LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BLB BRB The Blue Book in The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations," ed. Rush Rhees, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. The Brown Book in The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations," ed. Rush Rhees, Oxford: Basil Backwell, 1958. BT The Big Typescript (TS 213) CV Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman; trans. Peter Winch, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. LWVC Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann, ed. Brian McGuinness; trans. Joachim Shulte and Brian McGuinness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. NB Notebooks 1914-1916, 2nd ed., ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe; trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. PE PG PI PO "Notes for Lectures on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data,'" originally published with omissions from MSS 148, 149, and 151 in Philosophical Review 77 (1968), ed. and trans. Rush Rhees: 274-320; reprinted, with additional materials from MSS 148, 149, and 151 in Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951, eds. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), ed. and trans. for the additional material, David Stem, pp. 202-88. Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees; trans. Anthony Kenny, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1953. Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951, ed. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1993. PR Philosophical Remarks, ed. Rush Rhees; trans. R. Hargreaves and R. White, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975. RC Remarks on Colour, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe; trans. Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schiittle, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.
216 LIST OF ABBREVIA nons RLF "Some Remarks on Logical Fonn," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 8 (1929): 162-71; reprinted in Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951, pp.29-35. RPP, i Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol.i, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright; trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. RPP, ii Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol.ii, ed. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman; trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. TLP Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. WA Wiener Ausgabe, ed. Michael Nedo from MSS 105-108, Vienna: Springer-Verlag, 1994.
NOTES PREFACE 1 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1932, ed. Desmond Lee (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 82. 2 RC, I. sec. 53; III. sec. 248. 3 Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). CHAPTER I 1 They have been catalogued as MSS 105-108 by G.H. von Wright, and published recently as Wiener Ausgabe (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1994-95). 2 Philosophical Remarks consists of the materials Wittgenstein prepared for the renewal of his research grant at Cambridge. It is Wittgenstein's own selection and arrangement of passages from MSS 105-107 and the first half of 108. For the full account of its composition, see 'Editor's Note' in PR, pp. 347-51. 3 The Big Typescript (TS 213) is believed to be the only work Wittgenstein produced in a conventional book format divided by chapters and sections. It even contains a table of contents, which suggests that he at one time intended to publish it. But only parts of the whole typescript have been published in the Philosophical Grammar. For a detailed account regarding the publication of the Philosophical Grammar, see Anthony Kenny's "From the Big Typescript to the Philosophical Grammar" in The Legacy of Wiftgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). 4 M.O'C. Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein," in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Personal Recollections, ed. Rush Rhees (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981), p. 131. 5 Rush Rhees, "The Tractatus: Seeds of Some Misunderstandings," Philosophical Review 72 (1963): 217. 6 PR, sec. 218. 7 See LWVC, pp. 67-8. 8 There Wittgenstein says: "I do not now have phenomenological language, or 'primary language' as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary, All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language" (PR, sec. 1). 9 After the rejection of phenomenological language in section I of the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein explicitly says that our language is physicalistic in the following remarks: "Language itself belongs to the second
218 NOTES system. If I describe a language, I am essentially describing something that belongs to physics" (PR, sec. 68). For a detailed discussion of Wittgenstein's shift in language paradigms, see chapter 3, section 1 below. 10 See WA, i., p. 23; PR, secs. 1, 11,50,53,57, 71, 75; LWVC, p. 45. 11 PR, sec. 11. 12 PR, sec. 57. 13 Also, we should not confuse his shift of language paradigms with the trend in philosophy that attempts to reduce all psychological (and other) concepts to naturalistic terms. From his use of the term 'physicalistic language', there is no evidence that Wittgenstein is advancing or endorsing the idea of reductionism. 14 Rudolf Carnap, Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, 2 nd ed., [Der Lohische Aujbau der Welt (Berlin: Weltkreis-Verlag, 1928)] trans. Rolf George (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), sec. 67, p. 108. 15 See Carnap, The Unity of Science, ["Die physicalische Sprach als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft," Erkenntnis (1932): 432-65)], trans. Max Black (London: Kegan Paul, 1934), pp. 44-5. 16 It is rather more likely that Wittgenstein influenced Carnap's use of the term 'primary language' and the idea of physicalism. See Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 146-7; Jaakko Hintikka, "Ludwig's Apple Tree: On the Philosophical Relations between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle," in Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Developments ed. F. Stadler (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), p. 33. 17 Frank Ramsey, Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Kegan Paul, 1931), p. 212. 18 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 3 rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). See Introduction, pp. 1-24. 19 Ibid., p. 9. 20 Ernst Mach, "On the Principle of Comparison in Physics"(1894), in Popular Scientific Lectures, trans. Thomas 1. McCormack (Chicago: The Open Court, 1898), p. 250. 21 Ludwig Boltzmann, "On the Development of the Methods of Theoretical Physics in Recent Times," in Theoretical Physics and Philosophical Problems, ed. Brian McGuinness (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974), p. 95. 22 Ibid., p. 95. 23 See Ernst Mach-A Deeper Look, ed. John Blackmore (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), chap. 6, pp. 127-50. 24 "The Meaning and Limits of Exact Science," in Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 80-120. 25 Albert Einstein, "Physics and Reality," in Ideas and Opinions (New York: Crown Publishers, 1954), pp. 302-3.
NOTES 219 26 See Edmund Husserl, "Amsterdamer Vortrage," in Phtinomenologische Psychologie: Husserliana Vol. 9 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 302-3. 27 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 2 nd ed., p. 9. 28 See Keiichi Noe, "Mach's Relativism versus Apriorism and Mechanistic World View," in Ernst Mach-A Deeper Look, ed. John Blackmore, op. cit., pp. 237-8. Interestingly, it is reported that the Dutch philosopher Evert W. Beth even claimed that Husserl stole basic ideas of phenomenology from Mach. See Henk Visser, "Mach, Utrecht, and Dutch Philosophy," in Ernst Mach-A Deeper Look, ed. Blackmore, op. cit., p. 429. 29 See LWVC, p. 67-8. 30 CV, p. 19. 31 G.H. von Wright, Wittgenstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 213. 32 Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 38. Boltzmann's (as well as Hertz's) influence on Wittgenstein is studied also in Andrew D. Wilson, "Hertz, Boltzmann and Wittgenstein Reconsidered," Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 20 (1989): 245-63. Cf. Allan Janik, "How Did Hertz Influence Wittgenstein's Philosophical Development?" Grazer Philosophische Studien 49 (1994/95): 19-47. 33 PR, sec. 1. 34 Boltzmann, "On the Development of the Methods of Theoretical Physics," op. cit., p. 96. For Boltzmann's relation to phenomenology, metaphysics and related philosophical issues, see also John Blackmore, "Introduction," in Ludwig Boltzmann: His Later Life and Philosophy, 1900-1906, ed. John Blackmore (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), especially pp. 27-33, with further references. 35 Boltzmann, op. cit., p. 97. 36 Boltzmann, "On Statistical Mechanics," op. cit., pp. 155-6. 37 See Jaakko Hintikka, "The Idea of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein and Husserl," in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996). 38 The paper that provoked Wittgenstein's outrage is "Die physikalische Sprache als Univesalsprache der Wissenschaft," published in Erkenntnis in 1932. For a detailed story about this incident and the relation between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, see Jaakko Hintikka, "Ludwig's Apple Tree," in Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Development, ed. F. Stadler (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), pp. 27-46.; Thomas E. Uebel, "Physicalism in Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle," in Physics, Philosophy and the Scientific Community, eds. K. Gavroglu et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 327-56. 39 Rudolf Camap, Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), sec. 64, p. 101. 40 Ibid., sec. 93, p. 145. See also sec. 152, pp. 233-4.
220 NOTES 41 Ibid., sec. 65, pp. 103-6. 42 A general exposition of solipsism in relation to phenomenology is discussed in chapter 2, section 4. Also the similarity of Carnap's methodological solipsism to Wittgenstein's middle-period treatment of solipsism is discussed in chapter 3, section 2. 43 G. E. Moore, "Refutation of Idealism," in Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), p. 27. Moore's point of color as independent object of consciousness is also found in Wittgenstein's treatment of color. When Wittgenstein deals with color in the Philosophical Remarks and the Remarks on Colour, it is the color we immediately experience, and not the one physics or psychology would deal with. (Cf. Chapter 2, footnote 3 below.) Also, the general philosophical influence of Moore on Wittgenstein has been emphasized by 1. N. Findlay. See his Wittgenstein: A Critique (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 68-73. 44 See Bertrand Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics," in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp. 111-3, and "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," op. cit., p. 167. 45 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 13. 46 See Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics," p. 113. 47 Ibid. 48 For a detailed discussion of this point, see chapter 2, section 1 below. 49 Edmund Husserl, Ideas of Phenomenology, trans, William Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 3. 50 Ibid., p. 16. 51 See Jaakko Hintikka, "The Phenomenological Dimension," in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, eds. Barry Smith and David W. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 78-105. 52 Husserl, Idea of Phenomenology, p. 10. 53 Ibid., pp. 48-9. 54 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), sec. 8, pp. 20-1. 55 See Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics," p. 109. CHAPTER II 1 Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), p.152. 2 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.46.
NOTES 221 3 As in the case of Moore's objects of consciousness, Russell's notion of color as something we are directly aware of is further developed by Wittgenstein's treatment of color, which is given in our immediate experience. So even the earliest notion of color-incompatibility (TLP, 6.3751) should be understood in this context. 4 Russell, "On the Nature of Acquaintance," in Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert C. Marsh (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), p. 167. 5 NB, entry dated 16 June 1915, p. 61. 6 Russell, Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript~The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell Vol. 7, ed. Elizabeth R. Eames in collaboration with Kenneth Blackwell (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984). Also see David Pears, "The Relation between Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Propositions and Russell's Theory of Judgment," in Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, ed. C. G. Luckhardt (Ithaca: Cornell University. Press, 1979) and Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), chap. 3. 7 Russell, Theory of Knowledge, p. 97. 8 Ibid., p. 99. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 132. II Wittgenstein, Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, ed. G. H. von Wright (Ithaca: Cornell University. Press, 1974), p. 23. 12 David Pears, "The Relation between Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Propositions and Russell's Theory of Judgment," p. 206. 13 See NB, entries dated 22 August 1914, p. 2; 2 September 1914, p. 2; 3 September 1914, p. 2; 13 October 1914, p. 11; and TLP 5.473. 14 NB, dated 29 October 1914, p. 21. 15 See Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, pp. 56-7. 16 NB, entry dated 1 November 1914, p. 23. 17 NB, entry dated 3 November 1914, p. 24. 18 NB, entry dated 4 November 1914, p. 26. 19 NB, entry dated 18 October 1914, p. 15. 20 Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, pp. 53-4. 21 Russell, "On the Nature of Acquaintance," p. 167. 22 See Editor's Preface in LWVC, p. 22. 23 LWVC, p. 250. 24 LWVC, p. 249. 25 LWVC, p. 254. 26 BRB, pp. 171-2. 27 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1932, ed. Desmond Lee (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 81. 28 Ibid, p. 82.
222 NOTES 29 Pittsburgh Ramsey archives, item #004-21-02. Quoted in Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p. 77. 30 Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1982), sec. 50, p. 113. 31 Ibid, sec. 97, p. 239. 32 See Hintikka, "Husserl: The Phenomenological Dimension," in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, eds. Barry Smith and David W. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 97. 33 Ibid. 34 In fact, in his Logical Investigations, Husserl describes something very similar to Russell's logical forms when he discusses categorial intuition. For example, Husserl says, "what intuitively corresponds to the words 'and' and 'or', to 'both' or 'either', is not anything, as we rather roughly put it above, that can be grasped with one's hands, or apprehended with some sense, as it can also not really be represented in an image, e.g., in painting. I can paint A and I can paint B, and I can paint them both on the same canvas: I cannot, however, paint the both, nor paint the A and B." (HusserI, Logical Investigations, vol. 2, trans. 1. N. Findlay, New York: Humanities Press, 1970, p. 798) The words 'and', 'or', 'both' and 'either' are examples of Russell's molecular complex which constitutes logical forms along with atomic complex. See Russell's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 80, 99. But a more interesting fact is that Husserl sometimes uses the word 'logical forms' or 'categorial forms' in the discussion of categorial intuition. See Logical Investigations, pp. 818-9. 35 Hintikka, "Idea of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein and Husserl," in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996). 36 Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, sec. 27, p. 5l. 37 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 2. 38 Ibid., pp. 35-7. 39 See Dagfinn Fellesdal, "An Introduction to Phenomenology for Analytic Philosophers," in Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia, eds. Raymond E. Olson and Anthony M. Paul (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), p. 426. 40 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 67. 41 Ibid., p. 65. 42 Ibid., p. 67. 43 See Russell, "Relation of Sense-Data to Physics," in Mysticism and Logic, p. 112. 44 Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p. 19. 45 Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," in Mysticism and Logic, p. 162. 46 See section 5 of this chapter, footnote 51 below.
NOTES 223 47 See Jaakko Hintikka, "On Wittgenstein's 'Solipsism'," Mind 67 (1958): 88-91. 48 Cf. see PR, sec. 67. Wittgenstein says, "Suppose I had such a good memory that I could remember all my sense impressions. In that case, there would, prima facie, be nothing to prevent me from describing them. This would be a biography." 49 NB, 7 August 1916, p. 80. 50 NB, 11 August 1916, p. 80. 51 See Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," pp. 153-4. In this paper (written in 1910), Russell argues that "it would seem necessary, therefore, either to suppose that I am acquainted with myself, and that '1', therefore, requires no definition, being merely the proper name of a certain object, or to find some other analysis of self-consciousness." However, in his 1914 paper "On the Nature of Acquaintance," Russell excludes 'I' from the true proper names. "It follows that the word '1', as commonly employed, must stand for a description; it cannot be a true proper name in the logical sense, since true proper names can only be conferred on objects with which we are acquainted." See Russell, "On the Nature of Acquaintance," p. 164. 52 See Jaakko Hintikka, "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Phenomenology," in Language, Knowledge, and Intentionality: Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 49, eds. Leila Haaparauta, Martin Kusch, and Ilkka Niiniluoto (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1990), p. 17. 53 See PR, sec. 71. "It could, e.g., be practical under certain circumstances to give proper names to my hands and to those of other people, so that you wouldn't have to mention their relation to somebody when talking about them, since that relation isn't essential to the hands themselves; and the usual way of speaking could create the impression that its relation to its owner was something belonging to the essence of the hand itself." Also sec. 74. "Even the word 'visual space' is unsuitable for our purpose, since it contains an allusion to a sense organ which is as inessential to the space as it is to a book that it belongs to a particular person." 54 See Anthony Kenny, "The First Person," in The Legacy of Wiltgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 77-87. 55 Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, pp. 106-9. 56 NB, p. 98. Also cf. TLP, 4.024, 5.5151. 57 See Jaakko Hintikka, "An Anatomy of Wittgenstein's Picture Theory," in Artifacts, Representations and Social Practice, eds. C. C. Gould and R. S. Cohen (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 228. 58 "Some Remarks on Logical Forms" was originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian SOCiety, Supplementary Volume, vol. 9, and reprinted in PO, pp. 29-35.
224 NOTES 59 The Tractarian scheme of truth possibilities is presented in TLP 5.10 1. Wittgenstein's example with color-incompatibility is shown in "Some Remarks on Logical Form," in PO, pp. 33-5. 60 PO, pp. 29-30. 61 The propositions of the Tractatus in question read as follows: 3.323 In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification-and so belongs to different symbols-or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way. 3.324 In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them). 3.325 In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar-by logical syntax. 62 PO, p. 30. 63 PO, p. 35. 64 See PR, sec. 78. 65 PR, sec. 78. 66 PR, sec. 79. 67 PR, sec. 82. 68 PR, Appendix 2, p. 317. Also, LWVC, p. 63. 69 Cf. Wittgenstein himself elaborates this point in LWVC, pp. 73-4. 70 See PR, sec. 3. Wittgenstein states, "The words 'Colour', 'Sound', 'Number' etc. could appear in the chapter headings of our grammar." Cf. also sec. 81. 71 PR, sec. 83. CHAPTER III 1 The first entry ofms 105 is dated February 2, 1929 (See WA, i., p. 3); in May of 1930 Wittgenstein showed the typescript version of the Philosophical Remarks to Russell. See Editor's note in PR, p. 347. 2 Jaakko Hintikka, "Die Wende der Philosophie: Wittgenstein's New Logic of 1928" in Philosophy of Law, Politics, and Society: Proceedings of the 12th International Wittgenstein Symposium, eds. Elisabeth Leinfellner and Rudolf Haller (Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempski, 1987), p. 381. 3 RLF, reprinted in PO, p. 31. 4 LWVC, p. 47. 5 PR, sec. 45
NOTES 225 6 WA,ii., p. 89. The German original is: "Man mufi den Satz mit der Wirklichkeit zur Deckung bringen konnenlauf die Wirklichkeit auflegen konnenl." (All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.) 7 See WA,ii., p. 91. 8 'Time' here means physical time (i.e., information time) as opposed to memory time. For more detailed treatment on Wittgenstein's notion of time, see Jaakko Hintikka "Wittgenstein on Being and Time," in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996). About Wittgenstein's phenomenology of time, see section 3 of this chapter below. 9 See WA,ii., p. 92. 10 LWVC, p. 45. 11 PR, sec. 57. 12 See Jaakko Hintikka, "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Phenomenology," in Language, Knowledge, and Intentionality: Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 49, eds. Leila Haaparauta, Martin Kusch, and Ilkka Niiniluoto (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1990), p. 20. 13 BLB, p. 51. 14 Hintikka, "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Phenomenology," p. 23. 15 BLB, p. 46. 16 BLB, p. 48. 17 BLB, p. 58. 18 See Hintikka, "Witgenstein and the Problem of Phenomenology," pp. 25-30. Cf. For recent studies that pay attention to Wittgenstein's 'geometrical eye', see David Pears, "The Ego and the Eye: Wittgenstein's Use of an Analogy," Grazer Philosophische Studien 44 (1993): 59-68. Also see Michel ter Hark, Beyond the Inner and the Outer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), especially pp.82-93. 19 BLB, p. 64. 20 ELE, p. 64. 21 See PR, sec. 210. 22 See PR, secs. 206, 208. 23 BRE, p. 109. 24 BLE, p. 59. 25 BLB, p. 57. 26 ELB, p. 61. 27 BLB, p. 67. 28 BLB, p. 71. 29 PE, reprinted in PO, p. 255. 30 PE, reprinted in PO, p. 258. 31 BLB, p. 71. 32 BLB, p. 72. 33 PR, sec. 71.
226 NOTES 34 PRo sec. 74. 35 PE, reprinted in PO, p. 258. 36 Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), sec. 65,p. 104. 37 Ibid., sec. 16, p. 29. 38 See chapter 1, section 2 above. 39 G. E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33," originally published in Mind 63-64 (1954-1955), reprinted in PO, p.llo. 40 See Jaakko Hintikka, "Wittgenstein on Being and Time," in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986). 41 Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (Chicago: Open Court, 1914), pp. 121-2. 42 There is an interpretation of Russell's theory of acquaintance that cannot be made quite consistent with Russell's idea of time-construction based on memory. For example, 1. O. Urmson says that "it is impossible to use proper names of things in their absence," and that "a logically proper name can be given only to an object of acquaintance while one is actually acquainted with it; one cannot use demonstrative symbol to name a thing which is not present." (See Urmson, Philosophical Analysis [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1956], pp. 86, 134.) But David Pears criticizes Urmson's view by saying that "a person is said to have knowledge of a thing by acquaintance if he has come across it in his experience and remembers it, or, alternatively, if he is experiencing it at the moment." (See Pears, Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy [New York: Random House], 1967, p. 71.) As will be shown, I think Pears's view is more reasonable as we witness that Russell, in fact, regards memory as an immediate source of knowledge. 43 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 48. 44 Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Descriptions," III Mysticism and Logic, p. 152. 45 Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics," in Mysticism and Logic, p. 123. 46 See PR, sec. 67. 47 Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33," in PO, p. 110. 48 Ibid., p. 111. 49 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 22. 50 Ibid. 51 Moore presents in his lecture notes the different views between Russell and Wittgenstein as follows: "It looks to me as if, for the moment, Wittgenstein was confusing the two entirely different propositions, (1) 'It is logically possible that nothing exists except the present experience' which Russell may be said to imply, and (2) 'It is logically impossible that anything should exist except the present
NOTES 227 experience', which he certainly does not imply." (PO, p. Ill) Certainly, Russell would have believed (1) because, although temporal solipsism is logically not impossible, there is no reason to believe it, as there is no reason to believe experiential solipsism. Thus, Russell proposed to construct time from memory. On the other hand, what Wittgenstein saw in Russell is that if we rely on memory alone, we inevitably fall into temporal solipsism like (2). 52 See chapter 2, section 5 above. 53 At times, however, Wittgenstein relates temporal solipsism to experiential one. For example, he says: "If someone says, only the present experience has reality, then the word 'present' must be redundant here, as the word 'I' is in other context... " (PR, sec. 54, p. 85) 54 Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures," in PO, p. 112. 55 BLB, p. 67. 56 BRE, p. 108. 57 BRB, p. 108-9. 58 PR, sec. 67. 59 See Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of internal Time (1893-1917), trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), pp. 31,66. 60 See ibid., pp. 42-3. 61 One interesting thing here is that Husserl's ideas of time is also very similar to that of William James. James in the chapters entitled "The Perception of Time" and "Memory" in The Principles of Psychology elaborates his ideas on 'specious present', 'primary memory', and 'secondary memory'. Husserl's ideas of 'nowpoint', 'primary memory' and 'secondary memory' seem to have their origin in James's corresponding terms as Husserl acknowledges his debt to James as early as the time of Logical investigations. The fact that Wittgenstein has read James's book and even refers to him in the Philosophical investigations and other late writings indeed shows how the respective interests of Husserl and Wittgenstein come close. J. N. Findlay seems to notice this respective interest between Husserl and Wittgenstein. But while he credits James and Husserl for what they have done regarding time and memory, Findlay discredits Wittgenstein's contribution based on the contents of the Brown Book. Regarding James's influence on Husserl, see Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 100-4. For James's accounts of time and memory, see The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1890), especially vol. 1, pp. 630-55. And for Findlay's comments on this matter, see his Wittgenstein: A Critique (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 158-60. 62 For Wittgenstein's later criticism of this view, see section 5 of this chapter.
228 NOTES 63 Jaakko Hintikka, "Rules, Games and Experiences: Wittgenstein's Discussion of Rule-Following in the Light of His Development," in Revue internationale de philosophie, 43 (1989): 285. 64 According to Hintikka, Wittgenstein's rule-following discussion (PI, secs. 143-242) includes his effort to show his change of mind regarding this matter. For later Wittgenstein, experience is not the essential element involved in rules and rule-following. What becomes the most fundamental element is the languagegame idea. Without the basis of language-games, no question of rule and rulefollowing can be meaningfully asked. 65 These remarks appear in MS 116, sec. 218, and quoted here from Hintikka, "Rules, Games and Experience," p. 285. 66 BLB, p. 1. 67 BLB, p. 2. 68 BLB, p. 37. 69 The development of this idea seems to have a long history. Briefly, Wittgenstein frequently used the word 'calculus' in LWVC, PR, and PG, roughly from 1929 to early 1933. But from the Blue Book on, Wittgenstein hardly used the word after his self-criticism that language in practice is not used by strict rules as in calculus. It is true that our language is a rule-governed activity, but not the strict system as calculus governed by mathematical rules. So Wittgenstein opted to see our language as more like children's outdoor ball game. See BLB, p. 25. 70 "I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what 1 shall call language games. These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language." BLB, p. 17. 71 PG, p. 244. 72 This is the reason why there cannot be private language, even if we could utilize private rules arbitrarily. See the following section for a detailed discussion of private language. 73 Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, pp. 187-8. 74 Ibid., p. 189. 75 BLB, pp.12-3. 76 See PI, secs. 156-159. 77 See PI, secs. 197, 198. 78 Hintikka, "Rules, Games and Experiences," p. 295. 79 A similar remark appears in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology as follows: "The primitive language-game we originally learned needs no justification, and false attempts at justification, which force themselves on us, need to be rejected." (RPP, ii., sec. 453) 80 PI, sec. 655. 81 See Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, chap. 10. especially pp. 253-5.
NOTES 229 82 That Wittgenstein does not mean the private 'use' of language when he talks about private language is shown in section 243 of the Philosophical Investigations. He says "But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences-his feelings, moods, and the rest-for his private use?-well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?-but that is not what I mean." (Emphasis added.) Wittgenstein is certainly not interested in the matter of empirical fact in this regard. Instead, the point he makes in his discussion of private language is a conceptual one. 83 Jaakko Hintikka, "Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Skepticism," forthcoming. 84 Hintikka and Hintikka call this framework of spontaneous pain-behavior as physiognomic framework. Their view is that the connection between sensations and sensation-behavior is a logical one by means of which private experiences are correlated to the language-game. See Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p. 258. 85 PE, reprinted in PO, p. 258. 86 Wittgenstein began to write what is believed to be the prototype of the rulefollowing discussion (PI, secs. 143-242) around 1936 with MS 115. But the source materials for sections 198-242, including the explicit analogy of the primacy of language-games to 'customs' constituted by 'sign-posts' in sections 198 and 199, were mostly written in 1944-45. The exceptions are sections 214, 215, and 239 only. Moreover, what constitutes the so-called private language argument (from secs. 242 to 315) were also written mostly in 1944-45. Hence, we can say that Wittgenstein's idea of the primacy of language-games was not fully developed until 1944. About the source materials of the Philosophical Investigations, see Andre Maury, "Sources of the Remarks in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations," Synthese 98 (1994): 349-78. CHAPTER IV I In TLP, 2.0131 Wittgenstein says" A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space." 2 In TLP, 2.0251 Wittgenstein says "Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects." 3 This point is in sharp distinction to Wittgenstein's use of 'colors' as examples of simple objects. See Desmond Lee's Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1930-1932, p. 120. 4 Rush Rbees, "The Tractatus : Seeds of Some Misunderstandings" Philosophical Review 72 (1963): 217. 5 PR, sec. 218. 6 See PR, sec. 218.
230 NOTES 7 In a letter (19 January, 1950) to von Wright, Wittgenstein writes "The last two weeks I read a great deal in Goethe's 'Fabenlehre'. It's partly boring and repelling, but in some ways also very instructive and philosophically interesting." See "Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Georg Henrik von Wright," in PO, p. 475. 8 See PR, sec. 221. 9 See PR, sec. 219. 10 See PR, sec. 220. 11 See Moore's "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33," in PO, p. 108. 12 See PR, sec. 221. 13 LWVC, p. 67. 14 Cf. Hintikka and Hintikka suggest a solution to the problem which arises from the color-incompatibility issue that misleads people to see the impossibility of having two colors at the same time as a physical impossibility. They propose to see "This patch is green" and "This patch is red" not as the expressions of subject-predicate forms, but as functions that will map points in visual space into color-space. So instead of translating the two sentences into 'G(a), and 'R(a)', Hintikka and Hintikka propose to use functional analysis which translates the above sentences into 'C(a)=r' and 'C(a)=g" which enable us to see that there can only be one value for a, and thus that having two values, say green and red, at the same time is a logical impossibility. For a detailed discussion, see Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, chap. 5, especially secs. 3-5. 15 LWVC, p. 241. 16 ELE, p. 56. 17 Wittgenstein says, "We are not, however, regarding the language games which we describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as languages complete in themselves, as complete system of human communication." ERB, p. 81. 18 See BRB, p. 85. 19 See chapter 3, section 3 above. 20 PE, reprinted in PO, p. 220. 21 PE, reprinted in PO, p. 220. 22 Also see PO, p. 219. 23 ERE, p. 87. 24 ERE, pp. 136-7. 25 See RPP, ii., secs. 312,313, and 315. 26 PE, reprinted in PO, pp. 234-5. 27 PE, reprinted in PO, p. 235. 28 RC, III, sec. 71. 29 RC, III, sec. 72. 30 See Jaakko Hintikka, "The Cartesian Cogito, Epistemic Logic and Neuroscience," Synthese 83 (1990): 146-7. Also, Lucia M. Vaina, '''What' and
NOTES 231 'Where' in the Human Visual System: Two Hierarchies of Visual Modules," Synthese 83 (1990): 49-91. 31 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1932 ed. Desmond Lee (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 82. 32 Ibid. 33 See Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, pp. 298-30. 34 See PI, secs. 273, 274. 35 See PI, sec. 276. 36 See PI, sec. 280. 37 Even before he developed the idea of language-games, Wittgenstein wrestled with this problem of expressing immediate experience. One example is his observation that, although the visual space differs from the physical space, we cannot successfully express what we see in our visual field without using the words we usually use to describe the physical space. For instance, there can be no measurement in the visual field. But still, we use the words like 'exact', 'precise', etc., which seem to be more appropriate words for the description of the physical space where measurement can be made. For a detailed discussion, see chapter 3, section 2 above. 38 RC, I, sec. 22. Also see RC, III, sec. 188. This remark reminds one of Wittgenstein's middle-period treatment of the same problem. In the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein says: "What I need is a psychological or rather phenomenological colour theory, not a physical and equally not a physiological one." (PR, sec. 218) 39 RC, II, sec. 16. 40 RC, I, sec. 39; III, sec. 221. 41 PR, sec. 39. 42 See RC, I, secs. 10, 11, 14, 21; III, secs. 27, 30, 52. Also RPP, ii., secs. 421, 422, 423, 428. 43 RPP, ii., sec. 422. A similar example appears in RC, III, sec. 30. 44 RC, I, sec. 6. 45 RC, I, sec. 19. 46 See RC, I, sec. 37 and III, sec. 156. 47 See RC, I, sec. 40. 48 RC, III, sec. 76. 49 See RC, I, sec. 51 and III, sec. 229. 50 RC, III, sec. 234. 51 RC, I, sec. 63 and III, sec. 117. Also cf. III. secs. 273, 276. 52 RC, III, sec. 59. 53 RC, III, sec. 35. Also see I, sec. 3. 54 David Katz, The World of Colour, trans. by R.B. MacLeod (London: Kegan Paul, 1935). 55 Ibid, p. 2.
232 NOTES 56 See ibid., p. 3. 57 RC, I, sec. 77 and III, sec. 120. 58 RC, III, sec. 319. 59 See BLB, pp. 13-4; BRB, pp. 85-8; PI, secs. 48, 49. 60 Wittgenstein says there: "For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game-any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except in the language-game." (PI, sec. 49) 61 See chapter 3, section 5 above. 62 RC, I, sec. 53. 63 RC, III, sec. 248. I BRB, p. 175. 2 BRB, p. 172. CHAPTER V 3 See Jaakko Hitikka and Merrill B. Hintikka, "Ludwig Looks at the Necker Cube" in Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 38, edited by Ghita Holmstrom and Andrew Jones (Helsinki: The Philosophical Society of Finland, 1985), p. 43. 4 According to the OED, the definition of 'aspect' includes "the appearance presented by an object to the eye." See Oxford English Dictionary, 2 nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), vol. I, p. 692. Indeed, this definition serves the best purpose for Wittgenstein's phenomenology, for his phenomenological object is not physical object, but the object given in our experience, i.e., presented to the eye. 5 PG, p. 167. Emphasis added. 6 PG, p. 166. Emphasis added. 7 See PG, pp. 174 and 444. 8 LWVC, pp. 256-7. 9 LWVC, p. 257. 10 LW, i, sec. 634. See also PI, p. 206 where Wittgenstein says "The same tone of voice expresses the dawning of aspect." II LW, i, sec. 677. 12 TS 213, p. 442. The German original is: "Eine Kirchentonart verstehen, heillt nicht, sich an die Tonfolge gewohnen, in dem Sinne, in dem ich mich an einen Geruch gewohnen kann und ihn nach einiger Zeit nicht mehr unangenehm empfinde. Sondern es heillt, etwas Neues horen, was ich friiher noch nicht gehort habe, etwa in der Art-ja ganz analog-wie es ware, 10 Striche 1111111111, die ich friiher nur als 2 mals 5 Striche habe sehen konnen, plotzlich als ein charakteristisches Ganzes sehen zu konnen. Oder die Zeichnung eines Wiirfels, die ich nur als laches Ornament habe sehen konnen, auf einmal raurnlich zu
NOTES 233 sehen." This passage also appears in PR, sec. 224 and WA, ii, p. 22l. The translation above is from the PRo 13 Language-game (8) is presented in PI, sec. 8, in which 'there' and 'this' among others are used in connection with a pointing gesture. 14 PI, sec. 38. 15 BRE, p. 17l. 16 TLP, 5.5423. 17 Cf. PI, p. 208. 18 LW, i, sec. 588. 19 See RPP, ii, sec. 451; PI, p. 207. 20 PI, p. 209. 21 PI, p. 208. 22 RPP, i, sec. 862. 23 LW, ii, sec. 549; PI, p. 197. 24 LW, i, sec. 571; cf. PI, p. 198. CHAPTER VI I C. A. van Peursen, "Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (1959): 181-97. 2 For example, the German edition of the Philosophical Remarks was published in 1964, and the English edition in 1975. 3 Paul Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," in Phenomenology and EXistentialism, eds. E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 207-17. 4 Ibid., p. 21l. 5 Cf. Martin Kusch, Language as Calculus and Language as Universal Medium (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989). 6 The fruitful outcome of von Wright's valuable research on the Nachlass materials has a long publication history over the last two and a half decades. It was originally published as "The Wittgenstein Papers," Philosophical Review 78 (1969): 483-503. It reappeared in a revised and expanded version in von Wright's book Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 35-62. And once again, further revised and expanded version of it was published in an Appendix to the Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), pp. 480-506. Also, about the plans for the publication of the entire Nachlass materials, see Jaakko Hintikka, "An Impatient Man and His Papers" Synthese 87 (1991): 183-20l. 7 Herbert Spiegelberg, "The Puzzles of Wittgenstein's Phanomenologie (1929-?)(with Supplement 1979)," in The Context of the Phenomenological Movement, ed. Herbert Spiegelberg (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 227.
234 NOTES 8 See Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 3 rd. ed., p. 23, footnote II. 9 Nicholas Gier, "Wittgenstein's Phenomenology Revisited," Philosophy Today (Fall 1990): 274-5. 10 Ibid., 275. II PI, sec. 46. 12 Wittgenstein 's Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-1932, p. 82. 13 Nicholas Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), p. 104. 14 The quoted remark from the Philosophical Investigations was written in 1937. About the sources ofthe remarks in the book, see Andre Maury's "Sources of the Remarks in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations" Synthese 98 (1994): 349-78. And the quoted remark from the Blue Book is believed to be written in 1933-34. See the editor's Preface to The Blue and Brown Book. 15 PR, secs. 57, 218. Quoted in Gier's Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, p. 105. 16 Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, p. 158. Also see Gier, "Wittgenstein's Phenomenology Revisited," p. 275. 17 PR, sec. 107. 18 See TLP, 5.5541 and 5.5542. 19 A priori element is inevitably implicit in Husserl's system, for the phenomenological reduction which brackets out almost every presupposed elements from consciousness makes it impossible for us to dispense with the contribution of the subject part. 20 Harry Reeder, "Wittgenstein Never Was a Phenomenologist," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 20 (1989): 257-76. 21 Ibid., p. 258. 22 See ibid., pp. 263-4. 23 See chapter 2, section 3 and chapter 6, section 1 above. 24 Ibid., p. 261. 25 Ibid., p. 274, footnote 22. 26 For a detailed discussion of Wittgenstein's impatient character and the way it was present in his philosophy, see Jaakko Hintikka, "An Impatient Man and His Papers," Synthese 87 (1991): 183-201. 27 Reeder, "Wittgenstein Never Was a Phenomenologist," p. 268. 28 See ibid. 29 See chapter 3, section 2 above. 30 Ibid., p. 269. 31 Ibid., p. 270. 32 Ibid. 33 See David Pears, The False Prison, vol.l (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), chaps. 1 and 2. 34 Ibid., p. 4.
NOTES 235 35 Ibid., p. 98. 36 TLP, Preface, p. 3. 37 PR, sec. 225; WA, ii., p. 118. 38 Pears, The False Prison, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 278, footnote 16. 39 Pittsburgh Ramsey archives, item #004-21-02. Quoted in Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p. 77. 40 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1932, ed. Desmond Lee (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980),p. 109. 41 Ibid., pp. 81-2. 42 Pears, The False Prison, vol. 2, p. 233. 43 Ibid., p. 235. 44 See ibid., chap.ll, and also "Hintikka's Wittgenstein," forthcoming. 45 Pears, "Hintikka's Wittgenstein," p. 17. 46 WA, ii., p. 89. The German original is: "Ich mufi die Wirklichkeitja tatsachlich mit dem Satz vergleiehen konnen." 47 See WA, ii., p. 9l. 48 WA, ii., p. 91(dated 7 October 1929). 49 WA, ii., p. 91 (dated 9 October 1929). The German original is: "Das Problem der Wahrheit eines Satzes entschlopft mir." "Ich bin mir bewufit dab die herrlichsten Probleme in meiner nachsten Nahe liegen. Aber ieh sehe sie nieht oder kann sie nicht fassen." 50 WA, ii., p. 92 (dated 11 October 1929). German original: "Das Unmittelbare ist in standigem Flufi begriffen." (my translation) 51 WA, ii., p. 102 (dated 22 October 1929). 52 WA, ii., p. 108 (dated 25 October 1929). 53 See PR, sec. 3. 54 PR, sec. l. 55 BT, p. 437. The German original is: "Die Untersuchung der Regeln des Gebrauchs unserer Sprache, die Erkenntnis dieser Regeln und Obersichtliche Darstellung, laufi auf das hunaus, d.h., leistet dasselbe, was man oft durch die Konstruktion einer phanomenologischen Sprache leisten will." 56 BT, p. 444. The German original is: "Die Geomtrie unseres Gesichtsraumes ist uns gegeben, d.h., es bedarf keiner Untersuchung bis jetzt verborgener Tatsachen, urn sie zu finden. Die Untersuchung is keine, im Sinn einer physikalischen oder psychologischen Untersuchung. Und doch kann man sagen, wir kennen diese Geometrie noch nicht. Diese Geomtrie ist Grammatik und die Untersuchung eine grarnmatische Untersuchung." 57 See chapter 3, section 2 above for details.
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