SECULARISM AND SECURITY: THE CASE OF HEADSCARF IN FRANCE. Gül Ceylan Tok *

SECULARISM AND SECURITY: THE CASE OF HEADSCARF IN FRANCE Gül Ceylan Tok * In the last twenty years, the veil has become the main object of debates on Islam, secularism and security in France which has the biggest Muslim migrant population in Europe. In this contribution it is argued that the perception of the veil has gone through a transformation from a religio-cultural symbol which could be tolerated in the private sphere, to a threat to the principle of secularism, and therefore, the security of the Republic. In France, the level of securitization has reached such extreme levels that on May 19, 2010, for security reasons, the French Cabinet approved a draft bill to ban face-covering garments in public spaces such as restaurants, schools and public transportation The issue of the burqa is not a religious issue. It is a sign of the subjugation, of the submission, of women. I want to say solemnly that it will not be welcome on our territory. The above statement is made by Nicholas Sarkozy, the President of France in 2009 during the discussions whether to disallow full covering veil1 outside of the houses. One year after Sarkozy s remark the French Cabinet approved a draft bill to ban face-covering garments in public spaces such as restaurants, schools and public transportation on July 13, 2010. Under the bill s provisions, women wearing a face-covering veil in public spaces could be subjected to a 150 Euro fine or be asked to take classes to learn about the values of French citizenship. * Assist. Prof. Dr., Kocaeli University, Department of International Relations 1 In this contribution, the veil is used as a generic term for different practices of head and body covering. More precise terms will be specified when necessary. 86

In France the veiling practices Muslim women has become a major public issue since the 1990s. Although there was significant number of people opposing the introduction of the a national ban on headscarves when the first headscarf affair erupted in 1989, the majority began supporting the introduction of a national ban on burqa in the 2000s. In this paper it will be argued that the high public support for the ban on the burqa stemmed from the transformation of the veil from a religo-cultural practice to a security threat. While the public visibility of the veil has been presented as a threat to secular republic by the rightists, the veil has been deemed as the symbol of the womens oppression by the liberals. Although they have very different ideological standings, a consensus has been reached about the necessity of introduction of a ban on the veil. In this first section of the paper the literature on secularism will briefly be discussed and the second section will provide a historical analysis of the transformation of the French state s approach to the public visibility of the veil. 1.1 The Literature on Secularism The states can be divided into two with regard to state-religion relations: the secular and antisecular states. There are two main requirements for a state to be accepted as secular. Firstly its legislative and judicial processes should be out of institutional religious control. Secondly it should constitutionally declare neutrality toward religions in the sense that it should not establish an official religion2. Theocracy is a form of anti-secular state where there is a union or alliance between religious authority and state. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the major example of a theocratic state. Other forms of anti-secular states are defined as the states with established religions such as Pakistan and the antireligious states which shows an official hostility toward religions generally such as China. 2 Kuru, Ahmet. 2009. "A Research Note on Islam Democracy, and Secularism." Insight Turkey no. 11 (4):29-40. 87

The principle of secularism has been implemented with significant differences in each constitutionally secular state3. Table 1 is from Kuru s (2007: 571) comparative study which demonstrates the difference between the United States, Turkey and France with regard to the implementation of secularism. Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Constitutionally Secular States 4 Turkey United France States Ban on student s religious symbols in public schools Yes No Yes Pledge referring to God recited No Yes No Ban on private religious education Yes No No Religious instruction in public schools Yes No No State funding of religious private schools No No Yes Ban on organized prayer in public schools Yes Yes Yes The only resemblance between these three constitutionally secular states about the role of religion in education is the ban on organized prayer. As Table 1 clearly illustrates, such diversity in the interpretation and implementation of the principle of secularism in different constitutionally secular states makes a monolithic conceptualization of secularism impossible. In the literature on secularism, a distinction is made between French laïcité and Anglo- American secularism. Etymologically two words derive from different sources. Originating from the Latin saeculum, secularism meant of the world as opposed to of the church, whereas deriving from the French word lai, laïcité meant of the people as contrary to the 3 For a comprehensive classification of states based on state-church relations see: Bhagarva (2009). For a comparative analysis of constitutionally secular states see: Modood (2009) 4 Kuru, Ahmet. 2007. "Passive and Assertive Secularism Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion." World Politics no. 59 (July):568-594. 88

clergy. Davison emphasized the fact that secularism is not the English equivalent for the French laïcité. According to Yavuz and Esposito (2003: 16) on the one hand there is French laïcité which is antireligious and seeks to eliminate or control religion. On the other hand, there is Anglo-American secularism which is neutral to religions and does not conceive the public visibility of religions as a threat to secularism 5. For this reason, while there is strict separation between the church and the state in France, the use of religious symbols is allowed in schools and state institutions in the US. 6 The strict separation between the church and the state in France is explained as the result of bloody war between the Catholic Church and Republican political authority for sovereign power during the first decades of the Third Republic (1870 1905) (Kuru 2009). One major limitation of the typology between Anglo-Saxon and French is that it underestimates the importance of Christianity in the politics and daily life in the US. Religion constitutes one of the major mobilizing forces in American politics. It notably legitimized the Iraqi intervention after 9/11 for a significant part of the population and resulted in the election victory of George Bush in 2004. As noted by Modood 7, the churches in the south and midwest, whose members are mainly white, held open election campaigns supporting candidates and parties. They provided funding to politicians and took part in decision making processes with regard to issues such as abortion, HIV/AIDS, homosexuality, stem-cell research, prayer at school and so on (2009: 177). 5 Yavuz, Hakan, and John L. Esposito. 2003. Islam in Turkey: Retreat from the Secular Path. Edited by Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 6 For instance, the motto In God we trust can be seen on all coins and money bills, and the invocation God save the United States and this honorable Court is chanted at the beginning of Supreme Court s sessions. 7 Modood, Tariq. 2009. "Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship." In Secularism, religion and multicultural citizenship edited by Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood. New York: Cambridge University Press. 89

Another shortcoming of the typology is that the state support of religious associations and private religious schools in France does not comply with the image of anti-religious state. When a religious association is legally recognized by the state in France, it becomes exempted from taxes and receives financial support from municipal governments. It is revealing to note that although there is no public religious school in France, the salaries of the teachers in private Catholic schools are paid by the state 8. As a result of these limitations it is very difficult to develop a typology that would explain different interpretations and practices of secularism. As noted by Bauberot Indeed there is no absolute secularism in secular states. In each country and regarding each domain secularism is relative, mixed with other elements of social lives and traditions 9. Secularism is a particular experience since interpretations and institutional arrangements of secularism change from country to country. Modood explains the particularity with differing projects of nation-state building and dominant national religious culture in secular states (2009: 177). In France, laïcité is first institutionalized during the Third Republic with secular education reforms made in 1880s and 1905 law prohibiting recognition and subsidizing of any religion by the state. These arrangements were incorporated into the constitutions of 1946 and 1958. Between 1946 and 1980 there was a conflict between the left and right about the public subsidies for private schools which were mostly Catholic schools. Laïcité was associated with the left. The consensus over laïcité as being a part of the identity of the state is reached with the rise of public visibility of Islam and particularly the headscarf debates beginning from 1989. 8 Bowen, John R. 2007. Why The French Don't Like Headscarves Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 9 Kuru, Ahmet. 2006. "Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and Development Party." In The Emergence of New Turkey, edited by Hakan Yavuz. Utah: University of Utah Press. 90

1.2.1 The History of the L affaire du foulard (the Headscarf Affair) France has the highest Muslim immigrant population in Europe with 4.5 million 10. Due to the serious labor shortage in post- World War II, for three decades France recruited immigrant workers from predominantly Muslim countries as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. The first-generation Muslim immigrants did not bring their families in 1960s and early 1970s and confined their religious practice to the makeshift facilities. Therefore the public visibility of Islam was very limited in 1960s. Islam became more visible in 1970s when the first generation of immigrants decided to stay and bring their families from the country of origin. From then on French government shifted from simply policing immigration flows into much more strict assimilation 11. In France the integration policy is based on assimilation of immigrants who are expected to give up their ethnic, religious, cultural differences and most significantly their communities in order to be French. Communitarianism which can be defined as the priority of the community, rather than the nation, over the life of the individual, is assumed to be destructive to French integration. In order to deal with communitarianism, universalism is defined as the oneness, the sameness of all individuals 12 (Scot 2007: 11). Cesari stressed that especially since 9/11 the main distinction appeared to be between good Muslims who 10 Cesari, Jocelyne. The Securitisation of Islam in Europe 2009. Available from http://www.eumap.org/library/static/libr3/u/0/5/1826_1_g.pdf p.2 11 Fetzer, Joel. S., and Christopher. J. Soper. 2005. Muslims and the state in Britain, France, and Germany. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. 12 Scott, 2007, p. 11. 91

assimilated to the secular culture of the western societies and bad Muslims who reject assimilation 13. L affaire du foulard (the headscarf affair) arose in France in 1989 when Ernest Cheniere, a school principal in Creil did not allow three Magrebhi girls to come to the school with their headscarves on the grounds that wearing headscarf in the school is against the principle of laicism. This local affair provoked immense discussions at the national level between supporters and opponents of a general headscarf ban in public schools. The antiheadscarf and anti-ban manifestos were published in national newspapers 14. While the moderate leftist and rightist parties were divided in their positions with regard to the headscarf affair, the National Front, the extreme-right party took a strong position against the visibility of headscarf in public schools. The fight against the veil in public schools became the major part of propaganda for the National Front candidates in local elections. For instance Marie- France Stirbois who used the slogan of No to the headscarf in schools, no to mosques won a landslide victory by gaining 61 percent of the votes in Dreux in November 1989 15 (Freedman 2004: 134). It is significant to note that Ernest Cheniere who started the war against the headscarf was also later elected to the National Assembly as a deputy for the center-right RPR. 13 Cesari, Jocelyne. 2005. "Islam, Secularism and the Multiculturalism after 9/11: A Transatlantic Comparison." In European Muslims and the Secular State, edited by Jocelyne Cesari and Sean Mcloughin. Burlington,VT: Ashgate. p.46 14 Five Intellectuals (Elisabeth Badinter, Regis Debray, Alain Finkielkraut, Elisabeth de Fontenay and Catherine Kintzler) published an open letter to Jospin in Le Nouvel Observateur. In this letter they criticized him for his tolerance and defined allowance of the headscarf in public schools as the Munich of the French Republic. A counter manifesto was published in weekly magazine Politis by the defenders of pluralistic laicism (Joelle Brunerie-Kaufmann, Harlem e sir, Rene Dumont, Gilles Perrault and Alain Touraine 1989) who warned against the dangers of Vichy of the integration. Each side demonized the other by comparing its attitude to that of capitulation in the face of Nazism. (Baubérot 2009) 15 Freedman, Jane. 2004. Immigration and Security in France: Aldershot: Ashgate Publishhing Limited.p.134 92

In order to put an end to discussions Lionel Jospin, the Minister of Education from Socialist Party (PS), appealed to the Council of State for legal advice. In November 1989, the Council ruled that the wearing of signs of religious affiliation by students in public schools was not necessarily incompatible with the principle of laicism, as long as these signs did not constitute an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda 16. The Council concluded that only school administrations could interpret whether students religious symbols constitute such an act or not, therefore decision should be made by the school administrations, on a case-by-case basis. In light of the Council s recommendation, Lionel Jospin issued a decree ordering school administrations to deal with the issue through dialogue with students and their parents. In November 1993 the headscarf controversies erupted again when four girls in Nantua refused to remove their headscarves during gym classes which caused the majority of teachers to go on a strike on 12 October. It is interesting to note that the teachers declared that the wearing of the veil not only undermined the freedom of the pupils but also threatened the safety of them during science practice sessions and gym classes 17. It was the first time the headscarf was presented as literally a threat to physical safety. Following the teacher s protests Ernest Cheniere offered a bill asking for a ban on religious symbols in public schools. The media linked the headscarf affair to ongoing civil war in Algeria 18 which contributed to the association of Islam in general and headscarf in particular with violence and terror. The covers of the magazines featuring the pictures of women in black veils with a provocative title about the danger of Islamist threat became prevalent in the media which 16 Scott, Joan. 2007. The Politics of Veil. Princeton: Princeton University Press.p.25 17 Kepel, Gilles, and Milne Susan. Allah in the West: Islamic movements in America and Europe: Stanford: University Press. 18 The civil war erupted in 1992 when military backed regime cancelled the second round of elections in which Islamic Salvation Front was expected to win. This decision radicalized FIS and led to the creation Group of Islamic Army(GIA). Thousands were killed in Algeria as a result of the war between GIA and the army. 93

contributed to perception of bad daughters of the republic. As a result of the huge public opposition to the veil, Francois Bayrou, the Minister of Education in a right wing government, issued a decree to all public schools prohibiting ostentatious signs of religious affiliation. It is interesting to note that Francois Bayrou opposed a general ban on the headscarf in public schools when the first headscarf affair erupted. He explained his change of position as Since (1989) there has been so much evidence that we can no longer afford to ignore the real meaning of the headscarf for fundamentalists ( ) There are some movements faced with which it is impossible to be naïve: we all know where that can lead 19 His statement illustrates the fact that the headscarf turned into something which could not be tolerated anymore for people like Bayrou who took a more inclusionary position at the beginning. In this new light, the veil came to symbolize Islamic fundamentalism. In 1994 the number of expulsion cases reached such a serious level 20 that Bayrou appointed Hanifa Cherifi who had an Algerian origin, as a mediator in the headscarf cases. In her mediation Cherifi tried to persuade the girls to take off their headscarves in order to continue their education. She asked the girls Do you really want to continue fighting all the time through your exams, so that you can be more Muslim than the others? If the girls did not accept to take off the headscarf, she said she tried to convince the school administrations to allow a discrete scarf such as a bandana. Her neutrality as a mediator is questionable since she shared her distaste towards the veil. She stated that she looked with favor on a girl wearing scarf because of her family s pressure and disfavor on the girl wearing it despite the wishes of her family 21. 19 Freedman, 2004, p.134 20 There are different figures for the number of girls expelled from the school because of the veil in 1994. According to Bowen it was more than one hundred, whereas UNCHR states that in 1994 31 girls have been expelled from schools in 4 French cities for wearing headscarves in class.(unchr 2004) 21 Bowen, 2007, p. 89 94

Hanifa Cherifi estimated that the number of covered girls in public schools dropped approximately from 2000 at the beginning of 1990 to 400 in 1999 with around 100 being problematic 22. Girls wearing headscarves were tolerated in some schools, while in others they were refused entry to classes. The Council of State reaffirmed its 1989 ruling after Bayrou s decree. Between 1992 and 1999, 49 expulsion cases reached the Council of State and the Council overturned 41 cases where the headscarf was the only reason for the expulsion, whereas it approved eight of them where the school administrations demonstrated that girls had violated codes of conduct and were thus considered to have been harming public order such as refusing to attend gym classes or staging protests against the administration 23. In the 2000s is a French state s approach to the veil has transformed from relatively more tolerant model towards strict prohibition. At the beginning the distinction between the supporters of the laicism de combat (combative laicism), composed of socialists, feminists, and anti-immigrant rightists who asked for a general ban, and the defenders of laicism plurielle (pluralistic laicisim), composed of mainstream rightists and multicultural leftists who opposed a general ban, was very clear. Nevertheless this distinction disappeared gradually with the rise of anti-immigrationist sentiments, Islamophobia and fear of terror which was first felt Paris Metro bombings in 1995 and reached to a significant level especially following 9/11. 1.2.2 France: From Tolerance to War on Burqa The wave of anti-immigrationism, coupled with Islamophobia reached such an extent that Jean Marie Le Pen, the right wing extremist leader of the National Front, received 17 percent of the votes in the first round of 2002 presidency election. He received 10 percent in 2005 22 Winter, Bronwyn. 2008. Hijab & the republic: uncovering the French headscarf debate.. New York: Syracuse University press. p.163. 23 Kuru,2009,p.127. 95

elections where Nicholas Sarkozy won against Segolen Royal. National Front leader Marine Le Pen (Jean Marie Le Pens daughter) raised their votes to 17.9 percent of votes in the first round of elections in 2012 which made her supporters key to the May 6 runoff between President Nicolas Sarkozy and Socialist Francois Hollande. Although it is almost impossible for a National Front leader to win the elections the success of Le Pens had deep impact on the country. Tevanian described this situation as lepenization of minds which meant that National Front, had defacto won the battle of ideas although it lost the elections 24. The rise of Islamophobia and Le Pen caused main rightist and leftist parties to form a coalition against the headscarf in public schools. As a result of bills asking for a national ban on veil, in July 2003 President Chirac asked a commission to evaluate the application of the principle of laïcité in the Republic. Published in December of the same year, the final report of the Stasi commission argued that when these girls removed their headscarves, they were harassed, socially excluded and even sexually assaulted by their (i.e. Muslim migrant) communities 25. With regard to the organization of the hearings Bowen raises a significant criticism by stating that while the commission listened to teachers and schools administrations, they did not hear from any young women who were expelled from the school because of their headscarves. Instead, the testimony of the teachers and administrators of the schools who had expelled the students for wearing headscarves was taken into account, reinforcing the statist and patriarchal nature of the Stasi discourse. Apart from the problems about the organization of the commission, the solution it recommended to deal with the alleged oppression of the girls by their communities is very problematic. If the girls who do not want to wear veil were harassed, socially 24 Zúquete, José Pedro. 2007. Missionary politics in contemporary Europe. New York: Syracuse University Press.p.99 25 Jansen, Yolande. 2006. "Laicité, or the Politics of Republican Secularism." In Political Theologies Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, edited by Hent De Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan. New York: Fordham University Press.p.482 96

excluded and even sexually assaulted by their communities, how would the ban on the veil in public schools solve this problem. It is revealing to note that out of twenty-three recommendations made by the commission only one was adopted as a law immediately. It was the prohibition of the wearing of conspicuous signs of religious affiliation in public schools 26. The law passed through the parliament on March 15, 2004. The interpretation of laicism became apparent of in the following statement of President Chirac It is the neutrality of the public sphere which enables the harmonious existence side by side of different religions. ( ) Laïcité is one of the great achievements of the Republic. It is a crucial element of social peace and of national cohesion. We cannot allow it to be weakened. We have to work to consolidate it. (BBC 2003) According to this understanding of laicisim, the public visibility of the religious symbols are regarded as a threat to the neutrality of the public sphere. Within the conspicuous religious symbols such the Sikhs turbans or Jews skullcaps that are banned in French schools in 2004, the veil of Muslim women cannot be tolerated particularly, because it is the alleged symbol of women s oppression in Islam. President Chirac expressed his understanding of the veil as Wearing a veil, whether we want it or not, is a sort of aggression that is difficult for us to accept 27. French laïcité always needed an other to justify its existence. During French colonial history in Algeria in 1830-1962, Islam was represented as uncivilized, oppressive and backward religion in order to legitimize French colonization as a civilizing mission. As Hurd stressed, this negative representation of Islam not only reflected the political authority of laïcité but also helped to constitute it (2008: 57). Today Islam still constitutes the other for French laïcité over which it can present itself as the opposite. The negative representation of the veil as the symbol of women s oppression in Islam thus 26 ibid, p. 483 27 Henley, John. 2003. "Something aggressive about veils, says Chirac." Guardian. 97

contributes to the representation of French state as the emancipator of women from the community s oppression. On January 26, 2010, six years after the Stasi Commission, another parliamentary commission handed a 200 page report, recommending a partial ban on full body and face covering veils. This time Nicholas Sarkozy was the president and he shared his discomfort about the burqa with public in several occasions. After listening to 200 people (only one women wearing the full veil) the commission recommended prohibiting the use of veil in public service such as in hospitals, schools, government offices and on public transport and refusing residence cards and citizenship to anyone with visible signs of a radical religious practice (BBC 2010a). On July 13, 2010 the recommendation of the commission was adopted as a law in the parliament and niqab was officially declared as a radical religious practice. The ban on face covering veil started to be implemented in April 2011. Since the law came into force, there have been 91 incidents of women in niqab being stopped by police outside Paris and nine incidents in the Paris region28. The police does not have the authority to charge a fine, s/he has to refer the case to a local judge. The punishment of covering face in public can be 150 Euros fine, a citizenship course, or both. The niqab ban in France was followed by Belgium and the parliament approved the ban almost unanimously in April 2010 29. With the ban which began to be implemented on July 23, 2011, women who wear face covering veils in public will be charged with either 137.50 Euros or jail terms of up to a week. According to the Open Society Foundation, at least 30 French Muslims have since been fined or prosecuted 30. Far right politicians are pushing for similar bans in Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 28 Chrisafis, Angelique. 2011. "France's burqa ban: women are 'effectively under house arrest'." Guardian. 29 Traynor, Ian. 2010. "Belgium moves towards public ban on burka and niqab." The Guardian. 30 Luxmoor, Jonathan. 2011. "Belgium's Burqa Ban Divides Christians." Huffington Post. 98

It is significant to note that more important than the fines the Muslim women will be charged with is the impact of the ban on the public. It has been reported by the Muslim groups in France that since the introduction of the ban there has been an increase in physical and verbal violence against women in veils. According to the French Collective Against Islamophobia headscarved women account for 77% of victims of physical or verbal attacks which were doubled between 2011 and 2012. The introduction of the ban at the national level, affects the micro-politics of day to day life. In France there have been several instances where veiled women have been denied entry to shops by the owners or refused to get on the buses by bus drivers 31. Conclusion The chronological analysis of the headscarf affairs in France demonstrated that French state initially took a more tolerant approach to the visibility of the veil in the public schools. The reason for the tolerance was the disagreement about the meaning of the veil between different interpretations of laicism. It was however argued in this contribution, that such different interpretations of laicism was challenged by the rise of anti-immigrationist sentiments and Islamophobia, notably post 9/11. This resulted in a change in the position of the defenders of pluralistic laicism and the veil began to be associated with the oppression of the community. As such, the former competing interpretations of laicism on the meaning of the veil that existed in France merged in the agreement that the veil was a symbol of women s oppression in Islam. Although their reasoning differ, they both argued that there was an urgent need for the prohibition of the veil in order to protect the laic republic and women s freedom. 31 Chrisafis, loc.cit. 99

Defining laicism as the provider of national cohesion and public peace through the protection of the neutrality of the public sphere, made it possible to present public visibility of religious symbols as a threat to laicism. Such representation of the veil as the symbol of women s oppression, gave the state the opportunity to present itself as the emancipator of the women from the community s pressure, as demonstrated by the study of the case of the headscarf. 100