The Islamic State in Iraq and its Predecessor Organizations

The Islamic State in Iraq and its Predecessor Organizations Dr. Andreas Amborst University of Leeds, England Official self-designation: Republic of Iraq Capital: Form of government: Head of state: Head of government: Official languages: Languages of inhabitants: Religions: Baghdad Federal republic (rank in worldwide FFP failed state index: 13/178), with an Autonomous Region of Kurdistan Fuad Masum (President) Haider al-abadi (Prime Minister) Arab, Kurdish Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen Ca. 2/3 Shiites, 1/3 Sunnites, and a ca. 3% minority of other religious groups, maybe even less due to displacement Surface: 430,000 km 2 Population: 33,417,000 (as of 2013) Population density: 82.7 inhabitants per km 2 Population growth: ca. 2.47% (annual growth in the period 2005-2013) Average age: 19.7; median: 21.5 Population under 25 years: 56% (as of 2014) The present contribution gives a brief overview of the most important turning points in the 12-year history of the group Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. Besides their immediate humanitarian repercussions in civil society, the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq have an impact on the global ideology of Jihadism, thus indirectly affecting other regional conflicts as well. From 2003 until 2014 the IS was one among many regional groups all over the world that engaged in global jihad under the nominal leadership of al-qaeda. Today, the IS enforces claims to power of its own in Syria and Iraq in direct confrontation with the Syrian split-off (Jabhat An- Nusra) of al-qaeda. As a result of this conflict, Ayman az- Zawahiri publicly declared in February 2014 that al- Quaida excludes the IS from its ranks. This exclusion was one of the reasons why the IS, led by Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi, felt compelled to emphatically assert its claim to leadership in the region by proclaiming a caliphate. This was no spontaneous decision, however, as the establishment of a caliphate had already been planned by Baghdadi s group for many years and with the utmost effort. Due to the discord between the IS and the Afghan- Pakistani al-qaeda, the global jihadist movement is now divided into two influential units. The Iraq Conflict Jihadism in Iraq is an accidental result of the U.S. war against Iraq in 2003. Al-Qaeda did not play any major role in Iraq at the onset of the war. It was not until Saddam Hussein s fall and the subsequent civil war that global Jihadism became a political and military force to be reckoned with in Iraq. It is true that the United States eventually managed to create a comparatively high level of security by implementing a strategy for counterinsurgency devised by David Petraeus. However, in the wake of the complete pull-out of the American troops and the outbreak of the civil war in Syria the Islamic State was able to recover from its almost total defeat. Whether, and how strongly, the Arab Spring might have swept over Iraq and Saddam Hussein will remain an open question. While there are Arab revolts against the authoritarian politics of Nuri al-maliki in Iraq as well, these are 1

not under the banner of the Arab Awakening but rather sparked by the enmity between Sunnite and Shiite forces. Religious affiliation has clearly played a role during the entire course of the Iraq conflict from 2003 until today; however, it was not the sole cause of the conflict. The lines of conflict run inside the religious factions as well. Neither Sunnites nor Shiites constitute a homogenous political force in Iraq. Nor was there any religious or ethnic regularity in the early phase of Iraqi-U.S. relations: the U.S. had Sunnite Arab allies (the tribes from the Anbar Province) and Sunnite Arab adversaries (al-qaeda in Iraq); they had Sunnite Kurdish allies (the Peshmerga and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and Sunnite Kurdish adversaries (Ansar as-sunna/ansar al- Islam); they had Shiite allies (the Badr army and the Iraqi security forces), and they have Shiite adversaries (Muqtada as-sadr s Mahdi Army ). Each of these factions pursues its own political goals, sometimes engaging in armed conflict with their own religious community or ethnic group in that process. The main victim of the bloody power game is the civilian population, as becomes apparent from the large numbers of casualties: since 2003, some 140,000 civilians and 60,000 combatants have died in Iraq due to military and terrorist violence (Iraq Body Count Index). The death toll of the Syrian civil war is even more dramatic: it has already claimed some 200,000 lives (UN OHCHR 2014) within a much shorter period of time three years and among a much smaller population. 1 This means that there have been a total of 400,000 casualties in this region of the Near East alone. Al-Qaeda was very eager to maintain that situation, as this was the only way to ensure that no faction neither the occupiers nor the Iraqi security forces nor the Shiite militias could establish a monopoly on the use of force. Behind the seemingly arbitrary terror attacks against the Iraqi civilian population were an obvious strategy and political considerations. At that time, al-qaeda lacked the strength to establish a monopoly on the use of force of its own, but it was strong enough to prevent other groups from achieving that goal. 1 UN OHCHR 2014: Updated Statistical Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab Republic. Commissioned by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 2014. Emergence and Development of the Jihadist Movement in Iraq The development of the organization Islamic State can be easily traced by its frequent changes of name, as each of these marks an organizational and strategic turning point. 2 Organization for Tawhid and Jihad Al-Qaeda in Iraq emerged from the group Jama at attawhid wa`l jihad which was founded by Abu Mussab az- Zarqawi, a native of Jordan. Prior to that, Zarqawi had been the head of a training camp in Afghanistan that was financed by al-qaeda. When the Iraq war broke out in March 2003, he came to Iraq. Initially, Tawhid wa`l Jihad did not play any major role, being just one among many splinter groups active in the Sunnite uprising both against the Americans and the Iraqi security forces, the latter of which were still in the build-up phase. It was at that time, if ever, that the Ansar as-sunna/ansar al-islam was the most conspicuous group in the Sunnite spectrum. Ansar as-sunna is a Kurdish group with an ideological affinity to global Jihadism. In contrast to Tawhid wa`l Jihad, however, it had a much longer tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan where it fought the Peshmerga even before the Iraq war. The Peshmerga, in turn, struggled for an independent Kurdish nation. Ansar as-sunna was able to keep its organizational independence from the Islamic State until January 2015. After that, it had to submit to the power of Baghdadi who was the new ruler in the region. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) The first change in name was made in October 2004 when Tawid wa`l Jihad officially joined al-qaeda. Bin Laden issued a public statement in which he solemnly welcomed the new group. From then on its official name was Tanzim Qaidat al-jihad fi Bilad ar-rafidiyn (The Central Administration of al-qaeda in Mesopotamia). Many western governments and the media (as well as this dossier) call that group Al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI. However, foreign members of the AQI deliberately avoid using the country name Iraq in order to emphasize that they do not pursue a nationalist agenda. The brand name of al-qaeda and the supposedly sound political-religious agenda of global Jihadism were perfect tools for uniting the completely fragmented Sunnite groups 2 Armborst, Andreas (2014a): Dschihadismus im Irak. In: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 4/2014, pp. 418-425; Armborst, Andreas (2014b): Dschihadismus im Irak. Ein Update. In: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 6/2014, pp. 684-691. 2

under one banner. From the very beginning, however, Sunnite partisans had reasonable doubts as to the compatibility of the global jihadists goals of with those of the Sunnite nationalists in Iraq: many Iraqi resistance groups view al-qaeda s ideology and its call for solidarity with Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, and Afghanistan as abstract rhetoric of little practical use; their main concern is tangible national interests in Iraq. The group s focus is well illustrated by a slogan issued by Zarqawi: We are fighting in Iraq but our eyes are raised to Jerusalem. However, most Iraqis who have joined Zarqawi have their eyes raised to Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk rather than Jerusalem. In line with this, the AQI launched the majority of its attacks inside Iraq but was also active in Jordan. There was repeatedly dissent between the foreign fighters, most of whom have a global focus, and Iraqi insurgents on the issue of extending the battle beyond the borders of Iraq and the purpose of such an extension. Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq (MSR) In the end, however, the Sunnite insurgents succeeded in agreeing on a joint agenda, with the result that al-qaeda formed an alliance with five groups in January 2006. Part of the compromise was another change in name. This was probably a concession to the nationalist wing, as the group s name included the official country name for the first time: Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq (Majlis Shura al-mujahideen fi al-iraq), or MSR. While the MSR was officially still under the central command of al-qaeda, the global ideology now ranked second behind pragmatic national interests. This shift becomes also apparent from the fact that an Iraqi (Abdullah Rashid al-baghdadi, not to be confused with Abu Bakr al-baghdadi) was appointed Emir instead of the controversial Abu Mussab az-zarqawi who was, after all, still alive at the time. Nevertheless, the MSR continued to pursue a dual strategy: Act locally, think globally. On the one hand, it focused its struggle on its adversaries inside Iraq, that is, the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Americans, and the latter s new allies, the tribes from the Anbar Province. On the other, the group has not completely abandoned its global agenda. This became obvious when the MSR kidnapped four Russian secret agents in June 2006 despite the fact that Russia strictly opposed the Iraq war and did not officially participate in the military action against al-qaeda. In its ultimatum, the MSR instead calls on the Russian government to pull out all its troops from Chechnya and to release all Islamist inmates from Russian prisons. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) The establishment of the MSR as an umbrella organization of the various jihadist groups in Iraq was an important precondition for the next step: the founding of an Islamic state. That is why the MSR kept its name for only ten months before changing it again, in October 2006, into Islamic State in Iraq (al-dawla Islamiyya fi Iraq). By this change of name the ISI laid claim to legitimacy as a sovereign Islamic state not, of course, in accordance with U.N. public international law but based on Islamic constitutional law. At first glance, the solemn appointment of Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi as Caliph Ibrahim in late June 2014 looked like the spontaneous action of a megalomaniac. As a matter of fact, however, the group already worked towards creating the theological, military, and political preconditions for that step as early as in January 2007. The political precondition for the establishment of a caliphate is a functioning state with a public administration in which Islamic law is applied exclusively. Hence, the ISI began to gradually build an administration and judicial system of its own. Another precondition for founding a caliphate is that it has military control over its territory. In 2007 the ISI had military presence in a couple of provinces in northern Iraq; it did not gain complete control until the summer of 2014. To fulfill the theological requirements for the appointment of a caliph, the ISI s Sharia Commission has patched together a 100-page document on which inauguration according to Islamic law is to be based. While that document has some weaknesses in its legal and historical reasoning, 3 and while the group s claim to a caliphate appears presumptuous in the first place, it is obvious that the ISI has gone to great lengths to create a solid legal foundation for its caliph s claim to legitimacy. What was the attitude of the Afghan-Pakistani al-qaeda towards that step, which basically undermined al-qaeda s claim to leadership? In the beginning, Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other prominent representatives publicly hailed the establishment of the IS as a huge success. Internal correspondence reveals, however, that al-qaeda was very critical of its Iraqi spin-off, accusing it of being unable to actually put the promising vision of an own state into practice. And sure enough, the ISI initially failed to come up to its own ambitions in the phase from 2007 until 2011; that is why the big offensive of the IS was not launched then but as late as in spring 2014. 3 Kazimi, Nibras (2008): The caliphate attempted. In: Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 7, pp. 5-49. 3

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) With the proclamation of the name Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham Region/Levant in April 2013, the hostile takeover of the Jabhatu an-nusra (JBN) group by the ISI was sealed. The an-nusra Front is the Syrian split-off of al-qaeda. Its leader, Abu Mohammad al-julani, is a veteran of the Iraqi al-qaeda. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war the two groups have been closely interconnected in other personal and organizational respects as well, but there have also been major squabbles. The merger of the two groups was proclaimed singlehandedly by Baghdadi against the will of Julani and Zawahiri. Many followers of the JBN deserted to the ISIS in the weeks and months that followed, and there was armed conflict between the two organizations. ISIS took control of the Syrian city of Raqqa. Prior to the capture of Mosul, which is a city with over a million inhabitants, Raqqa was the ISIS capital. It can be safely said that Tawhid wa`l Jihad, AQI, MSR, ISI, and ISIL are different names for the same organization in various stages. However, the continuity of global Jihadism in Iraq came to an end due to the disagreement with the JBN. The proclamation of the caliphate and the concomitant most recent change in name into Islamic State are the beginning of a new development in the jihadist movement. While the goals of the latter have not fundamentally changed, it has now two rival leaders. The way things are at the moment, it is to be expected that jihadist groups with a regional focus will tend to join the IS while globally oriented groups, such as al-qaeda on the Arab Peninsula, will stay loyal to their mother organization. The Islamic State (IS) While the big offensive in spring 2014 was stunning, it did not come as a surprise. After all, the IS had never made a secret of its military ambitions, and had repeatedly demonstrated its potential in that respect. Over the preceding years the IS had become much more powerful than before, as became apparent from two interconnected developments: firstly, it initiated processes of state building; secondly, it enhanced both its military capacities and its capacity to act. By its own account, the IS currently comprises 16 contiguous provinces stretching from Aleppo to the suburbs of Baghdad. The spheres of influence are connected by corridors along important traffic arteries all the way to the borders of Turkey and Jordan. Territories outside that region, such as those in Algeria, Libya, and the Sinai are administrated by means of provincial IS governments (on the wilayat system of the IS see Zelin 2015). 4 Serious state-building processes that is, the creation of a civil administration became evident by 2013 at the latest. Particularly in the Syrian city of Raqqa the IS controls social processes, markets, jurisdiction, public administration, and the security apparatus. Abu Bakr al-baghdadi no longer exclusively calls upon foreign fighters in his public messages but also on Muslim physicians, engineers, and judges to come to the cities occupied by the IS to help in the civil construction of the Islamic State. This is in stark contrast to the situation in 2007 when the group called itself Islamic State but was no state. The other alarm signal with regard to the IS conquest campaign in spring 2014 was its military activities during the two years preceding the offensive. The group had turned to organizing its activities in military campaigns as early as in 2006. These campaigns included the Operation Clear Conquest (2006), Plan of Dignity (2007), and God s Harvest (2009). 5 Initially these campaigns had very crude strategic objectives. Over the years, however, they became more and more professional and their results increasingly impressive. The ISIS campaign Breaking the Walls from July 2012 until 2013 was its most impressive demonstration of power at the time. As is suggested by the name, the goal of the campaign was to free incarcerated members from prisons. Estimates vary, but it is probable that the ISI managed to free 1,000 people from Iraqi state prisons including well secured anti-terror facilities during that period. A total of 8 complex attacks on state prisons were documented during the campaign. The most spectacular attack was in July 2013 on the Abu Ghraib prison: 500 prisoners were freed, including high-ranking al-qaeda officers. In addition, the Breaking the Walls campaign was characterized by the massive use of car bombs. The group used more than 500 vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in 12 months, 6 thus demonstrating that it has functioning logistic supply chains and operates with a high degree of coordination. No other militant organization has ever used that many car bombs in such a brief period of time. 4 Zelin, Aaron (2015): The Islamic State s model. In: The Washington Post, January 15, 2015. 5 Armborst, Andreas (2013): Jihadi violence. A study of al-qaeda s media. Berlin. 6 Lewis, Jessica (2013): Al-Qaeda in Iraq resurgent part I and II. Institute for the Study of War (ed.): Middle East Security Report 14, September 2013. Washington DC. http://www.understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgentpart-ii. 4

Conclusion Since July 2014 at the latest, the Iraq conflict has no longer been an asymmetrical conflict but rather resembled war between two regular armies. While the IS still uses the typical modus operandi of terrorist groups, 7 it has many more branches of the military service at its command, and is apparently capable not only of using and maintaining some of these but also of supplying them with ammunition. This situation is made even more complicated by the Syrian civil war. If the IS manages to establish long-term safety for the Sunnite population in its territory and to create lasting state structures which provide for the population in all spheres of life, then the IS will be accepted by many as a new legitimate power in the region. In that case, it would be impossible solve the conflict in any way that is in the interest of the West. Compiled in February 2015. 7 Lewis, Jessica (2014): ISIS battle plan for Baghdad. Institute for the Study of War (ed.): Backgrounder. http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-battle-planbaghdad. 5

Flags and Names of the Jihadist Movement in Iraq, 2001 2014 2001 October 2004 Organization for Tauhid and Jihad October 2004 January 2006 Central Administration of al-qaeda in Mesopotamia (often also called al-qaeda in Iraq, AQI) January 2006 October 2006 Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq (MSR) October 2006 April 2013 The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) April 2013 June 2014 The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Sham Region (ISIL/ISIS), jointly with Dschabhat an-nusra From June 2014 onward Islamic State (IS) Source of image files: Wikipedia 6