THE MORAL SENSE AND ITS FOUNDATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

THE MORAL SENSE AND ITS FOUNDATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH VOLUME XXXI Editor-in-Chief: ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning Belmont, Massachusetts A SEQUEL TO VOLUMES XV, XX AND XXII FOUNDATIONS OF MORALITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES Phenomenology in a Foundational Dialogue with the Human Sciences THE MORAL SENSE IN THE COMMUNAL * SIGNIFICANCE OF LIFE Investigations in Phenomenological Praxeology: Psychiatric Therapeutics, Medical Ethics and Social Praxis within the Life- and Communal World MORALITY WITHIN THE LIFE- * AND SOCIAL WORLD Interdisciplinary Phenomenology of the Authentic Life in the "Moral Sense"

THE MORAL SENSE AND ITS FOUNDATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE: SELF, PERSON, mstoricity, COMMUNITY Phenomenological Praxeology and Psychiatry Edited by ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA The World Phenomenology Institute Published under the auspices of The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning A-T. Tymieniecka, President KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Moral sense and its foundational significance: self. person. historicity. co.munity. phenomenological praxeology. and psychiatry I edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. p. CI. -- (Analecta Husserliana : v. 31> "Published under the auspices of the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning." ISBN -13: 978-94-010-6737 -9 e-isbn-13: 978-94-009-0555-9 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-0555-9 I. Ethics. 2. Self. 3. Phenomenology. 1859-1938. I. Tymieniecka. Anna-Teresa. 63279.H94A129 vol. 31 [6..110121 142'.7 s--dc20 [171'.21 ISBN-13:978-94-010-6737-9 4. Husserl. Edmund. II. Series. 90-4094 Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates the publishing programmes of D. Reidel, Martinus Nijhoff, Dr. W. Junk and MTP Press Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands Printed on acid-free paper All rights reserved 1990 by Kluwer Academic Publishers Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1990 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS THE THEME I Crystallization Problems of the Phenomenology of the Moral Sense: Self, Person, Community, Historicity, and Life-Horizons ANTONINO IARIA I Opening Address ix xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ~ INTRODUCTORY STUDY ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA / The Human Condition within the Unity-of-Everything-There-Is-Alive: A Challenge to Philosophical Anthropologies 3 PART I THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE MORAL SENSE OF ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA DALLAS LASKEY I The Moral Sense: An Appraisal 21 MARY ROSE BARRAL I The Phenomenologico-Sociological Conception of the "Human Being-on-the-Brink-of-Existence": A New Approach to Socio-Communal Psychiatry 29 PART II HUMAN SELFHOOD AND PERSONAL IDENTITY WITHIN COMMUNAL BONDS L UZ MARIA AL V AREZ-CALDER6N I Truth, Authenticity, and Culture 49 NADIA FINOCCHI I Man within the Limit of the I: Some Considerations on Husserl's Philosophy from the Thought of Nicola Abbagnano 57 JOHN DOLlS I Narrating the Self 65 v

vi TABLE OF CONTENTS DIETER ZEISLER I Sartre's Account of the Self in The Transcendence of the Ego 77 AURELIO RIZZACASA I The Concept of "Person" between Existence and the Realm of Life 87 MARY ROSE BARRAL I The Truth and Identity of a Person and of a People 93 PART III THE MORAL SENSE, ETHICS, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE OSVALDO ROSSI I Ethics and Subjectivity Today 107 HELMUT H. LOISKANDL I Moral Sense, Community, and the Individual: Georg Simmel's Position in an Ongoing Discussion 111 EVEL YN M. BARKER I Personal Identity and Concrete Values 115 NEL RODRIGUEZ RIAL I The Moral Act 125 VALERIO TONINI I Scientific Phenomenology and Bioethics 145 WILLIAM L. McBRIDE I Social Justice on Trial: The Verdict of History 159 DA VID DOYLE I The Justice of Mercy: Reflections on Law, Social Theory and Heidegger's "Everyday" 169 ZIVOJIN NIKOLIC I Cekic und Lukacs tiber die Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins: Die Prioritiitsfrage 193 LUDWIG GRUNBERG I The Phenomenology of Value and the Value of Phenomenology 199 PART IV HUMAN SELFHOOD, WILL, PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND COMMUNITY LIFE IN A PSYCHIATRIC PERSPECTIVE BR UNO CALLIERI I Some Epistemological Aspects of Present- Day Psychopathology 209 GIOV ANNI ROCCI I Ethics in the Psyche's Individuating Development towards the Self 219 MANUEL RIOBO GONZALEZ I Free Will in Psychopaths: A Phenomenological Description 227

TABLE OF CONTENTS vii AARON L. MISHARA I The Problem of the Unconscious in the Later Thought of L. Binswanger: A Phenomenological Approach to Delusion in Perception and Communication 247 ROMANO ROMANI I The Unattainability of the Norm 279 CLAUDIO MENCACCI and ENRICA GOLDFLUSS I "The Emotional Residence": An Italian Experience of the Treatment of Chronic Psychosis 283 MIGUEL C. JARQUIN I Hacia un concepto significativo de 10 patologico y 10 sano, de 10 anormal y 10 normal 295 GRAZIELLA MORSELLI I Husserl, Child Education, and Creativity 321 JOHN R. SCUDDER, JR. and ANNE H. BISHOP I Recovering the Moral Sense of Health Care from Academic Reification 329 PART V THE HISTORICITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON: DEVELOPMENT,INTERSUBJECTIVITY, TRUTH AND TIME BIANCA MARIA D'IPPOLITO I Edmund Husserl: Intersubjectivity between Epoche and History 341 V. C. THOMAS I The Development of Time Consciousness from Husserl to Heidegger 347 TZE-W AN KW AN I Husserl's Concept of Horizon: An Attempt at Reappraisal 361 SANDRA B. ROSENTHAL and PATRICK L. BOURGEOIS I Mead and Merleau-Ponty: Meaning, Perception, and Behavior 401 MAIJA KULE I The Role of Historicity in Man's Creative Experience: A Comparative Analysis of the Ideas of Kant, Hegel, Husseri, Heidegger, and the Hermeneutical School 411 A. ZVIE BAR-ON I The Reality and Structure of Time: A Neo-Hegelian Paradox in the Conceptual Network of Phenomenology 417 VICTOR MOLCHANOV I Time, Truth, and Culture in Husserl and Hegel 433 INDEX OF NAMES 445

THE THEME CRYSTALLIZATION PROBLEMS OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE MORAL SENSE: SELF, PERSON, COMMUNITY, HISTORICITY, AND LIFE-HORIZONS The explorations of the meeting ground between philosophy and psychiatry which we gather in this volume further the investigation of human existence within the communal world of life already substantially begun in our previous researches published in Volumes XV, XX, and XXII of Analecta Husserliana. The present collection attempts to promote the reciprocal illumination that philosophy and psychiatry throw on each other while encountering (discovering) and investigating the issues that. surround the crucial center of their concern, the human being, and this from the advantageous position offered by the phenomenology of the moral sense. In fact, as we have brought out in these earlier volumes, the moral sense is, first, the factor of sense-giving which surges within the animal framework of life with the advent of the Human Condition. It is properly termed the "moral sense" because, as it unfurls within the creative orchestration of the specifically human functioning, it is instrumental in infusing our feelings, emotions, judgments, decisions, and furthest interpretations of life events with what we usually call "moral" or "ethical" significance; it is also responsible for the emergence of values. Second, we have discovered that it is this sense-bestowing factor of the moral sense, which is primogenital with man, that allows, through the operation of the "benevolent/malevolent sentiment" which carries it, the individual being - who draws from his Human Condition this germinal propulsion - to break out of the strict confines of his predominant self-interest and to reach out to other individuals recognizing them - and by the same stroke, himself - to be "congenial," and "equal" as members of the same human family, so to speak. It is the benevolent sentiment which through the moral sense establishes societal relatedness and infuses society's further development with the moralcommunal significance of life. In the previous volumes, we have extensively discussed the paraix

x THE THEME mount import of the communal significance of life for the understanding of societal life and institutions as well as for the understanding of the nature of the human being. In fact, we brought it out that our nature in its very nucleus already immerses the budding self in the communal interlinkages of the world of life. Thus, a human individual depends in his existence upon the equilibrium that his life-functioning maintains within his communal setting. If his communal ties are loosened, the individual shrinks and his functioning disintegrates to the limit point which I, in my essay in Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XX, have termed "existence on the brink"; it is the human individual on-the-brink-of-existence that is naturally the main subject matter of psychiatry. We propose it to be philosophically of paramount practical importance that psychiatry tum to the investigation of the individual's transformations when he reaches the brink-ofexistence in the perspective of the primogenital moral sense. Such investigations will yield crucially important ideas for therapy. They will, as well, bring a wealth of insights to phenomenological research on the human being within the world of life. While in the previous collections devoted to this subject we have been focusing especially upon the communal and societal involvements of the human individual person, in this volume the spectrum of studies indicates directly or indirectly the entire spectrum of issues to which the human factor of the Moral Sense extends and in relation to which we should investigate its role as well as its developmental crystallization. This perspective gives the present volume the intrinsic unity that is to be found in its topically differentiated sections: (1) The Phenomenology of the Moral Sense of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka; (2) Human Selfhood and Personal Identity within Communal Bonds; (3) The Moral Sense, Ethics, and Social Justice; (4) Human Selfhood, Will, Personal Development, and Community Life in a Psychiatric Perspective; lastly (5) The Historicity of the Human Person: Development, Intersubjectivity, Truth and Time. The introductory essay, "The Human Condition-within-the Unity-of-Everything-There-Is-Alive" indicates the new conception of the context within which this program of investigation is situated. ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

ANTONINO IARIA OPENING ADDRESS I suppose that the not so easy task entrusted to me by the World Phenomenology Institute, that of opening this international conference, comes from my being the representative of the host Institute. In this capacity, I give you all my warmest welcome with the wish that our work together will reap fruitful results. Since I did not think I had enough experience to guide these works effectively, especially from a philosophical point of view, I must admit that I was a bit reluctant to undertake the hosting of this conference, though I finally accepted due to Prof. Tymieniecka's insistent, stimulating, and enthusiastic urging. I note with pleasure that in this endeavor I succeeded in enlisting the collaboration of Prof. Ciani and Prof. Gaston, whom I thank very much for their contributions. On the other hand, I must say that I am not new to this task, since last year I attended and directed a work group in the international conference organized in house by the same Institute in collaboration with the Italian Phenomenology Center. And for two years I have attended monthly seminars where the relationships between philosophy, psychiatry, psychology, and psychoanalysis are discussed. Many famous scholars in these various disciplines have participated actively in these seminars, and you will be hearing the brilliant findings of many of them here. I am pleased to mention that among them have been Prof.ssa Iannotta, our kind host, Prof.ssa Ales Bello, Prof.ssa Cipolletta, Prof.ssa Dovolich, Prof.ssa Di Marco, Prof. Nicoletti, Prof. Rocci, Dott. Aversa, Dott. Ruberto, Dott. Giannone. (please excuse me if I missed anybody.) Some of these findings were published in the journal, Metaxu. Searching for yet another qualification for the task, I can mention my long, continuous, and pressing personal and professional interest in the relationships among the above-mentioned disciplines, and my needs and wishes as a psychiatrist to interrogate philosophy, in the sense of asking it for a rigorous methodology to be applied in our research and speculation. In fact, philosophy is often requested to provide a foundation for the identity of the individual disciplines, in order that the xi

Xll ANTONINO IARIA confusion generated by the different research methods of the various disciplines may be avoided, and that the too often forgotten totality of the human being may be re-established, thus avoiding the risk of forgetting or undervaluing the importance of the philosophic dimension of the human being. For this, and especially for what concerns personal factors, I have pointed out a conflict (a behavior common also to other psychiatrists) between a tendency to focus on concrete problems of how to give practical help to suffering people, and the other tendency to search for a systematic mental approach to psychic phenomena, psychic structures, and correct methodologies for the study of mental processes. All of these quests reflect what has been a constant concern of psychiatry for many years, that is, its search for an identity of its own. Many pointers in this direction have come from the side of psychiatric thought: P. Rossi delineates, it seems, six different approaches referring to cultural traditions very distant from each other, and which give rise to different practices, even though they have underlying connections. I believe that one of the first pointers in this direction came out of philosophy, with which the study of psyche has been confused, or from which it seems to have been directly derived. Now, confrontations, meetings, and disputes as well can be the start of autonomous investigations which looking for all the help possible, undertake alliances, collaborations, useful cooperations, and sometimes also connivances. On the happy occasion of one of our meetings the mutual problem of the crisis of philosophy was presented to me. It was said to me that if psychiatry is still searching for an identity, philosophy has already lost its own, at least in some schools of contemporary thought such as nihilism - which has its noble roots, of which we will probably hear much said during this conference, in Heidegger and Nietzsche. It was affirmed on the same occasion that now the central theme of interdisciplinary work is finding agreement on method, quite apart from the philosophical foundation of psychiatry itself. But it was reaffirmed by the philosophers that the possibility of a dialogue with psychiatry seeking a philosophical dimension has emerged. The philosophers, wondering what kind of philosophy could meet psychiatry's needs, responded that obviously it could be neither the traditional philosophy, nor the metaphysical tradition represented by Maritain's philosophy (which I will cite afterwards).

OPENING ADDRESS xiii A French psychiatrist, Anne Tholose, writes: "Even though there are still some philosophers, for diverse reasons philosophy itself is nowadays questioned, as to both its purposes and its means." This is due to its loss of identity, which also explains its loss of credit. Not only is its utility questioned, but also whether it was ever useful; it is not known anymore if it is a defined object or a sensible project. Not only is it divided, but it has disappeared from the scene or looks as if it is on the way to disappearing. I do not agree with this pessimistic or negative point of view, but there is no doubt that in her recent work "Les frontieres de la philosophie avec les sciences humaines" (BV. Bych 1980-1-1331), Ms. Tholose proposes some interesting, even though not fully shareable, ideas; anyway, they give hints for fruitful discussion. According to this scholar, the apparent disappearance of philosophy corresponds to the emancipation of sciences, which could only be born and grow a little under its protection, but then established their autonomy (Physics, chemistry, mathematics). But there remained a large field of exploration for philosophy, that is to say, man, life, consciousness, freedom, action, imagination. For a long time now, the disciplines concerned with these fields (psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis) have also been looking to establish their autonomy, and we see that the difficulty of defining and delimiting their respective fields of action increases; it is certain though that through this definition a greater knowledge of their shortcomings can be acquired. Nowadays, Prof. Tholose adds, we see psychology and psychiatry becoming the science of the experience of consciousness, psychology being concerned with aspects of the ordered functioning of consciousness, and psychiatry with its pathologically disordered functioning. Considering that it is philosophy's duty, not property, to look for wisdom, we can say that when it turns its gaze to the sphere of the human necessity, philosophy (as Maritain affirms) "makes man conscious not only of the means given to him by his own life, but especially of the reasons for living, suffering and hoping." Nevertheless, philosophy cannot be considered to be simple knowledge of a certain category of objects (in this case, the human disciplines being here considered), but a knowledge enriched by critical reflection on itself, its origin, conditions, method, limits, value. This is the path, sometimes backwards, that psychiatry follows in order to find its roots, in that process of looking for its identity which I

XlV ANTONINO IARIA mentioned before. In this difficult task, it can and must be helped by the means that philosophers have to offer from their knowledge and practice. Another discussion point could be the difficulties in the encounter of psychiatry and philosophy. I will try to enumerate them and maybe afterwards to define them, which is a much more difficult task. The first difficulty, in my opinion, is the difficulty of communication, since the means and verbal tools used are different, even though often the psychiatric vocabulary is borrowed or coopted from the philosophical ones. Psychiatrists represent a kind of subculture (see P. Rossi), one isolated from the environment and the other members of the community, sometimes also from medicine itself, to which psychiatry seems to belong institutionally (in reality this does not reveal everything: many institutions in fact included psychiatry at first, and then isolated it). First of all, psychiatrists have acquired a language of their own, and this often leads to difficulty in communication. This difficulty though expresses all the other difficulties and emerges out of them - because psychiatry has set itself on the border between biological science and the human sciences (even though the demarcation does not reflect, as P. Rossi says, essences, but rather rules referring to variables, which are also connected with institutional and academic facts). A beacon for this conference is the ambitious attempt to break down what Jaspers called the wall of genetic "incomprehensibility between healer and patient," that is to say, to touch the constitutional essence of the psychotic presence and maybe its constituent moment (P. Ricci Sindoni). Binswanger's declaration: "The failure of every valid co-attendance, that is to say, the impossibility of a presence's really becoming a participating presence, in short, the repeated set-backs suffered in appresentation, is the constituent moment of its alienation," reminds me of what I wrote in a long ago note of mine, and in a perhaps simpler and more intuitive way, about madness' being a characteristic reaction of the human being who in desperate situations cannot do anything else but "go mad," and that maybe also (as was observed by De Martiis in another old work) madness can be seen as an inevitable individual answer to the limitations imposed by living together with other people and to instinctual forces. Binswanger himself emphasizes the lack of a philosophical founda-

OPENING ADDRESS xv tion in psychiatry. Influenced by him, D. Camello has described in a masterly manner, in his important phenomenological research on psychiatry, the "set-backs and crisis suffered by psychiatry" - and in order to avert "ambiguity," he should even say through psychiatry. At the end of this long and perhaps peripatetic talk (I cannot consider it more than this), let me express the hope, as I said before, that this meeting will be able to throw light on interpenetrating neighboring fields and contribute to our finding clearer and fuller answers to mutual needs and tasks or that, at least, the "meeting of scientific themes and philosophical considerations becomes maybe a "solicitation," an invitation to reflection, as Jaspers affirmed, more than to "rigorous application." Ospedale Santa Maria della Pieta, Rome

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The collection of studies presented in this volume is a harvesting of the lectures given at the XXth International Phenomenology Congress organized by The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning in collaboration with the Ospedale Santa Maria della Pieta, Rome and the Centro Italiano di Richerche Fenomenologiche, in Rome, 3-5, June 1987, and at the Institute's XXIst International Phenomenology Conference held at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1-5 November 1987 in collaboration with the Yugoslav Hegel Society, as well as from the research seminars of The Boston Forum for the Interdisciplinary Phenomenology of Man, a continuing program of the Institute. We owe our thanks to Professor Antonino laria, Director of the Ospedale Santa Maria della Pieta for presiding over the Conference and for his cooperation and all the hospitality which the Roman congress received, and to Professor Nicola Ciani of, the University of Rome II, as well as to Professor Alberto Gaston for their participation in the running of the conference. Professor Angela Ales Bello, Director of our Italian Center, has devoted her expert efforts to the congress' organization assuring as usual its success; she deserves our heartfelt appreciation for her continuing cooperation. Professor Miodrag Cekic is due both credit and gratitude for his leading role in organizing the Belgrade congress. The commitment and effort of Professor Andrija Strojkovic, President of the Yugoslav Hegel Society was invaluable. Last, but not least, I would like to thank our Editorial Assistant, Mr. Robert Wise, for the careful and devoted attention with which he edited the papers. Acknowledgements are made to Phenomenological Inquiry for permission to republish "The Human Condition within the Unity-of Everything-There-is-Alive: a Challenge to Philosophical Anthropologies" by A-T. Tymieniecka, "Edmund Hussed; Intersubjectivity between Epoche and Historicity," by Bianca Maria D'Ippolito, and "Sartre's xvii

xviii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Account of the Self in The Transcendence of the Ego" by Dieter Zeisler. A-T.T.