03/27/2014 1/41
2/41
The Overall Argument For any x: (1) If x morally ought to φ, then x ought to φ regardless of whether he cares to, regardless of whether φ-ing satisfies any of his desires or furthers his interests. (2) If x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φ-ing. (3) Therefore, if x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φ-ing regardless of whether φ-ing serves his desires or furthers his interests. (4) But there is no sense to be made of such reasons. (5) Therefore, x is never under a moral obligation. [Joyce][p. 42] 3/41
Harman s Harman s idea is to save ordinary moral discourse by interpreting our moral judgments as elliptical for the agent-relative judgments (stemming from some instrumental reasons). Motion discourse as a paradigm. What holds of motion discourse, should hold of morality as well. 4/41
Harman s Harman s idea is to save ordinary moral discourse by interpreting our moral judgments as elliptical for the agent-relative judgments (stemming from some instrumental reasons). Motion discourse as a paradigm. What holds of motion discourse, should hold of morality as well. Joyce: the analogy does not hold, since (1) there is no new discovery in the case of morality, and.. (2) moral discourse is essentially (or unnegotiably) non-relative. 5/41
The Aims of the Chapter William s main argument: Any theory that supports non-instrumental reasons necessarily makes a mistake. No non-instrumental account of practical rationality Moral error theory. Joyce s aims: (1) describe the theory, (2) cricize the opposition. 6/41
A Little Bit of Reasonology (1) Objective rational reasons (2) Subjective rational reasons (3) Irrational reasons (4) William s-style reasons 7/41
A Little Bit of Reasonology (1) Objective rational reasons (2) Subjective rational reasons (3) Irrational reasons (4) William s-style reasons Definition (Williams) One has a reason to φ if and only if one would be motivated to φ after the process of fully informed [and] correct deliberation. (1) = (4)? Of course, Joyce goes for (2) [= normative reasons]. [..T]here are many different normative systems, and therefore many different kinds of normative reasons. [..] However, with Smith I will use normative reason in restricted sense, to mean something that is justified according to practical rationality. [Joyce][p. 70, fn. 21] 8/41
Joyce s real interest William s argument against external reasons. Definition (External Reason) An external reason claim is one that is applied to the subject of the ascription regardless of what his desires are. 9/41
Joyce s real interest William s argument against external reasons. Definition (External Reason) An external reason claim is one that is applied to the subject of the ascription regardless of what his desires are. For Williams smth. is a reason only if its consideration could (potentially) motivate the agent. Joyce: this is OK, as lons as we focus on normative reasons; all normative reasons are internal. 10/41
The Argument How does an internal reason explain an action?.. one can tell a story about psychological causation a certain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action. 11/41
The Argument How does an internal reason explain an action?.. one can tell a story about psychological causation a certain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action. Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drink coffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain my action? 12/41
The Argument How does an internal reason explain an action?.. one can tell a story about psychological causation a certain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action. Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drink coffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain my action?.. clearly, I must have internalized it in some way, i.e., I must believe that the coffee is tapu, 13/41
The Argument How does an internal reason explain an action?.. one can tell a story about psychological causation a certain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action. Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drink coffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain my action?.. clearly, I must have internalized it in some way, i.e., I must believe that the coffee is tapu,.. but this alone doesn t seem to be enough. 14/41
Humean conception of action (orthodoxy) In a nutshell: action requires beliefs & desires. Virtues: simplicity, explanatory breadth, and apparent intuitiveness. 15/41
Humean conception of action (orthodoxy) In a nutshell: action requires beliefs & desires. Virtues: simplicity, explanatory breadth, and apparent intuitiveness. The opposing view is commited to besires. Direction of fit against the naive besire theorist. Against the more subtle besire theorist.. all we have to is to imagine the desire element and the belief element of some given besire coming apart. 16/41
Millgram s Against Williams presupposition: Millgram describes a case in which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannot explain any of S s actions: 17/41
Millgram s Against Williams presupposition: Millgram describes a case in which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannot explain any of S s actions: Archie is insensitive towards people around him. This insensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfilling friendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannot appreciate their values. 18/41
Millgram s Against Williams presupposition: Millgram describes a case in which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannot explain any of S s actions: Archie is insensitive towards people around him. This insensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfilling friendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannot appreciate their values. Joyce considers: (1) Archie s reason for fulfilling friendships, and (2) his reason to go to counseling. 19/41
Millgram s Against Williams presupposition: Millgram describes a case in which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannot explain any of S s actions: Archie is insensitive towards people around him. This insensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfilling friendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannot appreciate their values. Joyce considers: (1) Archie s reason for fulfilling friendships, and (2) his reason to go to counseling. Archie 1, Archie 2,..., Archie n, Archie+ in the background: (a) Archie 1 isn t stuck, (b) Williams-style reasons Importantly, Archie+ is not the exemplar, but the advice-giver. 20/41
Hampton s Williams style internalism: Internal reasons =... correct deliberation... 21/41
Hampton s Williams style internalism: Internal reasons =... correct deliberation... Hampton s challenge: Explicating correct deliberation leads to a dilemma First Horn - Circularity: Correct deliberation =... internal reasons... 22/41
Hampton s Williams style internalism: Internal reasons =... correct deliberation... Hampton s challenge: Explicating correct deliberation leads to a dilemma First Horn - Circularity: Correct deliberation =... internal reasons... Second Horn - Self-undermining: Correct deliberation =... external reasons... 23/41
The first horn - Cicularity Joyce argues: Internal reasons are involved in correct deliberation, but correct deliberation is not defined in terms of internal reasons. Therefore, there is no circularity. 24/41
The first horn - Cicularity Joyce argues: Internal reasons are involved in correct deliberation, but correct deliberation is not defined in terms of internal reasons. Therefore, there is no circularity. But might there be further circularity problems with regard to when and how we ought to deliberate? For instance: When I am in calmer circumstances, then I may have reason to deliberate because doing so is conducive to the satisfaction of my desires. Not just my actual desires, but those that I would have after correctly deliberating under conditions of full information. Isn t that circular? 25/41
The first horn - Cicularity Joyce argues: Internal reasons are involved in correct deliberation, but correct deliberation is not defined in terms of internal reasons. Therefore, there is no circularity. But might there be further circularity problems with regard to when and how we ought to deliberate? For instance: When I am in calmer circumstances, then I may have reason to deliberate because doing so is conducive to the satisfaction of my desires. Not just my actual desires, but those that I would have after correctly deliberating under conditions of full information. Isn t that circular? Joyce s answer: No, because here nothing is defined. 26/41
The second horn - the self-undermining objection The objection: Correct deliberation=... external reasons... First interpretation: correct deliberation is the kind of deliberation that we ought to partake in. Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correct deliberation, but not always deliberate correctly. 27/41
The second horn - the self-undermining objection The objection: Correct deliberation=... external reasons... First interpretation: correct deliberation is the kind of deliberation that we ought to partake in. Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correct deliberation, but not always deliberate correctly. Second interpretation: Instrumental normative requirements can be formulated wide scope and narrow scope. The wide scope reading entails external reasons. narrow scope: If A has desire D, then A has a reason to take the means to satisfy D. wide scope: A has a reason such that: if she has a desire D, then take the means to satisfy D. 28/41
The second horn - the self-undermining objection The objection: Correct deliberation=... external reasons... First interpretation: correct deliberation is the kind of deliberation that we ought to partake in. Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correct deliberation, but not always deliberate correctly. Second interpretation: Instrumental normative requirements can be formulated wide scope and narrow scope. The wide scope reading entails external reasons. narrow scope: If A has desire D, then A has a reason to take the means to satisfy D. wide scope: A has a reason such that: if she has a desire D, then take the means to satisfy D. 29/41
The self-undermining objection II Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements, because that would lead to an implausible proilferation of reasons. 30/41
The self-undermining objection II Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements, because that would lead to an implausible proilferation of reasons. How bad would this proliferation of reasons be? Maybe not so bad, after all. Wide scope instrumental requirements have the advantage that, if we have some devious end, we can satisfy the requirement by giving up the end. 31/41
The self-undermining objection II Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements, because that would lead to an implausible proilferation of reasons. How bad would this proliferation of reasons be? Maybe not so bad, after all. Wide scope instrumental requirements have the advantage that, if we have some devious end, we can satisfy the requirement by giving up the end. Third interpretation: Even if we accept the narrow scope formulation we can ask for a reason to follow this (narrow scope) principle. In even asking th second question the questioner is evincing an allegince to instrumentalism (123) the questioner does not properly understand what the word reason means. (123) 32/41
Korsgaard s Korsgaard s idea: After a process of correct deliberation all agents will converge on th esame moral desires. 33/41
Korsgaard s Korsgaard s idea: After a process of correct deliberation all agents will converge on th esame moral desires. Joyce s reply: Korsgaard needs to explain the relevant cases. And she can t. let him consider Harman s Mafia hit man, and tell us exactly what deliberative defects this imaginary agent is suffering from. (124) 34/41
Korsgaard s Korsgaard s idea: After a process of correct deliberation all agents will converge on th esame moral desires. Joyce s reply: Korsgaard needs to explain the relevant cases. And she can t. let him consider Harman s Mafia hit man, and tell us exactly what deliberative defects this imaginary agent is suffering from. (124) Korsgaard s first argument: An action must be in line with one s self-conception. Joyce: The mafia man s actions are in line with his self-conception as member of the family. 35/41
Korsgaard s Korsgaard s second argument: An action must be in line with one s self-conception as a human. 36/41
Korsgaard s Korsgaard s second argument: An action must be in line with one s self-conception as a human. Joyce s reply: Valuing one s conception as a human does not imply valuing everybody s humanity. At least, one would need an extra argument to make that transition. 37/41
Korsgaard s Korsgaard s second argument: An action must be in line with one s self-conception as a human. Joyce s reply: Valuing one s conception as a human does not imply valuing everybody s humanity. At least, one would need an extra argument to make that transition. Korsgaard s third argument: reasons need to be communicable. Therefore, they cannot be agent relative. Joyce: Agent relative reasons are communicable. Just as a I can communicate that this piece of property belongs to me and not to you I can communicate that this reason is mine an not yours. 38/41
Korsgaard s (continued) Korsgaard s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable to everyone. Therefore, they can t be agent relative. 39/41
Korsgaard s (continued) Korsgaard s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable to everyone. Therefore, they can t be agent relative. Joyce s reply I: In one sense, agent relative reasons are justifiable to others. Ortcutt well-understands that A1 has a very good reason to kill him, and no particular reason to refrain. But that, of course, doesn t mean that Ortcutt has to like it. 129) 40/41
Korsgaard s (continued) Korsgaard s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable to everyone. Therefore, they can t be agent relative. Joyce s reply I: In one sense, agent relative reasons are justifiable to others. Ortcutt well-understands that A1 has a very good reason to kill him, and no particular reason to refrain. But that, of course, doesn t mean that Ortcutt has to like it. 129) Joyce s reply II: Not even the moral reasons favored by Korsgaard are sharable and justiable to all: Perhaps A1 and his family think that ordinary law-abiders are naive fools. (131) 41/41