Moral Skepticism Dr. Charles K. Fink Miami Center for Ethical Awareness Miami Dade College Is there objective truth in ethics? Or is morality merely a matter of opinion? People often express skepticism about ethics. What s right for me may not be right for you. Who s to say what s right? It s impossible to prove anything in ethics. What is right in one culture may not be right in another. It is unclear, however, what people mean by such skeptical comments, or whether they are saying something important about the nature of morality. We will refer to the somewhat hazy idea that morality is merely a matter of opinion as moral skepticism. In this module, we will attempt to clarify this idea and see whether moral skepticism, in one form or another, is philosophically defensible. 1. Is Morality Based on Social Conventions? Different cultures adopt different standards of etiquette and there are no independent, absolute standards by which we might judge the behavior of all people. In America, people eat with forks and knives, whereas in India it is appropriate to eat with one s bare fingers. There are no correct standards concerning what eating utensils people should use, just different standards. According to cultural relativism, the same can be said about the standards of morality. In America, it is acceptable to use cows for food, whereas in India this practice is considered an abomination. In some parts of Asia, people commonly eat dogs and cats, but in America and India this is considered wrong. According to the cultural relativist, it is not the case that one culture is right about the morality of people s food choices, whereas other cultures are wrong. Rather what is right or wrong in morality is entirely conventional and varies from one culture to another. If this is correct, then the right thing for an individual to do is whatever that individual s culture believes is right. Thus, it is wrong for an Indian to eat beef, but it is not wrong for an American to do so. And it is wrong for an American to eat dogs and cats, but it is not wrong for a Korean to do so. 1 Special thanks to Dr. Amy Lund, my Co-Director at the Ethics Center, and Dr. Mark Neunder for their suggestions and critical comments. This module is intended primarily as a resource for teachers, but various parts can be adapted for use in the classroom. There are footnotes here and there which suggest possible teaching strategies. All boldfaced terms are included in the Glossary. 1 If you teach cultural anthropology, you might contrast and compare the ethical systems embraced by different cultures. Are there ethical principles that are more or less universally recognized? You might also discuss the work of socio-biologists concerning the evolution of moral behavior. (See Recommended Resources.) If you teach history, you might explore the question of moral progress. Is the United States, for example, a more moral nation today than at its inception because of the abolition of slavery, women s suffrage, or the civil rights movement? If you teach political science, you might raise moral questions about different political systems. Is a democratic society morally superior to a theocratic one? If you teach economics, you might raise moral questions about different economic systems. Is a capitalist society morally superior to a socialist one?
The most common argument in support of cultural relativism is based upon the observation that people in different cultures adopt different moral conventions: (1) Different cultures have different beliefs about what is right. (2) What is right in one culture may not be right in another. The view expressed in the first premise is sometimes called descriptive cultural relativism to distinguish it from normative cultural relativism, which is the view we have been examining. There is an important difference between the two that is often overlooked or obscured. Descriptive cultural relativism is a theory about what people believe is right or wrong, whereas normative cultural relativism is a theory about what really is right or wrong. The first is a theory about moral beliefs, whereas the second is a theory about moral standards themselves. The conclusion of this argument, therefore, does not follow from the premise. For example, during the Middle-Ages, it was commonly believed that the sun (and all other heavenly bodies) revolved around the earth. We now know that the earth gravitates around the sun. Does it follow that people in the Middle-Ages lived in a different universe, one in which the sun revolved around the earth? The fact that people in the past have had different beliefs about the nature of the universe does not affect the nature of the universe itself. Why should we think that people s beliefs about the facts of morality alter or influence what these facts are? People in the Middle-Ages may have believed that it was right to burn heretics at the stake, but from this it does not follow that it was right. For the normative cultural relativist, moral standards are conventional in the same sense in which the standards of etiquette are conventional. Morality is something that people invent. In critically evaluating this view, consider the following two questions. First, is it wrong for an outsider to pass judgment on another culture? Is it the case, in other words, that moral judgments can be made only from within a culturally established moral framework and have no objective validity? Second, is the essence of morality social conformity? Or does doing the right thing sometimes involve being critical of your culture? Let us explore both questions. First, is it wrong for an outsider to pass judgment on another culture? Consider the treatment of women in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Until recently, women in Afghanistan were banned from schools and universities and, except in rare cases, from outside employment. Indeed, women were banned from all activities outside the home unless accompanied by a mahram (a father, a husband, or some other suitable male) and fully veiled in a burqa. Women who violated these restrictions, if only by having exposed ankles, were subject to public beatings and whippings. The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) identifies several other restrictions imposed on women by the Taliban, including: a ban on the use of cosmetics ; a ban on women talking or shaking hands with non-mahram males ; a ban on women laughing loudly (no stranger should hear a woman s voice) ; a ban on women wearing high heel shoes, which would produce sound while walking (a man must not hear a woman s footsteps) ; a ban on women s wearing brightly colored
clothes, which are regarded as sexually attracting colors ; a ban on women appearing on the balconies of their apartments or houses ; the compulsory painting of all windows, so women cannot be seen from outside their homes ; a ban on the photographing or filming of women ; a ban on women s pictures printed in newspapers and books, or hung on the walls of houses and shops. Penalties, even for minor infractions, were brutal. For wearing fingernail polish, women had their fingers chopped off, and for the crime of adultery, women were publicly stoned to death. 2 Is there an objective basis for condemning such practices? Or is it the case that such practices are wrong only relative to the moral standards of Western societies? 3 If it is wrong for an outsider to pass judgment on another culture, then it is wrong to condemn the brutal treatment of women, or institutionalized racism, or slavery, or human sacrifice, or any other practice that is or has been condoned by one culture or another. If you believe that such practices should be universally condemned, then you do believe that it is permissible for an outsider to pass judgment on another culture. (There is an additional problem. If the normative cultural relativist is right, then it is wrong for an outsider to pass judgment on another culture only relative to the moral standards of the outsider. If it is wrong in some absolute sense for an outsider to pass judgment, then the relativist is wrong.) Let us now turn to the second question. Is the essence of morality social conformity? If the right thing for a person to do, as the relativist maintains, is whatever that person s culture believes is right, then the moral saint is the social conformist. For the relativist, the person who follows the crowd is assured of living a saintly life, while the dissident from Jesus to Martin Luther King who challenges the moral standards accepted by his or her culture, is necessarily immoral. Yet, clearly this is wrong. We cannot dismiss a dissident s criticisms simply because that person disagrees with his or her culture. It is entirely possible that the dissident is right, which means that a culture cannot be the only source of moral standards. The argument can be summarized as follows: (1) If normative cultural relativism is true, then necessarily the social conformist is moral and the dissident is immoral. (2) It is not necessarily the case that the social conformist is moral and the dissident is immoral. (3) Normative cultural relativism is false. There is a sense in which what is right in one culture may not be right in another, but all that this means is that that what people believe is right in one culture may not be what 2 www.rawa.org. 3 To generate classroom discussion, you might show your students Shackled Women or some other documentary film which examines the status of women in the Third World. (See Recommended Resources.) Is a patriarchal society morally inferior to an egalitarian one? Or are such societies morally equivalent?
people believe is right in another. This should not surprise us, because what people believe is largely a matter of their enculturation. 2. Is Morality Personal? People sometimes say What is right for me may not be right for you. What is meant by this? One possibility is personal relativism. According to this view, the moral standards that people should live by are the ones that conform to their personal moral beliefs. In fact, what makes it right for someone to do something is simply that that person believes that it is right. If you believe that it is right to recycle newspapers, then it is right for you to do this. But other people may not believe in recycling, and so it may not be right for them. In general, since different people have different moral beliefs, what is right or wrong is varies from one person to another. (It will be noticed that the only difference between personal relativism and cultural relativism is that for the cultural relativist, the right thing for a person to do is whatever that person s culture believes is right, whereas for the personal relativist, the right thing for a person to do is whatever that person believes is right.) A similar view ties morality to people s feelings rather than to their beliefs. According to moral subjectivism, moral statements describe people s feelings of approval or disapproval feelings that vary from one individual to another. This is another way of understanding what people mean by What is right for me may not be right for you. When I say that something is right, what this means is that I approve of it. When you say that something is right, what this means is that you approve of it. On this view, moral statements are no different than statements about personal taste or preference. The statement Abortion is wrong is like the statement Opera is boring or Okra tastes bad. The argument for personal relativism runs as follows: (1) Different people have different beliefs about what is right. (2) What is right for one person may not be right for another. For example, I might believe that it is right to be a vegetarian, whereas you see nothing wrong with eating meat. For me it is right to be a vegetarian, but not for you. In this sense, morality is a personal matter. The premise of the argument is true people do have different moral beliefs but does the conclusion follow? The problem is obvious: that people have different beliefs about the facts does not mean that there are no facts. For example, I might believe in the existence of God, whereas you are an atheist. In some sense, for me God exists, whereas for you God does not. But clearly there is a fact of the matter, whether or not either one of us knows what this fact is. Either it is a fact that God exists, or it is a fact that God does not exist. One of us is right and the other is wrong. In the same way, I might believe that it is right to be a vegetarian, whereas you see things differently. For me it is right to be a vegetarian, whereas for you it is not. It does not follow from this,
however, that there is no objective truth concerning the morality of vegetarianism. It is still possible that one of us is right and the other is wrong. The above argument, therefore, does not prove personal relativism. Subjectivism, like personal relativism, connects morality to people s subjective states. But whereas personal relativism is a theory about the nature of moral standards, subjectivism is a theory about the meaning of moral language. (The subjectivist does not tell us what is right or wrong, but rather what it means to say that something is right or wrong.) In critically evaluating these views, consider the following two questions. First, is it possible for you to be mistaken about something in morality? Or are you morally infallible? Is it, for example, possible for you to do something wrong even though you believe that it is right? Second, can you know whether to judge an action right or wrong simply by exploring your feelings? Or should your moral judgments be based upon objective considerations? Consider the first question. According to the personal relativist, what makes it right for you to do something is simply that you believe it is right. Therefore, you can t believe that it is right to do something and yet be mistaken in this belief. In this sense, you are morally infallible. Suppose, for example, you believe that it is right to bomb abortion clinics or to engage in other terrorist acts. Then, according to the relativist, this would be the right thing for you to do. The mere fact that you believe that it is right makes it right. On the other hand, if it is possible for people to be mistaken in their moral beliefs, then the relativist is wrong. There must be facts, independently of what people believe, to be mistaken about. The argument against personal relativism can be summarized as follows: (1) If personal relativism is true, then people cannot be mistaken in their moral beliefs. (2) People can be mistaken in their moral beliefs. (3) Personal relativism is false. Unlike the argument in support of personal relativism, this argument is sound. The premises are true and the conclusion logically follows from them. In a sense, what is right for me may not be right for you, but all that this means is that what I believe is right may not be what you believe is right. This is compatible with the position that there are moral facts independently of what people believe. The personal relativist may also be right in saying that you should do whatever you believe is right. What else can you do? But this doesn t mean that the mere fact that you believe that something is right makes it right, because you can make moral mistakes. Now consider the second question. Can you know whether to judge an action right or wrong simply by examining your feelings? (Couldn t an unfeeling person make correct moral judgments? If so, then moral judgments cannot simply be descriptions of our feelings.) Suppose you learn that I took my neighbor s ladder from his backyard. Can you know, just by inspecting your feelings, what to say about this incident? Or do you need to have additional information? Suppose you learn that I snuck into my neighbor s
yard late one night and took his ladder because I needed it to paint my ceiling. Then you would probably say that what I did was wrong. But suppose my house was on fire and I needed the ladder to rescue my child from a second-story balcony. Then you would probably say that what I did was right. For the subjectivist, however, such considerations are essentially irrelevant; the facts relevant to making moral judgments are facts about our feelings, not about the objective world. If you approve of an action, then you can truthfully say that the action is right. If you disapprove of it, then you can truthfully say that it is wrong. We might summarize this objection to subjectivism as follows: (1) If subjectivism is true, then people can know whether an action is right or wrong simply by examining their feelings. (2) People cannot know whether an action is right or wrong in this way. (3) Subjectivism is false. Whether an action is right or wrong is a fact about the action, not about our feelings or other subjective states. Because of this, the statement Abortion is wrong is importantly different from the statement Opera is boring or Okra tastes bad. Statements about personal taste or preference are statements about how people feel about things, but whether an action is right or wrong is a fact about the action itself, not about how people feel about it. For this reason, subjectivism is false. 3. Are There Moral Facts? Earlier we defined moral skepticism in a somewhat sketchy way as the view that morality is merely a matter of opinion. We can now give a more precise formulation of this theory. The skeptic maintains either that (1) there are moral facts, but these facts are subjective or conventional in nature, or that (2) there simply are no moral facts. So far, we have considered different ways of defending (1). According to the relativist, there are moral facts, but these facts are determined by the beliefs of different individuals or by the conventions established by different cultures. According to the subjectivist, there are moral facts, but these are facts about people s feelings. Other skeptics take a different route, arguing that morality has no factual basis at all. This is what is meant by moral nihilism. One way of defending moral nihilism is to draw a sharp line between facts and values. For the nihilist, morality is concerned with values, not with facts. To judge something to be good or bad, right or wrong is to ascribe a negative or a positive value to it. It is not to describe a fact about it. People, in a sense, attach values to things, but things in themselves, independently of human judgment, are neutral. For example, it is a fact that hurricanes destroy property and cause floods, injuries, and deaths. But, according to the nihilist, it is not a fact that hurricanes are bad; rather people judge hurricanes to be bad.
One argument for moral nihilism focuses upon the problem of establishing truth and falsity in ethics and resolving moral disagreements. Suppose you and I disagree about some moral issue, such as the morality of war. I might believe that war is morally permissible, whereas you are a pacifist. If there is objective truth in ethics, then it should be possible for us to determine who is right and who is wrong. But how can we do this? This question has no obvious answer. According to the moral nihilist, the fact that there are irresolvable moral disagreements proves that there is no objective truth in ethics. Succinctly stated, the argument runs as follows: (1) If there are moral facts, then it should be possible to prove things in ethics. (2) It is not possible to prove things in ethics. (According to a popular sentiment: Who s to say what s right? ) (3) There are no moral facts. The reasoning is clearly valid, but both premises can be challenged. Is it the case that all facts can be proven? Is it true that moral opinions cannot be rationally as well supported as other opinions? Let us concentrate on the second question. To prove something (whether inside or outside the domain of ethics) is to provide good reasons for believing it. Is it possible to provide good reasons for a moral belief? If we consider only complex moral problems, such as the morality of war, then it is tempting to accept the premise that it is impossible to prove anything in ethics. But most of the moral claims that people make are not about such complex issues, but about comparatively simple things. For example, suppose I borrowed a book from you and promised to return it the following day. Is this something I ought to do? Assuming that there are no other relevant facts to consider, don t you have good reasons for believing that I ought to return it? If I announced the next day that I loaned the book to someone else or that I sold it to a used bookstore, wouldn t you think I did something wrong, and wouldn t you have good reasons for thinking this? Most of the moral claims people make are about uncomplicated issues such as this. If we have good reasons for making such claims, then it is possible to prove things in ethics. Consider some additional examples. Might there be good reasons for believing that the following moral claims are true? What might these reasons be? 1. Your car has a dead battery, and you need a jump. Your neighbor should help you start your car. 2. You have found someone s wallet lying on a sidewalk. You ought to return it. 3. While you were shopping in a supermarket, someone backed into your car, damaging the rear bumper. This person should accept responsibility for the accident. 4. Someone at work is spreading unfounded and malicious gossip about you, and this should stop.
5. You suspect that your husband is having an affair. He should be honest with you. Consider the first claim. Suppose you have been a helpful neighbor. Just last week, when your neighbor s car wouldn t start, you drove her to work. Her car is now in good working condition, and she has a pair of jumper cables. Assuming that there are no other relevant facts to consider, don t you have good reasons for saying that your neighbor should help you start your car? (Of course, you might also have good reasons for saying that the above claims are false, but this doesn t count against the point that we can often produce good reasons for the moral judgments we make.) There appears to be no important sense in which morality is merely a matter of opinion. People can and often do have good reasons for the moral judgments they make, and this is all that is involved in proving that such judgments are true. If people can prove that some of their moral beliefs are true, then people don t just have moral opinions, they have moral knowledge. 4. Is There Objective Truth in Ethics? The alternative to moral skepticism is the view that morality has an objective foundation. This is known as moral objectivism. For the objectivist, moral knowledge might be compared to mathematical knowledge. Our knowledge of mathematics is not based upon our observations of the empirical world, but upon our understanding of mathematical concepts our concepts of numbers, addition, subtraction, and so on. Because we can understand such concepts, we can acquire mathematical knowledge. We can know, for example, that the square root of 625 is 25. Human beings may be unique in their ability to grasp mathematical concepts, but the facts of mathematics do not depend upon us. Even if we lacked the conceptual resources to understand it, it would still be true that the square root of 625 is 25. Similarly, our knowledge of morality is based upon our understanding of moral concepts. Because we can understand such concepts, we can acquire moral knowledge. We can know, for example, that the brutal oppression of women is wrong. Human beings may be unique in their ability to grasp moral concepts, but the facts of morality do not depend upon us. Morality, no more than mathematics, is not something that people invent. Even if people lacked the conceptual resources to comprehend it, it would still be true that the brutal oppression of women is wrong. In this module, we have built a strong case against moral skepticism. Have we not, along the way, developed a positive argument for objectivism? The following observations have emerged from our discussion: (1) It is possible for you to be mistaken about some of your moral beliefs. You might believe that something is morally acceptable, such as abortion or capital punishment, even though it is wrong. (2) There are moral beliefs, and some moral beliefs are true and others false. Moreover, it is often possible to prove that a moral belief is true by providing good reasons for believing it. (3) Whether an action is right or wrong is a fact about the action, not about our feelings or other subjective states.
(4) Doing the right thing sometimes requires acting contrary to culturally established conventions. For example, it would not be right to support the practice of slavery even if one lived in a slaveholding culture; rather the right thing to do would be to oppose this practice. It does not necessarily follow from any one of these statements that moral objectivism is true, but it does follow from all of these statements taken together. From (1) and (2), it follows that there are moral facts. You cannot be mistaken about something in morality, for example, unless there are facts for you to be mistaken about. From (3) and (4) it follows that the facts of morality do not depend upon us upon our subjective states or the conventions that we establish. If there are, in this sense, objective moral facts, then moral objectivism is true. 5. Glossary Moral Nihilism: The skeptical theory that there are no moral facts. Cultural Relativism: According to descriptive cultural relativism, what people believe is right or wrong varies from one culture to another. According to normative cultural relativism, moral standards themselves vary from one culture to another: the right thing for a person to do is whatever that person s culture believes is right. (For the cultural relativist, that fact that a person s culture believes that something is right makes it right for that person to do it.) Moral Objectivism: The view that there are objective moral facts. Objective moral facts are facts that hold independently of people s subjective states (beliefs and feelings) and the conventions that people establish. Moral Skepticism: The view that morality has no objective or independent foundation. For the moral skeptic, either (1) there are moral facts, but these facts are subjective or conventional in nature, or (2) there simply are no moral facts. Moral Subjectivism: The skeptical theory that moral statements describe people s feelings of approval or disapproval. Personal Relativism: The skeptical theory that the right thing for a person to do is whatever that person believes is right. (For the personal relativist, the fact that a person believes that something is right makes it right for that person to do it.) 6. Recommended Resources For a book-length discussion of moral skepticism, see Russ Shafer-Landau s Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Another excellent source of information on the theories I discuss in this module is The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007) by James and Stuart Rachels. Many of the arguments and objections I raise have been raised, in one form or another, by other philosophers. In addition to the above sources, see Some Basic Points about Arguments in The Right Thing To Do, Fourth Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007) edited by James and Stuart Rachels. For internet resources on ethics, consult http://ethics.sandiego.edu and www.usna.edu/ Library/Ethics/Ethicinternet. For a defense of cultural relativism, see Ruth Benedict s In Defense of Moral Relativism, available online at www.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/ DionysianBehavior. In Taking Darwin Seriously (New York: Prometheus, 1998), Michael Ruse argues that the moral sense is a product of evolution and shaped by natural selection. The documentary film Shackled Women: Abuses of a Patriarchal World (Films for the Humanities and Sciences) examines the treatment of women in several Third-World countries.