Is Virtue Ethics (Still) Elitist? Edward C. DuBois University at Albany, SUNY (edubois@albany.edu) Word Count: 4,103 [excluding title, abstract, and references] Abstract: Aristotle's original theory of virtue has been criticized as being elitist because it denies virtue to (e.g.) women and slaves for reasons that contemporary theories of virtue deny. However, modern theories are still prone to charges of kinds of elitism which may make them unappealing to some. I review Aristotle's theory to pinpoint the basic charge of elitism, and then discuss how modern theories have remedied this. I then examine objections to these theories, and show how Aristotelian virtue ethics (AVE) can successfully counter such objections. Finally, I propose a distinction regarding the problem of elitism that identifies 'acceptable' and 'objectionable' elitism in AVE; philosophers should embrace the former while rejecting the latter.
Is Virtue Ethics (Still) Elitist? Introduction Aristotle's theory of virtue has been criticized as being elitist, because it denies even the possibility that a slave or a woman, among others, could ever achieve virtue. Modern theories of virtue which take Aristotle as their common ancestor (also called 'neo-aristotelian' theories) have worked to overcome this arbitrary elitism, to great success. However, even these modern theories suffer from charges of elitism. In this paper, I will explore some of the arguments for and against elitism in contemporary virtue ethics. I start by examining the historical context in which Aristotle's original theory was devised, and provide an answer the question 'To whom is the Nicomachean Ethics addressed?' I argue that such an audience was comprised of a small group of noblemen who Aristotle saw as being eligible for virtue and the good life. Then, I look at how modern theories have tried to overcome this perceived deficiency in Aristotelian thought, and how certain authors have still identified strains of elitism in contemporary work. I will also examine replies to such charges. In this, I largely follow work done by Frans Svensson (2008), who treats many objections to virtue ethics regarding elitist tendencies. Finally, I argue that these previous objections are all of a class which I call 'objectionable' forms of elitism in AVE; luckily, such objections can be easily answered. However, I demonstrate that AVE contains another kind of elitism, which I call 'acceptable' elitism, that is indispensable to it. That is, while all efforts must be made to reject objectionable elitist tendencies, virtue ethicists can and should embrace the acceptable 1
elitism which I identify at the end of this paper. Aristotle's Original Audience In The Audience of the Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas W. Smith (2000) suggests that Aristotle is addressing his work to people who were attracted to a life of noble action (184). For many Greek philosophers, such action is to be found in a life of civic involvement with one's polis. But, as Smith argues, [a]mbition for political rule as a way of achieving noble activity has ambiguous results, and while some of Aristotle's listeners might gravitate toward a life of virtue, others might gravitate toward a life of despotism and mastery (168-69). Lovers of noble activity are often attracted to honor, says Aristotle, but honor itself is just a kind of secondary good. It points to the desire for something even more basic, which Smith summarizes by remarking that Aristotle concludes that the lust for honor implies a lust for virtue (170). This is because honors are conferred by excellent people, and they are given as an acknowledgment of fine (read: virtuous) actions. Yet, the lust for honor has another side. As Smith points out, [t]he centrality of honor and its [Homeric] tendency to self-assertion and mastery were transmitted to classical Greece, where it affected ancient politics decisively (173). There existed a strong temptation to pursue mastery over one's fellows [which] seemed to promise both the extension of one's range of honorable activities as well as the chance to preemptively strike against those engaged in their own selfish bids for mastery (174-75). The result of the ambiguity of a life of 'noble action' is that, according to Smith, virtue became an 2
equivocal term. While some men pursued a socially constructed and reinforced path of virtueas-equity, others were tempted to tyranny. This latter conception of virtue is what he terms virtue-as-virility, referencing the Homeric interpretation of noble actions as bound up with manliness, domination, and strength (176, all). In the Ethics, Aristotle presents the common opinion that virtue-as-equity is insufficient for a good, happy life because it produces too little activity. On this account, one might be virtuous even while being asleep. Yet, Smith cautions us not to confuse this account for Aristotle's own view about virtue: [b]ecause the inquiry is dialectical [ ] he must initially present it as it appears to his audience. Most people, in Aristotle's estimation, think that happiness consists of a set of tangible external goods, perhaps obtained through mastery and assertion, which will make one's life secure (180). Thus, Aristotle's first task is to portray virtue-as-equity as implausible and undesirable. His second task is to demonstrate why such a 'foolhardy' view is actually in the listener's best interest. Smith's contention is that in trying to complete this second task, Aristotle leads his students through a more and more detailed inquiry that argues that virtue is the best outlet for their desire for noble activity (182). One way he does this is to replace 'honor' with 'good friends' as the most desirable external good: [he] tries to moderate the ambitions of his honor-loving audience by demonstrating that noble activity is most achievable against a backdrop of certain social and moral commitments. Therefore, undermining these (through bids for political despotism) is irrational, since it means rejecting or subduing those who are instrumental to one's own happiness (182, all). 3
Smith's view stands in contrast to positions like Leo Strauss' which argue that the audience of the Ethics was comprised of noblemen who uncritically accepted the goodness of moral virtue. Such men, these authors say, only needed some educational refinement, partly to clarify the demands of virtue and partly to guide them towards philosophy as the natural outcome of such moral commitments (167). Smith admits that Aristotle assumes his audience to have been raised nobly (kalos) in their habits, but that after such an assumption, Aristotle takes off not from a commitment to virtue but one of a certain kind of activity (168). This is the commitment to noble activity, which bifurcates in the way described above. The Good and the Beautiful Smith (2000) carefully argues that the audience of Aristotle's Ethics be understood as committed, ambiguously, to noble activity rather than wholly to good (virtuous) actions. Yet, even with such a plausible position, there are still questions that need to be answered if we are to discern the general features of Aristotle's audience, i.e. the properties that would tend to hold regardless of their commitments to virtue and activity. The guiding question, then, is 'What made a Greek gentleman?' The most important item is the quality of kalokagathia. The ancient Greek term kalokagathia is the noun form of an adjectival phrase, kalos k'agathos, literally 'good and beautiful.' That phrase itself is made up of three parts: kalos (good), kai (and), and agathos (beautiful). Hence, one might think of kalokagathia as 'good-and-beautiful-ness', 4
though an exact translation to English (as with many Greek terms) is somewhat elusive. As M.A. Dürrigl (2002) explains, Greek conceptions of good heritage (gentlemanliness) were intertwined with assumptions about not only the moral worth of individuals, but also their aesthetic worth. Dürrigl states that the idea of being both good and beautiful would bring to mind qualities such as (outward) handsomeness and (inward) decency. It was an ideal to be achieved through education and lifestyle which pertained to men (women were not considered) of good heritage and good upbringing (208-9). To the ancient Greeks, especially at Athens, kalokagathia included moral and social perfection (209). Hence, this quality is what marked off the aristocrats from the common people; only highborn citizens could possess a quality like kalokagathia, because such a quality was endemic only to that class. This means that the audience of Aristotle's Ethics would be made up of young noblemen who were not only enamored of a life of noble (political) activity, but also largely understood such a life as their birthright. The gentlemen were among the most likely to be privately educated, and thus literate and articulate; they could afford costly lessons from grammarians and philosophers, while most other young men went to work in a trade or as a laborer. The wealth of their families ensured that young gentlemen would not only have access to philosophical instruction about virtue, but that they would be able to exercise the virtues as well. This is because certain of the virtues required financial and social means in order to act nobly. For instance, Aristotle's discussion of generosity (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, Ch. 1) reveals that one must have sufficient wealth to give away in order to count as generous. The giving must 5
somehow benefit others, and Aristotle praises the man who gives so much that he leaves less for himself (cf. 1120b). All this implies that the wealthy, and not simply those with a few possessions, qualify for potential generosity. [Who else could give so much that he has less for himself, and still be able to live comfortably enough to take part in civic life?] Further, Aristotle's discussion of the magnanimous man (one who possesses megalopsychia, or 'great-souledness') is telling, insofar as he is suitably aware and proud of his great expenses and great deeds (cf. 122b25-30, where Aristotle explicitly denies megalopsychia to the poor). The upshot ought to be quite clear: the realm of the classical Aristotelian virtues belonged to a relatively small group of (young) men who came from respected families of financial and social standing. Without such prerequisites, the men could not qualify as standing among the kaloi k'agathoi, the good and the beautiful. The Elitism of Modern Virtue Ethics Since the resurgence in virtue ethics a few decades ago, there has been a reinterpretation of Aristotle to make a flourishing life more accessible to a wider range of people. Contemporary analyses of virtue are written with the everyman and everywoman in mind, and pride themselves on being much more attuned to our modern requirements on liberty, plurality, and equality. There are now even more ways to lead a virtuous life, and eudaimonia is considered open to a wider segment of humanity than ever before. The ancient, arbitrary elitism is now gone. For instance, while money might improve our odds at having a good life, it is no longer a chief determinant of such a life. [To wit, there are few, if any, virtue theories which now endorse 6
the kind of megalopsychia that Aristotle does.] And, while we can still recognize that some life conditions might preclude certain manifestations of virtue, we do not discriminate or rank such manifestations because others are possible. For example, an amputee may not be able to display physical courage (say, in helping to ward off an attacker) but may certainly display other kinds of courageous behavior perhaps by speaking in favor of a noble but unpopular cause. Therefore, in many respects, modern virtue ethics promotes a refreshing egalitarianism. The virtues are no longer rooted in facts about a few people's lives, but rather they have become rooted in facts about the overwhelming majority of human lives. Not only that, but contemporary values and modes of living are all given serious consideration. Rosalind Hursthouse's landmark On Virtue Ethics (1999) contains the following summation: proponents [of neo-aristotelian theories of virtue] allow themselves to regard Aristotle as just plain wrong on slaves and women, and [ they] do not restrict [themselves] to Aristotle's list of virtues (8). Few would deny that such ideological progress is an ingredient of virtue ethics' renewed popularity over the past few decades. But, is the elitism really gone, or just harder to spot? Are there still issues with these modern theories qua vestiges of elitism? Even though we have opened up the possibilities for virtue, it seems that there are still consequences which end up precluding a good portion of the human population. In the rest of this section, I explore some of these objections as well as the best responses to them. Hasse Hämäläinen's Objection. Hämäläinen (2011) argues that since only a few people ever 7
instantiate full phronesis (practical wisdom, the faculty which results in virtue) not only are there scant virtuous people, but the rest of us can never really trust our attempts to find and emulate such individuals. Further, we may not have a reason to even try! His argument is as follows: say that for the practically wise, it is 1/n probable that whomever they choose as practically wise really is wise. Yet, since the accuracy of the insight of any non-practically wise person is thus less accurate i.e. the probability of correct perception is < 1/n the nonpractically-wise have little to no reason to try to identify their moral superiors (82, all). In the end, this amounts to something of an elitist position that should worry virtue ethicists. Hämäläinen voices the core of the criticism thusly: [w]ho would like to think, after all, that she has no good reason to attempt to choose whose ethics to follow, but let those who call themselves wise show her that on her behalf? Hardly anyone (83). This is an important point to bring up against modern virtue ethics, since it prompts serious development in order to defeat the charge of elitism. Hämäläinen acknowledges that the charge is serious, but beginnings of a resolution might still take shape. He suggests that one way to overcome such elitism is by working with a more Aristotelian idea of communities as places small enough to ensure that the inhabitants can accurately know and evaluate each other's character. This may be difficult with the vast legal and political landscape that obscures much of the old senses of community, however. So, at the least, the idea of who should count as moral role models should be up to vigorous public debate to help reach this level of knowledge (92). 1 This would prompt public discussion of the virtues, 1 There are strains of Schneewind's critique of virtue ethics present in Hämäläinen's identification of the elitism 8
which is laudable, but it is unclear just how such a solution would begin to be implemented. Julia Driver's Objection. Hämäläinen identifies difficulties with the epistemic issue of how an agent might know that a given person is really practicallly wise, and also the motivational issue of why the agent should even care in the face of such underwhelming odds. Yet, this is only the most recent in a cascade of objections against contemporary readings of Aristotle which end up amounting to charges of elitism. For instance, Julia Driver (2001) argues that Aristotelian virtue ethics (hereafter AVE) places a kind of undue intellectual development and moral sophistication on the agent in order to attain full virtue (51). Following Frans Svensson (2008), this ought not to be too surprising. Virtue would cease to be an ideal if most people already possessed it. Yet, it functions as a useful ideal just because we are all in different stages of development and benefit from the kind of guidance and motivation that moral exemplars can provide. What is more troubling about Driver's position, though, is that she suggests that full virtue is beyond our grasp. That is, the majority of us could never successfully instantiate the necessary psychological, intellectual, and emotional structures which virtuous character seems to require. For instance, she makes the case that [v]irtue must be accessible to those who are not wise but kind; to those who had the misfortune to grow up in repressive environments that warped objection, namely that there seems to (unreasonably) exist an epistemically privileged group of moral exemplars. This precludes most people from being able to (or wanting to) identify their moral obligations for themselves. Cf. Svensson (2008), p. 149-50. 9
their understanding, yet who are capable of showing the appropriate compassionate responses to human suffering (54). Svensson (2008) identifies the core issue: [a]ssuming that ought implies can, it seems as if the ideal of full virtue must be normatively irrelevant, except possibly in relation to a few intellectually well developed and morally sophisticated persons (134). Yet, Svensson also suggests a reply to Driver might be found in adhering to a developmental model of virtue, wherein an action still is right if it is what a virtuous person would do, but wherein we are allowed to adjust for the gradations of virtue within each person. On such an account, right behavior involves different things for different people (139). The person closer to virtue is laden down with many more cognitive and affective requirements than, say, the person who is just learning to make substantial moral choices for the first time. For the beginner, the cognitive and affective requirements (perhaps in kind as well as degree) are neither expected nor required. Following this model, AVE cannot be said to violate the 'ought implies can' rule, since developmental virtue does not require us to live in a way that is not accessible to us, given our specific levels of development in virtue (139, emphasis mine). Peter Simpson's Objection. Peter Simpson (as summarized in Svensson, 2008) argues that Aristotle's Ethics is only addressed to those who already have the proper 'first principles' of ethics firmly entrenched in their souls: [t]he first principles are treated as facts on the basis of which Aristotle's project proceeds and, hence, are not provided with further arguments. Hence, those that lack knowledge of such principles are at a real disadvantage when it comes to attaining virtue. Aristotle, according to Simpson, denounces [those people] as being useless 10
and their possibly contrary opinions are not thought of as demanding serious attention (140). Svensson interprets the upshot of Simpson's critique to be that most people, on Aristotle's account, are pretty much left in the dark as to the direction their feelings, habits, and thoughts ought to follow. This is an important point, since AVE relies on 'what a virtuous person would do' as a criterion for rightness. Yet, the Ethics fails to even provide anything like a criterion of the ways of acting, feeling, and reasoning, characteristic of virtuous persons in particular situations which would be a great boon to the many people who are struggling with the first principles of ethics. This is problematic, because as a normative theory it seems that AVE excludes the many who are not already occupying some level of correct habituation towards the virtues. Yet, as Svensson points out, engaging in a continuous aspiration towards this [virtuous] ideal is what [ ] an ethical life is basically about. Among the virtues of this ideal [ are] courage, generosity, justice, temperance, and wisdom, [ ] none of which seem essentially biased towards a certain class (146). One might argue, though, that even an equalization of the virtues cannot provide the requisite action-guidance which is to be expected from a normative theory. But, this is not necessarily true for AVE; following Svensson (147-48), it is apparent that at the time when people begin to seriously reflect about their lives (and how to live them), they will end up reflecting upon the kinds of thoughts and behaviors that are (e.g.) just, temperate, and courageous. We already have some conception of what it is to be [these things] as well as identifiable role models to help us along (148). There is a middle ground due to stages of moral 11
development; we are not either totally wise or totally ignorant. And, finally, it is possible that the very ideal of being a virtuous person is incompatible with the notion of a rigid and universal decision-procedure; this last thought in particular seems to nullify Simpson's point about a lack of guidance (149). J.B. Schneewind's Objection. Schneewind famously wrote about the 'misfortunes' of AVE, chief among them being the observation that many people lack the central theoretical component of practical wisdom (phronesis). This results in cases of epistemological privilege; it means that certain folks will be equipped with the right kind of knowledge to act appropriately, while the rest of us need, more or less blindly, to rely on the judgment of the more wise (Svensson, 2008: 149-50). This is very close to what Hasse Hämäläinen sees as a shortcoming of AVE. But, while Hämäläinen attempts to supply a remedy on behalf of AVE, Schneewind rejects it in favor of a modern, largely Kantian conception of morality as self-governance wherein agents are assumed to be aware of their own moral obligations (Svensson, 2008: 150). I argue that Schneewind's assumption of 'equal competence' among moral agents is dangerously false. There is a clear difference between an equal capacity for ethical action among rational adults and an equal competence for ethical action among rational adults. In considering these terms to be identical, we make a harmful mistake which might plausibly result in unreasonably high expectations and misplaced trust among individuals. Yet, this by itself is not enough to dismiss Schneewind's charge against virtue. It is merely a consideration against 12
his view. But, there are other considerations which are directly applicable to his objection. For instance, Svensson's reply to Schneewind again invokes the developmental account of virtue. On Schneewind's view, it seems as if there's not much room for moral aspiration and that the capacities required for perfectly moral behavior are already there to an equal degree in all normal adults. Svensson argues that this is an undesirable view; AVE is more desirable because it turns a virtuous life into something more dynamic which involves continual aspiration to be something better, rather than just deciding when to activate our fully-formed ethical capacities (152). It seems like Schneewind's view leaves little room for growth and improvement, which is at odds with our moral observations (i.e. that people are at different stages of morality) and perhaps provides less action guidance than the very position he seeks to criticize. Is Virtue Ethics (Still) Elitist? In the above paragraphs, I have set out some main objections to AVE's perceived elitism, and offered replies on behalf of the virtue ethicist. But, it is time to examine the state of things; given all of the dialogue, is AVE (still) elitist? In short, yes but it isn't all bad. I want to argue that an element of elitism must be openly acknowledged in AVE. That is, there is an aspect of virtue ethics which is openly elitist, but it is my contention that this need not worry someone who identifies with the spirit and intentions of AVE. Here is my suggestion: we have to draw a distinction between what I call 'objectionable' elitism and what I shall call an 'acceptable' elitism in AVE. Roughly, the former category contains objections to AVE which are elitist in what seems to be a very arbitrary sense. For instance, limiting virtue only to a small cadre of well-born male 13
philosophers is objectionably elitist, as is alienating anyone who lacks the full amount of practical wisdom. Such components of a theory strike us as wrong; there is no good reason to restrict virtue to certain groups, or exclude those who are not-yet-wise. Yet, we ought to acknowledge that virtue ethics, even in the neo-aristotelian way, just is an elitist theory because full virtue is not (and will not be) achieved by everyone. There is an inductive prediction about the relative percentage of people that will attain virtue, and this prediction is necessarily exclusive. This may be in part to Aristotle's observation that, try as one might, achieving virtue depends on having at least some good luck (eutycheia) in your life. Without this, even the most diligent devotee of virtue is faced with incredible odds. However, luck notwithstanding, it takes immense commitment and discipline to act with practical wisdom in the way that virtues require of us. Yet, what I identify here is a different species of elitism than discussed in other criticisms of AVE. It is an example of what I see as an acceptable kind of elitism. In fact, virtue ethics seems predicated on this kind of exclusionary principle. Acknowledging that many people fall short of full virtue (actuality) does not per se limit who might end up being virtuous (potentiality). There is no arbitrary exclusion based on class, gender, or education level. All persons, theoretically speaking, are considered as eligible to be good. But, nevertheless, virtue ethics understands that the label of 'virtuous person' will fail to apply to many. This admission concedes that a life of virtue is a difficult path that many of us are never able to follow to its end, and that certain unknown events which some call 'luck' or 14
'chance' often force us to meander and dally on that path. But, this does not spell doom for virtue ethics; there is a hope that this admission may actually be motivational. The acknowledged rarity of virtue could end up spurring at least some people towards a path of noble action rather than deterring them from trying. By admitting that virtue is rare, but urging that it is still worth pursuing, this elitism may end up serving as a reason for one to engage in conscious efforts at character-building and self-improvement. AVE encourages us to do our best in all situations; as Svensson suggests, it encourages a full and dynamic life guided by practical wsdom. But, even if only a few of us get to experience a flourishing, virtuous life, it is important for all of us to at least try to live in such a way. 15
References Driver, Julia, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001) Dürrigl, M.A., Kalokagathia Beauty is More than External Appearance," Journal of Cosmetic Dermatology 1 (2002): 208-210. Engberg-Pedersen, Troels, Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight (Oxford: Clarendon,1983) Hämäläinen, Hasse, Elitism and the Ethics of Virtue, Diacritics 25.2 (2011): 79-94. Hursthouse, Rosalind, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999) Schneewind, J.B., The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998) Simpson, Peter, Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle in Virtue Ethics A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel Statman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1997) Smith, Thomas W., The Audience of the Nicomachean Ethics, The Journal of Politics 62.1 (2000): 166-86. Svensson, Frans, Virtue Ethics and Elitism, Philosophical Papers 37.1 (2008): 131-155. 16