: oup, 1991); T. Musgrave, Self Determination and National Minorities (Oxford: oup, 1997).

Introduction 5 of international law itself. Respect for the canon of human rights (and democracy) has become a benchmark of legitimacy, and states are (on the whole) required to proclaim their fidelity to these principles, even if their practice falls lamentably short. It is, then, hardly surprising that one of the most contentious questions international lawyers are called on to address concerns the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, a topic on which much has been written but few conclusions reached: we know it is anathema to the controlling dogmas of the international community state sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs and we know that the dangers of the abuse of such a right make most human rights activists back away from supporting unilateral action premised on such grounds, rather paradoxically choosing to allow innate distrust of states who seek to act in the name of human rights to triumph over the distaste for those who seek to violate them.8 This is not the place to engage in the substance of this debate, which is merely mentioned for illustrative purposes: the essential point is that we are all competent to join in the debate. Once again, then, the manner in which we, as subjects of that concern, perceive ourselves to be affected by the outworking of international human rights thinking becomes a criterion by which we can determine our response to that framework, irrespective of our understanding of the content and consequences of international human rights thinking which might (indeed, must) change over time. Not only do we have a mission and a methodology, we also have an evaluative tool, since, as subjects of the system, we have been granted status. But we have more than that: we have a variety of evaluative tools (as the preceding paragraphs are constructed to suggest). We can ask ourselves which sets of tools serve our perceptions of our own needs best: we can choose. Reducing this to its basics (and speaking as an international lawyer), it is as if both God and Human Rights can be seen as items on an à la carte menu for addressing our needs as human beings living in society. Must I choose? How do I choose? Do the flavours blend? Shall I have one? Shall I have the other? Shall I have both? Or am I on 8 For an excellent collection of writing summing up the trends in the voluminous literature see J. Holzgrefe and R. Koehane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: cup, 2003).

6 Introduction a diet, and have neither? It is only within the context9 of these questions that the general question posed at the outset does God believe in human rights? seems to make much sense to me. Taken in this context, the question points us to the dilemma of conflicting values and invites a response. Yet I still think there are grounds for questioning whether this question ought to be engaged with at all, enticing though it is. The difficulty is that as a question it yields too much ground. What happens if the answer is no? Will it be God or human rights that will be taken off the menu? That is the real question that needs to be answered, but which we are rarely prepared to address. Even if there is a choice to be made, is there a choice that can be made? The truth of the matter is it seems we are already dining table d hôte. It might be disappointing to discover that we are not as free as we might wish to determine the precepts undergirding our systems of governance, but it is hardly surprising. Outside of the revolutionary moment, our choices in this regard are revealed in the pattern of incremental change. Issue by issue, the grundnorm mutates. For example, Christianity remains deeply entrenched in the structure and psyche of this country, long after much of the regulatory and legislative reflection of this has been modulated or abrogated. The symbolic significance of the 1998 Human Rights Act should not be lost sight of here: it can be seen as a moment in which a new approach to answering questions of high significance within the domestic legal systems came to be recognised so fully encapsulated in the title of Francesca Klug s book about the Human Rights Act, Values for a Godless Age (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2000). Of course, this age was not nor is it any more or less godless than any other. The underlying question, potentially prejudged by that title, is whether there is a dissonance here. Is there a choice, or is there simply a lack of mutual understanding? I must confess that I have long been surprised by the reluctance of many religious folk to accept the difficulties posed by the ascendancy of human rights. Do human rights and religion clash? Do they present very real and very difficult choices? Of course they do; why wouldn t they? Some proponents of human rights go as far as seeing human rights 9 In the original draft of this paper, this was written as contest. I am not sure if this was merely a typographical error.

Introduction 7 thinking as being of necessity in opposition to that of religion.10 But it is not necessary to go this far in order to identify the causes of conflict. At the most basic level, it bears repeating that freedom of religion is itself a human right, and human rights come into conflict with each other as a matter of course: my freedom of expression might, for example, conflict with your right to a private life, and so on. Human rights activists and advocates have no difficulty living with this reality: indeed, it is the stuff of life! The very structures within which human rights standards are articulated presuppose the inevitability of a conflict of values. Indeed, the entire business of human rights as a methodology of governance involves testing out the appropriateness of the manner in which conflicts of interests and of values have been resolved by the state. If any confirmation were needed, one need look no further than the very structure of the legally binding human rights instruments, all of which adopt a common approach, exemplified by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides: (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice or observance. (2) Freedom to manifest one s religion shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This is a classic human rights formulation. It sets out what appears to be a very clear right that everyone enjoys the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This is generally referred to as the forum internum, the sphere of inner belief which is inviolable, but which permits little more (if anything) than the freedom of believing what one wishes. When 10 e.g. G. Robinson, Crimes against Humanity (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, 1999), 383, who includes churches alongside armies and states as traditional enemies of human rights, and K. Booth, Three Tyrannies, in T. Dunne and N. Wheeler, Human Rights in Global Context (Cambridge: cup, 1999), 54, where religion is linked to the tyranny of culturalism and traditionalism, from which they need emancipating.