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ICP
Published by Imperial College Press 57 Shelton Street Covent Garden London WC2H 9HE Distributed by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mullins, Sam (Professor of counterterrorism), author. "Home-grown" jihad : understanding Islamist terrorism in the US and UK / Sam Mullins. pages cm Includes index. ISBN 978-1-78326-803-0 (hc : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-1-78326-486-5 (pbk : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism--United States--Prevention. 2. Terrorism--Great Britain--Prevention. 3. Terrorism--Religious aspects--islam. 4. Terrorists--Recruiting--United States. 5. Terrorists--Recruiting--Great Britain. 6. Jihad. I. Title. HV6432.M857 2015 363.3250941--dc23 2015030485 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Copyright 2016 by Imperial College Press All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher. For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher. In-house Editors: Tasha D Cruz/Dr. Sree Meenakshi Sajani Typeset by Stallion Press Email: enquiries@stallionpress.com Printed in Singapore
There are things that we don t want to happen but we have to accept, things that we don t want to know but we have to learn Hasna Shaheen Salam, mother of Abdul Moeed Abdul Salam, American al-qaeda operative killed in Pakistan, December 2011. 1 1 Chris Brunmit and Gene Johnson, Why Did Boarding School Graduate Join al-qaida? NBC News, January 18 2012, available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ 46037238/ns/us news-life/t/why-did-boarding-school-graduate-join-al-qaida/, accessed January 18, 2012.
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Acknowledgments First and foremost I must thank my parents, without whose help and encouragement I would not be where I am today. I will also be forever grateful to my friend and mentor, Adam Dolnik, who taught me almost everything I know about terrorism, and to Nick Pratt, who taught me the rest. I wish to thank everyone at ICP for their support throughout the publication process, as well as the University of Wollongong (where this project started) and the George C. Marshall Center (where it has ended). Last, but certainly not least, a special thanks to my wife for her undying patience and support. vii
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Table of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction 1. Islamist Terror in the West: The Emergence of the Home-Grown Threat 1 2. Understanding Motivations: From Pre-Disposing Risk to Direct Motivators 27 3. Global Jihad and the Great Satan 61 4. Londonistan 95 5. Who Becomes a Jihadi Terrorist and How? 131 6. What Exactly Have American and British Jihadis Been Doing? 169 vii xi 7. How Have Jihadis Been Dealt With? 211 8. Conclusion 259 Glossary 293 Index 295 ix
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Introduction A little more than a decade ago, relatively few people in the West had heard of Osama bin Laden or al-qaeda, and when the attacks came on September 11, 2001 the world was truly shocked. Now, not only are we well aware that foreign terrorists adhering to distorted versions of Islam are intent on repeating such atrocities, but we have come to realize that the threat is also home-grown. Young men born and bred in Europe, North America, and Australia are radicalizing at home and pursuing violent jihad, either in conflicts overseas, or increasingly, in the countries where they grew up. Large-scale successful attacks by home-grown terrorists such as in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 have been mercifully rare, thanks to the vigilance of our security services. Indeed, reports of disrupted terrorism plots have become such a steady and seemingly never-ending stream that we barely blink an eye at the latest raids or arrests. Nevertheless, smaller attacks carried out by autonomous groups and individuals inspired by the likes of al-qaeda, but often lacking organizational support, continue to cause damage and distress (see Table 1.1, pp. 12 13). Individuals like Nidal Malik Hasan (the Fort Hood shooter), Roshonara Choudhry (who stabbed a British Member of Parliament), and Arid Uka (who murdered two US servicemen at Frankfurt airport) have not managed to inflict the kind of devastation we have seen in the past. Yet they are stark reminders of the existence of an internal enemy, intent on taking up the banner of violent jihad against the West. Indeed, bin Laden may be dead, but his cause lives on, as was demonstrated in dramatic fashion by the bombing of the Boston marathon in April 2013, and the brutal slaying of an off-duty British xi
xii Introduction soldier on the streets of London the following month. As if this was not bad enough, we must also now contend with the so-called Islamic State (IS), which rose to prominence amidst the chaos of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and for the time being appears to have eclipsed al- Qaeda as the preeminent jihadist organization. It too, has indicated its intent to strike against the West and is inspiring home-grown extremists to carry out attacks on its behalf. Home-grown Islamist terrorism (HGIT) has become an undeniable part of life in the West, yet it is still something that is often poorly understood. Contrary to popular belief, this phenomenon did not suddenly spring up after 9/11, even though this was a key turning point in the global jihad. Indeed, the historical development of Islamist terrorism in different Western countries and the way in which this has helped shape the contemporary threat are often underappreciated. What is more, there are still confused notions about what motivates home-grown jihadis, and with some notable exceptions 1 still relatively little in the way of systematic research that would give us a clear understanding of the range of HGIT activity in any given country. Relying on open source material (mainly press reports and legal documents), this book is based upon more than seven years of painstaking research examining the development over time and the contemporary manifestation of Islamist terrorism in two of the most prominent countries in the Global War on Terror the US and the UK. By systematically collecting and analyzing data on all publicly identified cases of Islamist terrorism involving citizens or residents of these two countries, this book adds to and sometimes challenges existing research aimed at understanding who the terrorists are, how they operate, and how they are being dealt with by the security services. Case-studies of individual countries are the first step in this process. Cross-comparison of results then adds another level of understanding. For example, it is widely believed that the home-grown threat in America has been significantly less than in Europe, yet there has been relatively little effort to measure this apparent difference. Moreover, popular explanations for this have tended to rely
Introduction xiii upon superficial description of Muslim populations, with little consideration for the historical development of militant infrastructure during the 1980s and 1990s, which laid the groundwork for developing jihadi subcultures. Similarly, explanations for the apparent rise in HGIT in the US in recent years pointed to continued American military operations overseas, with scant regard for the mechanisms of radicalization on the domestic stage. The detailed comparison of Islamist terrorist activity in the US and UK within this book is an attempt at illuminating the true nature of differences between these two countries, and provides in-depth, empirically supported, and theoretically relevant explanation. Ultimately, the more we understand the problem, the better equipped we will be to solve it. Analytical Method The aim of this research was to identify and analyze all publicly documented cases of Islamist terrorist activity relating to the Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ) committed by anyone from, living or offending in the US and UK. 2 This included citizens and residents of either country, whether they offended at home or abroad, as well as temporary visitors who committed a terrorist offense on American/British soil. In order to be able to capture historical development over time, the sample includes individuals active from the 1980s through to September 11, 2013. The aim was to be as inclusive as possible and this therefore includes people who were: convicted of terrorist and/or relevant non-terrorist offenses at home or abroad; facing related legal allegations; subject to special administrative sanctions such as financial asset freezing, deportation, detention without trial, and control orders; killed during the course of alleged terrorist activity; involved in terrorism by their own admission; publicly alleged to have been involved in terrorism. For the US, this includes 365 individuals (198 cases, 2 repeat offenders) and for the UK it includes 427 individuals (242 cases, 7
xiv Introduction repeat offenders). 3 This represents one of the largest combined samples of Western jihadi terrorists anywhere in the world to date and although the quantitative analysis is limited until September 2013, more recent developments are discussed throughout and given special consideration in relation to findings in the final chapter. It is also worth highlighting here that the chosen methodology (in particular the inclusion of people who are very clearly alleged to be involved in terrorism but have not been convicted, and the analysis of changes over time) becomes crucial when comparing results to other, similar studies and can significantly alter our understanding of the threat. Nevertheless and in common with the vast majority of comparable research by relying on open source materials it is an unavoidable fact that we are likely to be missing many cases that never make it into the public eye, for example where authorities utilize disruption tactics rather than pursuing prosecutions. Indeed, when dealing with such clandestine activity the reality is that we can never know the full picture. Despite this, by taking an exhaustive approach to data collection and by including all publicly known individuals that fit our criteria, this research makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the overall threat. The primary sources of data were press reports and legal or other official documents such as indictments and press releases from law enforcement agencies. 4 These were obviously not constructed for research purposes and are of course prone to inaccuracies and missing information. In particular, there seems to be a tendency towards positive reporting in the media, i.e. only mentioning interesting factors, such as being married or having gone to university, when they are present, but neglecting to mention them if absent. Such flaws in the data necessarily limit the degree of confidence in the findings. This is a common problem in the study of terrorism; however, the assumption (made by most terrorism researchers) is that there is enough accurate information that makes it into the public domain to point us in the right direction. As long as the reader remains cognizant of the limitations of open source data, the chances of treating findings with an unwarranted level of confidence are reduced. Indeed, while it may be frustrating to find that substantial amounts of data are
Introduction xv missing and that definitive answers are sometimes elusive, analysis of what is available especially when measuring change over time and differences between countries can still prove to be valuable by raising questions and highlighting new topics for further research. Another methodological detail that is important to bear in mind relates to the way that percentages are reported in this book. If researchers have a large enough sample and there is not too much missing information, they tend to report percentages as a function of the number of people that they do have data for (% n). For this study, however, the samples are not especially large mathematically speaking and information was sometimes missing for more than 50% of people on a given variable. On top of this, different variables have different probabilities which could be distorted or overlooked by using % n. 5 For example, university qualifications are statistically less likely, meaning that most of the missing information on that variable would be a negative. Using the % n method of reporting could therefore artificially inflate the proportion of people who appear to have such qualifications. The method used in this research was therefore to report all variables as a percentage of the total US/UK sample and to include the percentage of people for whom data were missing wherever relevant. This is important when comparing the results of this research to others where the % n method was used. Five additional points must be made. First, as touched on above, a deliberate choice was made to utilize a relatively broad definition of terrorism to include people accused or convicted of a range of sometimes non-violent terrorism-related activities, including a limited number of criminal opportunists and others on the fringe of terrorism proper. Although we might not choose to call each and every individual included in the overall sample a terrorist, examining the full spectrum of violent and non-violent behavior gives a more complete understanding of the overall phenomenon. As discussed at length in Chapter 7, it also highlights international differences in terms of what is proscribed as a terrorism offense. A second, related point is that the terms terrorist, militant, jihadi, and offender will be used interchangeably to describe the individuals in this book (see Glossary for definitions of key terms).
xvi Introduction Thirdly, the focus throughout is upon Islamist terrorists inspired by the vision of a global jihad against the US and its allies, as championed by al-qaeda and subsequently taken up by a variety of violent Salafijihadi organizations and individuals with ostensibly global ambitions. It is important to bear in mind that such individuals represent only the tiniest proportion of the wider Muslim population and the findings within are not intended to reflect upon any segment of society beyond the militants themselves. Fourth, irrespective of the status of named individuals, this book is an analysis of existing, publicly available information. No new allegations are made at any point and this research has no bearing on legal judgments in any of the cases described. Fifth and finally, the threat that we are facing is dynamic in nature and is constantly evolving. The picture presented here is thus a snapshot of two countries during a particular period in time, which should be constantly reassessed in light of new developments. Layout of the Book We begin by examining the historical development of HGIT in the West in general. Chapter 2 explores the various motivations of Western jihadis and proposes a motivational model for understanding how these different factors fit together. Specifically, the model differentiates between pre-disposing risk factors, necessary conditions, and direct motivators. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a historical overview of HGIT in the US and UK respectively. The quantitative analysis is then presented in Chapters 5 through 7, including a systematic comparison of each country and how they have developed over time. The analysis in Chapter 5 includes a statistical summary of each sample and addresses the question of who becomes a jihadi terrorist and how? Chapter 6 focuses on operational behaviors in other words, what exactly American and British jihadis have been doing; and Chapter 7 examines how they have been dealt with by law enforcement, including investigatory practice and legal outcomes. Findings are summarized in Chapter 8, followed by a discussion of theoretical and practical implications in light of recent developments in relation to Syria and Iraq.
Introduction xvii Notes 1 Of particular relevance to this research are: Robin Simcox, Control Orders: Strengthening National Security (London: The Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010), available at: http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1301651552 1.pdf, accessed December 20, 2010; Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer, Al-Qaeda in the United States: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offences (The Henry Jackson Society, 2013), available at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/al-qaeda-in-the-usabridged-version-lowres-final.pdf, accessed April 7, 2013; Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, and Houria Ahmed, Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections (London: The Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010). 2 For the sake of brevity, individuals in the sample will be referred to as being in or from the US/UK, and will be collectively referred to as the American or British sample. 3 See online Appendices for the full list of individuals included in each sample. A further 191 (US) and 258 (UK) persons of interest were ultimately excluded from the final analysis either because their involvement in the GSJ could not be confirmed, or because they did not belong in the American or British samples according to the sampling criteria. 4 Personally collected by the author over a seven year period beginning in 2007 and stored, organized, and analyzed using Microsoft Excel. 5 For similar reasons, inferential statistics were not used for this study.