TWO KINDS OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN NARRATIVE TEXTS

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Workshop Speech Acts, Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft May 29, 2017 TWO KINDS OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN NARRATIVE TEXTS Stefan Hinterwimmer University of Cologne

Introduction Introduction Free Indirect Discourse Viewpoint Shifting Open Questions In this talk, I will argue for the existence of two distinct kinds of protagonists perspective taking in narrative texts. First kind: Free Indirect Discourse, where context with respect to which various expressions are interpreted is shifted to a fictional protagonist s context. Second kind, Viewpoint Shifting, does not involve context-shifting. Rather, situation described as perceived by a protagonist or in a way that reflects doxastic state of a protagonist, not with respect to Common Ground (CG) of narrator and reader. 2

Free Indirect Discourse Introduction Free Indirect Discourse Viewpoint Shifting Open Quesions Free Indirect Discourse (FID) widely recognized as mode of presenting protagonists thoughts or utterances that is distinct from both Direct Discourse (DD) and Indirect Discourse (ID). (1) a. Mary smiled. Tomorrow she would reveal her true identity at the press conference. b. Mary smiled. She thought: Tomorrow I will reveal my true identity at the press conference. c. Mary smiled. She thought that on the following day she would reveal her true identity at the press conference. 3

Free Indirect Discourse (1) a. Mary smiled. Tomorrow she would reveal her true identity at the press conference. b. Mary smiled. She thought: Tomorrow I will reveal my true identity at the press conference. c. Mary smiled. She thought that on the following day she would reveal her true identity at the press conference. In FID, pronouns and tenses interpreted as if sentence was in ID mode, while all other context-sensitive expressions interpreted as if it was in DD mode (Banfield 1982, Doron 1991, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015, to appear). 4

Free Indirect Discourse Not only temporal or local adverbials, but evaluative expressions such as epithets, speech act particles or speech acts like exclamations in FID interpreted with respect to protagonist s perspective. (2) a. John felt uneasy. He didn t want to be in this room with all these arrogant idiots staring at him. b. John felt uneasy. He thought: I don t want to be in this room with all these arrogant idiots staring at me. 5

Free Indirect Discourse (3) a. Kate was very satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. How smart she was! So much smarter than any of these amateurs. b. Kate was very satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. She thought: How smart I am! So much smarter than any of these amateurs. 6

Free Indirect Discourse Schlenker (2004), Sharvit (2008) and Eckardt (2014): Expressions not only interpretable with respect to speaker s/narrator s context C, but also with respect to fictional context c of some prominent protagonist. Author of c = respective protagonist. Time of c = Reference time of ongoing story. Location of c = Location of protagonist at reference time. Maier (2015, to appear): FID a form of mixed quotation. Accommodated speech or thought act quoted, with pronouns and verbal tense being unquoted. 7

Free Indirect Discourse On first type of approach lexically specified that all contextsensitive expressions except pronouns and verbal tenses are interpreted with respect to c whenever c is introduced in addition to C. On Maier s (2015, to appear) approach pragmatically driven convention in effect in FID. 8

Free Indirect Discourse Protagonists contexts required for FID cannot be introduced by when-clauses: (4) a. On her way home, Mary heard a new song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the radio. She would buy his new album tomorrow. b. * When Mary heard a new song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the radio on her way home, she would buy his new album tomorrow. c. When Mary heard a new song by Kendrick Lamar that she liked on the radio on her way home, she thought: I will buy his new album tomorrow. d. When Mary heard a new song by Kendrick Lamar on the radio on her way home, she thought that she would buy his new album on the following day. 9

Free Indirect Discourse (5) a. Charles stood at the beach, watching the sea waves crushing up and down. It would have been great to live here with his wife and kids. b. *When Charles stood at the beach, watching the sea waves crushing up and down, it would have been great to live here with his wife and kids. c. When Charles stood at the beach, watching the sea waves crushing up and down, he thought: It would be great to live here with my wife and kids. d. When Charles stood at the beach, watching the sea waves crushing up and down, he thought that it would have been great to live there with his wife and kids. 10

With that constraint in mind, consider the sentence in italics in (6). (6) I wanted to be home in case he came back early, made it in time The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the whole time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, AHWOSG: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). 11

Introduction Free Indirect Discourse Viewpoint Shifting Open Questions (6) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the whole time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, AHWOSG: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). Main clause in bold clearly describes situation from perspective of ego-narrator s brother, Toph. First reason: It would be very strange for the ego-narrator to refer to himself via his brother. Second reason: Ego-narrator obviously knows proposition denoted by main clause to be false. 12

Introduction Free Indirect Discourse Viewpoint Shifting Open Questions (6) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the whole time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, AHWOSG: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). Still, good reasons to assume that no FID involved. First, event providing spatial and temporal parameter for c would be contained in when-clause. 13

(6) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home his brother was there/#here, of course had been there/#here the whole time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, AHWOSG: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). Second, there could be replaced by here if sentence were in FID mode, since with the exception of pronouns and verbal tenses indexicals behave as in DD in FID. (7) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home he thought: My brother is there/ here, of course has been there/here the whole time, of course has never left. 14

(6) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home his brother was there/#here, of course had been there/#here the whole time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, AHWOSG: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). When it is in FID-mode, in contrast, there has to be used, as shown in (8). (8) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home he thought that his brother was there/ #here, of course had been there/#here the whole time, of course had never left. 15

(9) a. [The T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in the cave on his left.? [A T-Rex]/[The T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the dark. b.[the T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in the cave on his left. When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds later, [a T-Rex]/[the T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the dark. While in (9a) indefinite cannot be interpreted as picking up individual referred to by definite description, in (9b) possible. In (9a) CG of speaker and narrator relevant. With respect to that CG, using indefinite when presupposition of definite description is satisfied would violate Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991). 16

(9) b.[the T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in the cave on his left. When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds later, [a T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the dark. In (9b), in contrast, when-clauses licenses shift in perspective. Consequently, not CG of narrator and reader relevant for interpretation of indefinite, but doxastic state of Billy. With respect to that state, presupposition of definite not satisfied, and indefinite can be used without violating Maximize Presupposition! 17

(9) b.[the T-Rex] i hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in the cave on his left. When Billy j looked up in his j hiding place a few seconds later, [a T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the dark. Intuitively, main clause in final sentence in (9b) not interpreted as content of a conscious thought of Billy. Rather, what he sees is described in a way that is compatible with his doxastic state at that time. 18

Evidence for two different kinds of shifts to protagonists perspective in narrative texts: FID and Viewpoint Shifting (VS). In FID, speech or thought act of some salient protagonist accommodated. On Maier s (2015, to appear) account, that speech or thought act is partially quoted. Since only independent sentences can be interpreted as speech or thought acts, contrasts like those between (4a)/(5a), on the one hand, and (4b)/(5b), on the other, to be expected. 19

Alternatively, one could assume that accommodated speech or thought act is precondition for introduction of second context c in addition to narrator s context C (Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Eckardt 2014) namely fictional context in which respective speech or thought act has occurred. Temporal and spatial parameters of c provided by eventuality introduced by preceding sentence. 20

VS not restricted to force level, since no speech or thought act accommodated and no additional context introduced. Rather, situation described in a way that is compatible with doxastic state of protagonist at the time of him or her perceiving the relevant situation. Time of accommodated perceiving event determined by locally prominent eventuality in cases considered left-adjoined whenclause. 21

Assumption: Just like everything that all interlocuters perceive consciously during a conversation becomes part of their CG, everything a protagonist in a narrative text perceives consciously becomes part of the set of propositions representing his/her beliefs at the relevant time. Under certain conditions, content of a clause not added to CG directly, but rather to set of propositions representing doxastic state of a prominent protagonist. 22

Possible implementation: Covert operator optionally inserted at TPnode of finite clauses, turning an eventuality predicate P into a predicate of eventualities of perceiving e 1. Further properties of e 1 determined by context and experiencer of e 1 some contextually determined prominent individual x. Crucially, in all worlds representing doxastic state of x at the time immediately following (the run time of) e 1, there is an eventuality e satisfying P. Presupposition: P is not true in all worlds representing the doxastic state of x prior to e 1. 23

(10) [[OP VS 1 C 2 ]] g,c = λp <ev,<s,t>>. λe. λw. PERC(e)(w) g(c 2 )(e)(w) Experiencer(e, g(1))(w) w DOX (g(1))(τ(e)+)(w) [ e [P(e )(w) overlap(τ(e), τ(e )]] 24

First, contextually prominent individual has to be available as experiencer of e 1 and further properties of e 1 have to be determined. Consequently, required information has to be contextually available. Finally, since insertion of VS-operator presumably costly, there has to be some reason for inserting it, i.e. perceiving eventuality has to have an effect on doxastic state of respective individual. In cases considered so far introduction of VS-operator furthermore required since otherwise inadequate interpretation of respective sentence. 25

(11) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the whole time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, AHWOSG: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). In case of sentence in bold in (11) all conditions satisfied. First, interpretation of main clause would be inadequate without insertion of VS-operator since ego-narrator (a) cannot refer to himself as his brother and (b) knows that proposition denoted by main clause is false. 26

(11) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the whole time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, AHWOSG: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). Second, individual variable can be resolved to ego-narrator s brother. Being the agent of the locally highly prominent event introduced by the when-clause makes him a very suitable candidate. 27

(11) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the whole time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, AHWOSG: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). Third, information concerning further specification of perceiving eventuality indirectly made available by events introduced by preceding sentence in combination with one introduced by whenclause. Presumably eventuality of seeing his brother lying in bed and sleeping. 28

(11) The house was empty, and I dove into bed, fell back asleep, and when he came back home his brother was there, of course had been there the whole time, of course had never left. (D. Eggers, AHWOSG: 112, cited in B. Dancygier 2012: 62). Assumption: Prior to perceiving event only true in all worlds compatible with Toph s assumptions concerning stereotypical course of events that his brother is home and has been home all night. After perceiving event true in all of his belief worlds. 29

(11) when he came back home his brother was there, (of course) had been there the whole time. VS-operator thus adjoined to main clause TP, taking eventuality predicate denoted by that clause as argument. (12) λp <ev,<s,t>>. λe. λw. PERC(e)(w) see(e)(w) Exp(e, toph)(w) w DOX (toph)(τ(e)+)(w) [ e [P(e )(w) overlap(τ(e), τ(e )]]. (λe. λw. home(e, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w))(w) τ(e) < t 0 t T C [ e [home(e, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w))(w) τ(e ) t τ(e ) < τ(e)]]) = λe. λw. PERC(e)(w) see(e)(w) Exp(e, toph)(w) w DOX (toph))(τ(e)+)(w) [ e [home(e, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w ))(w ) τ(e) < t 0 t T C [ e [home(e, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w))(w) τ(e ) t τ(e ) < τ(e )]] overlap(τ(e), τ(e )]]. 30

(11) when he came back home his brother was there, (of course) had been there the whole time Combining that eventuality predicate with the one denoted by the when-clause gives us (13): (13) λw. e e [come_home(e)(w) Agent(e, toph)(w) τ(e) < t 0 PERC(e )(w) see(e )(w) Exp(e, toph)(w) w DOX (toph))(τ(e)+)(w) [ e [home(e, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w ))(w ) τ(e ) < t 0 t T C [ e [home(e, ιx. brother(x, toph)(w))(w) τ(e ) t τ(e ) < τ(e )]] overlap(τ(e ), τ(e ) overlap(τ(e), τ(e )]] Since story told from perspective of ego-narrator, set of worlds denoted by entire sentence intersected with set of worlds compatible with ego-narrator s beliefs. 31

(14) [The T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in the cave on his left. When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds later, [a T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the dark. Concerning sentence in bold in (14), conditions for insertion of VSoperator likewise fulfilled. First, interpreting indefinite as picking up T-Rex referred to by definite would violate Maximize Presupposition! Second, individual variable can be resolved to Billy since being the agent of event introduced by when-clause makes him locally highly prominent. 32

(14) [The T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in the cave on his left. When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds later, [a T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the dark. Third, information concerning further specification of perceiving eventuality made available by events introduced by preceding sentence in combination with one introduced by when-clause and event introduced by main clause itself. Obviously event of Billy seeing event introduced by main clause. 33

(14) [The T-Rex] hesitated. Maybe the little dinosaurs had hidden themselves in the cave on his left. When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds later, [a T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave and squinted into the dark. Finally, clear connection between proposition being true in all worlds representing Billy s doxastic state at time of e and what he sees in e since before seeing main clause event worlds do not include such an event. 34

(14) When Billy looked up in his hiding place a few seconds later, [a T-Rex] bent down to the entrance of the cave... After insertion of VS-operator entire sentence thus interpreted as shown in (15). (15) λw. e e [look_up(e)(w) Agent(e, billy)(w) τ(e) < t 0 PERC(e )(w) see(e )(w) Experiencer(e, billy)(w) w DOX (billy)(τ(e )+)(w) [ e x[t-rex(x)(w ) bend_down(e )(w ) Agent(e, x)(w ) τ(e ) < t 0 overlap(τ(e ), τ(e ))]] 35

Open Questions As already observed by Montague (1970), predicates such as see have non-veridical uses in addition to their standard veridical uses. Sentence in (16), for example, has a reading on which it does not entail the existence of unicorns. (16) Angela saw a unicorn. Maybe not lexical ambiguity involved, but rather instances of VS. 36

Open Questions (16) Angela saw a unicorn. Sentence would thus be interpreted as shown in (17). (17) λw. e[perc(e)(w) see(e)(w) Experiencer(e, angela)(w) w DOX (angela)(τ(e)+)(w) [ e x[unicorn(x)(w ) see(e )(w ) Experiencer(e, angela)(w ) Theme(e, x)(w ) τ(e ) < t 0 overlap(τ(e), τ(e ))]] Raises the question of whether the conditions under which nonveridical uses of such predicates are available are identical to those under which VS is available. 37

Open Questions Second question concerns the range of expressions that can be shifted in VS as opposed to FID. We have seen that indexical expressions such as here, tomorrow etc. cannot be shifted in VS. But what about epithets, speech act particles etc.? In particular, is the behavior of perspective-dependent expressions in VS identical to ID? 38

References Banfield, Ann. 1982. Unspeakable sentences: Narration and representation in the language of fiction. Boston: Routledge. Dancygier, Barbara. 2012. The language of stories. A cognitive approach. Cambridge University Press. Doron, Edit. 1991. Point of view as a factor of content. In Steve Moore & Adam Z. Wyner (eds.) Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) I. Cornell Working Papers in Linguistics. 51-64. Eckardt, Regine. 2014. The semantics of free indirect discourse. How texts allow to mindread and eavesdrop. Leiden/Boston: Brill. Maier, E. (2015). Quotation and Unquotation in Free Indirect Discourse. Mind & Language 30, 345-373. Schlenker, P. 2004. Context of Thought and Context of Utterance. A Note on Free Indirect Discourse and the Historical Present. Mind and Language 19: 279-304. Sharvit, Y. 2008. The Puzzle of Free Indirect Discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy 31: 353-395. 39