Influence Warfare and Modern Terrorism 1. James J. F. Forest

Influence Warfare and Modern Terrorism 1 James J. F. Forest The Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw once wrote that thought transcends matter. This is particularly true for terrorist and insurgent groups, who seek to mobilize a population toward a vision of the future believed to be unachievable without violence. Because these groups have lower militarily capabilities than nation-states, their ability to recruit and galvanize large audiences is a critical part of their asymmetric warfare strategy. Indeed, as Thomas Hammes recently noted, insurgent campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerilla and terrorist operations. 2 This crucial struggle for hearts and minds is increasingly fought throughout the Internet. During the latter half of the twentieth century, the global struggle for strategic influence was primarily between communist and democratic nation-states, most often conducted via radio, print media, and television. Today, the main ideological conflict is between Western liberal democracy and a Salafi-jihadist interpretation of the Qur an whose adherents hope to establish a new Islamist caliphate. 3 The global proliferation of information technology provides new tools for influencing the perceptions of a population, emboldening terrorists and insurgencies like never before. Indeed, al-qaeda seeks to shape perceptions in the Muslim world through all forms of media, particularly videos, blogs, and web forum debates. As al-qaeda strategist Ayman al-zawahiri (Osama bin Laden s closest advisor) explained in a July 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-zarqawi (the former leader of al-qaeda in Iraq), We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a race for hearts and minds of our umma [the global community of Muslims]. 4 Every video released by bin Laden and al-zawahiri on the Web-based As-Sahab (the clouds) media network is a salvo in the struggle for strategic influence. Therefore, in confronting al-qaeda, the United States and its allies must discredit and delegitimize efforts to justify terrorist violence and empower credible voices within the Muslim world to publicly identify the contradictions and narrative weaknesses of al-qaeda s ideology. The Vulnerabilities of al-qaeda s Ideology The ideology constructed by the leaders of al-qaeda and its affiliates in the global Salafijihadist movement is relatively simple. 5 To paraphrase the movement s key ideologues: The world around us is a mess because of infidels and apostates, so join our global jihad and help us create a world in which our interpretation of Islam dominates all spheres of human endeavor. Because al-qaeda and its affiliates and supporters are convinced that the achievement of this utopian vision requires violence, they must constantly defend their ideology and their actions against criticism not only from the Western world, but from the Muslim world, whose members have suffered most from terror attacks. The Salafi-jihadist ideology portrays jihad as perpetual war between Muslims and non- Muslims. Jarret Brachman has observed that use of the term jihad a core Islamic concept of struggle in this fashion is unwelcome among most Muslims, who point to Qur anic passages that emphasize the use of violence only for self-defense from unsolicited aggressors. However, it is embraced by more radical elements within Islam as a rallying cry for those who see themselves suffering under the draconian policies of autocratic governments; for those in a

struggle with imperial overlords for the right to establish a national homeland; and, for those who see themselves fighting to stave off advanced stages of cultural corruption. 6 Thus, the success of al-qaeda depends largely on its ability to convince large swaths of Muslims to embrace a particular interpretation of concepts and symbols that have deep historical meaning and context in the Muslim world. Leaders and affiliates of al-qaeda must constantly defend the legitimacy of their interpretation of jihad; this has particularly been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the past year, a number of religious leaders and fellow extremists who once had significant influence with al-qaeda have publicly criticized it and its affiliates for the use of violent tactics. 7 For example, Saudi Arabia s top cleric, Grand Mufti Sheik Abdul Aziz al- Asheik, gave a speech in October 2007 attempting to deter Saudis from participating in jihadist activities in Iraq. Similarly, Abdul Aziz al-sherif, a top leader of the violent Egyptian movement Islamic Jihad and a longtime associate of al-zawahiri, recently published a book that renounces violent jihad on legal and religious grounds. 8 In Pakistan s Northwest Frontier Province, Islamic scholar Maulana Hassan Jan declared the practice of suicide bombing un-islamic, and Mufti Zainul Abidin issued a fatwa that declares the Taliban to be out of Islam as a result of their violence and their failure to follow Islamic teachings. 9 Statements and fatwas such as these undermine al-qaeda s critical need to maintain legitimacy within the Muslim world. In response to such criticisms, Abu Yahya al-libi considered by some analysts as the heir-apparent to the head of al-qaeda s central leadership recently published a book online in which he attempts to justify killing innocent Muslims. 10 His interpretation of the Islamic tenet of al-tatarrus the exemption to the Islamic prohibition against shedding innocent Muslim blood is focused on historical instances when a Muslim army is forced to kill fellow Muslims who are being used as shields by non-muslim enemies. Thus, he argues, the defense of Islam requires the martyrdom of these Muslims, and he encourages readers to accept the argument of Ibn Taymiyya, a prominent thirteenth-century scholar, that their death is for the sake of jihad and is analogous with the death of Muslims when fighting [for Islam], in which case they are martyrs. 11 Similarly, the field commander of Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyya, Imam Samudra, wrote a book in 2004 attempting to justify the October 2002 Bali bombing that killed more than two hundred Western tourists. He acknowledges that it is forbidden in Islam to kill women and children, but asserts that this rule only applies when the enemies themselves do not transgress the rule. He then argues that U.S. and Western actions from the embargo placed on Iraq to Israeli attacks against Palestinians with America s military and financial support have resulted in thousands of innocent Muslim deaths. 12 These and other publications by Islamist extremists demonstrate their concern over the need to rationalize and defend their violent actions against criticism from learned scholars within the Muslim world. This is not a challenge unique to al-qaeda: terrorists and insurgents throughout history have faced a significant challenge of convincing their audiences that the righteousness of their cause justifies their violent attacks. For al-qaeda, nowhere has this rationalization effort become more prevalent than through Web sites, blogs, videos and other forms of communication on the Internet. Al-Qaeda and the Modern Tools of Influence Warfare To most analysts, al-qaeda is a pioneer of online terrorist-oriented activity. For more than a decade, the organization has been disseminating propaganda, military instruction manuals, and videos online in multiple languages. According to a study by Gabriel Weimann, thousands of

Web sites along with e-mail, chat rooms, and virtual message boards are increasingly used by terrorists as virtual training camps, providing an online forum for indoctrination as well as the distribution of terrorist manuals and instructions. He also notes that terrorist organizations capture information about the users who browse their Web sites, which can be useful for the early stages of recruitment. 13 Indeed, al-qaeda leaders view those at the center of their information strategy the Web site designers, bloggers, and video editors as important mujahideen. As al-libi declared, May Allah bless you lions of the front, for by Allah, the fruits of your combined efforts sound, video, and text are more severe for the infidels and their lackeys than the falling of rockets and missiles on their heads. 14 Through the Internet, the spread of al-qaeda s ideology has taken on a form of viral marketing, with throngs of al-qaeda supporters and imitators creating new Web sites, posting blog content and YouTube videos, and forwarding links to other online resources via e-mail distribution lists. Moreover, as Evan Kohlmann recently observed, radical Web sites have evolved into a disturbing MySpace-like social-networking hub for [extremists] intent on becoming the next generation of terrorists, hijackers, and even suicide bombers. 15 This evolution creates a self-sustaining community of believers and supporters, some of whom can be expected to transfer their radical activities from the online world to the physical world. Overall, the Internet provides an increasingly important forum where al-qaeda and its critics debate the merits of the violent jihadist campaign. Al-Qaeda strategists such as Abu Musab al-suri have consistently encouraged the followers of the movement to use the Internet for mobilizing the umma, arguing that communications via open source channels empowers the movement by disseminating ideology and tactical information. 16 However, the ability of anyone online to speak on behalf of the jihadi movement means that dissenting voices can now reach a wider audience. This has emboldened some individuals within the community of radical Muslims to voice their disagreements with al-qaeda s tactics and strategies. 17 According to Gabriel Weimann, online debates occur regularly between members of violent jihadi groups, and may reflect religious differences, clashes of political agendas, and disagreement over actions and operations. 18 These disagreements, in turn, offer potential opportunities to exploit ideological weaknesses in the movement, as driving wedges can help undermine and discredit its ideology. Influence Warfare and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Like al-qaeda and other terrorist groups, nation-states must also rely on positive perceptions, or at least acceptance, among key constituencies in order to muster support necessary for achieving their strategic objectives. Unfortunately, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates aptly noted, It is embarrassing that al-qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America.... Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. strategic communications. 19 Indeed, when it comes to information warfare, our enemies have proven to be more agile. For example, a recent Washington Post report described how the Taliban clearly dominates the propaganda war. 20 They use a variety of high-tech means to communicate their version of events, often far faster than their adversaries, particularly on controversies over civilian casualties inflicted by U.S. and NATO airstrikes. 21 According to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, When it comes to video, we are frankly in the Stone Age. NATO has no ability to gather video from the field, to show people what is happening. We are also barely on the field when it comes to the Web. 22

During the first several years of the Global War on Terror, many in Washington saw engaging the information domain as relatively unimportant. Instead, the responses to terrorism in the initial years after 9/11 were focused primarily on kinetic activities, with the U.S. military, law enforcement organizations, and intelligence agencies leading the counterterrorism effort. Only recently have we seen policymakers and government analysts worldwide calling for a greater focus on the critical non-kinetic aspects of counterterrorism. As Danish security expert Thomas Elkjer Nissen recently observed, The battle of perceptions is just as important, if not more so, as the physical battle. It is winning the local population, and not the physical destruction of the Taliban, that will win this battle. 23 A significant challenge for the United States is determining who should be responsible for leading this effort. During the Cold War, the United States Information Agency (USIA) directed the nation s effort to counter communist propaganda and confront our enemies in the communication realm. The director of USIA reported directly to the president through the National Security Council, and coordinated closely with the secretary of state on foreign policy matters. During the 1990s, USIA was shut down as an independent agency, with most personnel either retiring or transferring to the State Department. As Secretary Gates noted, this shortsighted approach undermined America s ability to engage, assist, and communicate with other parts of the world the soft power which had been so important throughout the Cold War. 24 And yet, it has become increasingly clear that a USIA-like organization is needed to lead the nation s effort to engage our enemies in the information domain. Recognizing this need in 2002, then-secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld attempted to establish an Office of Strategic Information (OSI) within the Pentagon. As described in news accounts at the time, one part of OSI s mission would be to release news items to foreign media outlets in an attempt to influence foreign audiences perceptions of the United States. 25 However, a surge of public criticism citing the potential for these news items coming back to the United States from foreign news outlets and thus violating the Smith-Mundt Act (which prohibits the U.S. government from distributing propaganda to its citizens) led President Bush to order the program s dismantling. Today, the strategic communication landscape remains a patchwork of players with overlapping duties. 26 Several entities share responsibility for waging the battle of ideas, including the White House, the Department of State, the National Counterterrorism Center s Extremist Messaging Branch, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, USAID, and the Department of Defense. For its part, the Department of Defense recently announced it will pay private contractors in Iraq up to $300 million to produce news stories, entertainment programs, and public service announcements for the Iraqi media in an effort to engage and inspire the local population to support U.S. objectives and the Iraqi government. 27 According to some Pentagon officials, information operations have already played a key role in the reduction of violence in Iraq. For several years, U.S.-produced public service broadcasts and billboards have touted improvements in government services, promoted political reconciliation, praised the Iraqi military, and encouraged Iraqi citizens to report criminal activity. The United States communicates to local audiences in Iraq through various Arabiclanguage radio broadcasts: the Voice of America offers news and current events; Radio Sawa offers a mix of both music and news geared toward young adults; and Radio Free Iraq seeks to provide fair and objective news to the Iraqi people. The United States also sponsors Alhurra ( The Free One ), an Arabic-language satellite television network that offers objective news coverage. Operated by the Middle East Broadcasting Network, Alhurra was established primarily

to provide an alternative to news reports broadcast by the al-jazeera satellite network. Alhurra s broadcasts reach 22 countries throughout the Middle East with a mixture of discussion programs, news, health, sports, and fashion, and the United States provides its annual budget of $70 million. 28 The United States is also working with local Arabic TV stations, newspapers, radio, and Internet publications in order to communicate American policies and intent in Iraq. Recommendations While these efforts move us in the right direction, there is considerable room for improvement. In addition to dramatic increases in spending on the civilian instruments of national security including diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development the U.S. government must overcome significant limitations in what it can do to confront online radicalization. 29 While some government agencies have been monitoring radical Web sites and blogs for years, authorities are legally constrained in how they can intervene in these forums. In particular, Congress needs to examine the Smith-Mundt Act and provide new legal basis for a robust online counter-ideology effort that hopefully will fracture the jihadi community and force the propagandists to defend their deficient ideology. As part of this effort, the United States must craft and deliver messages via all available media including the Internet that will undermine and discredit al-qaeda s rationales for violence. Terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw explains that a government s counterterrorism message must not only serve to reduce the probability of violence, but also to influence the terrorist organization s incentive structure, increase the opportunities to exit the terrorist group, and promote internal dissension. In essence, a government s policy should aim to make the organization less destructive and less cohesive rather than to defeat it militarily. 30 Throughout its strategic communications effort, the United States must highlight the unappealing nature of al-qaeda and the impossibility of achieving its objectives through the use of violence, which will only lead to more Muslim deaths. Counter-ideology messages should highlight the disconnect between fact and the ideology of defending Islam against the West. For example, if Muslims are under attack, why are they doing so well in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere? What about all the generous charity and development work from the West that benefits the Muslim world? In addition, our response to al-qaeda must address how extremist interpretations of the Qur an by a small handful of charismatic ideologues (Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb) have led people away from the true Salafi model of pious living. For example, how can you selectively ignore passages in the Qur an in your attempts to justify killing others, when the Qur an only authorizes defensive violence? How are you promoting unity and peace in the Muslim world by all these attacks? The deeper challenge in combating Salafi-jihadist ideology is identifying and enlisting allies within the Muslim world, credible voices who can help us achieve our strategic influence objectives. Among certain communities, we are viewed as a discredited messenger, and thus have limited if any chance of convincing those audiences. As a result, we must recognize the limitations of the nation-state in the information domain, and embrace the new and innovative ways in which individuals are increasingly empowered to confront hostile ideologies. One recent effort of note is the Radical Middle Way an organization of young British Muslims who have rejected the Salafi-jihadist interpretation of the Qur an and are trying to consolidate a mainstream response to fundamentalist Islam. Their public events and Internet activities are funded by the sale of music videos, and are being touted as an example of how to

weaken the resonance of al-qaeda s ideology among youth. 31 Similarly, in Indonesia, Ahmad Dhani the leader of the immensely popular rock band Dewa has used music to influence millions of fans, encouraging them to resist the tide of religious extremism. As Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid former president of Indonesia observed, Dhani and his group are on the front lines of a global conflict, defending Islam from its fanatical hijackers [and helping] to rescue an entire generation from Wahhabi-financed extremists whose goal is to transform Muslim youth into holy warriors and suicide bombers. 32 And Egyptian Amr Khaled, who runs one of the Arab world s most popular Web sites and hosts a regular show on a Saudi-owned religious satellite channel, is a moderate who encourages Muslims to transform their lives and their communities through Islam while also getting along with the West. He writes, Osama bin Laden is saying he is talking on behalf of Muslims; who asked him to talk on behalf of us? Nobody. 33 Private initiatives like these will most likely do far more to counter the influence of al-qaeda than any U.S. public diplomacy strategy or strategic communications effort. We should provide money, diplomatic support, and covert assistance to any such activity that poses a threat to the unity and legitimacy of the Salafijihadist community. A lack of unity, anti-al-qaeda religious rulings, and a widespread refusal to accept the need for violence these are all things that al-qaeda fears much worse than bullets or Predator drones with Hellfire missiles. Through a concerted strategic influence effort, we can erode the base of support that is so critical to their movement, and hasten its decay. As Secretary Gates notes, Arguably the most important military component in the war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower [others]. 34 Clearly, the messenger matters as much as the messages. The strategic communication efforts of the United States must evolve to a more sophisticated approach that embraces competition with the myriad sources of information available on the Internet. Failure to do so provides our enemies with an advantage in the information domain that they cannot be allowed to have. Notes 1 This article draws from the author s book, Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas (Praeger Security International, forthcoming). 2 Col. Thomas X. Hammes, Retired, Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves; FIFTH EMERGES, Military Review 87, no. 3 (May/June 2007): 14-23. 3 See William McCants, ed., Militant Ideology Atlas (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006). Available online at http://www.ctc.usma.edu. 4 John Hughes, Winning the war of words in the campaign against terrorism, The Christian Science Monitor 17 May 2006. Emphasis added. 5 See Militant Ideology Atlas. For a detailed analysis of the global Salafi movement, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 235. 6 Jarret Brachman, Jihad Doctrine and Radical Islam, in The Making of a Terrorist, Volume I: Recruitment, ed. James J. F. Forest (Praeger Security International, 2005). 7 See Mike McConnell, DNI Authorities Hearing, (testimony, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., February 14, 2008). Available online at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080214_testimony.pdf (date accessed: 2 November 2008).

8 See Abdul Aziz al-sherif, What Life has Taught Me (self-published, Cairo, Egypt, August 2007) in Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, U.S. Adapts Cold War Idea to Fight Terrorists, New York Times, 18 March 2008. 9 The News [Karachi], 16 September 2007; and, PakTribune, 15 September 2007, in Fatwa in Tribal Pakistan Declares Taliban Out Of Islam, Terrorism Focus 5, no. 12 (25 March 2008): Briefs(1). 10 Jarret Brachman and Abdullah Warius, Abu Yahya al-libi s Human Shields in Modern Jihad, CTC Sentinel 1, no. 6 (May 2008): 1-4. Available online at http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel. 11 Ibid. 12 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris (Solo, Indonesia: al-jazera, 2004), 109-116. See Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Unlicensed to Kill: Countering Imam Samudra s Justification for the Bali Bombing (Singapore: Peace Matters, 2006). 13 Gabriel Weimann, Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization, in Forest, The Making of a Terrorist. 14 Abu Yahya al-libi, To the Army of Difficulty in Somalia, al-sahab Media, April 2007. 15 Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda s MySpace : Terrorist Recruitment on the Internet, CTC Sentinel 1, no. 2 (January 2008): 8-9. Available online at http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel. 16 Jarret Brachman and James J. F. Forest, Exploring the Role of Virtual Training Camps, in Michael Innes, ed., Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 124-138. 17 See Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-qaida s Organizational Vulnerabilities (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006) and Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qaida, 1996-2006 (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, March 2008). Available online at http://ctc.usma.edu. 18 Gabriel Weimann, When Fatwas Clash Online: Terrorist Debates on the Internet, in Influence Warfare. 19 Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture (lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, November 26, 2007), U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199. 20 Pamela Constable, A Modernized Taliban Thrives in Afghanistan: Militia Operates a Parallel Government, Washington Post, 20 September 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com. 21 See the comments by the chief spokesman for NATO forces, Brigadier General Richard Blanchette, in Pamela Constable A Modernized Taliban. 22 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Public Diplomacy in NATO-led Operations, (seminar, Copenhagen, Denmark, October 8, 2007). 23 Thomas Elkjer Nissen, The Taliban s Information Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of NATO Information Operations and Taliban Information Activities (Copenhagen, Denmark: Royal Danish Defense College, December 2007), 9. 24 Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture. 25 Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, Pentagon Propaganda Plan Is Undemocratic, Possibly Illegal, 19 February 2002. Available online at http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1660. 26 Matthew Moneyhon, Taming China s Wild West: Ethnic Conflict in Xinjiang, Peace, Conflict, and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal 5, no. 5 (2004): 2-23.

27 Karen deyoung and Walter Pincus, U.S. to Fund Pro-American Publicity in Iraqi Media, Washington Post, 3 October 2008. 28 Alhurra TV, About Us, http://www.alhurra.com (date accessed: 1 August 2007). 29 Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture. 30 Martha Crenshaw, An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism, Orbis 29, no. 3 (Fall 1985): 465-89. 31 See their Web site at http://www.radicalmiddleway.co.uk. 32 Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid and C. Holland Taylor, In Indonesia, Songs Against Terrorism, Washington Post, 7 October 2005, A(23). Available online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/06/ar2005100601559.html. 33 Asra Q. Nomani, Heroes and Pioneers, Time, 14 May 2007, p. 99. 34 Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture.